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We may pick a thousand sallets ere we light on such another herb
2
ABSTRACT
Privatisation of gas, electricity and water services in Britain has been predicated on an
explicit belief that ordinary consumers would be amongst the major beneficiaries of the
programme to restructure the utility industries. Along with the promise of reduced prices
and improved standards of service, domestic users of public utility services were to be
given new rights in relation to consumer sovereignty and choice. Has the delivery of the
utility privatisation programme thus far, matched these expectations?
This study is the first substantive attempt to address the question of how domestic
consumers have fared under the structure of public utility privatisation and regulation
in Britain. As well as containing a detailed examination of the impact of the
privatisation on domestic consumers generally, the study gives considerable attention to
how low income households have been affected. The research is based on a
comprehensive survey of primary and secondary data sources and on extensive
fieldwork.
The first part of the thesis establishes the background for evaluating the consequences
of privatisation. It includes a review of the history of the utility privatisation programme,
which documents for the first time, the community and consumer sector campaign to
influence the privatisation legislation; an analysis of the social and economic
characteristics of energy and water services, which distinguish them from other
commodity areas in the market economy; and a critical examination of the British model
of public utility regulation.
In part two, the social consequences of utility privatisation are considered at two levels.
First, major aspects of the privatisation settlement are examined - asset sales, share
ownership, company profits and employment - and it is concluded that these have
resulted in regressive distributional outcomes. Second, key areas of the utility
companies' relationship with domestic consumers are assessed - i.e. prices, debt and
disconnection, standards of service and consumer protection, and consumer
representation. It is found that although the outcomes for consumers in general have
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been mixed, low income consumers in particular have been adversely affected. The
intervention of the independent regulatory bodies has been an instrumental factor in
some areas of service provision.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the limitations in the British model of
privatisation and regulation, and argues that the paradigm of consumerism is
inappropriate to the domain of public utility services.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important areas in which there should have been more
prolonged and persistent debate and discussion in the 1980s was
precisely around the question of the social effects or social consequences
of free market policies - or around the issue which classical economists
refer to as the question of social cost.
Taylor (1990) p.6
Sadly, there is no reason to expect the political process to lead to the right
pattern of privatization. Unless we are luckier or more careful than we are likely
to be, political pressures will tend to retain for the public sector functions where
privatization would make sense, and to privatize tasks that would be better left
to government. Donahue (1989) p.13
Privatisation appears to have made its initial entry into the lexicon of political ideas with
the publication of Peter Drucker's book The Age of Discontinui in 1969 1 , and for
more than a decade it has formed a dominant leitmotif in the policy making of the
Thatcher and Major governments. One of the most significant manifestations of
privatisation policy in Britain has been the denationalisation of public enterprises 2.
From relatively modest beginnings during the period 1979-1983, with the divestiture of
a number of state-owned firms operating in competitive markets, such as British
Aerospace, Britoil, Cable & Wireless, National Freight Corporation and Amersham
International, the privatisation programme reached deep into the post-war fabric of the
State with the sale of the public utilities - British Telecom, British Gas, the water
authorities and the electricity supply industry - from 1984 to 1991.
Privatisation policy in Britain has been driven by a diverse set of political and economic
objectives, which range from the ideological (i.e. "rolling back the frontiers of the state"
and "popular capitalism") to the pragmatic (e.g. generating additional public revenue).
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Not all of these objectives, as we will see, have been equally important, and a number
of them appear contradictory. But despite the chameleon character of the programme,
where different objectives have been emphasised in line with shifting political and
economic imperatives, privatisation policy has been enacted according to a more or less
coherent ideological agenda, involving a substantive re-drawing of the boundaries of the
State and the market in contemporary society.
The phenomenon of privatisation has not been confined to Britain, of course, with
governments of varying political hues in Western countries embracing the precepts of
privatisation. And the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have encouraged
developing and Eastern European countries to adopt privatisation as a major instrument
of economic surgery and reform (Starr, 1989; de Oliveira & MacKerron, 1992). The
internationalisation of privatisation has been documented by a number of writers
including Cook & Kirkpatrick eds., 1988; Fraser, ed. 1988; Letwin, 1988; MacAvoy et
al 1989; Ramanadham, ed. 1989; Ott & Hartley eds., 1991; Glennerster & Midgley, eds.,
1991.
The pervasiveness of privatisation as a major item on the public policy agendas of
governments throughout the world seems to suggest that the current period represents
a pivotal point in the history of the modern State. In effect, we appear to be witnessing
a process of transformation in the way that the State, and its constituent parts, views
itself and is viewed by influential external interests and possibly, by the public at large.
The post-war consensus about the explicit responsibility of the State for strategic parts
of the industrial economy (such as energy policy and coal production) and for physical
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infrastructure provision (e.g. transportation, telecommunications, energy and water
services) has been progressively displaced by a very different set of views about the
nature of the role of the State vis-a-vis industrial activity and infrastructural
development.
The transfer of the water and energy utilities to the private sector illustrates, in clear
relief, this pivotal shift in political and economic thinking, as these industries occupy not
only a fundamental position in the economic and social development of society at large,
but they also exert a direct and powerful influence on the lifestyles of every household
in Britain.
The sale of the gas, electricity and water utilities to the private sector has not led,
however, to a disengagement of the State from the arena of public utility services.
Despite it relinquishing ownership and production functions, the State has been required
to maintain a significant presence as a regulator of public utility activity. The influence
of public regulation on the provision of essential services under private monopoly or
quasi-monopoly conditions forms, therefore, a new and important field for policy
analysis in this country.
The British Government's privatisation programme has attracted a considerable degree
of academic attention; although to date, this interest has been primarily directed at the
economic and, to a lesser extent, the political dimensions of the programme 3. The
advent of industry-specific regulatory agencies has likewise stimulated a developing
literature, but here also the focus has been heavily oriented towards economic analysis.
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However, the public utilities occupy too important a place in society to continue to cede
almost monopoly control of the discourse on utility industry policy and regulation, to
the discipline of economics.
The energy and water utilities make a fundamental contribution to individual and social
well-being and questions concerning the distribution of utility services directly intersect
with major issues of social policy. Yet, surprisingly, little analysis of the public utility
phase of the privatisation programme has been undertaken from a social policy
perspective. Indeed the literature on social policy and the public utilities generally, is
extremely scant. Energy is better served in this respect than water, but even in the
former, only two major works have been published on the subject in Britain over the last
decade i.e. Bradshaw & Harris, eds. (1983) and Boardman (1991a).
Nor, up to this point, has a concerted effort been made to evaluate the impact of utility
privatisation and regulation on domestic consumers in general, and on low income
consumers in particular. This is likely to be a reflection of the short history of the public
utilities under privatisation. But even in those studies that have attempted to assess the
outcomes of the privatisation programme thus far (e.g. Bishop & Kay, 1988; Chapman,
1990; Roberts et al, 1991; Whitfield, 1992), only cursory attention has been given to the
important question of how privatisation has affected ordinary consumers. The central
aim of this thesis is to fill this major gap in the literature and in our understanding of
how privatisation of the energy and water industries has operated in practice.
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It is still too early to provide a conclusive account of how domestic consumers have
fared under privatisation, but the restructuring of the public utilities has been in place
sufficiently long enough to give a clear indication of the extent to which the new regime
is acting either to the advantage or the disadvantage of consumers. This thesis analyses
the impact of gas, electricity and water privatisation up to the end of October 1992 4.
While this date reflects the exigencies of the author's writing timetable, it also
constitutes an appropriate point at which to reflect on the outcomes of the initial phase
of the utility privatisation programme. For in each of the utility industries, there is a
very real sense that the first act has drawn to a close and that there are likely to be
significant changes in the plot, and possibly even the players, as the next act unfolds.
The catalysts for these probable changes include the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission investigation into the gas industry, the forthcoming reviews of the water
and electricity price controls by the industry regulators, and the Government's review
of energy policy in the wake of its controversial proposal to close many of the country's
remaining coal mines.
This study focuses centrally on the impact of privatisation and regulation on primary
areas of service provision for domestic consumers, namely:
* tariffs and systems of charging
* debt and disconnection practice
* service standards and consumer protection
* mechanisms for consumer representation.
It also seeks, however, to undertake an assessment of the broader distributional
consequences of the sale of the public utilities (in Chapter 5). It is particularly concerned
throughout to examine the way in which the new structures of ownership and regulation
have affected access to energy and water services by low income households in Britain.
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Because of the significant negative externalities associated with the provision of energy
and water services, privatisation has been attended by considerable concern about the
nature and quality of private sector 'stewardship' of the environment. Although an
analysis of the environmental effects of the privatisation of the water and energy utilities
is largely outside the scope of this work, the interaction between aspects of
environmental policy and social policy is alluded to on a number of occasions,
particularly where this is directly relevant to equity and distributional issues. The
relationship between social and environmental policy is an area of increasing importance
(Ferris, 1990; Ife, 1991) and is one where much more research attention is warranted in
the future.
In seeking to evaluate the outcomes of the utility privatisation programme, the researcher
is immediately confronted with the problem as to what constitutes the most appropriate
'frame of reference' for conducting such an evaluation. A 'before and after' approach,
involving a direct comparison of the service systems of the public utilities under
nationalised and subsequently, privatised regimes, would be instructive, but is made
difficult due to the absence of comparable data. Juxtaposing outcomes with the
objectives explicitly set for the privatisation programme is a useful way of testing the
efficacy of privatisation in its own terms, and it utilises the orthodox methodology of
goal-oriented evaluation. But it may not capture the full array of consequences of utility
privatisation, as the field of analysis is fundamentally driven (and constrained) by the
logic and rationale of the designers of privatisation policy. The application of exogenous
evaluative criteria - like equity - is therefore likely to be required if the researcher is to
get anywhere near tapping the depth of the 'privatisation affect', particularly in regard
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to its social impact. Elements of each of these three modes of evaluation are employed,
although emphasis is given in the study to the latter two approaches.
This analysis of the impact of privatisation and regulation has been informed by the use
of a wide range of primary and secondary sources. Extensive use has been made of
documentary material from government agencies, the regulatory bodies, the utility
companies and community sector organisations. This has been complemented by
interviews with key informants in the community and consumer sector, the regulatory
bodies and the utility industries. Also the author has been a participant observer, over
several years, in a number of the key fora set up in England and Wales to represent the
interests of low income consumers of utility services, including the Public Utilities
Access Forum 5 and the National Right to Fuel Campaign. The burgeoning literature
on the economic aspects of privatisation and public utility regulation has provided an
important part of the conceptual framework of the study.
Additional information on the research focus and the fieldwork stage of the research is
contained in Annexe 2.
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Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 establishes the context for the study by providing a summary account of the
major events in the privatisation of the gas, electricity and water industries hi Britain,
and a detailed review of the legislative and regulatory framework, particularly in relation
to consumer affairs. It also documents, for the first time, the attempts made by the
community and consumer sector to influence the legislative process; using primary
source material, obtained through interviews with individuals involved in the campaigns
and parliamentary briefing papers. Many of the issues raised, unsuccessfully, by the
community and consumer sector at the outset, were to become recurrent problems in the
implementation of the new structure of utility provision and regulation.
Privatisation connotes a paradigm of utility services as 'commodities' like any other. But
in Chapter 2 it is argued that this is not the case and that energy and water services have
a composite of features - e.g. essentialness, inelasticity of demand, strategic importance,
natural monopoly provision, and externalities - which distinguish them from other
services purchased by ordinary consumers in the marketplace. The social and economic
characteristics of the utility industries mean that they also intersect directly with major
issues of public policy. This chapter weaves together, in an original way, theoretical and
empirical material from the disciplines of welfare economics, environmental economics
and social policy.
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The distinguishing characteristics of utility services necessitate an overlay of strong
public regulation. In the past, this was seen to be best achieved through public
ownership. However, privatisation manifestly offers an alternative model of public utility
management and regulation. Chapter 3 opens with a discussion of the importance of
economic and social regulation in the public utility context. After briefly reviewing the
alternative regulatory models, the discussion moves onto an assessment of the British
model of utility regulation, based on a comparison with the system of regulation in the
US and on an original analysis of the modus operandi of the British energy and water
regulatory bodies. The chapter concludes by considering whether the problems of
principal-agent theory, regulatory capture and accountability, identified in the literature
on regulation, are likely to be significant factors in the regulatory framework established
in Britain.
The British privatisation programme has been characterised by multiple economic and
political objectives, and Chapter 4 sets the scene for the empirical analysis of the
outcomes of gas, electricity and water privatisation in the chapters that follow by
examining these objectives. Extensive use is made here of the literature on privatisation.
The political environment in which privatisation is located cannot be fully
comprehended, however, without an understanding of the ideological foundations of the
programme. Consequently, the discussion on the objectives of utility privatisation is
preceded by a review of the major precepts of New Right political theory, as articulated
by leading New Right theorists. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether
the privatisation programme represents one part of a hegemonic project in late twentieth-
century Britain.
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Privatisation of the public utilities has resulted in concrete changes in the relationship
between domestic consumers and utility providers. But it has also had broader
distributional effects, and hence prior to considering how individual consumers have
fared under gas, electricity and water privatisation, it is important to examine these
macro-distributional outcomes. Chapter 5 does this through using primary and secondary
source material to explore the issues of public utility assets sales, share ownership and
distribution, company profits, executive salaries and employment.
Chapters 6 and 7 form the empirical core of the thesis. They directly address the
question of how domestic consumers have been affected by the radical restructuring of
the three utilities between 1986 and 1991, and draw on a comprehensive range of
material from the regulatory bodies, the consumer and community sector and the
privatised companies. The two chapters provide the first substantive evaluation of what
has happened in the areas of (i) prices and tariff structures, (ii) debt and disconnection
practice, (iii) service standards and consumer protection, and (iv) consumer
representation, since privatisation.
The final chapter considers the major limitations in the original privatisation settlement
and in the evolving model of privatised utility provision and regulation, from the
perspective of domestic consumers. It suggests inter alia that further action is needed
if domestic consumers are to benefit fully from the restructuring of the three utilities.
The chapter concludes with a consideration of the paradigm of consumerism, which has
underpinned the privatisation of the utilities, and suggests that a preferable alternative
model could be found in the concept of social citizenship.
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There is a certain poignancy, as well as historical irony, in the fact that many of the
arguments that were used by a reforming Conservative Government in the middle and
late 1980s to justify the wholesale privatisation of the energy industries, imitated (in
their objectives, if not in their philosophical roots) many of the arguments used by the
reforming Labour Government of the middle and late 1940s to support their
nationalisation in the first place. While the water industry was 'nationalised' in a
different historical era, much of the rationale was framed in similar terms to that which
accompanied the nationalisation of electricity and gas.
Yet the ascendency of privatisation as a prescription for public utility organisation is
attributable, in part, to the ascribed failure of the nationalised (or Morrisonian) model
of ownership. A short history of nationalisation, based on a survey of the literature on
this period, is provided in Annexe 1. This includes a case study of the operation of the
nationalised energy utilities' code of practice on debt and disconnection.
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ENDNOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1. Said by Chapman (1990) to be the originator of the term 'privatisation' - although Drucker
actually uses the expression `reprivatization':
It would..be a systematic policy of using the other, the non-governmental
institutions of the society of organizations, for the actual 'doing', i.e. for
performance, operations, execution. Such a policy might be called
'reprivatization'. The tasks which flowed to government in the last century
because the original private institution of society, the family, could not
discharge them, would be turned over to the new, non-governmental
institutions that have sprung up and grown during the last sixty to seventy
years. Drucker (1969) p.218
2. Privatisation will be defined in this thesis as the act of transferring functions and
activities of the State - in the areas of either (i) production/delivery of goods and services
(ii) financing or (iii) regulation - to other institutions in society, including the private and
non-government organisation sectors. This is very similar to Gilbert & Gilbert's (1989,
p.28) definition:
Privatisation occurs when functions related to ownership, funding, regulation,
management, and provision, are removed from the public domain.
It is also similar to Alan Walker's (1985) definition of privatisation. Consequently,
manifestations of privatisation in Britain, other than the denationalisation of public enterprises,
would include: the contracting out of central and local state services, the sale of public
housing, and the movement of responsibility for community care to voluntary organisations,
private-for-profit agencies and to individual families.
3. Much has been written on the economic aspects of privatisation in recent years, but the
best generic account remains that written by John Vickers and George Yarrow in 1988,
Privatization: An Economic Analysis.
4. Although it strays a little beyond this date on the related issues of coal mine closures and
energy policy.
5. "The Public Utilities Access Forum [PUAF] was set up in 1989 to develop policy on the
regulation of public utilities and low-income consumers. Membership includes: the National
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, Age Concern, the National Right to Fuel Campaign,
RADAR, the Money Advice Association, Winter Action on Cold Homes, Help the Aged and
other voluntary organisations with an interest in these issues. Observers include the Gas
Consumers Council, the National Consumer Council, the local authority associations and the
utility regulators" (PUAF letterhead). PUAF meets bi-monthly.
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CHAPTER 1: THE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC
UTILITY PRIVATISATION IN BRITAIN
INTRODUCTION
The gas, water and electricity industries were privatised, in succession, over a period of
five years by the Conservative Government - British Gas in 1986, the regional water
authorities in 1989 and the electricity supply industry (ESI) in 1990-91 Despite their
essential commonality as public utilities, the three industi	 ies had quite distinct
organisational and operational histories and this, in conjunction with a range of
exogenous factors, presented the Government with different issues and problems in
steering the privatisation of each of the industries through the policy making and
legislative process. As well as adapting the utility privatisation model (originally used
in the privatisation of British Telecom in 1984) in light of the particular characteristics
and circumstances pertaining in each industry, it is also evident that the Government
utilised a degree of 'policy learning' in its management of the privatisation programme,
with some of the lessons from earlier privatisations being applied to those that occurred
subsequently. This is most noticeably the case in relation to the promotion of
competition and to aspects of regulation.
This chapter will examine the process of privatising the gas, water and electricity supply
industries between 1986 and 1991, giving particular emphasis to the legislative
provisions and structures introduced for the economic and social regulation of the three
utilities. It will provide a synoptic, rather than a detailed, account of the major events
in the history of the privatisation of each of the three utilities, and it will give close
attention to the involvement of community sector and consumer organisations in the
legislative process. This is partly because good general accounts of the privatisation
process in these industries exist elsewhere (see for example, gas: Vickers & Yarrow,
1988; electricity: Roberts et al, 1991, Green, 1991; and on water, from different
perspectives and different points in time: Kinnersley, 1988, Cook, 1989, Richardson et
al, 1992 and Ogden, 1991). But also, given the focus of this study, it is more important
to detail the regulatory framework developed at the time of privatisation - particularly
as it relates to domestic consumers, and to identify the sorts of issues that organisations
representing the interests of consumers were seeking to place on the policy-making
agenda at the outset, rather than to simply reiterate the known history of utility
privatisation. The involvement of the community sector has been largely overlooked in
published accounts of the privatisation programme in Britain, which have tended to
focus, by and large, on the economic aspects of privatisation and regulation.
The privatisation of the utilities did not, of course, take place in a social, political and
economic vacuum and the broader ideological and political context of privatisation is
considered in some detail in Chapter 4 (The Political Economy of Public Utility
Privatisation) .
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1. THE PRIVATISATION OF BRITISH GAS
(i) Background
Merely to replace state monopolies by private ones would be to waste an
historic opportuniry. So we will take steps to ensure that these new firms
do not exploit their powerful positions to the detriment of consumers or
their competitors. Those nationalised industries which cannot be
privatised or organised as smaller and more efficient units will be given
top-quality management and required to work to clear guidelines.
The Conservative Manifesto 1983 p.17
The privatisation of the gas industry in 1986 has been perceived generally as a major
opportunity lost. This is because it involved the straightforward metamorphosis of a
public monopoly supplier, the British Gas Corporation, to a private monopoly supplier,
British Gas Plc, without any significant attempt to restructure the industry, or to
introduce competition into the domestic gas market
Unlike in the earlier privatisation of British Telecom and in the privatisation of the
water and electricity industries subsequently, the way to the sale of British Gas had not
been paved by a clear election manifesto commitment, nor a White Paper outlining the
details of the new structure for the gas industry in Britain. Indeed, as the quotation
above shows, the 1983 Conservative Party Manifesto, argued against the very structure
that was introduced in the gas industry when it was privatised.
Several months after the election of the Thatcher Government to a second term of office
in mid-1983, the Secretary of State for Energy, Peter Walker, established a departmental
working group to examine the options for privatising the British Gas Corporation.
According to Lord Belstead, in his Second Reading speech on the Gas Bill in the House
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of Lords, this working group carried out "the most careful scrutiny of the regulatory
systems in a number of other countries and a full review of the existing and past
arrangements for the control of the gas industry and other utilities here in Great Britain"
(HoL, 10/4/86, col. 370).
In April 1985, the Secretary of State for Energy sought, and gained, Cabinet approval
for the introduction of legislation to privatise the British Gas Corporation. The policy
choices available to the Government for the future structure of the privatised gas
industry in Britain included, (i) the retention of the unitary and monopoly structure of
the British Gas Corporation, (ii) the separation of the transmission and supply functions
into two businesses, and (iii) the sale of the twelve area boards of the Corporation as
separate companies. In the event, the legislation made provision for the Government to
sell its 100 per cent stake in a unitary British Gas plc - a company which looked little
different from its nationalised predecessor, with the exception of the earlier divestment
of the British Gas Corporation's on-shore and off-shore oil fields and the removal of its
status as the sole authorised gas utility.
The Government's arguments for retaining the existing model were premised centrally
on a recognition of the natural monopoly characteristics of the domestic gas industry,
as the following excerpt from the Secretary of State for Energy's Second Reading
speech on the Gas Bill illustrates:
It has been argued that splitting the corporation into area boards serving
different parts of the country would achieve greater competition. I
carefully examined this possibility, and looked into the advantages and
disadvantages that it would bring. Under such an arrangement, each
consumer would, as is now the case with electricity, face a single
supplier in their area. Breaking up the corporation would also put at risk
economies of scale through the integrated transmission and distribution
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system that has been developed, which allow best practices to be spread
rapidly through all parts of the country. HoC, 10/12/85, col. 776
The Secretary of State also argued that significant structural change would be attended
by marked variations in gas tariffs throughout the country and would cause "disruption
to consumers and industry" (ibid). Interestingly, these arguments have gained a new
resonance in recent times, as a result of the referral of British Gas to the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission (see Chapter 6).
Whatever the merits of the arguments in favour of a unitary model, the privatisation of
the gas industry manifestly contradicted the restructuring and competition objectives
explicit in both the Government's election manifesto and the privatisation programme
as a whole. The failure to achieve these objectives in the sale of British Gas, in all but
the most limited of ways, has been variously attributed to the negotiating power of Sir
Denis Rooke (the then Chairman of the British Gas Corporation), the indifference of the
Secretary of State for Energy to the Government's privatisation agenda, a desire to
maximise the financial returns to the Government through selling the industry intact, and
an imperative to complete the sale ahead of the upcoming General Election in 1987.
Certainly, the board and senior executives of the British Gas Corporation appear to have
played a pivotal part in shaping the outcomes of gas privatisation (National Audit
Office, 1987; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988), and this pattern of executive influence on the
'privatisation settlement' was to be a recurring feature in the public utility privatisation
programme.
The key events in the privatisation of British Gas are set out in Figure 1.1 overleaf.
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GAS PRIVATISATION: KEY EVENTS
April 1983:
	 Conservative Party election Manifesto promises to abolish "the
Gas Corporation's statutory monopoly of the supply of North Sea
gas to industry" and to increase competition in, and attract
private capital to, the gas industry (pp.16-17)
September 1983:
	 Secretary of State for Energy sets up departmental working group
to examine options for privatising British Gas Corporation
April 1985:
	 Secretary of State for Energy presents paper to Cabinet
recommending privatisation of British Gas Corporation
May 1985:
	 Government announces intention to privatise British Gas
Corporation
December 1985:
	 Second Reading of Gas Bill in House of Commons
April 1986:
	 Second Reading of Gas Bill in House of Lords
April 1986:
	 British Gas incorporated as public limited company
July 1986:
	 Gas Act 1986 enacted
August 1986:
	 Transfer of British Gas Corporation's assets to British Gas Plc
Director General of Gas Supply appointed
December 1986:
	 Flotation of British Gas
Figure 1.1: Key Events in the Privatisation of British Gas
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(ii) Regulatory framework
The framework adopted by the Government for the regulation of British Gas was
substantially based on the prototype developed for British Telecom. As is the case with
all of the privatised utilities, the statutory instruments for the regulation of the industry
consist of two parts: the primary legislation or enabling Act, and the operating licence
(called in the case of British Gas, the "Authorisation"). The economic regulation of the
monopoly gas supplier, contained in the Authorisation, was framed around the price cap
formula RPI-X+Y developed by Professor Littlechild in 1984; where X (the 'efficiency
factor') was set at 2 per cent and Y provided for the full pass-through of gas purchase
costs to consumers. Because of the retention of the unitary, monolithic structure of the
industry, the second critical dimension of economic regulation - the promotion of
competition - was effectively excluded from the regulatory regime; although under
sections 3 and 19 of the Gas Act 1986, British Gas lost its previously-held exclusive
right to supply gas through pipes.
Responsibility for the economic regulation of British Gas and the enforcement of the
terms of its licence, along with a duty to protect the interests of consumers, was vested
in the Director General of Gas Supply. As well as being given a general duty to protect
consumers, the Director General was also specifically required to "take into account, in
particular, the interests of those who are disabled or of pensionable age" (s. 4(3) Gas Act
1986). However significantly, the Director General of Gas Supply's general and specific
duties to protect the interests of consumers is secondary to his primary duties of (i)
securing the satisfaction of "all reasonable demands for gas", and (ii) securing that
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authorised suppliers of gas "are able to finance the provision of gas supply services" (s.
4, Gas Act 1986). A similar set of regulatory priorities (where social regulation is
subordinate to economic regulation) also exists for the water and electricity regulators,
despite the fact, as will be seen, that organisations such as the National Consumer
Council and the Consumers' Association argued strongly against this, particularly during
the passage of Water Bill.
In addition to the creation of an Office of Gas Supply, the legislation provided for the
setting up of an independent national consumer body (with offices in each of British
Gas' regions) - the Gas Consumers Council - to investigate complaints and, if necessary,
to make referrals to the Director General of Gas Supply. Remarkably, the Council was
given powers in a number of areas which exceeded those given to the Director General
of Gas Supply, such as the scope to investigate matters affecting "contract" as well as
"tariff" customers 2 and a mandate to deal with complaints related to gas appliances.
The establishment of a national, industry-specific consumer body working independently
of but in conjunction with, the regulator was unique to gas privatisation (as will be seen
below). This model was not replicated in either of the subsequent privatisations, despite
the fact that in the electricity industry - as with gas - a national body representing
consumers had been in existence for many years prior to privatisation. The reasons for
the retention of a national consumer body in the case of gas and not electricity is likely
to be related to the fact that the about to be abolished, National Gas Consumers Council
(with the support of the National Consumer Council) argued for a national forum
independent of the regulator and that Sir Denis Rooke apparently lent his influential
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support to the argument for an independent consumer body 3. Neither of these
conditions applied in period leading into and during the privatisation of the electricity
supply industry.
Despite the apparent superiority of the model of consumer representation put in place
during the privatisation of British Gas (and this is discussed in Chapter 7), the overall
framework for economic and social regulation in the gas industry was, on most criteria,
the weakest of the regulatory regimes introduced for the three utilities under study.
Many of the weaknesses of the system of regulation being developed were recognised
by community sector and consumer organisations seeking to influence the passage of the
Gas Bill through the House of Commons and the House of Lords in late 1985 and early
1986.
(iii) Community sector campaign
Unlike later privatisations, and most especially water privatisation, the involvement of
the community sector 4 in activity surrounding the formulation of the primary and
secondary legislation for the privatisation of the gas industry was relatively low key.
It also lacked the cohesion and coordination evident in the water privatisation campaign.
The absence of policy documents foreshadowing the privatisation legislation (in the form
of Green and White Papers) and a lack of campaigning experience on an issue of such
complexity, may partly explain the character of the community sector's response to the
Gas Bill.
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Most of the community sector organisations involved in lobbying over the Bill adopted
a pragmatic approach i.e. they sought not to challenge privatisation per se, but to
influence the shape of the regulatory environment that would attend the privatisation of
the gas industry. This essentially pragmatic engagement with the policy making process
was also characteristic of the sector's modus operandi in the subsequent water and
electricity privatisations 5. However, there were some organisations involved in lobbying
over the Gas Bill and other privatisation legislation - of which the National Right to
Fuel Campaign was a leading example - that adopted what could be described as a
'dual-pronged' strategy; where outright opposition to privatisation as a principle, was
complimented by a set of 'second-best' proposals aimed at improving the regulatory
regime and at advancing the interests of low-income consumers 6.
The community sector campaign (or more accurately, campaigns) to influence the gas
privatisation legislation was directed primarily along three fronts, namely:
1. Identib)ing the inherent flaws in the proposed system of economic regulation,
2. Exposing the pauciy of regulatory protection for low-income consumers,
3. Arguing for energy efficiency obligations/incentives for British Gas
The National Consumer Council (NCC) took much of the running in the first area,
arguing in its briefings on the Second Reading of the Bill and to the Standing
Committee on the Gas Bill that, because of the absence of competition in the structure
of the privatised gas industry, consumers were unlikely to receive much benefit
("competition is the best way of transferring power from the producer to the consumer,
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of increasing efficiency and of promoting technical innovation." NCC Second Reading
Briefing on Gas Privatisation, undated p.1). In the absence of competition it was
imperative, the NCC pointed out, that the regulatory bodies be given "real teeth..with
proper powers and proper funding" and that "..trying to save money by reducing the
power of the regulator is short sighted. The inefficiency of a utility is passed on to its
consumers." (ibid. p.2). The NCC concluded that the powers being given to the Director
General of Gas Supply were less than the already circumscribed powers given to the
Director General of the Office of Telecommunications. The NCC's call for a stronger
regulatory presence in the privatised gas industry was imitated by other community
sector organisations, such as the National Right to Fuel Campaign (which also advocated
the appointment of a "Gas Ombudsman.. with the power to award compensation" p.3),
and the trade association-cum-energy efficiency lobby group, the Association for the
Conservation of Energy.
On the primary instrument of economic regulation, the price control formula, the NCC
argued that it was seriously deficient in that (a) the full pass-through of gas costs
provided no incentive for British Gas to purchase economically and that consumers not
the company would bear the brunt of any poor purchasing decisions ("If British Gas
slips up in signing a long-term contract with its suppliers and makes a bad deal, it is the
shareholders, not the consumers, who should shoulder the costs." ibid p. 4), (b) it took
no account of a possible decline in standards of service ("lack of quality regulation") and
(c) that the structure of formula "allow[s] the industry to reduce prices on services that
are subject to competition, while raising prices on those that are not. This tends to mean
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that prices to big business go down, while prices to householders and small businesses
go up" (ibid, p. 3).
The NCC arguments were apparently given very little credence by the Government of
the day, for none of these issues was addressed in the legislation. But, although their
impact at the time was minimal, it is interesting to observe that these matters have been
very much at the core of the regulatory agencies' engagement with British Gas over
recent years. This has been exemplified in, for example, the OFGAS Tariff Review in
1991, the Office of Fair Trading injunction to British Gas to separate its transmission
business and to reduce its dominance of the contract market, and the referral of the
company to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in July 1992.
The second strand of community sector action on the Gas Bill and the draft licence was
directed at exposing the possible dangers that low-income consumers of gas might face
in their dealings with a profit-oriented monopolist, and at introducing a set of formal
protections for this group of consumers in the privatisation legislation. Although under
the draft licence, British Gas was required to produce and publish codes of practice on
debt and disconnection and on customer service there was, as the NCC pointed out
"nothing in the licence about what they should contain." (NCC Comments on the Gas
Bill and draft licence to Standing Committee on the Gas Bill, 9/1/86, p. 4). In the view
of organisations such as the Child Poverty Action Group and the National Right to Fuel
Campaign, codes of practice requirements in the licence afforded insufficient protection
and they argued for statutory codes of practice as part of the primary legislation. In large
part, scepticism about the efficacy of non-statutory codes of practice was conditioned
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by experience of the operation of the voluntary, and substantially unenforceable, codes
of practice introduced in the fuel industries in the mid 1970s (see Annexe 1).
As well as the introduction of statutory codes of practice, the National Right to Fuel
Campaign sought the abolition of British Gas' right to disconnect (contained in the
Public Gas Supply Code of Schedule 5 of the legislation) and argued that the industry
should be obliged to recover its debts "through the courts or a tribunal", that controls
should be placed on the amount by which the standing charge could be increased each
year, and that "British Gas have a statutory duty to consider the welfare of
disadvantaged gas consumers and to ensure that policies do not exacerbate their
problems" (Fuel News Vol. 4, 1985). In the event, only one of these proposals met with
any success - the level of annual increase in the standing charge was fixed to increases
in line with movements in the Retail Price Index.
The third and final area around which community organisations attempted to influence
the legislative and regulatory framework for the operation of British Gas concerned
energy efficiency. In making their case, the National Right to Fuel Campaign, the
Association for the Conservation of Energy and others, emphasised the seeming
incongruity of energy efficiency principles and practice with a privatised energy
industry, released from the public accountability and policy constraints of government,
and operating under a price control formula explicitly biased in favour of maximising
gas sales. It was argued, therefore, that the only way in which this 'market failure'
might be corrected would be through placing a statutory obligation on British Gas for
ensuring the efficient use of energy 7. Detail of the actual mechanics of how this
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obligation might be defined, monitored and enforced by the regulator was less precise.
The ground on energy efficiency was to be re-visited three years later during electricity
privatisation, with only marginally more success.
The issues relating to low-income consumers and energy efficiency which were raised
during the passage of the legislation in 1985/86 made (with the minor exception of the
standing charge) little discernable impact on the Government's policy decisions at the
time. Yet, as in the case of the NCC's critique of the system of economic regulation,
their pertinence and relevance has been confirmed over the short history of the privatised
gas industry, as will be seen in Chapters 6 and 7.
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2. THE PRIVATISATION OF THE REGIONAL WATER AUTHORITIES
(i) Background
The sale of the ten regional water authorities in England and Wales was unequivocally
the most contested part of the Thatcher Government's privatisation programme. This was
reflected in the strong, and largely successful, extra-parliamentary campaign to change
the Government's original plans for the organisation of the industry in the private sector,
and in the failure of the Government, throughout the entire process of water
privatisation, to win broad public support for the sale. For most of this period, between
70 and 80 per cent of people interviewed expressed their disagreement with the idea of
privatising the water industry (Consumers' Association, 1989b, 1989c; The Guardian,
17/5/89 and 28/9/89; Observer, 2/7/89; McAllister and Studlar, 1989). Nevertheless, the
Government completed the sale of the water authorities in December 1989.
The character of the privatisation programme generally has been evolutionary and
opportunistic (albeit within a coherent ideological world view, see Chapter 4) and this
is exemplified nowhere better than in the sale of the water industry 8. The story of the
idea of water privatisation "arriv[ing] on the agenda suddenly" (Richardson et al, 1992)
and the way that "the government and water authorities stumbled into it" (Kinnersley,
1988a) has been documented fully elsewhere (see sources above, plus Water Bulletin,
1/9/89), and therefore only the outline will be sketched here.
39
It is generally acknowledged that the precipitating event in water privatisation was a
dispute between the Government and the Thames Water Authority in early 1985 over
the accelerated repayment of loans and a consequential increase in water charges. In the
subsequent House of Commons debate on the issue, the Minister for Housing and
Construction announced that the Government "will be examining the possibility of a
measure of privatisation in the industry" (HoC 7/2/85 col. 1142).
Following the dissemination of a hastily put together and poorly-drafted (according to
ICinnersley, 1988a) discussion paper by the Department of the Environment (Water
authority privatisation: a discussion paper, 1985), which drew an indifferent response
from the water industry, the Government released the White Paper Privatisation of the
Water Authorities in England and Wales (HMSO, 1986b) outlining its plans for the sale
of the ten regional water authorities. Along with articulating the rationale for privatising
the industry (which, interestingly, made no mention of the 'environmental imperatives'
that were to occupy such a prominent place in the Government's arguments in 1988/89),
the White Paper set out the proposed privatised industry structure and the system of
economic regulation to be introduced.
The publication of the White Paper attracted, almost immediately, a strong negative
response. A response, not directed primarily at the principle of privatisation as such, but
at the core proposal that the integrated river-basin management model introduced under
the Water Act 1973 (involving the organisation and management of water resources and
the water-related environment around river basin catchment areas 9) be retained and that
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the privatised water companies continue to perform both a water production and an
environmental regulation function.
Although the integrated river-basin management approach to the organisation of the
water industry was viewed as generally successful, strong apprehension was felt about
private profit-making bodies performing the critical environmental management
responsibilities explicit in the integrated model. Also as the water authorities themselves
were major contributors to water pollution (e.g. through sewerage discharges), there was
concern that the advent of private water companies with regulatory responsibilities
would serve to deepen the inherent conflict of interest involved in combining production
and environmental policing functions.
In the face of concerted opposition from organisations as diverse as the CBI, Council
for the Protection of Rural England, Country Landowners Association, Green Alliance
and the water sector trade unions (plus apparently the new Secretary of State for the
Environment, Nicholas Ridley 10) and doubts about the legality of private water
authorities being constituted as 'competent authorities' under European Commission
environmental law, Nicholas Ridley advised the House of Commons that the tabling of
water privatisation legislation would be indefinitely deferred (i.e. effectively until after
the next General Election) 11.
41
A solution to the conflict of interest problem inherent in the integrated approach was
subsequently found at the expense of the retention of the integrated river-basin
management model. As part of its election manifesto, the Government announced that,
upon re-election, it intended establishing a separate water environment watchdog to
com&ent the privatised water authorities. Following the election, this was formalised
in the Department of the Environment paper The National Rivers Authority: The
government's policy for a public regulatory body in a privatised water industry (July
1987), where it was indicated that the new authority would subsume inter alia the
pollution control, water resource management, discharges consents, flood defence and
land drainage functions of the regional water authorities.
The plans for the creation of an independent water environment regulatory body were
greeted with wide approval, although the Water Authorities Association (representing
the ten water authorities) expressed dissent about the abandonment of integrated river-
basin management. This was to be, however, the only major disappointment for the
water authorities in the privatisation process. In their analysis of the water privatisation
policy-making process, Richardson et al (1992, p.172) conclude that "..the WAA
lobbying was very effective indeed. The NRA issue was a defeat, but the rest of the
[financial settlement] package, as was privatisation itself, represented a very good deal
for the industry".
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The reversal of the original blueprint for the privatisation of the water authorities in
1986/87 represented the nadir of the Government's water privatisation project. After this
initial setback, for all the moral outrage expressed about the notion of expropriating a
"public good" like water for private profit, regardless of a deep, but latent, popular
opposition to the sale, and notwithstanding the 'unhelpful' interventions of the European
Commission on the timetable for meeting environmental obligations, the Government
experienced remarkably few problems in completing its legislative programme for water
privatisation. Only once did the Government appear to lose its sang-froid, when in
March 1989, the Prime Minister ostensibly rebuked the two ministers responsible for
water privatisation, Nicholas Ridley and Michael Howard, for not handling the process
well enough (Sunday Times, 5/3/89).
The major landmarks in the legislative journey towards privatisation of the water
industry are summarised in Figure 1.2 overleaf.
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WATER PRIVATISATION: KEY EVENTS
February 1985:
	 Government announces that it "will be examining the possibility
of a measure of privatisation in the [water] industry"
April 1985:
	 DoE releases discussion paper on water privatisation
February 1986:
	 White Paper Privatisation of the Water Authorities in England
and Wales published
July 1986:
	 Privatisation of water industry postponed
May 1987:
	 Commitment to privatise water industry and to create National
Rivers Authority contained in Conservative Party election
manifesto
June 1987:
	 Conservative Government re-elected
July 1987:
	 Plans for revised framework for water privatisation and for the
creation of a National Rivers Authority published
May 1988:
	 Public tidily Transfers and Water Charges Act enacted
empowering water authorities to transfer property to other bodies
corporate and sanctioning the introduction of water metering
trials
December 1988:
	 Second Reading of Water Bill in House of Commons
April 1989:
	 Second Reading of Water Bill in House of Lords
July 1989:
	 Water Act 1989 enacted
Director General of Water Services appointed
September 1989:
	 Transfer of RWA assets to successor companies
Instruments of Appointment (licences) come into effect
Transfer of water resource and environmental management
functions to NRA
December 1989:
	 Sale of the 10 Water Holding Companies
July 1991:
	 Consolidating Acts, including Water Industry Act 1991, enacted
Figure 1.2: Key events in the privatisation of the water industry
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Under the legislation introduced into the House of Commons in November 1988, the ten
regional water authorities were 'converted' to public limited companies with
responsibility for the provision of water and sewerage services within their designated
regional areas; although technically two companies were created out of each RWA: one
generic holding company (unregulated) and one with specific water and sewerage
undertaker functions (regulated). In contrast to the British Gas situation, it was formally
acknowledged that water and sewerage provision is dominantly a natural monopoly.
Hence, by and large, the regional water and sewerage companies would constitute
monopoly providers within their geographical boundaries and that in lieu of substantive
competition, a form of proxy competition involving comparisons of the performance of
each of the companies would be the 'second best' solution adopted (this is also known
as 'yardstick competition' and the way it could be employed in the water industry was
initially outlined by Professor Littlechild; see for example, Littlechild, 1988).
However, arguably in deference to the ascendency of competition as the ruling principle
rather than because of any realistic expectation of practical achievement, a nominal
element of competition - relating to 'inset appointments' - was contained in the Bill.
'Inset appointments' enable, at least in theory, water and sewerage undertakers to
compete for large customers outside their area, who are not already serviced by a water
and sewerage company e.g. a new large residential or commercial development.
Measures have been introduced subsequently to extend the possibility of companies
competing for the business of large customers, i.e. through changes made to the Water
Industry Act 1991, via the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 12.
45
The legislation also made provision for the (then) 29 statutory water companies,
supplying around 25 per cent of water to consumers in England and Wales, to convert
to public limited company status.
(ii) Regulatory framework
The regulatory regime proposed in the Bill and subsequent draft licences 13 , shared the
broad contours of the systems introduced in the privatisation of the telecommunications
and the gas industries, but in a number of respects it was marked by some quite distinct
differences. One obvious difference, which will not be discussed at length here, relates
to the fact that the function of the economic regulator (Director General of Water
Services) was complemented by the existence of the so-called "quality regulators" [i.e.
environmental and water quality regulators], the National Rivers Authority, HM
Inspectorate of Pollution and the Drinking Water Inspectorate. The intersection and
"goodness of fit" of the different interests and constituencies represented in these four
regulatory bodies has raised particular problems in the overall regulatory environment
of the water services industry, which is touched on in Chapter 6.
As with gas, in the absence of competition between water companies ", the price
control formula becomes the primary lever for the economic regulation of the industry;
although because of the existence of 39 companies [now 33], the Director General of
Water Services has an ability to undertake performance comparisons not available to his
counterpart in the gas industry 15 . The price control formula set for the water industry
was RPI+K, where K represented the amount that water companies were allowed to
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increase charges above the rate of inflation, to offset the substantial injections of capital
required to upgrade the infrastructure and to meet existing environmental obligations
(totalling an estimated £26 billion at 1989 prices). The level of K set for the first five
years varied between companies, but the national average was five per cent. The
companies were also given the right to seek interim adjustments to K to take account
of "a relevant change of circumstance" arising from factors such as unanticipated costs
associated with meeting additional European Commission environmental obligations, the
costs associated with the introduction of domestic metering, and increases in national
construction industry costs above those assumed in the initial setting of K.
The Director General of Water Services was given two primary duties, one of which was
to ensure that the water companies could operate profitably:
to secure that the functions of a water undertaker and of sewerage
undertaker are properly carried out as respects every areas of England
and Wales
and to secure that companies holding appointments., as water undertakers
or sewerage undertakers are able (in particular, by securing reasonable
returns on their capital) to finance the proper carrying out of the
functions of such undertakers
(s. 7 Water Act 1989, changed subsequently to s. 2 Water Industry Act 1991 16),
The Director General's secondary duties included a general provision to protect the
interests of customers and to take specific account of the interests of the disabled and
pensioners. The Director General has an additional duty, resulting from a House of
Lords amendment during the Third Reading of the Bill, to protect the interests of
customers and potential customers in rural areas in respect of charging for water services
(s. 7 (3) (a) Water Act 1989, s. 3 (a) (i) Water Industry Act 1992).
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The legislation provided for the setting up of ten regional customer services committees
(CSCs), with responsibility for dealing with complaints and for advising the Director
General on matters related to the interests of consumers. In contradistinction to the
structure of consumer representation established under the Gas Act 1986, the consumer
bodies in the water industry were attached to the Director General's office (e.g. the
Director General makes the appointments and funds the committees) and the bodies were
structured on a regional rather than national level. As will be seen below, the power
given to the Director General of Water Services with respect to the management and
work of the CSCs was a major area of concern to consumer organisations during the
passage of the legislation.
The water legislation also made explicit provision, for the first time in the regulated
industries, for a measure of quality regulation. This may possibly have been the result
of concerted on-going advocacy of community sector and consumer organisations, in
tandem with a belated recognition of the difficulties confronting 01. 1EL and OFGAS,
in the absence of significant powers in this area. Along with the traditional requirement
that the companies establish codes of practice in particular areas of customer service (of
which more will be said in the section that follows), the Director General of Water
Services was required to establish two sets of enforceable standards: the first, for overall
standards of performance that the companies would be expected to attain, and the
second, for service standards that "ought to be achieved in individual cases" (s. 38
Water Act 1989 and Water Industry Act 1991). In the latter, it was envisaged that a
small financial penalty would be levied (and payable to the consumer) for failure on the
part of a company to meet the specified service standard. This Guaranteed Standards
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Scheme was announced, with much fanfare, by the Minister for Water and Planning,
Michael Howard, during the passage of the Water Bill. The Minister described it as:
..a no-nonsense, no-quibble scheme to provide a spur to management for
good commercial manners and quick recompense to customers for the
inconvenience that they have suffered. It will be a new remedy for the
customer. It will be in addition to existing legal rights. It will be but one
of the many advantages that will accrue to the customer as a result of
privatisation. HoC, 8/12/88, col. 524.
(iii) Community sector campaign
Amongst the triad of utility privatisations forming the focus of this study, the
privatisation of the water industry saw the most concerted community sector campaign
aimed at influencing the post-privatisation regulatory model. The same appears to be
true for other activist sectors in the British polity, for example, the environmental and
trade union movements (Ogden, 1991, Nalgo 17)•
The reason why the activity of the community sector was more concentrated and
cohesive during the passage of the Water Bill is not terribly clear, although it is possible
to speculate on a few of the likely contributory factors. Firstly, the general political 
climate that attended the privatisation of the water industry suggested that the
Government's plans might be more vulnerable than had hitherto been the case, giving
rise in turn to a view that appropriately targeted action could lead to success. The fact
that the Government had experienced a significant defeat in its first approach to the sale,
along with wide ranging popular and media scepticism about the water privatisation
process, possibly strengthened activist resolve and contributed to a new sense of political
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efficacy. In the upshot of events, the Government's fragility was more illusory than real,
but this was not apparent for much of the time in 1988 and 1989.
Secondly, the experience of political lobbying in the earlier privatisations had reinforced
the need for a collaborative and coordinated campaign, involving a cross-sectional and
broadly-based political alliance. The agenda for change in the water privatisation process
was wide enough, and without the tensions implicit in earlier campaigns 18, for a
coalition to be forged for the first, and only time, between community and consumer
organisations, environmental groups, local government peak bodies and the industry
trade unions.
Thirdly, and this is relevant only to a comparison with the involvement of the
community sector in the Electric4y Bill, the timing of the passage of the two pieces of
primary legislation for water and electricity privatisation (both were introduced into
Parliament in late 1988) was such that the organisations concerned were effectively
forced to make tactical choices about where and how they would deploy the bulk of
their campaigning effort 19 . In the event, the community sector directed more of its
attention to the Water Bill than to the contemporaneous passage of the electricity
privatisation legislation.
Figure 1.3 (overleaf) indicates the major community sector groups involved in the water
privatisation campaign; it also cites the issues for which they individually took notional
responsibility.
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Major community sector players involved in the Water Bill
* AMA Social Services group: charges, metering & disconnections
* NACAB: disconnections, billing & payment procedures, metering
* NCC: Consumer representation, consumer protection, standards of
performance
* Consumers Association: price regulation, consumer representation & the
regulators powers
* National Council for Voluntary Organisations: Co-ordinating & Parliamentary
liaison function
Figure 1.3: Community sector involvement in the Water Bill
The general strategic position of the community sector organisations lobbying around
the Water Bill was summed up by one of the NCC campaigners as "working for what
you can win rather than what you want..realistically we had to focus on some pretty
small areas." (interview with researcher, July 1989). In seeking to influence the
legislation, the alliance focused primarily - but not exclusively 20 - on the passage of
the Bill through the House of Lords. This was argued on the grounds that:
the huge majority of the Government in the House of Commons dictates
everything and there is no real pressure on the Government in the
Commons.. the ethos in the House of Lords is different, its a place where
people still listen to debates and where votes can be won. .although the
Government can overturn this, it can cause embarrassment if they do so.
AMA campaigner in interview with the researcher (18/8/89)
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The issues identified by the coalition of community sector organisations as the major
ones upon which to focus in their campaigning were:
I. Payment methods and Disconnection
2. Consumer representation
3. Duties of Director General of Water Services
4. Service Standards and redress
Each of these issues will be considered briefly in turn, including the response of the
Government to the arguments raised by the coalition.
1. Payment methods and Disconnection
The advent of metering trials in a number of areas throughout the country, in
combination with the prohibition on charging for water according to rateable value after
the year 2000 under section 80 of the Water Bill, raised fears that the newly privatised
water companies would introduce the compulsory metering of domestic properties. Early
data from the metering trials indicated that "water bills for large families on low
incomes, in low rateable value properties [were] increasing by as much as sevenfold"
(Fimister, 1989b). In addition, it was anticipated that the water companies would take
up the power available to them in the legislation and directly pass on to domestic
consumers the costs of meter installation (estimated at between £150-£200 per property).
Because of this, the community sector organisations proposed that a statutory
requirement be placed "on the water companies to offer consumers at least one option
for paying for water which does not involve metering" (AMA Briefing to the House of
Lords). It was also suggested that, in light of the budgeting problems of low-income
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households arising from the traditional practice of the water authorities of levying
charges in standard half-yearly or yearly cycles, that provision be made in the Bill for
consumers to pay by more regular instalments. And that consumers be given a choice
of a range of flexible payment options similar to those made available by the fuel
utilities. In response, the Government gave no ground on the metering issue, but the
Minister for Water and Planning indicated that he would encourage the water companies
to adopt a more imaginative and customer-sensitive approach to water billing.
Disconnection from water supply was, relative to the standards of the fuel industries, a
relatively rare occurrence. However, there was evidence that the level of water
disconnection for debt had risen sharply over the years leading into privatisation
(amongst the regional water authorities from less than 2,000 in 1981 to over 9,000 in
1987/88). Concern about the prospect of increasing disconnections in an area with such
acute public health implications was reinforced by the experience of gas privatisation,
where the level of disconnections had escalated between the period 1985 and 1988.
As this was an issue of fundamental importance to low-income consumers, as well as
being one where a high degree of public and political sensitivity existed, the community
sector alliance decided to put considerable effort into this area.
A tactical decision was taken to present two distinct lines of argument: the first, carried
by the AMA Social Services group, that the power to disconnect domestic customers for
debt should be abolished, and the second, argued by NACAB and NCC, that
disconnections for water debt should not be allowed to occur without recourse to county
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court action, and that this should be enshrined in an statutory code enforceable by the
Director General of Water Services:
We never thought we'd achieve our position but we hoped that in pushing
our position that the NA CAB line might win acceptance. AMA
campaigner in interview with the researcher (18/8/89)
As anticipated by the campaign members, the no disconnections argument was rejected
by the Government. Lord Hesketh, Parliamentary Under-Secretary Department of the
Environment concluded, for example, that it was "advocating what amounts to a free
water policy. In the experience of the water industry, a small minority of customers
choose not to pay their water charges even after a county court order has been
obtained. .for this minority the water undertakers must retain their right as a last resort
to disconnect supply." (HoL, 18/5/89, Col 1300).
However, earlier the Government in concert with the Water Authorities Association and
the Water Companies Association, had produced a revised code of practice which
specified that water disconnections for debt would not occur without reference to the
county court, except for those customers who had previously appeared before the court
for the recovery of water charges, or where a payment agreement between a customer
and water company had been broken (irrespective of whether this had involved county
court action or not). It was subsequently argued by the coalition, ultimately with success
in the House of Lords, that the exemptions contained in the draft code excluded the very
people most likely to be in need of a court assessment of their level of indebtedness and
that it discriminated against consumers with multiple debts. In the same House of Lords
debate where Lord Hesketh had rejected the call for an abolition of the power to
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exception 21) and that the code on disconnections would form padt %r thie iiimoit
disconnect, the Government indicated that it would remove the exetn ilo 1 MIS 0*.lititli 42fitli
conditions [subsequently Licence Condition I-1] which would be eafottoa t p e by the
Director General of Water Set-vices. The changes effected in disconnection Wiley ANANV
generally perceived by members of the coalition as the major achievement of them Wokir
Bill campaign.
2. Consumer representation
Consumer representation is...a partisan activity. Regulation and consumer
advocacy, are not, therefore the same thing,
Consumers' Association (1989b) p.9
The ability of the new Customer Service Committees to represent effectively the
interests of domestic consumers was directly challenged by the community sector
coalition involved in the Water Bill campaign. Their discontent about the provisions for
consumer representation fell under two broad headings: 6) the absence of a national
consumer forum equivalent to that established in the gas industry, and (ii) concern that
the CSCs were being set up in a way that would make them the creatures of the Director
General of Water Services rather than being independent agents promoting the consumer
interest. In the latter, it was argued inter alia (i) that the members of the CSCs should
be appointed by the Secretary of State and not the Director General in order to ensure
independence and public accountability, (ii) that the CSCs should have control over the
appointment of their own staff and budgets, and not be beholden to the Director General
for these essential resources, (iii) that the Director General should not hold 'censorship'
powers over the reports of the CSCs, (iv) that they should be given the scope to advise
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agencies other than the Office of Water Services on matters of importance to consumers
(such as the National Rivers Authority, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission and
the European Commission), and (v) that provision should be made for representation of
low-income and disabled consumers on the CSCs. The National Consumer Council
encapsulated the coalition's position on the issue when it stated:
We believe that the effectiveness of a CSC as a robust, independent
consumer voice will be severely muted if it is unable to express its views
independently of the Director General to, for example, the MMC and the
European Commission.. The Director General General's role is to
maintain a balance between the interests of the industry, the shareholders
and consumers, and it would be entirely inappropriate for him to have
editorial control over the publications of the CSCs.
(NCC Briefing House of Lords - Report Stage of the Water Bill, June 1989)
Consumers must be assured that their interest in important debates such
as metering, charges, sewerage law and the control of disconnections will
be robustly promoted in public. The Customer Services Committees must
have an independent voice.
(NCC Water Bill 1989 Consumer Representation, May 1989)
The Government rebutted the coalition's case by stating that those amendments aimed
at increasing the autonomy of the CSCs "would drive a wedge between the customer
service committees and the director general" (Lord Hesketh, HoL 15/5/89, col 977) and
by arguing that the nexus between the CSCs and the Director General actually enhanced
the power of the former:
The committees carry that much more weight in their investigations of
complaints through such an association. Any divorce between him and
those committees would therefore weaken rather than strengthen them.
Minor victories were achieved, however, in guaranteeing that the Director General would
be obliged to set up CSCs in the first place (the "may" in the original legislation was
changed to "shall"), that the CSCs role be broadened to include a general policy review
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function, and that their meetings be opened up to public. But the unsatisfactory nature
of these outcomes, for the organisations involved, is illustrated in the NCC's admission
that "[we] have also failed to ensure that the CSCs are independent of the Office of
Water Services. We must conclude that the government is determined to limit the
effectiveness of the CSCs." (NCC HoL Third Reading Briefing, June 1989)
3. Duties of Director General of Water Services
The priority given to the duties of the Director General in the enabling legislation is of
fundamental importance to the operation and scope of the regulatory regime. If his/her
mandate for ensuring that the interests of consumers are protected (in relation to matters
such as charging, debt and disconnection and service quality) is given equivalent status
to those powers relating to the financial operation of the privatised utilities, then the
Director General is in a position to arrive at a reasonable balance between the interests
of the various stakeholders in the industries (i.e. consumers, management, shareholders).
In particular the regulator would have the ability to rule in favour of the consumers
and/or 'public interest', even though this might conflict with, or bear negatively on, the
interests of management and shareholders. If, however, the regulator is given
superordinate responsibility for protecting the commercial interests of the privatised
companies (representing a clear imperative to conclude in favour of shareholders and
management when conflicts arise), the 'consumer watchdog' function will be legally and
operationally shackled as a consequence.
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As shown earlier, in the Water Bill tabled in Parliament, the duties of the Director
General were firmly prioritised, with the consumer protection function occupying a
subsidiary position. However, in a widely-leaked unpublished draft of the Bill, provision
had been made for the Director General to apply equal weight to the duties of consumer
protection and advancing the interests of company shareholders 22.
During the passage of the Bill through the House of Commons Standing Committee, and
later in the House of Lords, the National Consumer Council and the Consumers' Council
argued vigorously against the apparent change in the Government's thinking on the
duties of the regulator and pointed out the contradiction between the framing of these
duties and the statement in the 1986 White Paper that "[the] Director General's principal
duty will be to safeguard the interests of the customers.." (Privatisation of the Water
Authorities in England and Wales, HMSO, 1986b, para. 57). In proposing an amendment
in the House of Lords, aimed at balancing the duties of the regulator, in May 1889, the
NCC expressed the core of the issue:
If left unamended the companies will not be prevented from overcharging
or providing a low standard of service, because the Director General will
be required to put the profitability of the water and sewerage companies
above the interests of the protection of consumers.
(NCC Briefing Paper on Amendment 77A, May 1989).
In the debate on the amendment, tabled by the Labour peer Lord McIntosh of Haringey,
the Go\ ernment argued that the financial performance of the water companies and the
interests of consumers were inherently interwoven:
a service cannot be properly carried out that is not in the interests
of the consumer. The consumer is right up front..
The creation of this dual framework is quite deliberate. It reflects the paramount
importance for customers that companies are able to cony out their functions
properly, and to do this they will need to be able to finance those functions and
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earn a return on capital. For that reason the duties in subsection (2) are a
necessary precondition to the others. Similar, but not identical, structures are
provided in the Gas and Telecommunications Acts and in the Electricity Bill.
(Earl of Caithness, HoL, 4/5/89 col. 354 & col. 355)
The amendment was subsequently withdrawn.
4. Service Standards and redress
The arguments put by members of the community/consumer alliance in the general area
of service standards and redress were (i) that the codes of practice needed to be
enshrined in statute (based on the view that licence-based codes of practice would be
virtually unenforceable 23), (ii) that the Guaranteed Standards Scheme was substantially
limited to "administrative matters" and did not cover key areas of service performance
such as water quality 2A and (iii) that an effective complaints procedure was required.
The alliance made little headway with on any of these issues, and on the major question
of the legal status of the codes of practice, the Government claimed that
[operating] through a licence condition provides more flexibility than would a
statutory code, recognising the continuing role of the Director General in
policing this and other aspects of the framework of regulation we are
introducing.. it is not, however, a soft option: an undertaker cannot be appointed
unless he meets the requirements I have described. Letter from Michael Howard
[Minister for Water and Planning] to Chris Patten, 20/1/89.
Two other matters advocated by the community sector - unrelated to service standards -
but of importance to tenants, were more successful, i.e. that the Director General be
given the power to set the maximum price for the resale of water and the removal of the
provision making tenants liable for water charges if they had not been paid by the
landlord.
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3. THE PRIVATISATION OF THE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
(i) Background
The privatisation of the electricity supply industry was both the biggest
and most successful of all the Government's privatisations. It marked
another major milestone in the remarkable Conservative programme of
popular capitalism and private enterprise.
Conservative Research Department (1991) p.157
If the sale of the water authorities was the Government's most controversial
privatisation, the sale of the electricity supply industry was its most complex and
troublesome. The scale of the Government's plans for the privatisation of the ESI,
announced in its White Paper Privatising Electricity (HMSO, 1988a) in February 1988,
prescribed the most radical restructuring of a utility industry to date, involving the
vertical and horizontal separation of a traditionally highly integrated industry.
The monolithic Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), responsible for electricity
generation and transmission, was to be broken up into three distinct parts. The
generating infrastructure of the CEGB was to be split between two new companies:
GEN. 1 (later to become National Power) with 70 per cent of generating capacity, and
GEN.2 (later PowerGen) with 30 per cent of generating capacity. The decision to
allocate the generating resources (i.e. power stations) of the CEGB in this uneven
fashion was premised on a recognition that the larger generating company would be
required to carry the 'liability' of nuclear generation. The transmission network of the
CEGB was to be established as a functionally and operationally separate entity, owned
and managed conjointly, not by the generators, but by the regional electricity companies
60
(National Grid Co.). The twelve existing area electricity boards, responsible for the
distribution and supply of electricity to 'end-users', were to be sold as twelve separate
public limited companies. At the same time as the Government published its blueprint
for the ESI in England and Wales, the Secretary of State for Scotland announced that
the electricity in Scotland would also be privatised. But in contrast to the proposed ESI
structure south of the border, the Scottish industry was to be sold as two vertically
integrated companies, with generation, transmission, distribution and supply functions
intact (Scottish Hydro-Electric and Scottish Power).
This scenario for the future of the ESI in Britain was formalised with the tabling of the
Electricity Bill in the House of Commons in December 1988.
In comparison with the earlier utility privatisation legislation, the Electriciy Bill made
provision for the introduction of an unprecedented level of competition. The two non-
natural monopoly dimensions of the electricity industry - generation and supply 25 -
were to be exposed to full competition over the medium-term. New entrants to
electricity generation and supply were to be encouraged through the granting of
operating licences, and through the opening up of the 'common carriage' networks to
"second tier" operators. The purchasing of electricity from the generators was to occur
through a form of electricity spot market, known as the "Pool" (and run by a subsidiary
of National Grid Co.). It was believed that the combined impact of these structural
changes would result in a more efficient ESI, supplying electricity at a lower cost to
consumers
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However, because the regional electricity companies (RECs) were allowed to retain their
monopoly franchise for supply to users of medium and small amounts (i.e domestic
consumers) of electricity until 1994 and 1998 respectively 26, the gains accruing from
this new competitive structure would initially be directed mainly to large industrial and
commercial users of electricity. Although in theory at least, the small user stood to gain
some benefit from the lower costs of purchasing wholesale electricity in this new
competitive market v. This was based on the twin assumption, of course, that the
competitive generation market would function effectively and that the savings made by
the RECs in purchasing electricity would be passed on to consumers and would not be
expropriated as surplus profit.
Yet within this pro-competitive framework, the legislation and draft licences contained
some distinctly non-competitive features. These included the limitations placed on the
generating companies' ability to enter the supply market (limited to an average of 15 per
cent of demand for the first four years and 25 per cent for the four years thereafter) and
conversely, the limits applied to the amount of generation activity that the REC's could
undertake (15 per cent of total capacity).
Most controversial of all the competitive constraints, however, was the requirement that
the RECs purchase a proportion of their electricity from nuclear sources until 1998,
under the Non-Fossil Fuel Orders 28, and the provision that the extra costs associated
with purchasing nuclear power be retrieved through the application of a so-calledfossil
fuel levy on electricity prices. The level of the levy set by the Secretary of State for
Energy at the time of privatisation was 10.6 per cent. In justifying this premium on
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electricity prices - estimated to be about 3p per kilowatt hour (HoC Energy Committee,
1992a) - to subsidise the nuclear industry 29, the Secretary of State for Energy, Cecil
Parkinson, argued that:
The consumer will pay no increased costs beyond those he would have
paid under the existing structure. Our proposals will simply identib, costs
which had previously remained hidden. The fact that these costs will be
identified does not mean that there will be an increase. It simply means
that they will be identified and subject to scrutiny not rolled up in the
bulk supply as at present. HoC, 12/12/88, col. 686
The validity or otherwise of this argument aside, the formalisation of a heavy measure
of cross-subsidisation could be seen as an extremely ironical outcome for a programme
designed to create a competitive electricity supply market and ostensibly operating under
economic pricing conditions.
The Government was to face an even deeper irony after the ElectriciV Act 1989 was
given Royal Assent. The Conservative Party's long-standing commitment to the
development of Britain's nuclear power industry had been given a considerable boost
after the industry contributed to the defeat of the Coal Miner's Strike in 1984-85. In the
run-up to privatisation, a number of economic and energy commentators (for example,
Helm, 1987, 1988b; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Bunn & Vlahos, 1988) questioned the
true costs of nuclear power (as opposed to those published by the CEGB) and identified
some of the possible problems that might be encountered in any attempt to sell the
nuclear generation sector in the marketplace.
Regardless of the mounting critique of nuclear power as a saleable commodity, the
Government held to its belief that the sector could be sold, as long as it was bundled
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with the major generating company (National Power) and if a sufficient level of public
subsidy could be guaranteed to partially underwrite the massive decommissioning costs
of the nuclear industry 30 •
 But finally the increasingly close analysis of the economics
of nuclear power by the City in the summer and autumn of 1989, forced the
Government first to withdraw the ageing Magnox stations from the sale and ultimately,
in November, to withdraw nuclear power completely. The irony of the capital market
dealing a body blow to the Government's favourite energy sector was further
compounded by the associated announcement that the nuclear sector, unfit for private
consumption, would be retained in public ownership, under the guise of Nuclear Electric
and Scottish Nuclear. (See Chesshire, 1992 and Roberts et al (1991) for interesting and
informative accounts of what the latter authors describe as "the nuclear fiasco").
The consequential change to the originally-proposed industry structure resulted in three
generators in England and Wales (National Power with 50.2% of net capacity,
PowerGen with 32% and Nuclear Electric with the 14.2% 31 ) and three in Scotland
(with the addition of Scottish Nuclear). In retrospect, the exclusion of the 'nuclear
burden' from the privatisation equation at the outset would have given the Government
far greater scope for breaking up the generating sector into smaller units. This, rather
like the privatisation of British Gas, is now viewed as an opportunity lost:
When the CEGB was abolished, the opportunity to divide its existing
stations among more than three successor companies was missed, and so
greater competition can now only come about through new companies
building new stations or the two main generators selling stations.
HoC Energy Committee (1992a) s.38
The Government experienced other problems along the way, such as the 'on again, off
again' and finally aborted, trade sale of PowerGen to Hanson Holdings during the
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summer 1990, and the Iraq crisis (with its reverberating effect on the stock market); but
despite extending the timetable for the sale of the RECs by six months, the Government
completed the entire sale of the ESI in Britain by June 1991. Figure 1.4 below
summarises the major events in the sale.
ELECTRICITY PRIVATISATION: KEY EVENTS
May 1987:
	 Commitment to privatise the electricity supply industry (ESI)
contained in Conservative Party election manifesto
February 1988:
	 White Papers Privatising Electricity and Privatisation of the
Scottish Electricity Industry published
May 1988:
	 Public Utility Transfers and Water Charges Act enacted
empowering electricity boards and Electricity Council to transfer
property to other bodies corporate
December 1988:
	 Second Reading of Electricity Bill in House of Commons
April 1989:
	 Second Reading of Electricity Bill in House of Lords
July 1989:
	 Electricity Act 1989 enacted
September 1989:
	 Director General of Electricity Supply appointed
November 1989:
	 Withdrawal of nuclear generation from the ESI sale program and
creation of Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear
March 1990:
	 Transfer of CEGB and Area Board assets to successor companies
Licences come into effect
December 1990: 	 Sale of the 12 Regional Electricity Companies (and National
Grid)
March 1991:
	 Sale of National Power and PowerGen (60% of shares)
June 1991:
	 Sale of Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Electric
Figure 1.4: Key events in the privatisation of the electricity supply industry
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(ii) Regulatory framework
Given the complex structure of the ESI, it is hardly surprising that the system of
regulation introduced under the Electricity Act 1989 was also likely to be characterised
by a degree of complexity. The Director General of Electricity Supply was given
substantial economic regulation powers in those domains of the ESI where natural
monopoly elements prevail: transmission, distribution and (for the sub-1MW market)
supply; his powers in relation to generation and the Pool - where competition
theoretically prevails - are somewhat more oblique. Discussion in this section will
concentrate primarily on those areas of regulation most immediately affecting the
interests of domestic consumers.
As in the other regulated utilities, the ubiquitous RPI-X price control formula was
introduced as the central mechanism for economic regulation of the ESI; and with a
sense of poetic justice perhaps, the inventor of the device, Professor Stephen Littlechild,
was appointed Director General of Electricity Supply, with responsibility for making it
work. The price formula, with different constituent elements, was applied to the areas
of transmission charges, distribution charges and supply charges to sub-1MW consumers.
Wholesale electricity purchasing charges were not subjected to price control, as these
are notionally 'regulated' by the law of supply and demand through the Pool (although
in reality most wholesale purchasing currently occurs outside the Pool under 'contract
for differences' or through direct sales arrangements 32).
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The complicated array of pricing prescriptions built into the operation of the privatised
ESI were additionally compounded by the introduction, under Condition 3C of the
Supply Licence, of a "supplementary" supply charge for the sub-1MW sector, which is
operable until April 1993. The "supplementary" price cap was devised with the aim of
limiting electricity tariff increases to the rate of inflation, and was inserted by the
Secretary of State for Energy following political anxiety about the movement in prices
in the early years after privatisation. The X factor for transmission and supply charges
was set at zero (i.e. without an efficiency saving), and for distribution charges it was set
for each of the RECs, across a range from zero to plus 2.5 per cent (with an average of
1.3 per cent).
The duty of the Director General of Electricity Supply to protect the interests of
consumers was accorded, consistent with the other regulators, secondary status:
A curiosity of the regulatory system is that among the Director General's
three primary duties is the duty `to secure that licence holders are able
to finance the carrying on of their activities which they are authorised by
their licences to carry on '..whereas his duty `to protect the interests of
consumers of electricity' is only a subsidiary duty to be exercised subject
to the primary duties. This is a strange way of ensuring that 'the
customer, not the producer or distributor, comes first, which was one of
the principal declared aims of electricity privatisation.
HoC Energy Committee (1992a) s.134
His duties with respect to the generality of consumers was supplemented with specific
duties to protect the interests of electricity consumers in rural areas and the disabled and
pensioners.
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Amongst the repertoire of powers given to the Director General were the ability to set
overall standards of performance and standards of performance in individual cases
(Guaranteed Standards of Performance) for the RECs. The Director General was also
given a number of additional powers, which his regulatory colleagues originally did not
have (subsequently, under the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992, the powers
of the four utility regulators have been 'levelled up' - see Chapter 7). These included
the power to determine disputes and to make orders for the settlement of disputes
carrying the weight of a county court judgement (sections 23 & 39 Electriciol Act 1989),
and wider information collection and publication powers.
A similar model of consumer representation to that in the water industry was introduced
i.e. regional Consumers' Committees under the jurisdiction of the Director General. This
was later supplemented by an amendment to the original Bill providing for the
convening of a National Consumers' Consultative Committee, chaired by the Director
General and composed of the chairmen of the Consumers' Committees. Under the
amendment the national committee was given a potentially wide-ranging brief, "to keep
under review matters affecting the interests of consumers of electricity generally" (s. 53
(2)(a) Electricity Act 1989) and was required to meet at least four times each year. This
amendment was achieved largely as a result of successful advocacy of the National
Consumer Council.
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(iii) Community sector campaign
The community and consumer sector's endeavour to influence the passage of the
electricity privatisation legislation did not really gather pace until the Electricity Bill was
debated in the House of Lords. Nor did it have the same sense of united purpose that
characterised the water campaign 33. The former appears to have had less to do with
strategic considerations (as mentioned in the previous section on water privatisation) and
more to do with the fact that during the passage of the legislation through the Commons
the over-stretched resources of the sector were almost exclusively focused on the Water
Bill. Also there was an assumption that the Electricity Consumers Council (ECC) would
make much of the running on the Bill. This expectation was not realised, however. And
this, in conjunction with the ECC's position on the structure for consumer representation
post-privatisation (see below), was for some of the activists involved one of the most
disappointing aspects of the campaign:
..the ECC just sat there and watched..their silence was deafening..the
chairman took a different view of regulation to us. .believed that it ils
basically a technical activity and therefore there is no need for consumer
regulation.
Electricity privatisation campaigners in interview with researcher (25/7/89)
During the passage of the Bill through the House of Lords, organisations such as the
National Right to Fuel Campaign, the National Consumer Council, Age Concern, Winter
Action on Cold Homes, NACAB, and the Association for the Conservation of Energy,
concentrated on a set of issues not dissimilar to those at the forefront of earlier
lobbying; namely:
# Disconnection
# Consumer representation
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# Standards of performance
# Energy efficiency
Much of the sting had been taken out of the disconnection issue by the alacrity with
which the Government 'imported' into the regulatory framework of the PSI, the
Condition 12A modification to British Gas' authorisation by OFGAS earlier in the year.
Under the terms of this modification, British Gas were obliged, prior to taking
disconnection action, to offer consumers in default a prepayment meter "where safe and
practical to do so". The Government stated that it would be inserting a similar provision
into the supply licences of the RECs (later to become licence Condition 19).
The community organisations argued that while the OFGAS measure represented a
considerable advance, it did not go far enough. In order for this 'protection' to apply,
the utility company needed to make contact with the defaulting consumer. And evidence
from British Gas was already showing that thousands of consumers were still being
disconnected because of "no contact". The alternative, in the view of organisations such
as NCC and the National Right to Fuel Campaign was to place the RECs under an
obligation to supply, but not necessarily on credit terms. Thus, when a consumer
defaulted, the companies should be required to install a prepayment meter whether
contact had been made with the consumer or not. The Government, with some
justification, rejected this amendment on the grounds that the imposition of a
prepayment meter irregardless of the wishes of the consumer would represent an severe
invasion of privacy. To which the NCC responded:
We do not think that installation of pre-payment meters as an alternative
to disconnection is an invasion of customer privacy, indeed it could be
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the only means by which a customer retains access to an essential
supply.
(NCC HoL Report Stage Briefing, June 1989, p.4)
The Government remained unconvinced. Rather ironically, the NCC also sought an
amendment requiring companies to obtain the consent of consumers prior to the
calibration of a prepayment meter to recover a previous debt, and in the event of this
not being obtained the "debt would need to be recovered in the same way as any other
consumer debt, i.e through the courts." (Ibid. p.6). Apparently there was a limit to the
number of consumer rights that the Government was willing to defend on this occasion,
for the amendment was rejected.
The well-trammelled ground over the arguments for a national independent consumer
body was covered again, but with only slightly greater success than during water
privatisation. The decision by the Electricity Consumers Council to abolish itself ahead
of the enabling legislation, weakened the case for the establishment of a national body
of electricity consumers. As indicated above, though, the NCC was successful in having
the inferior 'fall back' provision on the formation of an ad hoc National Consumer's
Consultative Council added to the Bill.
In welcoming the power of the regulator to set guaranteed standards of performance, the
campaigning organisations maintained that the proposed areas to be covered by the
scheme were too limited, in that they did not cover many of the areas of service delivery
most germane to domestic consumers. In order to give some real teeth to the concept
of quality regulation it was additionally suggested that a system of financial penalties
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or some form of price formula adjustment should be available to the regulator for
breaches in the overall performance standards. Neither of these matters gained
Government support at the time, but they have been pursued, in part, by the regulator
in more recent times (see Chapter 7).
The amendments on energy efficiency, particularly the one promoted by the Association
for the Conservation of Energy (ACE), came closest to giving the sector a major victory
in the electricity privatisation legislative process. As with gas, the price control formula
provided in-built incentives for the companies to maximise the sale of electricity and
contained no off-setting mechanism for promoting energy efficient practice. Utilising
research on the American experience of regulation, ACE proposed that a US-like clause
on 'least-cost planning' be inserted in the Bill. This would have forced the companies
to explore the cost-benefit of energy efficiency alternatives to capital investment on new
plant and would have empowered the Director General to penalise companies through
the price control formula if they failed to do so.
The amendment was successfully negotiated through the House of Lords despite the fact
that it was "technically deficient" (Roberts et al, 1991, p.77) 34 , but it was rejected by
the Government when the Bill returned to the House of Commons. In lieu of the original
amendment, the Government added the clause that the Director General "determine such
standards of performance in connection with the promotion of the efficient use of
electricity by consumers as, in his opinion, ought to be achieved by..suppliers" (s.41
ElectriciO, Act 1989). This effectively gave the regulator a promotional function without
the complimentary enforcement power to back it up. In the view of a leading advocate
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of the amendment, its defeat reflected "the power of the vested interests and industries
supporting the anti-conservation status quo"; whereas another campaigner, less closely
associated with the amendment described its flawed drafting as "a disaster" (both
interviews with the researcher, July 1989).
CONCLUSION
This account has shown that the Government introduced a number of structural changes
to the model of utility privatisation over the course of the programme. This is illustrated
most distinctly in the juxtaposition of the complex, dis-aggregated model of the ESI with
the unitary model of British Gas. Yet from the perspective of the domestic consumer,
for all the competition-oriented refinements introduced between the privatisation of
British Gas and the privatisation of the electricity supply industry, the broad statutory
and organisational framework for the three utilities was substantially similar,
notwithstanding the incremental modifications made to the regulatory regime over this
period.
It is apparent, reflecting over the three community sector campaigns, that although some
successes were achieved, most of these were of a relatively modest nature. On the major
issues - such as those concerning the priority to be accorded to the interests of ordinary
consumers in the regulatory system, the balance between equity, service quality and
company profitability considerations, and the ability of domestic consumers to achieve
a strong independent voice - the community sector campaigns had a minimal impact; at
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least at the time. With this in mind, it is difficult to dispute the conclusion of the
organisation that played a leading part in the three campaigns - the National Consumer
Council - in its book In the absence of competition (1989):
Although the interests of consumers have been given increasing emphasis
as the [privatisation] programme has progressed, the overall impression
is that they have largely been treated as a residual of other policy
considerations. NCC (1989a) p.18
The community sector was not alone in its impotence, of course. One of the more
striking aspects of the history of the Government's utility privatisation programme is the
way that it emerged from the legislative process almost completely unscathed. But then
given the Government's resolve to complete the project, its parliamentary dominance,
over the period 1986 to 1991, and the powerful coalition of utility industry and City
interests supporting the original terms of the privatisation settlement, this is neither
particularly surprising nor inexplicable. Following Hill et al (1989), the process of
privatising the three utilities could be seen as an expression of 'elite policy making'.
Significantly, many of the issues raised unsuccessfully by the community sector at the
time of privatisation were to become residual problems in the regulation of the public
utilities, as later chapters reveal.
The organisational structure established through the three pieces of primary legislation
is illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 1.5 on the next page.
74
Cl)
	 g	 rA
gw	
e4..
	
Z	 w a)C)
	
0	 , 0E-4
	rn	 z
	
p	 c.)	 z	 0)c.)
	
¢	 V)	 0	 Cl)	 0 C/)	 ...,--,
0g E-4
	
W Z	
Z '150	 0 w
E	
U 41E 2	 "cl)
	
W	 U c„;	 w kLi E	 •
a)
E.,Z U	 0.
	
Z a.,	 C/)	 0 g	 6	 0c.)a g
0 0 	 ci98 8	 .,..,.,
0
..to
0=
am g00 T.i= 0	 0
[LI U tg
g	 •,-,
U)<
g	
"O K	 z	 „5.
. ra,
5
Ell 0	 U 'E--.1
HO
()
P4	 En
<	 .> 0	 fa] .;:
E4
-i 
cz l'a.)
	
L.,	 41	 oL.
0 -tC 
i	
0 ;q
.5
Lt.,	 b-.1	 44 0	 a>
-0
41 Z	 W
	
.-	 0
E 
P
¢ •	 E
0 z = 0,	 0	 ›0
to
'RI
'C
a)
cn
•..
z
•
	
,	 E
,--10 \
	
0 \	
':',--1
	
A	
*
'-i'
a)
	
(7)	 c)	 Cl)
	
0\	 oON
	
-	 CI)
	
1 	 Z	 F-L-1
El e
rn  C.;
	
csu	 . 'A	 E
, sm	 0.4 a) 0
	
n cz	 0 g
0 , .? al 0 78
	
E* 0 t .°	 Z ro C()2, • .<,0
.o
	
g .-c-d —	 z	 fi) • .0.)
a4	 E-1
4.1	 C.)	 w 8 (i)	 ° —	 NH	 W	 Z .4-1 7)1	 P	 a? EL.¢	
,—	 41 c'* 0	 ¢	 4 c\I -
w 0 ,-- Z ZA z7. 1- 8
ENDNOTFS TO CHAPTER 1
1. In stating this it needs to be recognised that in the case of Northern Ireland
(electricity and water) and Scotland (water) the privatisation programme is yet to be
completed. In April 1992, Northern Ireland's power stations were sold to three separate
companies, with the remainder of the industry is due for sale later in the year. The
Government has also taken preliminary steps towards the ultimate privatisation of the
water industry in both Northern Ireland and Scotland. Currently, water and sewerage
services functions are performed by the Water Service of the Department of the
Environment in Northern Ireland, and by the Regional and Islands Councils in Scotland.
In the middle of November 1992, the Government published a consultation paper on the
options for privatising the Scottish water industry.
2. A contract customer is defined in the legislation as anyone who receives a supply of
gas in excess of 25,000 therms in any period of twelve months.
3. Sir Denis Rooke's support was suggested as an influential factor by Gas Consumer
Council policy officers in an interview with the researcher (24/7/89).
4. The term community sector will be used hereafter to encompass community service
organisations (such as NACAB) and consumer organisations (such as NCC and the
Consumers Association)
5. Both the National Consumer Council (1989) and the Consumers' Association (1989)
declared that ownership per se was not a significant issue.
6. The National Right to Fuel Campaign, for example, in declaring its opposition
privatisation of the British Gas Corporation ("as we can see no advantage for the low
income consumer that could not be achieved within the existing framework"),
supplemented this with the proposal that money from the sale be used to invest in
energy efficiency improvements in low income households. Fuel News Vol. 4 1985
7. The Association for the Conservation of Energy suggested that the regulatory body
might most appropriately be entitled the Office of Gas Regulation and Efficiency - i.e.
OGRE, Evidence from the Association for the Conservation of Energy to the Select
Committee on Energy on the Regulation of a Private Sector British Gas Corporation
(undated)
8. It is important, however, to recognise the level of policy continuity vis-a-vis the water
industry leading up to privatisation, and that the changes introduced in 1983 in
particular, (see Annexe 1) laid the foundation for the radical restructuring of the industry
embarked on in 1985. Richardson et al (1992, pp.159-160) make this point well:
Since 1973 water has been seen less and less as a 'service' and more as
a 'commodity:. The further restructuring of the industry through the
Water Act 1983 pushed the RWAs towards an ethos which stressed
commercialism, as did the final exclusion of local authority
representation on RWAs, and hence from the policy community itself The
distribution of power within the policy community changed: local
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authorities were finally excluded, and economic considerations became
more important than technical ones. Increasingly tighter government
financial restrictions were also placed on the RWAs.
Thus, the decision to privatize may not be as radical as it appears, in
terms of the historical development of the industry. The industry had
become more 'managerial' and `technocratic' and conventional public
accountabiliry had declined."
9. See Parker & Perming-Rowsell (1980) and Kinnersley (1988a) for accounts of the
development and operation of the river-basin management approach.
10. "Mr Ridley was never keen on the proposals which he inherited from his predecessor
Kenneth Baker. Mr Ridley was concerned by the notion of one private company having
the power to prosecute another." Richardson et al (1992) p.167
11. For far more detailed accounts of the defeat of the Government's first model of
water privatisation see Kinnersley (1988a), Richardson et al (1992), Bowers et al (1988)
and Ogden (1991).
12. Up to October 1991, no inset appointments had been made (DoE, 1991).
13. A model "instrument of appointment" [licence] was published by the Government
on 20th December 1988, during the House of Commons Standing Committee stage of
the Bill.
"..each Appointment runs for a minimum of 25 years from 1st September, 1989 and may
be terminated by the Secretary of State at any time on or after the expiry of that period,
provided at least ten years' prior notice has been given. An Appointment may be
removed from a Water Services Company at any time as a result of making a special
administration order.." Water Prospectus (1989) p.36
14. The term water companies will be used as a generic descriptor of both the regional
water and sewerage companies and the old statutory water companies. Where they are
to be separately identified the term "water services companies" will be used to designate
the former and the term "water only companies" the latter.
15. Interestingly, the Government questioned the efficacy of the yardstick comparison
methodology at the time of gas privatisation:
In realiry, as our examination of the American system showed clearly,
there is no effective competition as a result of comparisons with gas
prices in one region as opposed to another. In fact, there are always
considerable differences in the cost of distribution and other factors that
give a reason for variation. Secretary of State for Energy in Second
Reading speech, HoC, 10/12/85, co1.776
There is no reason why this argument should not hold similar weight in the water
industry.
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16. In citing sections of the original legislation, it is necessary to give its 1991
equivalent, as the Water Industry Act 1991 (which was fundamentally a piece of
consolidating legislation) is now the relevant legislation for the industry.
17. Account of the trade union campaigns by Nalgo policy officer in interview with the
researcher (25/7/89). On gas, it was suggested that "a lack of confidence at the time that
the government could be beaten" and the fact that "industrial relationships in the
industry had always been pretty cosy" explained the relative impotence of the union's
campaign. In relation to electricity privatisation, the view was put that "they [i.e.
electrical trade unions] don't appear to have learnt the lessons of the water campaign [in
terms of public relations, forming alliances with other sectors and promoting a positive
agenda like the Charter for Water]" and that "there was a reluctance to really go for it..a
concern that this might affect their post-privatisation negotiating position." Certainly,
Nalgo economic committee minutes over the period of the passage of the Electricity Bill
provide evidence of the ambiguous position of some of the electricity unions to the anti-
privatisation campaign. For a more sanguine account of the contribution of the
Electricity Supply Trade Union Council see Davies (undated).
18. For example, during gas privatisation "there was not the same willingness to open
up a broader alliance with sectors like the fuel poverty lobby..there was a lack of
sympathy amongst industry trade union members for people who defaulted on their gas
bills. .the general view from amongst the rank and file tended to be negative regarding
this sector of the customer population." Nalgo policy officer in interview with researcher
(25/7/89). The same conclusion might be drawn about the attitude of electricity trade
unions towards fuel poverty issues. It is perhaps significant that the "low-income
consumer agenda" does not figure amongst the array of amendments to the Electricity
Bill advocated by the Electricity Supply Trade Union (see Davies, undated).
19. The National Consumer Council, for instance: "because the Electricity Consumers
Council existed it was decided tactically to concentrate our efforts on water lobbying."
NCC privatisation campaign staff in interview with researcher (25/7/89).
20. The National Consumer Council had been active in lobbying for amendments during
the passage of the Bill through Standing Committee D in the House of Commons.
21. "except where the Appointee or, as the case may be, the Water Authority, has
obtained an enforceable judgement against him [the consumer] for the payment of those
Relevant Charges but they remain unpaid for any reason (other than by virtue of
compliance with the terms of the judgement)." Licence Condition H, Instrument of
Appointment of the Water and Sewerage Undertakers. The extent to which this caveat
could be exploited by the water companies was not, understandably, appreciated at the
time. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the impact of Condition H.
22. ".. (a) to ensure that the interests of every person who is a customer or potential
customer of a company.. are protected as respects-
(i) the fixing, imposition or recovery by that company of charges for any
services, facilities or rights which are performed, provided or made
available by that company in or in connection with the carrying out of
any of the functions of such an undertaker;
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(ii) the terms on which any services, facilities or rights are so performed,
provided or made available; and
(iii) the quality of any services or facilities and the nature and extent of
any such rights;
..(c) to secure that the carrying out of the functions of a water undertaker or sewerage
undertaker is profitable for any such company which is both economical and efficient."
s.5 (3) draft Water Bill
23. "That the code of practice is a condition of the licence does not provide sufficient
protection. The policing of the licence is very unwieldy and the loss of a licence seems
an inappropriate instrument to deal with breaches of the Code of Practice."
NACAB Briefing to Water Bill Standing Committee
24. They also disputed the exclusion of customers in default from the Guaranteed
Standards Scheme (i.e. consumers who had not paid their water bill within the previous
four weeks): "Non-payment of bills is a separate matter and collection of outstanding
debts is covered in the Bill and the Code of Practice for Disconnection..The issue is that
the undertaker has failed to meet a service standard and therefore should be obliged to
make compensation payments. If the customer has failed to pay his bill the normal
procedures for collection of the outstanding debt should be followed." p.11 NCC
response to GSS, June 1989. In the Water Act 1989 this caveat was amended to six
weeks in default
25. Because it would be uneconomic to duplicate existing transmission and distribution
networks for carrying electricity it was recognised that they would, under present
technological conditions, remain natural monopolies.
26. "Until 30th March 1994, the franchise limit is 1MW [monthly demand] and from
31st March 1994 until 30th March 1998 the franchise limit is 100kW [monthly
demand]." RECs Prospectus (1990), p.32
27. Fuel and generation costs represent 71% of the final price of electricity, according
to Vickers & Yarrow (1991, Table 1, p.190).
28. In effect, this means that all of the nuclear generation capacity in the country has
a guaranteed and secure market. At the 31st December 1990, nuclear generation
accounted for 14.2% of declared net generation capacity in England and Wales (National
Power and PowerGen Prospectus, 1991).
29. Only 1% of the fossil fuel levy goes to non-nuclear sources i.e. renewable energy
generation (e.g. wind, wave, landfill gas and waste incineration). The levy totalled
£1,265 million in 1991-92 and contributed 52% of Nuclear Electric's income (Nuclear
Electric, 1992). The Director of Electricity Supply raised the level of the levy to 11%
from 1st April 1991.
30. Technically, under Schedule 12, s. 1 of the Electricity Act 1989 the scope for
providing direct financial assistance to the nuclear industry was much broader than
decommissioning nuclear plant, however, it was in the area of decommissioning that the
greatest fears were held about the size of the expenditure involved [estimated at £13
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billion in 1989 prices, Whitfield (1992) p.180]. Section 4 of Schedule 12 allows for
grants to be given in the range £1 billion to £2.5 billion. In July 1989, the Government
indicated that it would be necessary to award the maximum level of grant.
31. The remaining 3.6% is held by National Grid Co. for its own purposes. National
Power and PowerGen Prospectus (1991)
32. "95% of the electricity traded through the Pool is wholly or partly determined by
contracts." HoC Energy Committee (1992a) s.104
33. In a rare reference to the community sector campaign, Roberts et al (1991) conclude:
they [community sector organisations] had other more immediate
objectives, concerning improvements to consumer rights, that resulted in
their efforts being spread over several issues.
Early on there were some attempts to co-ordinate the lobbying efforts of
the various groups by the National Council for Voluntaty Organisations.
This however proved to be ineffectual. p.128
34. "The DGES [Director General of Electricity Supply] did not have the power to give
capital investment approval and so could not refuse it." Roberts et al (1991) p.77
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CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO PUBLIC POLICY
INTRODUCTION
The public utiliry concept appears to involve two conditions: one is that
the service should be considered to be so essential that it requires public
regulation, ownership or operation; the other is that the service should
be monopolistic., water, gas, electricity, ports and harbours are
indubitably public utilities. Robson (1960) p. 18
The inclusion of the utilities in this approach [based on market
principles] is highly significant. It implies an impatience with the idea
that utility services are special or essential and need to be treated in
ways vastly different to other goods or services. Instead, the products of
utility industries are, as far as possible, to be treated as a commodity like
any other. It also places the emphasis of public policy firmly on the
promotion of efficiency, with the issue of equity in second place, and
identifies the introduction of competition as the best (almost the only)
way of achieving that goal.
National Consumer Council (1989) p. 18
The commercial basis to the provision of utility services, like water, electricity and gas
has been given increased emphasis in a number of Western economies in recent years
(e.g. OECD, 1987; WA, 1991). While the ascendency of commercial objectives over
social objectives has long been a characteristic of the organisation and management of
public utilities in Britain (as illustrated in Annexe 1) and in other countries, 'utility
commercialisation' could be seen to have reached its apotheosis in the privatisation
programme of the British Conservative Government. Elsewhere, measures by
governments to liberalise and deregulate 1 the utility industries - such as those presently
being countenanced by Federal and State administrations in Australia 2 - appear to be
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similarly premised on assumptions about the incontestable dominance of commercial
considerations in public utility practice.
The growth of a highly economistic formulation of public utility practice - with an
implicit change in the meaning of the term itself 3 - has been paralleled by the
promulgation of the view that public utility services are, first and foremost,
commodities that can and should be traded like any other product in the market
economy. Directly or indirectly, this 'commodification' (or perhaps more accurately,
're-commodification') of utility services, has had a substantial impact on ideas about the
most appropriate way to organise and manage the industries concerned. It has also had
a pivotal influence on the long-standing debate about the scope of public utility
responsibility for 'non-commercial' objectives and activities; particularly in the field of
social policy.
Under the conceptualisation of public utility services as 'merely another set of
commodities', there is ostensibly little justification, in market economies, for the
industries concerned to be owned and managed outside the private sector; or at an
absolute minimum, to be isolated from the disciplines and efficiency criteria of the
private market. The sanguine view of the nonpareil capacity of the private market as a
mechanism for commodity production, distribution and consumption - much invoked by
advocates of the New Right in the 1980s (see Chapter 4) - has been given additional
credibility by the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990.
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Similarly, the commodity view of utility services, effectively pre-determines the scope
of producer/supplier responsibility vis-a-vis their consumers. If utility services are of the
same fundamental character as the array of products purchased by customers in the
conventional market place, it follows that the suppliers of these services have no more,
nor less responsibility for customer care than is applicable in the market place generally.
This requires the operation of a customer service regime, expressive of the principles
and statutory obligations of fair trading, and the use of customer relations approaches
(including possibly, the promotion of access to supply for groups such as the elderly and
disabled) essentially designed to gain commercial advantage over competing firms or
industries 4.
It certainly does not require - and indeed usually proscribes - that attention be given by
the utility industries to access, equity and distributional impacts as they affect different
classes of customers. These considerations are seen to fall exclusively within the
territory of government; as is deemed to be the case with other essential commodities,
like housing, clothing and food.
But can utility services, like water, electricity and gas, reasonably be viewed as
commodities like any other? Do they have internal and external properties that
differentiate them from other goods and services traded in the general market place?
If they are more than 'mere commodities', what then are the broad implications for
public policy? These are the questions that form the substance of this Chapter.
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In an exploration of the nature of public utility services, it is useful to make a distinction
between their demand and supply characteristics. The demand features of utility
services relate to what might be seen as their 'internal' attributes and to the importance
they occupy in the hierarchy of consumption needs at an individual and collective level.
Included in this dimension would be the essentialness of utility services, their relative
non-substitutability, their status as "merit goods", their strategic importance, and their
inelasticity of demand features.
The supply properties of utility services, on the other hand, refer to the particular
character of their production and distribution (or 'external' attributes), and would include
natural monopoly provision, externalities, and pricing (particularly cross-subsidisation).
The demand and supply dimensions of public utility services will be considered in Parts
1 and 2 respectively.
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PART 1: PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES - DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
(0 The essentialness of utility services 
Access to water and energy is generally perceived to be one of the fundamental service
benchmarks of a modern civilised society. Water and energy represent two of the vital
ingredients in the physical and social infrastructure of all contemporary societies; albeit
that in some countries, notably in the developing nations, this infrastructure is still often
in a rudimentary form.
For the individual, water and energy - or more specifically in the case of the latter, fuel
for lighting, cooking and warmth - form part of the quartet of goods, along with food
and shelter, which are universally acknowledged as necessities for living. For society at
large, the water and energy utilities provide much of the motive power for physical,
economic and social development. Because of their centrality to individual and collective
well-being, water and energy are, as Helm & Yarrow (1988, p.iv) suggest, "basic social
primary goods" (alternatively they might be described as "natural-rights goods",
Dasgupta, 1986).
Indeed it is usually argued, that on the basis of their contribution to personal and social
welfare, water and energy are essential services; with the corollary that minus one or
the other, life would become unsustainable:
'Essential' means that they cannot be cut off without danger of total or
partial collapse of the economy. Starting from an allocative point of view,
we stress the importance of these goods and services as part of the
infrastructure, for producers and consumers. Starting from a
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distributional point of view, we would have to stress their importance for
providing consumers with necessities of life. Bos (1986) p.18
While the essentialness of water services would seem to be beyond dispute (at least in
respect to its water supply part), there is less unanimity about whether energy should
reasonably be held to be an essential staple of everyday life. Bradshaw, for example, in
his introduction to one of the few texts written on energy and social policy, puts the
view that the "trouble with fuel is that it is questionable whether it is essential to
survival. Given food, adequate clothing and shelter most households could exist without
fuel, at least in our temperate climate. Indeed some do, even in Britain in the 1980s"
(Bradshaw & Harris, 1983, p.3).
Although, in his view, the physiological need for fuel in Britain is uncertain, Bradshaw
goes on to acknowledge that if a different frame of reference were used - i.e. social
norms and expectations - then most people "would probably accept that fuel for cooking,
light and perhaps heating water are basic needs, or that living without them is too severe
a deprivation to countenance." (ibid p.3)
There would be many, including the fuel poverty lobby, who would challenge the
validity of Bradshaw's view of the non-essential nature of personal fuel consumption in
the climatic conditions of this country; particularly in a context where "in an English
winter up to 4 million homes may be at risk of becoming particularly cold, of which
roughly a quarter were at risk of becoming very cold indeed" (DoE, 1991b, p.51).
However, to pursue the issue of the physiology of energy consumption here, would be
largely beside the point; for as Bradshaw acknowledges in his second statement, the
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Public perceptions of the importance of utility services
Public utility-related services occupied primary places on the list of publicly-defined necessities derived from
MORI surveys undertaken as part of the Breadline Britain series in 1983 and 1990. The top five standard of
living items (with percentage of survey sample classing them as necessities) were:
1983	 1990
Heating to warm living areas
of the home if it's cold
Indoor toilet (not shared
with another household)
Damp-free home
Bath (not shared with
another household)
Beds for everyone in the
household
97%	 97%
96%	 97%
96%	 98%
94%	 95%
94%	 95%
Other utility-related items also rated highly as necessities [1983 figure first, followed by 1990 figure] e.g.
refrigerator (77%; 92%), washing machine (67%; 73%), television (51%; 58%) and telephone (43%; 56%).
Mack & Lansley (1985) p.54; Frayman (1991) p.4.
A European Commission study on the Perception of Poverty in 1989 (Commission of the European
Communities, 1990), found that across the 12 member states, 94% of the sample of people interviewed rated
"having running water, electricity and one's indoor toilet" as "absolutely necessary". 71% of people also rated
"having basic equipment such as refrigerator or television set" as "absolutely necessary". p.10
question of essentialness is fundamentally a socially defined one. And access to energy
services for the purposes cited by Bradshaw, and for warmth, are generally viewed, as
essential to the maintenance of an acceptable standard of living by the populations of
Britain and Europe. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Public perceptions of the importance of public utility services
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(ii) Non-substitutability
Associated with the essentialness of water and energy services is the fact that they are,
in many instances non-substitutable, i.e. there is a substantive or practical absence of
alternative means for meeting water and energy-related needs. This is most clearly
evident, in the substantive sense, in the area of water services; where there are no
realistic and hygienic alternatives to running water for meeting the requirements of
household washing, cleaning, food preparation and disposal of human waste. While there
are an array of commodities available for satisfying personal drinking requirements (such
as bottled mineral water, soft drinks and alcohol), these are generally used as a
complement to, rather than as a full substitute for, drinking water, in most households.
The possibilities for product substitution are greater in domestic energy use than is the
case with water services. This is due to the product rivalry that exists within certain
sectors of the domestic energy market (most particularly between electricity and gas),
namely in space and water heating and for the running of certain appliances. However,
for a large number of households the prospect of substituting gas for electricity - or vice
versa - as the fuel source of heating or cooking, is foreclosed, in a practical sense, due
to the high conversion costs involved (e.g. the purchase and fitting of new appliances,
multiple standing charges etc.). In the case of lighting and for appliances other than
those used for heating and cooking, there are presently no technically or socially viable
substitutes for electricity 5.
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(iii) "Merit goods" status 
This fusion of essentialness and non-substitutability in water and energy, clearly
differentiates them from most other consumption goods traded and purchased in the
orthodox market place. Because of the product character of water and energy, the scope
for individuals to exercise purchasing choice amongst an array of similar "commodity
alternatives (as in the case of food for example) is highly circumscribed. This has the
attendant effect of creating formidable barriers to the realisation of consumer
sovereignty, for as Hood (1986, p.173) concludes, "these pressures in practice get
weaker the more practically indispensable the service is to the ordinary consumer".
The fundamental place that water and energy services occupy in the structure of daily
life - on an individual and societal level - is sometimes characterised under the concept
of "merit goods". "Merit goods" as defined by Musgrave and Musgrave (who originally
enunciated the term) are those goods,
the provision of which, society (as distinct from the preferences of the
individual consumer) wishes to encourage or, in the case of demerit
goods, to deter. Musgrave & Musgrave (1984) p.78
Beckerman (1986, p.17) adds that they "are goods that, on basically ethical grounds,
society believes should be supplied to - and where appropriate actually consumed by -
everybody, perhaps only to certain minimum levels, whether they like it or not and
whether they can pay for it or not."
89
Universal access to a clean water supply is generally seen as an integral part of basic
package of rights and living conditions for citizens in most contemporary societies; and
much of the public hostility in England and Wales to the privatisation of the water
industry, over the period 1986-1989, might be attributable to a high level of public
anxiety about the potential impact on access, service and water supply standards, in the
wake of private management of the industry. Supporting the normative position (or what
Beckerman calls "ethical grounds") that access to a decent water supply is part of the
common inheritance of all citizens in contemporary society, is a self-interested
recognition of the externality effects - particularly in relation to public health - of
excluding individuals and groups from adequate water and sewerage services. Martin
and Wilder (1992) express this interaction between private and public utility in the
provision of water services in the following way:
..increased cutoffs of low-income households.. not only leads to
substandard living conditions but also raises public health concerns.
Water and sewer service therefore has some characteristics of a public
good, in the sense that if my neighbour's service is cut off, both of us
suffer. p.101
Because of their importance to both individual and collective welfare then, water
services might reasonably be seen as "merit goods", or indeed even, quasi-public goods.
The implication of this is that public policy should be directed at ensuring that all
members of society haVe access to an adequate level of water services provision.
Some dimensions of the water industry - such as the provision of water for public fire
protection and the recreational use of water company reservoirs and land - fall within
the realm of "public goods" in the classical economic sense. They contain elements of
indivisibility/non-rivalness and non-exclusiveness, which in turn undercuts the capacity
90
to employ the price mechanism as a means of limiting entry and charging for service
use 6. The public good character of water for fire-fighting was recognised in the Water
Act 1989, where under section 81 "no charge may be made by any water undertaker in
respect of. .water taken for the purpose of extinguishing fires or taken by a fire authority
for any other emergency purpose" 7.
Concern over the potential impact of privatisation on public access to and use of water
authority land was raised by a number of public amenity groups during the privatisation
process (e.g. National Trust, Rambler's Association, Council for the Protection of Rural
England (CPRE), and anglers' groups) and formed part of the substance of a major
report by CPRE, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the World Wildlife
Fund for Nature (Bowers et al, 1988). The Water Bill was subsequently amended to
provide protection for areas of outstanding natural beauty and sites of special scientific
interest. The water companies are also subject to a code of practice, issued by Secretary
of State for the Environment, on the environmental and recreational aspects of water-
related land management. The land holdings of water companies are considerable, and
are often located in environmentally and recreationally strategic sites. Figure 2.2 overleaf
shows the land holdings of each of the ten water and sewerage companies in 1989.
91
Water & Sewerage Companies: Land Holdings 1989
Total holdings: 428,250 acres
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Figure 2.2: Water company land holdings
The "merit goods" status of energy services is arguably less clear cut; although Dilnot
and Helm (1987, p.33) see little cause for equivocation when they assert "that energy
is a merit good should follow from its being necessary to fulfil the basic capability of
living". While access to energy for heating, lighting, cooking and indeed, leisure
purposes, is generally viewed as a basic necessity (Mack & Lansley, 1985; Frayman,
1991), the extent to which there is consensus about supplying even a basic minima of
energy to all households, independent of the issues of income and capacity to pay, is
rather less apparent. The slightly more ambiguous position of energy as a "merit good"
(relative to water), is possibly reflected in the rather different tenor of the parliamentary
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debate on disconnection of domestic consumers during the passage of the Electricity Bill
compared to that of the Water Bill, and in the ostensibly less stringent conditions for
disconnection devised for the privatised electricity supply industry 8•
The delineation of certain areas of individual and household consumption as "merit
goods", is more than simply an exercise in economic taxonomy and semantics. For the
attribution of "merit goods" status connotes a sense of public priority, and brings with
it an overlay of public policy attention and intervention; in particular, the need for action
to overcome information failure, imperfect knowledge and under-consumption (Dilnot
& Helm, 1987; Head, 1974). Beckerman (1986) captures the policy dimension of "merit
goods" when he states:
Once 'merit' goods are admitted into the proper sphere of public policy
it is obviously easy to show that most of them will not be consumed to
socially optimal levels unless they are provided or financed or subsidised
by the public authorities in one way or another, or made the subject of
mandatory legislation. p.17 9
If an obverse test of what constitutes "merit goods" were applied - i.e. they consist of
those areas of consumption where the public believe that substantial government
involvement is necessary - then survey evidence (Figure 2.3 on next page) suggests that
water and energy are perceived by the British public, and the population of other
countries, as visible exemplars of "merit goods".
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British Social Attitudes Special International Report
Percentage of sample favouring either government ownership or control of the
electricity industry
Britain	 USA Australia	 West Germany	 Austria	 Italy
73%	 68% 81%	 83%	 96%	 96%
Taylor-Gooby (1989), p.38
In an Observer/Harris opinion poll (reported 1/10/89), 56% of the sample surveyed
expressed the view that a future Labour government should renationalise the water
industry.
Figure 2.3: Attitudes to government ownership or control of public utilities
(iv) The strategic importance of the utility industries
The strategic position that the utility industries occupy in the economic life of all
countries, parallels the centrality of water and energy services in the everyday lives of
individual households. The 'lifeblood' products of electricity, gas and water run through
the veins of the entire economy and form a integral part of the foundation for economic,
physical and social development. Investment decisions in these primary infrastructural
areas have wide-ranging 'knock on' effects in other sectors of the economy.
The provision of core physical services, in the form of water and energy infrastructure,
is an essential precursor to, and catalyst for, residential and industrial development.
Decisions about the timing and location of these services predetermines the pace and
direction of urban growth. They also interact directly with the issues of territorial and
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inter-generational equity (Rees, 1981). Investment in the capital infrastructure required
to supply water and energy to new or remote communities may be inordinately low, or
alternatively, may result in the setting of disproportionately high access charges for
individual consumers (e.g. water infrastructure charges introduced following
privatisation), if left to market forces alone. An additional complication of releasing the
levers of public control over infrastructure planning and development, is that private
water services companies could potentially exploit the strategic power of the industry,
in respect to land use and development, for their own commercial advantage:
The capacity for the bodies responsible for providing water infrastructure
to influence the location and pace of development cannot be overstated.
Nor should the potential for the abuse of this capacity be underestimated
in a situation in which commercial pressures for development are not
fully externalised from those responsible for servicing it...WUPLCs might
give priority for advance infrastructural investment to land which it owns
itself in order to facilitate its profit objectives; WUPLCs as subsidiaries
of larger construction companies may prioritise their land/ development
sites and obstruct or delay servicing rival companies' land developments.
Bowers et al (1988) p. 29
The management of utility industry resources demands the adoption of long-term
planning horizons and an assessment of the collateral effect of capital development
decisions on other sectors of the economy. In other words, to be effective, utility
resource management cannot be conducted in a policy vacuum. The accelerated
movement towards gas-fired electricity generation in Britain, with its consequential
detrimental effect on the domestic coal industry, is illustrative of the inter-relationship
between public utility capital decisions and macro-economic policy generally.
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The critical impact that the industries have on the economy directly, as well as the
pervasiveness of their 'second order' planning effects (either of a positive development
or negative externality kind), suggests that they are unsuitable candidates for laissez faire
de-regulation approaches.
The reverberating effect that utility policy and practice, at a macro- and micro-level, has
on collective and individual welfare, is likely to demand a framework of decision-
making for these industries that provides a clear avenue for public accountability and
public influence. The degree to which this can be achieved along different points of the
public ownership-public regulation continuum is, of course, one of the primary questions
in this thesis.
(v) Inelasticity of demand for utility services 
Conventionally, the market system of commodity production and exchange is predicated
on inter alia two explicit operational principles. The first principle maintains that there
is a strong and continuous nexus between the demand for a particular good and its price.
Therefore if price moves, in either an upwards or downwards direction, demand will
respond in an obverse manner (price elasticity of demand) 1°. The second principle
holds that the demand for a particular good changes in line with income. Hence the
higher a household's income the more a particular good will be consumed. Or
alternatively, the higher the income the more consumption of basic goods will be
supplemented by the consumption of luxury goods (income elasticity of demand).
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If, however, in the case of specific classes of goods, the interaction between demand and
price, or demand and income is low or ambiguous, then the self-regulating power of the
supply and demand deus ex machina of the market system, in these product areas, will
be inevitably muted.
The essential and relatively non-substitutable nature of water and energy services
suggests a priori that the association between level of demand and price or income, in
the domestic sector at least, is likely to be weak. That is, irrespective of how low a
household's income may be, or regardless of price increases, a reasonably constant level
of demand for water and energy services will exist, as this is necessary for physical and
social well-being. Similarly, although the level of demand may rise with an increase in
income or a decrease in price, it will not do so in direct proportion to changes in income
or price, nor will it continue to rise indefinitely beyond the point where the need for
these basic services are satisfied. In this sense, water and energy will exhibit the
properties of inelastic demand.
The income inelasticity of demand for energy has been well documented (for example,
Bradshaw & Harris, eds., 1983; Hutton, 1983; Dilnot & Helm, 1987; Helm & Yarrow,
1988; Micklewright, 1988; Johnson et al, 1990; Boardman, 1991a; Brechling & Smith,
1992) 11 . In contrast, the inelasticity or otherwise of water services - according to
income or price - has received less attention; possibly in part, because the historical
absence of volume-related charging systems in the water industry in Britain has made
the task of calculating this virtually impossible 12.
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Consumption and expenditure studies in Britain have consistently underlined two central
themes in the structure of domestic fuel demand: (i) that fuel expenditure represents a
far greater proportion of low-income household budgets than it does in the budgets of
higher income groups, and (ii) that although household expenditure on fuel generally
rises with income, it does so at a proportionately lower rate than for most other
commodities, and for expenditure generally (NCC, 1976a; Hutton, 1983; Dilnot & Helm,
1987; Johnson et al, 1990; Boardman, 1990, 1991a; Pearson & Smith, 1991; Hutton &
Hardman, 1992a, 1992b):
The elasticities confirm the results of other studies of household energy
demand that domestic fuel has the demand characteristics of a 'necessity'
- in other words, a I per cent change in income will result in less than
a 1 per cent change in domestic fuel use. The income elastici ty
especially low for private renters and pensioner households.
Brechling & Smith (1992) p.38
Expenditure data from the 1990 Family Expenditure Survey shows, for example, that the
lowest income quintile spent an average of £8.62 per week on fuel, which represented
10.5 per cent of total expenditure; whereas the highest income quintile spent £14.05 per
week, which was 3.1 per cent of total expenditure 13 • Yet significantly, while fuel
expenditure amongst the highest income group was 63 per cent higher than that of the
lowest income group, total expenditure across all commodity areas was 446 per cent
higher. Figure 2.4 illustrates the way that fuel demand - as expressed through
expenditure - differs from demand for other commodities generally, as household income
increases.
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Figure 2.4: Income Elasticity of Demand for Fuel
The relative income inelasticity of demand can also be viewed by comparing expenditure
on fuel with expenditure on other specific commodities. Figure 2.5 (overleaf) based on
data from the 1990 Family Expenditure Survey, juxtaposes the change (from the bottom
to the top quintile) in fuel expenditure with changes in expenditure in other major
commodity areas, excluding housing. It can be seen that, with the exception of tobacco,
expenditure on fuel stands out as being by far the least responsive to changes in income.
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Figure 2.5: Differences in household expenditure on major commodities
The implications of the finding that fuel expenditure forms a disproportionately high
component of low-income household budgets, and that fuel demand is relatively
inelastic, are at least two-fold. First, it confirms the status of energy services as "basic
social primary goods"; 'primary' in the sense that a discernable minima (or core level)
of demand is apparent, irrespective of income or objective capacity to pay, and 'basic'
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in the sense that growth in demand for fuel rises at a far lower rate than virtually every
other area of household consumption, as income increases 14 . Second and most
importantly, it highlights the distributionally sensitive nature of energy policy and
practice (Dilnot & Helm, 1987). Helm, Kay & Thompson (1988, p.43-44) allude to this
when they state:
Since energy comprises a substantial proportion of the household budgets
of the poor, the pricing policy of the energy utilities is likely to have a
considerable impact on poverty.
The primary place that energy consumption occupies in most households also effects the
extent to which price elasticity of demand exists in this sector of the market. As a result
of its physiological and ascribed importance to individual well-being, domestic
consumers are, in effect, locked into particular patterns and levels of demand; and the
basic parameters of this demand are likely to fixed, irregardless of movements in price.
This is confirmed in the Department of the Environment qualitative study on Attitudes
to Energy Conservation in the Home (DoE, 1991a):
Most saw the scope for making savings as fairly small, whether by
cutting down what they use or by becoming more efficient. They felt that
a more than marginal reduction in spending would eat into their comfort
or change their lifestyle in unacceptable ways. Many would compensate
for a fuel cost increase by cutting back on other areas of spending,
rather than by cutting fuel use itself p.86
There will be, of course, some scope for reducing household demand in the face of
extreme price pressure (for example, through moderating appliance use and introducing
more efficient heating systems). However, the margin for reducing demand will
generally be more constrained amongst low-income households; either because the
minima of energy demand has already been reached or because access to the capital
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required to make energy efficiency savings is limited (DoE, 1991a, 1991b 15)• But, in
any case, response to price signals in the energy market will be substantially conditioned
by what households regard as the point beyond which reductions in demand would be
intolerable. Once this point is reached (and it will obviously vary amongst different sets
of consumers) the impact of price increases on domestic demand markedly declines; and
it is here that the price inelasticity of demand of energy becomes most apparent.
To date, there has not been a sustained effort to exert downward pressure on energy
demand through the price mechanism in Britain. Certainly domestic energy prices were
used by Labour and Conservative administrations during the 1970s and 1980s as an
instrument of macro-economic policy. But the purpose of tariff increases was to increase
the self-financing capacity of the energy industries (and related to external financing
level targets) and to raise additional revenue for the Exchequer, and was not aimed at
achieving reductions in energy demand per se. However, in the future environmental
imperatives will, in all probability, transform the methodology of pricing energy. With
the possible result that energy prices will be deployed as the efficiency/conservation
'shock troops' in the battle against global warming [see Part 2 (ii) below]. The efficacy
of such a strategy remains to be seen; but certainly the evidence from the past is not
encouraging, notably in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, when electricity and gas prices
were raised substantially in real terms, without any notable impact upon domestic
demand (Harris, 1983).
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The comparative insensitivity of energy demand in the domestic and non-domestic
sectors to changes in price - at least over the short-term - is shown in Dr Scott Barrett's
analysis for the Department of Energy of the impact of the introduction of a carbon tax
(cited in Pearson & Smith, 1990, p.7). According to Barrett's estimates taxes in the
order of 40% (gas) and 67% (coal-generated energy) would be required to produce a
drop in demand of 4% (gas) and II% (coal-generated energy) in the space of about one
year. Although, Barrett estimates that over the long run (i.e. about 10 years) smaller
levels of tax would produce better results, with a 14% tax on gas resulting in a 3%
increase in demand, and a 24% tax on coal-generated energy leading to a 25% reduction
in demand. But as Pearson & Smith (1991 p.16) argue, the responsiveness of the
domestic energy market even over the longer-term will be constrained by the fact that
"energy consumption is not heavy enough to justify the fixed costs of moving from one
form of energy to another".
Research into the distributional consequences of environmental taxes by the Institute for
Fiscal Studies (Johnson et al, 1990, p.15) where it is concluded that an "increase in the
price of fuel by 75% would be needed..in order to reduce consumption by around 20%",
highlights the relatively indirect relationship between energy prices and energy
consumption 16• This is also highlighted in the DoE-commissioned qualitative study on
domestic energy consumption:
Increasing energy cost seems a blunt instrument for controlling usage.
Increases might need to be substantial before they began to bite hard on
consumption - and many people were worried about the effects thils might
have on low-income families and the elderly. (DoE, 1991a, p.16)
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As the above quotation implies, the price inelasticity of demand characteristics of energy
has potentially serious ramifications for domestic consumers generally, and low-income
consumers in particular. Because many domestic consumers are effectively 'captive' to
an established level of energy consumption (determined by factors such as condition and
energy efficiency level of housing, type and range of appliances, amount of reserve
capital for improvements, and commitment to a particular life style), their ability to
respond to price increases in conventional consumerist ways, by for example reducing
consumption or finding substitute products, will inevitably be circumscribed. Because
expenditure on energy services is a more substantial part of the budgets of low-income
households, price increases, by implication, will have a disproportionately severe effect:
..to the extent that demand elasticities are lower among lower income
groups, the poor may end up paying higher prices and the resulting
distributional consequences might be judged unsatisfactory. Generally,
it is not obvious that charging more to precisely those customers who
have the least opportunity to substitute out of the given good or service
is a desirable outcome. Helm & Yarrow (1988) p.iv
At a more general level, in a commercial environment where the capacity of domestic
consumers to respond to price signals is limited, the utility industries - particularly when
backed by the power of monopoly supply - will have formidable leverage. This could
result in the introduction of tariffs for the domestic sector well in excess of those
necessary to meet marginal costs requirements, with virtual impunity. There is also the
danger that charges levied in the price inelastic sector of the market (i.e domestic
consumers) may be artificially inflated in order to enable lower prices to be set in more
competitive, price elastic sectors (indeed this is given economic sanction under so-called
"Ramsey pricing" principles). In many instances, commercial and industrial enterprises
have considerably greater room for manoeuvre in terms of energy consumption (i.e. in
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aggregate level, form of energy used and time of use 17), particularly over the longer
term, than is generally the case with domestic consumers. Hence the motivation exists
for energy utilities to adopt a more 'creative' marketing strategy with the non-tariff
sector, possibly at the direct expense of domestic consumers through some form of cost
cross-subsidisation.
The existence and influence of income and price inelasticities in water services is less
well known (in Britain in particular); although as suggested earlier, because they share
many of the properties of energy services - with an even more substantive claim to
essentialness - a strong a priori argument could be made that similar inelasticities will
apply.
The historical system of charging for water (i.e. standard charge based on rateable value
of property) and the absence of data on household water consumption, have not been
amenable to calculating domestic demand elasticity; yet it has apparently been an issue
of interest to the industry and economic analysts since at least 1960 18. In the last few
years, as a result of the introduction of domestic metering trials throughout selected
areas of England in 1989, some very rudimentary information, relevant to the question
of elasticity is becoming available. Because of the small number of water companies and
consumers involved and because of unrepresentativeness of the population in the trial
areas (see Chapter 6), the data emerging from the metering trials should be treated with
caution, and should be viewed as suggestive only, at this stage.
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Two of the primary issues being tested in the current water metering trials are the
impact that charging for water, on the basis of volume consumed, has on tariffs and on
demand. The results of the trials, contained in the Second Interim Report of the National
Metering Trials Co-ordinating Group, published in July 1990, indicate that:
About 65% of households in the small scale trial areas are paying less
than or the same as their previous RV bill. About 20% of households are
paying more than 20% over their previous RV bill. 19
The short-term impact on demand has varied considerably, from a 25%
fall to a small increase. It averages around a 10% decline, and it
appears that the drop Ls greater where there is a multi-rate tariff with
higher marginal charges for water as consumption increases or during
the peak; the drop has been much less with the more traditional tariffs.
NMTCG (1990) pp.iii-iv
In essence, evidence from the metering trials indicates, that although domestic consumer
demand for water may be influenced - at the margin - by price, the overall relationship
between demand and price is generally an inelastic one 20•
 This is reflected more
clearly, in Figure 2.6 overleaf, which is based on data from nine of the twelve trial areas
where comparable figures were available. Figure 2.6 juxtaposes the proportion of
domestic consumers paying over 20% more for their water, with changes in demand.
It shows, in the metering trials at least, that there is generally an indirect and imprecise
relationship between price and demand, in water consumption; with the overall picture
portraying a distinctly inelastic complexion.
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between water charges and demand
Remarkably, the distributional effect of water metering on different classes of
consumers, such as low-income households, has not been fully explored in the metering
trials 21 • Therefore, because information on the income of participating households has
not been gathered, an assessment of the income elasticity of demand for water (as
revealed in the trials) is not possible. There is, though, evidence that the level of demand
beyond a "fixed element of usage" (NMTCG, 1990, p.51) is influenced by factors such
as, occupancy rate (household size), housing type, and socio-economic status:
Levels of demand vat), with socio-economic grouping and housing type.
The highest levels of demand are observed in .1, JIB and JII [Acorn]
classifications (Suburban/High Status/High Income). The lowest levels of
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usage are found at EIIIF classifications (Flats/Council Properties/Poorer
Status Housing).
p.51 22
The unspecified "fixed element of usage" component clearly represents the most inelastic
part of household water demand; and it is this core area of consumption that will be
most resistant to changes in price or income. The shift in water tariff systems, from
rateable value to metered charges, as a general rule, will be likely to impact more
heavily upon low-income households than other types of households. This is largely
because the former, generally occupy low rateable value properties and hence have
hitherto paid relatively low water charges. But it is also because low income households
probably have less scope to reduce demand; that is, as they are less likely to have large
gardens, swimming pools and the like, they will use less water in 'discretionary' areas
and their current pattern of consumption is more likely to fall around the core or "fixed
element" of water use. The differential impact of the introduction of volume-related
charges is apparent in the interim results of the metering trials:
About 20% of households with low rateable values are paying more than
50% extra under metered charging. For high RV properties, less than 2%
are paying more than 50% extra. In cash term, bill increases of
140+ lyear fall on 20% of low RV properties and 6% of the high RV
properties.
NMTCG (1990) p.42
Additionally, the obvious fact that demand inelasticity for utility services will differ
within, as well as between, different groups of domestic consumers (based, for example,
around household size and the water-related needs of different household types) is
illustrated in the interim results of the water metering trials:
It should be emphasised that within the relatively small percentage of
customers who are paying more there will be a very few who are
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experiencing substantial increases in their bills, perhaps at the extreme
as much as 500% or £500..
This problem appears particularly to affect families with individuals with
medical problems which require constant washing or laundry.
NMTCG (1990) p.44
The emerging data on elasticity of domestic water demand in Britain is broadly
consistent with that from countries elsewhere (OECD, 1987; Patterson, 1987; Mann,
1989; MMBW, 1991); which shows that although there appears to be a relationship
between prices and demand, the nature of this relationship is relatively weak and indirect
compared to the 'price elasticity' of commodities generally. And it suggests that, very
considerable increases in tariffs (even to a greater extent than for energy) will be
required, if reductions in domestic water consumption are to be sustained over the longer
term.
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PART 2: PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES - PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY
CHARACTERISTICS
(i) Natural Monopoly
The water and energy industries have been conventionally classified as natural
monopolies, with the attendant scenario of absence of competition and single firm
dominance. And this has often formed the substance for arguing that these public
utilities should operate within a framework of public ownership. However, the basis for
classifying electricity, gas and water services as natural monopolies is by no means
clear-cut, nor unproblematic.
The case for defining utility services, like water and energy, as natural monopoly
services has been predominately an economic one. Sharkey (1982), in one of the most
influential recent works on the subject, enunciates the core of the economic basis of
natural monopoly, when he states:
..there is natural monopoly in a particular market ([and only if a single
firm can produce the desired output at lower cost than any combination
of two or more firms. Natural monopoly is defined in terms of a single
firm's efficiency relative to the efficiency of other combinations of firms
in the industry. p.54
However, as the privatisation programme of the British Government over the last decade
has tended to illustrate, the designation of areas of production and supply as natural
monopolies (or more pertinently in a number of instances, their re-classification as 'less
than natural monopolies') is not decided on economic factors alone. That is to say, the
'least cost' economic test of what constitutes the appropriate structural arrangements for
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utility industry operation, like those indicated by Sharkey above, may be attenuated by
political objectives, such as a desire to break-up the monolithic structure of the
industries, or to introduce an element of choice, however contrived, for domestic
consumers of utility services.
In addition, the allocation of natural monopoly status to particular industries is
temporally-located, and hence it is possible that this will change over time, for as
Waterson (1988) asserts:
Whether or not an industry is a natural monopoly is not an immutable
fact. Technology and tastes (demand) are the fundamental influences, and
as these change, optimal industry organisation can change; industries
which once were in this category may be removed from it, and new
industries may become natural monopolies.
p. 145
Within these shifting boundaries of the concept of natural monopoly then, to what extent
can the water and energy industries be described as natural monopolies? In assessing the
natural monopoly characteristics of utility industries, a distinction needs to be made
between the production and supply of utility services; although this distinction is
sometimes less than clear in practice.
Generally it is argued that the production of electricity, gas and even water (via
generation, procurement, and water and sewerage systems development and management
respectively) do not bear the theoretical hallmarks of natural monopoly, for it is possible
to introduce competition and to reduce unit costs through the entry of new firms in these
areas of production. Also while it may be possible to secure cost economies of scale
through monopoly production, these are seen to be substantially outweighed by the
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efficiency and pricing gains that are derived from competitive pressures under a more
heterogeneous model of industry organisation (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Littlechild,
1988; Yarrow, 1988; Veljanovski, 1989b) 23.
Whether utility production is theoretically amenable to efficiency improvements via
direct competition (and hence would not qualify as a natural monopoly) is often, in a
practical sense, beside the point. The more important issue, from an implementation
perspective, is whether efficiency-enhancing competition is indeed likely to emerge in
the productive structure of the industries, theoretical possibilities notwithstanding.
The character of the industries, in terms of their history, capital requirements, technology
etc. may be such that new producers may be deterred from entering the field. Waterson
(1988) draws attention to the possible hiatus between theory and reality in the
production and supply of utility services in the following terms:
Of course, many natural monopoly industries are not in fact ones in
which entry, even if allowed, is easy. Entry often involves very substantial
expenditure, much of which would not be returnable if the project were
to fail. For example, a potential supplier of water to a particular area
would have to engage in earthworks whose alternative uses would be
very meagre. In such cases entry may not be attracted into the industry
even if the incumbent firm is grossly inefficient, as long as it has some
hold either on customers or over the necessary resources for supply.
p.146
Along with the high level of "sunk investment" (Vining & Weimer, 1990) involved,
another major barrier to the entry of new utility enterprises, is the possible predatory and
anti-competitive behaviour of existing monopoly producers intent on preserving their
privileged position in the market for utility services. Concern about the restrictive
practices of British Gas as the dominant producer and supplier of gas to the 'contract
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market' (i.e. large industrial and commercial users) has been a residual theme in the
regulation of the gas industry since 1986:
In spite of the strong economic factors acting in favour of a competitive
contract market, in the late 1980s, the competition stayed away. It did so
for two main reasons: first, British Gas' dominant market share enabled
it to offer bargain-basement prices to selected (usually high load factor)
customers who appeared likely targets for competition. Meanwhile, it
could subsidise its revenues by charging more to customers where
competitors did not wish to trade or could not afford the distance-related
costs of transmission. Second, insufficient gas was available for any
single competitor to take the risk of market entry. Powe (1992) p.8
The alleged anti-competitive posture of British Gas lead to the Office of Fair Trading
referring it to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) in 1987-88 and forms
the basis for the current parallel reference to the MMC by the President of the Board
of Trade and the Office of Gas Supply (see Chapter 6).
The electricity industry, likewise, is characterised by a strong suspicion that the major
producers have been engaging in anti-competitive practices, with the aim of maintaining
market dominance 2A. In an inquiry into the operation of the Pool (where electricity is
bought and sold) in late 1991, the Director General of Electricity Supply found some
evidence to support the view of major industrial customers and the RECs that the
generating companies PowerGen and, to a lesser extent, National Power had been
manipulating the Pool to their commercial advantage 25.
In contrast to production, the supply - and certainly the distribution - of water and
energy services has been viewed as rather less susceptible to the introduction of
competition; and as such they have often been referred to (until recent times, at least)
as classic exemplars of natural monopoly.
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The arguments underlying the designation of water and energy supply as natural
monopolies are essentially rooted in the fact that these services are distributed and
supplied to consumers through an extensive network of pipes or power lines 26.
Because the mechanism for supplying consumers involves a complex and capital-
intensive infrastructure, it would be inefficient, uneconomic and disruptive (to the
physical environment) to duplicate these networks, in order to provide alternative
avenues of supply (Helm, Kay & Thompson, 1988). The operational consequence of the
economic case for having a single network of water, or electricity, or gas supply, across
a given geographical area, was inevitably seen to be the existence of monopoly
provision.
In recent years, however, the seemingly immutable link between a single supply system
and monopoly provision has been challenged; particularly in relation to energy services.
Within a single distribution system, it is argued, the potential exists for the advent of
multiple carriers, each of whom would compete (in terms of price and service quality)
for business from industrial, commercial and domestic consumers. With the introduction
of appropriate metering technology, consumers would be able to switch instantly from
one supplier to another on the basis of an evaluation of which firm offers the best value
for money at any given point in time 27•
It has been argued consistently by the Director General of Electricity Supply, that this
scenario of multiple sources of supply, attuned to consumer demand, and providing
domestic consumers with the opportunity to break free of geographically-bounded
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monopoly supply, will apply in the British electricity industry following the introduction
of unrestricted competition in 1998 (01. 1, ER, 1992b). Since October 1992, firms other
than British Gas have been able to compete for the business of customers using 2,500
therms and above, and under section 37 the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act
1992, provision exists for the Secretary of State to lower, or to eliminate altogether, the
competitive market threshold in the gas industry 28 . This potentially opens up the
domestic gas market to full entry by competitors of the current monopoly supplier,
British Gas in the future. While under the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992
there is also the theoretical prospect of domestic consumers choosing their water
supplier 29 , it is generally acknowledged, not least by the regulator himself, that water
services will retain its natural monopoly features for some time to come (Byatt, 1991).
The extent to which the theoretical and policy dissolution of the natural monopoly basis
to energy supply will radically alter the monopoly base of domestic electricity and gas
supply, of course remains to be seen. As does the issue of whether similar structural and
technological changes can be effected in the water industry, which is the most naturally
monopolistic of all public utilities. It would be little more than blithe speculation to
assert with confidence, at this stage, that such a system will indeed result in concrete
gains for domestic consumers in respect to choice, price, and quality, in the provision
of utility services 3°. For the medium-term future though, in electricity and gas supply,
and for the foreseeable future in water supply, the domestic consumer will remain
subject to a regime of geographical monopoly supply, with the consequential constraints
that this places on the exercise of consumer sovereignty.
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(ii) Externalities 
The existence of externalities, as part of the process of producing and supplying energy
and water services, is an important, and increasingly controversial, dimension to the
operation of public utilities. Externalities arise, as Helm, Kay & Thompson (1988) state:
when the private costs of production and consumption are not equal to
those of society, because costs or benefits spill over to those not directly
involved. These social costs are ypically considered to be large in the
energy sector. p.44
Externalities are the systemic by-products of the method of production and supply of
energy and water services, which are effectively unaccounted for in the conventional
pricing mechanisms of the market (Pearce et al, 1989). In this sense, the existence of
externalities represents market failure, for the distribution of costs (or benefits)
associated with a particular good is not confined to the parties directly involved in its
production, exchange and consumption. The displacement of costs or benefits, under
situations where externalities exist, is further complicated by the fact that future, as well
as current generations of citizens, will experience their negative or positive outcomes.
Much of the discussion of externalities in the energy and water industries has focused
(with considerable justification) on their manifestation as negative costs; for example,
the release of large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere through fossil fuel
generation (with its consequential effect on "global warming", Donaldson & Betteridge,
1990), the ecological and social devastation caused by accidents in the nuclear power
industry, and the environmental hazard of sewerage and effluent discharges into fresh
water streams and coastal areas 31 • Public concern about the environmental impact (or
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externalities) of the water and electricity industries was a powerful undercurrent
throughout the privatisation process in both industries in Britain 32•
Yet, as the earlier definition suggests, utility externalities can also be of a positive kind
(Stiglitz, 1988) 33 . The benefits to public health of wide access to clean water supplies
and efficient effluent systems, or the macro-economic effects of a vibrant power
industry, are instances of positive externalities. This is because the sum of their
aggregate contribution to social welfare is greater than the sum of their individual
'transactional' parts.
The positive externality dimension of public utilities extends well beyond the examples
cited above. In fact, because of their overall contribution to systems maintenance, social
well-being and lifestyle enhancement, it could be argued that the paramount example of
positive externality in the water and energy industries, would reside in the universal
provision of adequate quantities of energy and water to all households. The basis for
arguing this need not be altruistic or normative, but instead could arise from a self-
interested concern about the negative externality effects of non-universal provision, in
terms, for example, of the dangers to public health, the public expenditure impost of the
treatment of hypothermia (King, 1992), the economic productivity impact of poor diet
(from lack of energy-related cooking and storage facilities), or at a more general level,
the threat to social cohesion of the exclusion of certain sectors of society from base line
quality of life services. Albon (1988) discussing positive externalities in
telecommunications states:
The subsidization of access has been argued by many economists.. The
basis for the subsidy is an externally - being on the telephone benefits
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both the individual user and all other users who can now contact the
newly connected subscriber. Externalities are notoriously difficult to
evaluate and this one is no exception. Nonetheless, there is a theoretical
case for some subsidization of access. p.104
And as is the case with externalities generally, left to its own devices, the market place
is likely to be a blunt and ineffective instrument for achieving these desired
distributional outcomes. In this respect, arguments about positive externality intersect
with the previously discussed concept of "merit goods".
A recognition of utility industry externalities, coupled with an acknowledgement that
conventional market mechanisms are unable to take account of the social costs or the
social benefits involved, infers that a level of government intervention is necessary in
order to provide a corrective for the mis-allocation of costs and benefits. Stiglitz (1988)
articulates the rationale for government involvement, when he states:
Whenever there are such externalities, the resource allocation provided
by the market may not be efficient. Since individuals do not bear the full
cost of the negative externalities they generate, they will engage in an
excessive amount of such activities; conversely, since individuals do not
enjoy the full benefits of activities generating positive externalities, they
will engage in too little of these. Thus, for example, there is a widespread
belief that without government intervention of some kind, the level of
pollution would be too high. To put it another way, pollution control
provides a positive external4y, so without government intervention there
would be an underpro vision of pollution control. p. 76
Government intervention of some sort is usually seen as the natural corollary of
externalities, but there is less agreement about the shape that government action should
take, and over the extent to which surrogate market-based solutions can be devised m.
The relative merits of using regulatory or pricing systems (although they are not in any
sense mutually exclusive), have become the axes in the debate over the most appropriate
way for governments to deal with externalities; particularly those of a negative kind.
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The set of possible regulatory actions, designed to ameliorate the dysfunctional
environmental outcomes of utility production and consumption, lie on a continuum from
dirigiste forms of state intervention and ownership, to the enforcement of minimalist
standards (in areas like pollution control) within a private sector utility industry
structure. Recourse to ownership as a means of controlling negative externalities, has
increasingly fallen out of favour with policy-makers and academic analysts alike. While
the British Government has clearly been in the forefront of this disaffection with
ownership as a regulatory device, other governments - with ostensibly less of an
ideological axe to grind - have tended to mimic the arguments against conjoint state
stewardship of utility industries and the environment (see, for example, Australian
Industries Assistance Commission, 1989; Industry Commission, 1991a) 35 . What might
be described as the 'empirical' (as opposed to the ideological) argument against
ownership as effective regulation, is outlined by Helm & Pearce (1990):
Is regulation likely to be tougher and easier to impose and monitor in the
private or public sector? The intuitive and conventional answer that
greater control is engendered through ownership is highly misleading. It
may be better not to own the regulatee. The problem can be modelled
through 'principal-agent' analysis. The incentives of government
regulators needs first to be assessed. If they also own the polluter, they
are likely to be susceptible to its financial performance. In the public
sector, a politician is answerable for the performance of the firm, and
will inevitably want to defend its record. In the UK water industry,
Government Ministers frequently acted as de facto apologists for the low
standards of water quality. Now that the industry is privatised, Ministers
are still answerable for water quality, but have no financial responsibility
to the shareholders of the water companies. There is an incentive gain
through privatisation. p.12
Even with the incentive gain that arguably accrues from the separation of ownership
from regulation, formidable difficulties are said to stand in the way of regulation as the
'leading edge' of externality control. No matter how precisely a government, or its
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regulatory agencies, set standards for the performance of utility industries vis-a-vis
environmental management, the problem of effective monitoring and enforcement of
these standards remains acute.
In addition to the informational and financial imposts associated with external agency
regulation of utilities as complex and heterogenous as those found in the water and
electricity industries in Britain, there is the danger (based in the American experience,
e.g. Swann, 1988; Weyman-Jones, 1989) of 'regulatory capture'; i.e. the co-optation of
the enforcement agency by the regulated industries 36 (see next Chapter).
Partly because of these factors, a superior alternative to government regulation in
addressing negative externalities, is seen to reside in the use of the market pricing
system 37. Although the specific elements of a market-based approach to
environmental management differ, they essentially revolve around the introduction of
new forms of taxation; designed both to offset the costs of environmental damage and
to act as a deterrent to the production and consumption of utility services with high
negative externality effects. In this sense, reference to them as "market-based solutions"
is a misnomer, for they represent government-imposed 'environmental taxes' and not
some form of price adjustment that emerges endogenously out of the market mechanism.
Among the more commonly discussed types of environmental taxes are carbon taxes
(paid either at source by the industries or at the point of consumption by the
consumer 38), a generic value-added tax (on all domestic fuel), pollution permits (which
are purchased and can be subsequently traded), and fines for breaches of environmental
standards.
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Apart from having the potential for generating substantial amounts of revenue, which
could be used to counteract environmental damage 39, environmental taxes allow for
the apportionment of costs to those industries where the negative externality effects are
greatest; although the precision with which this will occur depends on the type of tax
adopted 4°. Despite the fact that these taxes are formally predicated on the "polluter
pays" principle, it will be consumers of environmentally damaging goods who, directly
or indirectly, will be required to carry the bulk (if not the entirety) of the additional
costs involved. David Pearce, environmental economics advisor to the Secretary of State
for the Environment in 1990 and a leading advocate of environmental taxes, explains the
rationale for this when he says:
Making the consumer of the polluting product pay some of the clean-up
cost may seem at odds with the PPP [Polluter Pays Principle] but in fact
it is exactly what should happen. For the price mechanism now signals
the "true" costs of production to the consumer, comprising normal costs
of production and the hitherto free environmental inputs. This is how the
"green power of market forces" works.
Pearce et al (1989), p.158
The power of "green taxes" to raise revenue is one thing, but their ability to
substantially re-shape the behaviour of either the utility industries or that of domestic
and non-domestic consumers of utility services, is another. The inelastic nature of water
and energy demand will manifestly weaken the signal of increased prices; although this
will be less the case with energy, where there is the possibility of substituting electricity
with the cleaner technology of gas in some areas of household consumption. Research
from the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Pearson & Smith, 1990, 1991) indicates that,
following the introduction of carbon-related taxes, a long lead time is required for any
significant drop in consumption to occur. Also, the ability of industries to pass on the
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additional production and supply costs associated with "green taxes" may well inhibit
their impact on the environmental practices of utility concerned.
Thus far the introduction of environmental taxes, such as a carbon tax, has been resisted
by the British government (although Fells & Lucas, 1991, describe the fossil fuel levy
as "a primitive carbon tax", p.72) 41 , but they are almost certain to become a prominent
feature of the utility policy landscape internationally over the next decade. In September
1991, the European Commission announced plans for the introduction in 1993 of a
carbon/energy tax throughout the member states of the European Community. It is
proposed that this carbon/energy tax be phased in over a period of eight years, and it
is estimated that it will increase the price of coal by 60 per cent and the price of gas by
one third (Pearson & Smith, 1991, p.14). The additional revenue generated by the tax -
estimated at over 42 billion ECU in 1988 prices 42 - would be distributed back to the
member states to use as they wish, although,
..the Commission's proposals stress that the tax should be introduced on
a revenue-neutral basis - in other words, the revenue should be used to
reduce other taxes rather than to increase public spending.
Smith & Pearson (1991) p.1
If revenues from the tax are used in this way, it will have the effect as Pearson & Smith
point out of being doubly regressive, in that tax cuts in other areas will largely benefit
the well-off, while the application of a flat-rate carbon tax on energy consumption will
have a disproportionately negative impact on the budgets of low income households.
122
Notwithstanding their possible merit as a means of identifying and allocating negative
externality costs therefore, environmental taxes raise substantial social policy issues
(Boardman, 1990). Of particular importance is the distributional effect that value-added,
pollution and carbon taxes will have on domestic consumers; most notably, low-income
consumers. hi a context where 'price inelasticity of demand' is high, an increase in
water and energy prices, to meet the costs of environmental externalities will ceteris
paribus impinge more heavily upon low-income households. Attention is drawn to this
by Helm & Pearce (1990):
Income effects from taxes may at least partially offset the substitution
effect. Many goods produced by polluting technologies are merit goods.
Electricity, transport, and water are obvious examples and the resulting
demand behaviour from taxes may conflict with distributional objectives.
Indeed, in the case of a tax on electricity, the substitution effect is very
small, while the income effect is large. p.13
Kiers (1983) expresses the distributive problem rather more directly when she says:
It is particularly important to note that many of the measures available
for substantially reducing energy consumption cost money. It is therefore
likely to be higher-income earners who will be able to afford to adjust
their consumption levels. It is the low income earners, many of whom
may have already adopted all the available inexpensive measures to
reduce costs and are depriving themselves of comfort who can least
afford to contain the ever increasing percentage of their budget necessary
to pay essential energy bills. p.5
An analysis of the distributional effects of the introduction of a 15 per cent value added
tax on electricity and gas, carried out by the Institute for Fiscal Studies in 1990 (using
Family Expenditure Survey data), highlights the disproportionate impact that
environmental taxes are likely to have on certain classes of domestic consumers:
The distributional effects of the change are strongly adverse. The
increase in tax paid by households in the lowest decile by income would
be £1 per week and that of the richest 10 per cent of households would
be around £2, yet the richest decile are sixteen times richer before tax
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than the poorest. Worse still, the poorest decile cut their consumption of
energy by 10 per cent, whereas the richest decile would hardly reduce
their consumption at all.
Pearson & Smith (1990) p.12
The more recent analysis of the distributional consequences of the proposed European
carbon tax by the same authors confirms these findings (see Pearson & Smith, 1991,
Chapter 5; also Tasman Institute, 1992 for similar conclusions about the impact of
carbon taxes in the Australian context).
The major implication of the regressive impact of environmental taxes is that
compensatory mechanisms will need to be devised to ensure that low income households
are not substantially disadvantaged in the important public policy quest to reduce global
warming. These would need to take several forms including, the provision of additional
social security benefits to offset price increases, and the extension of energy efficiency
programmes (i.e. capital grants, energy efficiency advice and information) designed to
ensure that low income households have the capacity to substitute and conserve energy,
without experiencing a decline in their overall quality of life. Only in this way, as
Johnson et al (1990) suggest would the twin goals of environmental care and social
justice be reconciled:
Where specific heating objectives form part of the aims of public policy,
reliance on higher taxes and income compensation alone is likely to put
environmental policy and these other objectives at odds. Policies aiming
to encourage insulation and thermal efficiency, especially in poorer
households, would then appear a necessaty adjunct of policies, such as
environmental taxation, which aimed to reduce the overall level of
domestic use.
Johnson et al (1990) p.52
Significantly, in this context it is most unlikely that environmental taxation measures
could be 'revenue neutral'.
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In the area of water services, consumers are already subject to a form of 'water
environment tax'. This arises from the £26 billion programme (1989 prices), introduced
at the time of privatisation, to clean up the water-related environment. Because of these
environmental improvements, water charges are expected to rise on average around 5-
6% above inflation each year between 1990 to 2000; excluding the 'pass through' costs
of the water industry meeting  additional European Commission environmental directives.
The flat-rate nature of these increases in water charges, in tandem with the inelastic
character of domestic water consumption, means that they will have a regressive effect
similar to that of carbon taxes.
The use of general taxation revenue would have provided a progressive (in a taxation
sense) alternative to the financing of necessary environmental improvements in the water
industry, but clearly this would have confounded the fiscal management objectives of
the Government in the water privatisation programme (see Chapter 4). The need to
increase social security benefits in order to off-set the financially detrimental impact of
substantially increased water charges on low income households was not formally
recognised by the Government until October 1991 (see Chapter 7).
One of the more striking aspects of the vigorously argued case for the superiority of the
price mechanism (and targeted taxation measures) in dealing with externalities, is that
there is considerably less enthusiasm for using this approach in promoting positive
externalities; most notably those that contain a distributive or welfare element. If the
manipulation of prices and taxes can legitimately be applied to the task of tackling
negative externalities, it would seem to follow that they might be deployed with similar
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justification and efficacy in positive externality areas, such as extending access to utility
services (through, for example, the provision of subsidies for the payment of energy and
water bill payments in low-income households). Advocates of environmental taxes, such
as Pearce et al (1989) and Helm & Pearce (1990) appear to recognise that compensation
is often required in order to reduce their regressive effect on low-income households:
..an energy tax tends to be regressive in so far as the poor and aged
respond less in terms of energy conservation than do the better off and
younger sections of society. But many taxes are regressive and
mechanisms to offset the regressiveness do exist, eg. through other tax or
benefit concessions.
Pearce et al (1989) p.164
But usually only remedial measures are envisaged under the "theory of pricing" as a
device for the management of externalities, rather than a more proactive strategy for
access and equity in the provision of utility services.
A more proactive strategy, like the approach to environmental pollution, would be
premised on strong government action aimed at influencing externality outcomes. To an
extent, the positive externality objective would require an inversion of the goal of
environmental economics of shifting the distribution of costs from the social to the
private sphere (or from society at large, to individuals). This could be justified on both
social justice and self-interest grounds. The former relates to the status of water and
energy as "merit" or "participation goods". In the case of the latter, some of the costs
which attend insufficient access to utility goods by certain households will, directly or
indirectly, be borne by a larger section of society, and hence warrant collective action
aimed at their prevention.
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(iii) The pricing of utility services 
The drive towards the privatisation and 'commercialisation' of public utilities has served
to sharpen a long-standing debate - amongst economists, and between consumer
advocates and the industries concerned - on the question of what is the most appropriate
system of charging for utility services.
The elements contained in this debate on charging are intricate and often, highly
technical in their exposition. But essentially they can be distilled into one issue namely,
should the industries formulate their charges (for each unit of consumption) on the basis
of the actual costs involved or should the setting of charges be influenced by factors
other than simply unit costs? Additional factors which could be taken into account in
any charging formula include, 'equalisation' considerations (i.e. a similar framework of
charges within a defined geographical area), a desire to structure charges competitively
in the most demand elastic sector of the market (`Ramsey pricing'), and ability to pay
concerns.
Inevitably, if the industries are to be financially viable, charging systems which deviate
from the actual (marginal) costs of production and supply, will require an element of
direct or indirect cross-subsidisation. This is because the application of attenuated
charges for one group of consumers will need to be offset by the use of marginal cost-
plus charges for other categories of consumers (direct cross-subsidisation). Alternatively,
revenue shortfalls resulting from artificially low prices for particular sectors of the
consumer population - e.g. large industrial, low income or rural consumers - could be
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supplemented by government subsidies, in the form of direct grants or taxation
allowances, to the industries concerned (indirect cross-subsidisation) 43. Taken to its
extreme, this latter approach would involve the full financing of utility services through
the taxation system, rather than through user charges, and organisations such as the
Welsh Consumer Council have argued, in the past, that this would be an appropriate
way of funding water services (NCC, 1991b).
The case against the structuring of utility charges to reflect anything other than the true
costs of supply, is most often framed around arguments about efficiency and efficacy
(e.g. Musgrave & Musgrave, 1984; Webb, 1976, 1978; Helm, Kay & Thompson 1988;
Industries Assistance Commission, 1989). First, it is held that the introduction of factors
other than actual costs into the charging equation, undermines both allocative and
productive efficiency. In the former, because they distort consumer pricing signals which
in turn leads to the misuse (i.e. the over- or under-utilisation) of utility services, and in
the latter, because cross-subsidies can be used to disguise ineffective organisational
performance and poor productivity.
Second, it is argued that the manipulation of utility tariffs to achieve 'welfare objectives'
(like geographical and vertical equity), represents a crude, ineffective and possibly even
counterproductive, device for influencing distributional outcomes (e.g. Rees, 1981).
Commenting in the mid-1970s on what he described as the "equalisation bug", Williams
expressed this concern as follows:
I cannot help feeling that water charges are a very inappropriate, clumsy
and ineffective way to deal with the social injustices which flow from the
inequalities in income and wealth in our society, and if the pattern of
water charges were significantly adapted with this end in view, then they
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may well prove self-defeating (like rent control) because they may well
dry up the supply of the underpriced good altogether. For if water
authorities are still to break even, other people's charges will rise, with
consequent increasing political resistance to service expansion in low-
revenue-yielding areas.. pp.5 -6
The view that tariff manipulation aimed at assisting low-income households is, at best,
distributionally-imprecise, is given empirical support in the research of Bradshaw &
Hutton (1983) and Dilnot & Helm (1987). The analysis by Franlcham & Webb (1977)
of the likely effect of the proposed introduction (in 1976) of a national equalisation
policy of water charging, raised substantial queries about the distributive merit of a
uniform pricing system for water.
The case for moving beyond the confined parameters of unit cost considerations, in the
calculation of utility charges, stems from two very different roots; although on occasions
the two may, inadvertently, intertwine. The first is built on an assessment of which
system of charges is most likely to further the commercial interests of the utility
industry concerned. Potentially, the structure of charges devised through this commercial
prism, may conflict with the costing prescriptions of pure economics. For example, the
use of a 'competitive' schedule of charges in the more volatile and demand elastic areas
of consumption (i.e. in the 1 MW and above sector in the electricity industry) may
deviate from marginal unit cost requirements - and hence breach a fundamental
economic precept - but it may also be in the best long-term interests of the utility firm
to do so (in terms of securing new business etc.). Also, as the Australian Industries
Assistance Commission report (1989) points out, the use of equalisation measures may
make more commercial sense than many economists seem to allow:
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As in the case of private enterprise, a public firm may adopt uniform
pricing as a sensible commercial decision to avoid the expense of
accurately costing every unit of the good or service supplied. p.F-4
Presumably, this sort of consideration underlies the national standard pricing practices
of many large retailers in Britain, such as Sainsbury, Tesco and Marks & Spencer.
The second set of arguments for a more flexible approach to utility charging are built
around a desire to use the charging mechanism to promote equity objectives. Also,
arguably, they connote a rather different conceptualisation of the purpose and function
of public utilities in contemporary society than that envisaged by the advocates of full
cost pricing; i.e. one that implicates the public utilities directly in the promotion of
universal access to utility services.
Equity, as Frankham & Webb (1977) and Rees (1981, 1992) caution, is a normative and
imprecise concept; but in its application to utility charging it appears to be founded on
two quasi-philosophical precepts: the 'benefit principle', and the 'ability to pay'
principle. The 'benefit principle' suggests that "charges to consumers should be related
to the benefits which they receive from the supply of particular goods or services"
(Franlcham & Webb, ibid, p.198; see also Beatley, 1988); and hence where these benefits
are similar, charges should be similar. In this sense it could be used to support a case
for the application of a uniform schedule of energy or water charges for domestic
consumers - irrespective of where they live - as the benefits that accrue will be broadly
the same (a variant of horizontal equity) 41. The case for the 'equalisation' of water and
energy charges, within and between different regions of the country, can also be argued
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on externality grounds, in that it encourages population dispersal, and obviates the rise
of pervasive ill-effects that attend under-consumption; particularly in respect to water.
The 'ability to pay' principle is more assertively re-distributive in its focus, and implies
that intervention in the pricing system is necessary if equal access to adequate levels of
utility services is to be achieved. This may necessitate, for example, the setting of a
scale of utility charges for domestic consumers, that is roughly proportional to the
amount of disposable income held. Kiers (1983) argues in favour of this approach:
Given what we know of the persisting differences in the consumption of
energy necessities by different income groups, the reduction in these
inequalities and the redistribution of energy resources should be
regarded as a valid objective of government policy. At the very least, this
requires that energy prices be structured progressively, in much the same
way that the income tax system, for all its faults, attempts a measure of
income redistribution through progressive structures. Energy tariffs
should not be allowed to undermine the objectives built into the social
security system. p.29
Additionally, it has been suggested that ability to pay objectives could be furthered by
actions such as, eliminating the standing charge (although the equity outcomes of this
are, at best, unreliable 45), and through the provision of seasonal concessions to low-
income households (e.g. reductions in energy bills for pensioners over the winter
months) 46.
The British system of charging for energy and water services, to date, might be
described as pragmatic and eclectic, rather than being built primarily on economic
pricing principles. And while there has progressively been a general movement towards
the full economic cost approach - stimulated by tighter financing controls in the 1970s
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and by privatisation imperatives from the mid-1980s onwards - the structure of charges
in the electricity, gas and water industries contain strong residual elements of a number
of different approaches to charging.
This is reflected in the continuing application of uniform charges within regional
boundaries in most cases (and indeed in the case of British Gas, uniform tariffs across
the country 47), the apportionment of an element of unit costs within standing charges
(particularly in the water industry) 48, and in the differential setting of charging
schedules in order to gain competitive advantage.
The domain of charging that has attracted the least interest amongst British utilities
historically has been in relation to the issue of ability to pay; where under the protective
guise of being statutorily obliged to avoid 'undue discrimination' between classes of
consumers, the utilities have generally been circumspect about assuming, what they
perceive as, an invidious social security role. Writing in the early 1980s, Bradshaw (in
Bradshaw & Harris, eds., 1983, p.105) remarked that "to date economic rather than
social objectives have continued to determine both the level and structure of prices".
However, a number of pricing initiatives aimed at assisting low income consumers have
been introduced for short periods in the past with mixed success. These include the
Labour Government-funded "Electricity Discounts Scheme" during the mid to late 1970s
(involving a 25 per cent discount on the winter electricity bills of social security
beneficiaries), and the area electricity boards' "Domestic Standing Charge Rebate
Scheme" in 1982-1985 49.
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Much has been made of the what Williams described as the "equalisation bug" in the
utility industries, where as a result of cross-subsidisation, consumers in certain areas of
the country are seen to have been insulated from the true costs of production and supply.
Yet, in practice, the water - and to a lesser extent, the energy industries - have been
characterised by significant regional variations in charges. This is illustrated for the
water industry in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 on the pages that follow; where it is evident that
up to privatisation the pattern of variability in inter-regional domestic charges remained
reasonably constant over time.
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Figure 2.7: Average household water services bills 1982/83 and 1988/89
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Figure 2.8: Variations in water services charges 1982/83 and 1988/89
As the privatisation (and competitive) regime develops, it is not only likely that
differences in domestic water charges between regions across England and Wales will
increase, but the injunction to "let costs lie where they fall" will possibly result in the
creation of large price variations within individual water company areas. This was
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foreshadowed in the Office of Water Services Charging Policy Consultation Document
published in May 1990:
There is the further issue.. of the extent to which tariffs should reflect
differences in cost across a company's area, between different times of
the day or year, and for different qual4y of service. p.2
In the new framework of utility industry organisation in Britain, the system of
formulating charges for utility services is likely to be subject to considerable re-
conceptualisation and change. The moves to establish water metering as a primary
method of charging for water (OFWAT, 1991u; DoE/Welsh Office, 1992 - see Chapter
6) is one expression of Ns.
The regulatory challenge - as much for the Government as for the industry regulators -
is to see that the principle of horizontal equity occupies a place in the structure of utility
charges, as well as to ensure that the demand inelastic (domestic consumer) side of the
market is not disadvantaged in the competitive struggle for large industrial and
commercial custom. In a discussion of the RPI+K pricing formula in the water industry,
Rees (1989, p.8) draws attention to this fundamental regulatory problem:
Under the proposed tariff  basket system price controls apply to the
average charge increase across services, consumers and tariff elements.
Some price rises could therefore, far exceed the average as long as
others are below it. In these circumstances a profit maximising company
has every incentive to restructure its tariffs to ensure more rapid price
rises for standing charges, consumers and services with inelastic
demands, and for customers in strongly growing sectors of the business.
In practice cross subsidisation is likely to occur, as indeed it does now.
Almost inevitably, under privatisation, the opportunity for using the structure of utility
charges to further vertical equity objectives, unless accompanied by substantial public
subsidies, will disappear altogether.
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CONCLUSION
In this Chapter it has been argued that public utility services display particular
characteristics which, in composite, substantially differentiate them from most other
commodities and services in the economy. While it is true that some other commodities
share one or two of the features of public utility services (e.g. food and housing in terms
of 'essentialness'), no other area of human consumption manifests the array of complex
demand and supply attributes found in public utility services. Because of this, it is
inappropriate to assert - as has been the case in government and industry circles in
recent times - that public utility services are essentially no different from other
commodities and that as such their production and distribution should be devolved to
market forces alone.
The life enhancing products, and potentially life destroying by-products, of public utility
services places them in the front line as determinants of contemporary quality of life,
at both an individual household and societal level. And this, in combination with the
structural characteristics of the industries, which will be monopolistic for some time to
come for ordinary consumers at least, invariably means that the random stewardship of
the free market will be inadequate to the task of managing the major distributional and
environmental issues implicit in the provision of public utility services.
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This Chapter has illustrated how water and energy services provision is interwoven with
major questions of public policy and as such the state is inevitably implicated in the
management of public utilities, irrespective of where the locus of ownership lies.
The function of the state is first and foremost a regulatory one, aimed at ensuring that
the strategic contribution of the public utilities is directed at constructive economic and
social ends. In addition, the state has a vital financing role to play, aimed at securing
equity of access to utility services.
The next Chapter examines the regulatory function of the state and in particular, it
explores the emerging model of public utility regulation in Britain.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 2
1. Waterson (1988, p.122) suggests that privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation are
the three dominant contemporary forms of "experimentation with the loosening of
control" of natural monopolies.
2. See, for example, Industry Commission (1991a) Energy Generation and Distribution,
Volume 1: Summary and Recommendations, Canberra: Australian Government
Publishing Service; Industry Commission (1992) Water resources and waste water
disposal: Draft Report, Canberra; Public Bodies Review Committee (1991b) Discussion
Paper on Corporatisation, Melbourne, October 1991; Economic and Budget Review
Committee. (1991) Out on the Table: The Cost of CommuniO, Service Obligations,
Thirty-Second Report to the Parliament, Melbourne: Parliament of Victoria.
3. This change of meaning might be characterised simply, as the movement away from
the use of the term 'public utility' as connoting a form of public service (with all that
this implies), to its use primarily to describe the production and distribution of essential
infrastructural services. Interestingly, however, Sherman (1989, p.14) defines a public
utility as "a privately owned corporation serving public purposes". [author's emphasis].
See Ogden (1991) for a discussion of how the "discourse of accounting" has permeated
the water industry.
4. The major generic consumer protection statutes in the UK are outlined by Swann
(1988) p.30.
5. The test of 'social viability' (i.e. what would be deemed to be acceptable under
contemporary living standard norms) would clearly exclude the use of 'technically
viable' forms such as candles and paraffin lamps for lighting.
"In the domestic market about half of total electricity consumption is estimated to go
on applications for which there is no effective substitute for electricity (such as
lighting)." OFFER (1991) Energy Efficiency Consultation Paper, p.8
6. "Once a public good is produced, non-excludability makes it impossible to prevent
people from using it, hence it is not possible to levy charges (this is the free-rider
problem); in such cases the market may fail entirely. Non-rivalness implies that the
marginal cost of an extra user (though not of an extra unit of output) is zero. The
efficient price should therefore be based on individual marginal valuations of the good,
i.e. on perfect price discrimination; where this is not possible, the market is likely to be
inefficient. If a public good is to be provided at all, the appropriate form of intervention
is generally public production." Barr (1987) p.83
7. Under the consolidated water legislation enacted in 1991, this provision is now
contained in section 147 of the Water Industry Act 1991.
8. Under Condition H of the Instrument of Appointment of the Water and Sewerage
Undertakers, county court action is generally required before the disconnection of
domestic customers can occur. Whereas under Condition 19 of the Public Electricity
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Supply Licence, based on the Condition 12A amendment to British Gas' licence, an
electricity company is only obliged to offer a prepayment meter to a defaulting tariff
customer "where safe and practical to do so", as an alternative to, disconnection.
9. Head (1974) concludes similarly:
Since merit goods are those satis.6)ing merit wants, merit goods may be
defined as those of which, due to impetfect knowledge, individuals would
chose to consume too little. In such cases the government should
intervene to encourage consumption. p.216
10. An obverse relationship is also, of course, seen to apply i.e. that price responds to
demand.
11. "..households tend to spend a relatively fixed amount on fuel regardless of income.
They tend to spend what they need." Bradshaw (in Bradshaw & Harris, eds., 1983) p.5
12. Also the fact that, until recently, the cost of water services was viewed as a minor
item in the expenditure of most households, may have contributed to a neglect of the
distributional consequences of water charges.
13. "For low-income households fuel is the third largest expenditure commodity after
food and housing" Bradshaw (in Bradshaw & Harris, eds., 1983, p.5). In 1990, fuel
remained the third largest area of expenditure for the lowest income quintile (after
housing and food). For the median quintile, on the other hand, fuel was the seventh
largest area of expenditure out of the fourteen commodity groupings in the FES.
14. Dilnot & Helm (1988, p.34) also view this as confirmation of energy's "merit goods"
status:
This pattern [of expenditure] strongly suggests that we could think of
energy as being a merit good, the consumption of which forms a vital
part of life.
15. "as expected, the likelihood of a house or flat becoming cold appears to be largely
governed by its energy efficiency, particularly the availability of a comprehensive and
efficient heating system, and by the income of the household governing the fuel
consumption" English House Condition Survey 1986: Supplementary (Energy) Report
DoE (1992b), p.51. A recent analysis of the 1986 English House Condition Survey by
the Institute for Fiscal Studies has contested the importance of income as a factor in
energy efficiency investment, rather it found a much closer association between the latter
and type of tenure, i.e. private and council tenants are far less likely to reside in an
energy efficient home (Brechling & Smith, 1992). Of course, in many ways, tenure
might be treated as a proxy for level of household income.
16. A similar finding is given in the Institute for Fiscal Studies examination of the
proposed European carbon tax (Pearson & Smith, 1991, pp.16-17):
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Microeconometric estimates of the effects of higher energy prices on the
demand for domestic energy and petrol by private households seem to
confirm this general conclusion that the price elasticity of demand for
energy is low. Estimates using the IFS model of consumer expenditures
indicate that an increase in domestic energy price of 15 per cent would
cut energy consumption by 5.5 per cent..
17. Reflected, for example, in the gas and electricity industries 'interruptible' and non-
peak load contracts with industrial and commercial customers.
18. A summary account of the 'history' of interest in water metering is given in
OFWAT (1990d) Annexe 7.
Writing in the mid-1970s Williams (undated), alluding to the water metering studies
carried out in Fylde and Malvern, states:
At the lower end of the scale, price elasticities of-0.1 have been reported
for domestic water (i.e. the proportionate fall in utilisation is one-tenth
of the proportional rise in price) but figures as high as -1.0 have also
been found (i.e. utilisation falls in the same proportion as the price
increase). Thus the actual magnitude is clearly of some significance, and
the British data is vet)) scant on this matter. p.8
19. These figures are exclusive of the costs of installing meters in domestic properties;
which are estimated in the Second Interim Report to cost on average between £165-£200
per property (depending on whether they are internally or externally located).
20. How this information from the water metering trials underlines the 'inelasticity' of
demand for water, is made apparent in the following technical definition of 'price
elasticity of demand' by Norton (1984, p.15):
..if a price increase of 5% leads to a 5% reduction in demand (that is a
change of -5%), the coefficient E [price elasticity of demand] = -I, and
demand is neither elastic nor inelastic. Where the percentage change in
quantity demanded is less than the percentage change in price, E will lie
between -1 and 0, and demand will be inelastic. An E less than -I (say, -
1.5) means that the percentage change in quantity demanded is greater
than the percentage change in price, and demand is elastic.
21. Athough some limited information on this issue was gathered in the Department of
the Environment/OFWAT sponsored study into the Social Impact of Metering (1992u)
conducted in 1992. The major findings of this research are discussed in Chapter 6.
22. The percentage difference, on a per capita basis, in annual water consumption (April
1989 to March 1990) between the highest and lowest consuming groups - 'affluent
suburban housing' and 'mixed council estates' respectively - was 36% (or 16 cubic
metres per person per year). NMTCG, 1990, p.53.
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23. This view has underpinned the British Government's approach to electricity
privatisation (White Paper, 1988); albeit that the breakup of the monopoly generating
power of the CEGB, via the creation of National Power, PowerGen and Nuclear Electric,
has been rather less ambitious than free market advocates have sought.
In contrast, the water industry has been privatised minus any substantive change in the
monopoly production position of the previous water authorities. The earlier privatisation
of British Gas similarly retained the monopoly production position of the former
nationalised gas utility.
It need not, by any means, automatically follow that the introduction of competition will
impact positively on price (i.e. result in reduced prices). Nelson (1990), for example, in
a study of the effects of competition on publicly-owned electricity utilities in the U.S.
found that:
„competitive plants had higher generating costs than monopoly plants for
most output levels. In addition, it appears that operating costs would fall
significantly if a single monopolist were to replace two competitors in a
given market. p.48
Although his explanation of the possible reasons for this is rather ambiguous
(see pp. 48-9).
24. This, as with gas, preceded privatisation. The failure of the 1983 Energy Act to
engender a measure of competition in the electricity generation industry in Britain, for
example, has been attributed, in part, to the 'anti-competitive behaviour' of the Central
Electricity Generating Board at the time (e.g. Weyman-Jones in Button & Swann, 1989).
25. During one period, PowerGen followed a policy of declaring some plant
unavailable which was subsequently redeclared available. This policy
increased Pool Prices, and introduced greater uncertainty into the
market. I conclude that it represented an abuse of the company's
dominant market position.
The interests of customers would be served, and confidence in the Pool
increased, if the two major generators were not able to manipulate availability
so as to exercise monopoly power. I therefore propose a new licence condition
on National Power and PowerGen explicitly to prohibit monopolistic or anti-
competitive behaviour in relation to the availability of plant and the closure or
mothballing of stations [change to Licence, new Condition 9A, made in June
1992; applicable to Nuclear Electric as well as the other two generators]. It
would oblige a licensee to publish information relating to these matters, and to
establish arrangements under which it will seek to establish whether, and if so
at what price, others would be willing to purchase any power station which it
intends to close or mothball. OFFER (1991m) p.3
See Helm & Powell (1992) for an analysis of the workings of the Pool over the
first couple of years of operation.
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26. "Natural monopolies arise most frequently in networks.." Helm, Kay & Thompson
(1988) p.47
27. This system of competitive supply is somewhat analogous to the way that the
privatised regional electricity companies and second tier supply companies notionally
purchase electricity from the generators via the Pool.
28. The Government has indicated that it will review the limits on competition in the
gas market in May 1993. This will no doubt take into account the findings of the MMC
which is due to report around the same time.
29. Under section 41 of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992, domestic
consumers can technically choose a water supplier other than the one in whose area they
are located. The connection costs associated with this (i.e. laying of separate pipes etc.)
preclude it from being a realistic choice at this point.
30. The informational demands of a domestic variant of the electricity Pool system, from
the individual consumer's perspective, are likely to be extremely exacting, which may
outweigh any benefits accrued. Also as is the case with complex consumer-information
systems, it is likely to discriminate against the elderly, the disabled and the
disadvantaged. Although hardly an "unrestricted competitive environment", the evidence
from the advent of competition in the British telecommunications industry tends to
indicate that it has been the business user rather than the domestic customer who has
been the primary beneficiary (Bishop & Kay, 1988; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988).
31. The report on water privatisation prepared for the Campaign for the Protection of
Rural England, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, and the World Wildlife
Fund by Bowers et al (1988) gives an extended example of the interactional externalities
in the water industry:
The key water services are users of a freely available natural resource, water. In one
case the industry is merely supplying that resource with minimum of processing to
ensure potability to consumers, in the other it is using that resource as a medium of
transport of waste products. These are not the only uses made of common property:
industry and agriculture directly discharge waste products into the system and draw
from it without the interposition of the water and sewerage companies. Parts of the
system are also used for fisheries and for water transport as well as for various forms
of recreation. Competing users impose costs on other users and in extreme cases can
render the resource unsuitable for other users. These costs are not controlled through
the markets for water based products and uncontrolled use - uncontrolled competition
- can lead to the depletion or destruction of the resource. This phenomenon is known
usually as the 'tragedy of the commons'. p.9
32. Paradoxically, arguments about the negative externalities associated with these
industries (and the action required to address them) were used by both the proponents
and opponents of utility privatisation to support their case. The Thatcher Government
vigorously invoked the spectre of water-related externalities, and the need for private
capital investment to correct them, in the months leading up to the flotation of the water
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industry. This argument was reiterated, after water privatisation, by the then chairman
of the Conservative Party:
This year, the now privatised water industry is preparing to invest £28
billion over the next 10 years to improve the puriol of drinking water and
to clean up further our rivers and beaches. .No one could have expected
that as a nationalised industry the water authorities would ever have
invested so much. Our environment will now directly be improved by our
privatLation programme. Kenneth Baker in The Observer, 14/10/90
33. In many instances, positive externalities are the mirror image of negative
externalities.
34. Although, the confused policy position of the Thatcher Government on the
environment reflected a marked reluctance to acknowledge that even a minimal degree
of government intervention is necessary to deal with environmental problems. This was
reaffirmed in the release of the Government's muted White Paper on the environment
(This Common Inheritance: Britain's Environmental Strategy, Cm 1200) in 1990. In
seeking an explanation for the ineffectualness of the White Paper, The Guardian
(Comment, 26/9/90) stated:
There is no inherent contradiction between conservatism and
conservation, but it does pose problems for Mrs Thatcher and her
philosophic objections to the three necessary mechanisms: public
expenditure, regulation, and a national strategy.
Even advocates of market-based remedies, like Helm & Pearce (1990) who describe the
call for greater state intervention, as a "simplistic approach" (p.10), envisage a clear
regulatory role for government:
The presumption in favour of market-based policies does not, however,
imply the unfettered operation of market forces. Rather, the market
should be harnessed to generate the most efficient method of achieving
desired pollution reductions. The role of the state is to regulate through
command and control procedures, in setting maximum pollution levels.
The role of the market is to find the best method of achieving them. p.14
35. Evidence of the environmental holocaust wrought by state managed industries in
Eastern Europe has considerably strengthened the voice of anti-statist policy makers and
lobbyists.
36. The notion of 'regulatory capture' is, in some respects, a variant of the arguments
of the 'public choice' school of political theory about the failure of democracy to control
the executive branch of government.
37. Although, in practice, the use of market pricing measures does not negate the need
for some form of government regulation. See, for example, Helm & Pearce (1990).
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38. The distinction is useful only in that it identifies the point and possible means of tax
collection, for in reality under either system, it will be the consumer who ultimately
bears the cost. See Pearson & Smith, 1991, Chapter 4 for a discussion of the pros and
cons of different systems of collecting carbon taxes.
39. But they may not necessarily be used for this purpose. Indeed the proposed
European Community carbon tax is designed to be 'revenue neutral' and it is likely that
the additional tax impost resulting from the collection of carbon taxes would need to be
off-set by reductions in other areas of taxation (see Pearson & Smith, 1991, for a
discussion of this).
40. On a continuum of precision in the apportionment of energy carbon dioxide costs,
for instance, the "scattergun" end would be represented by a generic value-added tax
on fuel, with the more closely targeted end comprising a tax on individual power station
plants, according to volume of CO2 emissions.
41. This was reflected in the absence of proposals for the introduction of a carbon tax
in the Conservative Government's environment White Paper This Common Inheritance
in 1990, despite the fact that the then Secretary of State for the Environment, Chris
Patten, favoured such measures:
..proposals by the former Environment Secretary, Chris Patten, to
introduce carbon taxes were blocked by Mrs Thatcher, who was hostile
to green pricing policies which would interfere with the operation of the
free market. The Guardian, 30/12/90
The British Labour Party gave broad, if rather hesitant, support to the introduction of
"green taxes" in its policy review (Looking to the Future, 1990, p.20) and in its paper
on the environment, An earthly chance (October, 1990). At the same time it rejected the
idea of introducing a "carbon tax", in the immediate future:
We have carefully studied this idea, but remain unconvinced that on its
own it can achieve the cuts in emission required..
Studies suggest that a carbon tax would have to be set at an unrealistically high
level if it were to have the desired effect of reducing demand.. Without
compensation, a carbon tax would fall very heavily on the poor.
An earthly chance (1990) p.21
42. Pearson & Smith (1991) Table 5.1, p.38
43. "Explicit or implicit cross subsidies can arise either as a result of different prices for
a product by different consumers or because a uniform price is paid for a product
regardless of different costs of delivery to different consumers." Industries Assistance
Commission (1989) p.F-1.
The use of government subsidies to attenuate utility charges for particular groups of
consumers has been the conventional way of financing "community service obligations"
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and is the approach favoured by both economists and the utility industries themselves.
44. This is a quite different conclusion from that drawn by Franicham & Webb (1977),
for after defining the 'benefit principle' they go on to argue:
This principle is thus consistent with the proposal (informational
requirements and metering costs allowing) that consumers should pay
charges related to the costs which they impose on the water supply
system. p.198
This conclusion, however, does not naturally follow from the way the 'benefit principle'
has been defined.
45. As the Electricity Consumers' Council report on the standing charge (1982) shows
in the case of electricity, if this were to result in an overall increase in the unit rate, it
would be likely to have a deleterious impact on certain groups of low-income
consumers, such as families with children and council tenants with all electric homes.
Schemes introduced in Britain in the past to abate energy standing charges have also
been found to be of major benefit to second home owners (see Endnote 51).
46. Most states in Australia, for example, presently provide some form of pensioner
rebate for winter energy charges.
47. It will be recalled from Chapter 1, that in 1985 the then Secretary of State for
Energy used the uniform pricing argument as part of the reason for retaining the unitary
structure of British Gas:
The major structural change would, as in the past, mean far greater
regional diversities in prices..At the end of the day, the idea is that a
therm of gas could be obtained at such and such a price in the north-
west as opposed to London or the south-east. HoC, 10/12/85, col. 776
48. Commenting on standing charges for water, the Office of Water Services stated:
The proportion of costs recovered through standing charges Ls, on
average, about 30%, but in some cases is as much as 60%. Varying the
size of the standing charge results in significant differences of incidence
of charges between customers, and the current range is difficult to defend
on either equity or cost grounds.
Charging Policy Consultation Document: Synopsis, May 1990, p.2.
49. "From April 1985 all Area Boards withdrew the domestic standing charge rebate
scheme which had reduced standing charges for certain domestic consumers whose
quarterly consumption were very small. About 2 million customers had benefited from
the scheme, including a small number on low incomes; however many more rebates
related to second or holiday homes, empty premises etc. and the scheme had not
benefited customers on low incomes with high electricity consumption" (Electricity
Council, Annual Report 198-1185, p.12).
146
CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC UTILITIES AND REGULATION
INTRODUCTION: THE TERRAIN OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
Water and energy services are characterised by features which, in combination,
differentiate them from other commonly-purchased and consumed goods and services.
Importantly, much of their distinctive character appears to amount to more than simply
a temporally-specific set of factors, which will dissolve with time or technology. These
differences are also not merely artifacts of the way that the industries concerned have
been traditionally structured and organised. For the domestic consumer, over the
foreseeable future at least, the relatively inelastic demand for essential and life-
enhancing quantities of water and energy services will continue to be met within
monopoly supply conditions; with its concomitant impact upon access and choice.
The social and economic dimensions of public utility services, outlined in Chapter 2,
form the substantive basis for arguing that the provision of water and energy services
is subject to market failure (Norton, 1984; Helm & Yarrow, 1988). That is, that the
market is apparently incapable - left to its own devices - of efficiently and equitably
supplying water and energy services to domestic and other consumers; and that the
intervention of the state is required, in some form, to counteract the endemic
deficiencies of the free market system in the supply of utility services. Kling (1988,
pp.198-9) makes this point within the perspective of orthodox welfare economics theory:
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The traditional theory of competitive markets yields strong statements
about the efficiency of the market outcome. While providing an argument
for relying on free markets, it also suggests the limitations of markets.
For when certain ideal conditions do not hold, or when efficiency is not
the primary concern, market theory itself suggests that intervention is
appropriate. Thus, instances of externality, monopoly power, and inequity
are cases of market failure justib)ing extra-market decision-making by an
enlightened state authority.
The existence of market failure in the production and provision of public utility goods
has, in the past, provided the rationale for a policy of state ownership and nationalisation
of the utility industries. However, the emergence over recent years, of the theory of
government failure (Helm & Yarrow, 1988; Vining & Weimer, 1990) as a form of
conceptual and ideological counterpoint to the well-documented case for market failure,
has ostensibly weakened the credentials of dirigiste policy making (see Chapter 4).
The symptoms of government failure in the management of utility industries, in the eyes
of its proponents, include an inherent inability to achieve productive and allocative
efficiency outcomes 1 , and to provide effective stewardship of both the public, and the
consumer, interest (Demsetz, 1989).
Nevertheless, despite the strong reservations shared by many orthodox welfare
economists about the dynamics and impact of government intervention in the industrial
economy, it is generally acknowledged that a government-led regulatory regime of some
sort is required in the management of utility services. In large part, the tentative support
for public utility regulation, has its origins in an empirically-based concern over the
potential for monopoly exploitation 2. Sherman (1989, pp.10-11) captures the essence
of this anxiety about monopoly power, when he says:
Without competition in the form of free entry, a single supplier must be
expected to follow many understandable tendencies of monopolies. To
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raise revenues, prices may be adjusted so that markets with less elastic
demands will have prices proportionately farther above marginal costs;
and more subtle discrimination by price may be attempted, again because
it allows more revenue to be raised. Unless quality is clearly defined and
easily monitored, it may be altered. Reliability of service may suffer, for
example, when there is no threat from alternative suppliers, and
consumers may be forced to wait for service. Costs rise too as managers
shirk or avoid difficult decisions. Innovation may not occur either, for the
enterprise has no great incentive to make its own ways of doing things
obsolete.
The disincentives to efficiency and the barriers to consumer sovereignty implicit in
monopoly enterprises (particularly where demand elasticity is low), necessitates the
introduction of a regulatory system that provides a set of proxy market conditions and
'disciplines', and affords a level of protection both to the public interest generally, and
to consumer interests specifically. In this sense regulation is, to adapt a popular
advertising slogan, "..a means of reaching those parts of industries which competition
cannot reach" (Gibson and Price 1988, p.42).
Public utility regulation consists of two primary dimensions: economic and social
regulation (Swann in Button & Swann, 1989). Economic regulation centres around
firstly, the role of the utility industries in the economy (e.g. monopoly practices,
competitive structure, contribution to economic growth) and secondly, the financial
management of the utilities (e.g. rate of return, pricing and productive efficiency), and
most academic attention has been directed at this dimension of regulation. Social
regulation is a somewhat more amorphous concept, but is generally seen to encompass
(i) those areas of utility activity directly related to interactions with consumers (e.g.
information provision, standards of service, consumer redress), and (ii) areas of utility
practice which intersect with environmental and social policy (Swami, 1988). Social
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regulation involves, in some instances, the placing of duties on the public utilities, which
if left to their own commercial devices they would not necessarily choose to undertake;
these are sometimes described as "community service obligations" 3. The demarcation
between economic and social regulation is not clear-cut, nor should it be; for in practice
the two dimensions of regulation are intertwined. An example of this can be found in
the way that utility prices and standards of service are invariably linked.
Social regulation has become a primary theme in US regulatory practice over recent
years (Kling, 1988; Swann, 1988); and its emergence as "new style regulation" (Swami
in Button & Swann, 1989) has been directly attributed to the failure of economic
regulation alone, to promote societally-important objectives:
Initially, economic regulation was introduced for genuine public interest
reasons with the intention of combatting specific distortions in the
economic system. It was seen at various times as a measure capable of
dealing with such diverse problems as monopoly exploitation,
environmental damage, inadequate service provision, excessive
competition, and potential health hazards. One of the reasons..for the
retreat from this position has been the realization that regulation of
prices and market entry is a blunt and indirect instrument for
ameliorating such problems. With the retreat from economic regulation
has come the need to develop alternative, more sensitive policy tools to
tackle these problems directly.
(Button & Swami, 1989, p.325)
Regulation premised on an explicit recognition of the social and economic characteristics
of water and energy services must perforce move beyond the relatively circumscribed
terrain set by classical welfare economists, who have thus far dominated the debate on
public utility organisation and regulation:
The creation of regulatory agencies was bereft, as the Americans would
say, of policy analysis. Not, note, bereft of academic advice. But the
advice supplied, notably by Professor Stephen Littlechild, now himself the
Director General of the Office of Electricity (sic!), has come from a
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single discipline, economics, and had a dogmatic, prescriptive, rather
than analytic flavour. Walker (1990) p.150
Consideration of the equity implications of general utility policy, and of the
distributional impact of utility industry re-structuring more particularly, have been, by
and large, only cursorily addressed in past work in the field using orthodox methods of
economic analysis. This neglect of the social dimension is hardly a recent phenomenon,
as evidenced by Bradshaw's conclusion (written in 1983) that an "..underlying theme of
energy policy-making has been that 'sensible' energy policies should not be adapted to
serve social purposes".
In part, this derives out of the fundamental nature of the 'frame of reference' used in
welfare economics; where equity considerations are either seen to be incompatible with
efficiency imperatives (e.g. Demsetz, 1989), or at best, problematic and requiring some
form of `trade-off' between efficiency and equity objectives (e.g. Vining & Weimer,
1990; Le Grand, 1991). Helm in an essay on "The Economic Borders of the State" in
the Oxford Review of Economic Policy encapsulates the poverty of welfare economics
theory when he states, that "[on] all the really interesting distributional questions,
however, neo-classical theory is silent" (p.xxii). 4 Le Grand (1991) concludes similarly,
if less categorically, when he says:
Equiry considerations have often sat rather uneasily within the discipline.
Although much of the literature on welfare economics currently brackets
equity with efficiency as one of the principal aims of policy, it is almost
invariably efficiency that receives the lion's share of the analytic
attention. p.176
In his essay on Equity and Choice (1991), Le Grand directly challenges the common
belief that public policy-making is inevitably confronted with the problem of achieving
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a balance between efficiency and equity objectives. The 'trade-off' question is in Le
Grand's view a non sequitur, for equity objectives, in the sense of promoting
distributional fairness and justice, are of a different normative order to those relating to
efficiency. Efficiency, in the sense of optimising the deployment and use of scarce
resources, is a means to the achievement of major social ends, of which equity is one:
„efficiency can be defined only in relation to the ability of forms of social
and economic organization to attain their primary objectives and
therefore efficiency cannot itself be one of those primary
objectives. .Efficiency is not an objective in the sense that equity is an
objective; rather it is a secondary objective that only acquires meaning
with reference to primary objectives such as equity. p.29
Goodin (1988, pp.247-255) makes a similar argument when he defines efficiency as "an
instrumental means" of achieving the "meta-principle of want-satisfaction".
In a powerful assault on what she describes as the "new regulatory economics", the
former commissioner of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, Edythe Miller (1990,
pp.728-30), calls for the interweaving of efficiency and equity principles in public utility
regulation. The substance of her critique of how the concept of efficiency has been
conventionally applied in regulatory economics is worth quoting at length:
The failure of vision..stems, however, from the narrow focus of
contemporary orthodoxy upon efficiency, to the exclusion of equity
considerations. The question of power is one of relative standing in the
social and economic hierarchy. A view of humans strictly as resources
to be optimally allocated to their "highest" uses is a mechanical
perspective that leaves out of account such complex questions..
The idea of public interest should not be narrowed, but broadened, and
the use of collective action in its service reintroduced.. Today, collective
action is seen simply as interference. Moreover, it is seen as interference
that can result only in intrusion or encroachment, and never as restraint
on the acts of the bully on the block..
Moreover, efficiency should be seen in its systemic as well as in its
individualistic sense. In its systemic sense, efficiency has to do with
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socially provided foundations and connections, the social and economic
underpinnings and framework of a society that gear it to work for its
members, that discourage fragmentation and polarization, for example,
and encourage participation, interaction, and coordination; that enhance
the links between humans that are the essence of humanity itself.
An approach such as this, which explicitly identifies public utility policy and regulatory
practice as a site for the enactment of equity outcomes on a collective and individual
scale, extends the frame of analysis well beyond the usual one-dimensional formulations
of productive and allocative efficiency, and bland definitions of a generic consumer
interest. Among other things, it requires a recognition of the fact that traditional
injunctions towards efficiency may disguise policies and actions which foreclose access
and choice for consumers, and certain groups of consumers in particular 5. It also
presents a challenge to the utilitarian view, which pervades much of the literature on the
subject, that domestic consumers are more or less an homogeneous 'class', with unitary
interests and common bargaining power 6. Attention to the 'social division' of utility
goods is all the more important under changing conditions, for as the National Consumer
Council (1989, p.19) cautions:
The introduction of competition, and changes in the regulatory regime,
will alter the balance of power between..groups of customers, as well as
between customers in general and other groups.
The discussion of regulation in this Chapter is premised on a recognition of the
importance of questions of social distribution, in addition to consumerist and efficiency
considerations, in the formulation of public utility policy.
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PART 1: MODELS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION
Regulation is viewed, almost unanimously, as an inevitable structural concomitant of
natural monopoly industries. Even in the outer reaches of economic liberalism, a form
of regulatory oversight of natural monopoly utilities is seen as necessary; if only until
such time as more functional competitive mechanisms can be introduced into these areas
of the economy (Veljanovsld, 1989a, 1989b). Much of the substance of the debate over
regulation and the public utilities lies not around the question of whether regulationper
se is required, but rather around 'second order' issues such as, the most appropriate form
that regulation should take, and the scope that should be given to regulatory intervention.
And, intertwined yet distinct, are an additional set of issues relating to the efficacy of
different models of regulation and the problems implicit in the regulatory task.
Most definitions of regulation tend to focus on its negative, restrictive function, for
example, "the imposition of controls and restraints and the application of rules" (Button
& Swann, 1989, p.3), or "prevent[ing] 'abuse' of market power" (Glynn, 1988). But
whilst the 'power to constrain' is unequivocally a central element of regulation, the
exercise of regulatory influence can also encompass more positive dimensions. Along
with setting and enforcing the parameters for commercial behaviour, regulation can act
inter alia to provide financial stability for the utility industries, to create opportunities
for industry development and innovation, to extend the scope of consumer power, to
promote access and equity in the provision of utility services, and to stimulate industry-
wide 'best practice'; all of which serve the long-term interests of both the utilities and
their consumers alike.
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Additionally, regulation can contribute to strategic management of vital infrastructural
resources. Without some measure of policy overview and direction via the regulatory
machinery, the operation of the utility industries is likely to be characterised by
disparateness, conflicting objectives and insular commercial behaviour premised on
short-term planning horizons. Under this latter scenario, public utilities are unlikely to
be able to respond to the macro-economic, social and environmental imperatives implicit
in the contemporary and future management of water and energy resources.
As a system of controls and inducements, designed to optimise the economic, social and
environmental performance of the public utilities, regulation can take a number of forms.
The figure below presents a 'regulatory continuum', which illustrates the range of
regulatory options; each of which demands a different level of public policy intervention
in the activity of the utility industries. It is unlikely, however, that all of the five options
will be equally efficacious in achieving economic and social objectives.
A Regulatory Continuum
Nationalisation	 Public ownership	 Franchising	 Privatised	 Privatised
Utilities	 Utilities
(Liberalisation)
Internal regulation External
	
Point of entry	 External
	
Internal
STATE < 	 > MARKET
Figure 3.1: A Regulatory Continuum
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The classical dichotomy between state control and market freedom is found at the ends
of the continuum, with the other three forms of regulatory structure occupying an
intermediate position between these two extremes. Each of these will be briefly
considered in turn.
While they are structural opposites, the nationalised and free market forms of public
utility organisation have one feature in common; namely, their reliance on what might
be described broadly as 'internal' systems of regulation. In the case of nationalised
utility industries, this will be in the form of direction and monitoring by the relevant
minister and sponsoring department (i.e. effectively by the owners of the industries);
whereas in the utility free market situation, regulation - beyond the conventional
structures for the enforcement of competition and "fair trading" law - would occur
through the 'natural' workings of the competitive market place (i.e. by the owners,
competitors and consumers).
(i) Deregulation 
In a substantive sense, because of its focus on the self-regulating behaviour of the
industries themselves, the free market option might more accurately be viewed as a
form of 'deregulation' rather than regulation. It is important to recognise though, that
in the context of natural monopoly utilities, it contains an inherent contradiction. For as
it is fundamentally premised on the existence of active competition, the free market
approach is likely to be singularly incapable of responding to the regulatory challenge
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of natural monopoly industries, where competition is, to all intents and purposes, non-
existent. Nor, arguably, is its intuitive reliance on the power of unfettered market forces
to balance the supply and demand for utility services, consistent with the particular
characteristics of these services themselves i.e their 'merit goods' status, their
inelasticity of demand aspects, their strategic importance, and the existence of
externalities.
But, in the view of advocates of the de-regulated model, most of these constraints are
more transitional than permanent in character. The natural monopoly constraint on
competition, in particular, is seen as a transient shackle which could be broken through
the dismantling of utility functions (e.g. the separation of distribution and supply) and
through the use of new technologies such as electronic metering. In this context,
regulation is perceived as a necessary temporary measure, designed to facilitate re-
structuring and competition. Having achieved this, it should then wither away. This view
is shared, to some extent, by a number of the utility regulators themselves:
when change is managed properly there need be no fears and if
regulation is seen as a process for managing change it should be
welcomed as a temporary phenomenon. We at OFGAS see regulation in
that way and we aim to get out of the way of business operations as soon
as a self-sustaining competitive market gets on its feet. We will measure
our success by the speed with which we can withdraw from situations
where competition is developing. Director General's Statement (OFGAS,
1992) p.8
My job is to promote competition where it is feasible and sensible to do
so, bearing in mind that it was not possible at the time of privatisation
to move in a single step from a state-owned monopoly to a privately
owned, fully competitive industry. My task is therefore to help complete
this transition: not merely to monitor competition but actively to promote
it. Littlechild in Veljanovslci, ed. (1991) p.108
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(ii) Regulation and public ownership
As a mechanism for gaining maximum policy leverage over the utility industries,
nationalisation appears to have a significant advantage over most alternative systems
of regulation. Yet, as the history of nationalisation in Britain shows (see Annexe 1), the
public utilities have been generally characterised by a domination of producer interests
over those of consumers and an acute vulnerability to the shifting policy preferences and
financing rules of successive governments. These features have been seen as major
inhibitors of industry performance and as a barrier to successful regulatory management
of the industries. Helm et al (1988, p.58) underline this when they state:
Though it has been thought that nationalisation 'solves' natural
monopoly by replacing profit maximisation by the pursuit of social
welfare, it must now be relatively uncontroversial to claim that it in fact
'solves' vet)) little in itself The naive view which dominated thinking in
the early post-war period was clearly mistaken, and the painful attempts
at control in the 1960s and 1970s reinforced this observation. Only
effective regulation can mitigate the abuse of natural market dominance.
As a result of the apparent failure of nationalisation as a system of utility regulation,
academic and political attention internationally has been increasingly directed towards
the three forms of regulation occupying intermediate positions on the continuum in
Figure 3.1. While the privatised industry - external regulator option has attracted the
most interest (particularly in Britain and North America), the other two options represent
potentially viable regulatory alternatives. However, as neither has immediate relevance
to the current regulatory environment in Britain, and as they are usually articulated in
quite imprecise terms, they will only be referred to in passing here.
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The notion of building a system of external regulation onto the framework of publicly-
owned and managed utility industries has become a significant part of the Left's re-
conceptualisation of public ownership in contemporary Britain. This is reflected in the
Labour Party's policy review documents in the early 1990s (i.e. Looking to the Future,
An earthly chance, Labour: Opportunity Britain, Labour's better way for the 1990s.
Figure 3.2 overleaf provides a synopsis of the main features of Labour Party policy
related to the public utilities.
In the view of its proponents this revised approach represents much more than the
simple grafting of a form of independent regulation onto the old nationalised utility
industry structure. In combination with the introduction of an integrated and more
powerful set of regulatory agencies (i.e. a Consumer Protection Commission and an
Environmental Protection Executive), it is envisaged - albeit in rather vague terms and
only in relation to water - that the utilities would operate in a more publicly accountable
way than they have in the past (under a form of regional government), and with a far
greater consciousness of consumer interests. Essentially, the public ownership with
external regulation model seeks to find the public interest and consumerist middle
ground between producer-oriented nationalised utilities and profit-oriented private utility
companies.
Other variants of the public ownership model of utility management and regulation can
be found in the small-scale municipal or community-owned public utility enterprises
advocated by Sloman (1978) and Jones (1992), amongst others. Interestingly, the
privatisation of the electricity supply industry - in particular the separation of generation,
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distribution and supply and the provision for "second tier licences" - potentially provides
significant openings for the development of local-level, community-managed alternatives
to monopoly provision, in the form, for example, of combined heat and power and
district heating schemes.
Looking to the Future (1990):
* Water - restoring public ownership (no indication of how this will be implemented!), under
control of regional authorities p.17
* Consumer Protection Commission (amalgamating current regulators, with stronger powers) pp.17;
also see An earthly chance p.22
- consumers charter p.23
- utilities 'customer service contracts' (including no disconnections without court order & none at all
if young child or elderly person in household) p.23
An earthly chance (1990):
Extensive regulations are required to supervise natural monopolies such as the utilities to
ensure that they are harnessed to the achievement of environmental goals and are serving
the consumer. p.10
Social considerations must be built into energy policy from the start. Putting up energy
prices so that the elderly and vulnerable could no longer afford to keep warm might help
reduce pollution but is unacceptable on social grounds. p.22
* Environmental Protection Executive p.17
* Energy privatisation & commitment to taking over National Grid p.22
* Water privatisation & commitment to public ownership p27
Labour: Opportunity Britain, Labour's better way for the 1990s (1991):
We will also establish a Consumer Protection Commission to cover all utilities, in both
public and private ownership, with divisions for transport, energy, water and
communications. It will monitor prices, quality and service provision, giving firm backing
to consumers who have been treated unfairly and who find themselves in dispute with the
utilities. The commission will report annually. p.27
The House of Commons must also have the power, through a new Select Committee, to
examine and monitor the performance of these industries and to call management to
account for pricing and service decisions. p27
Figure 3.2: Labour Party policy on the public utilities
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(iii) Franchising
The concept of franchising can be viewed as both an alternative to the conventional
ownership dichotomy of 'public' and 'private' (for it can involve elements of both), and
as a substitute for continuous external regulation. Franchising was originally advocated
by Edwin Chadwick in the mid-nineteenth century (Weimer & Vining, 1989, p.130) as
a means of introducing a measure of competition into natural monopoly industries,
which he termed "competition for the field" (as opposed to "competition in the field").
In its simplest terms, franchising is analogous to competitive tendering, where potential
utility services suppliers compete to gain the contract for monopoly supply within a
given geographical area. In contrast to orthodox competitive tendering however, the
utility services contract is awarded not on the basis of the sum each competing company
is willing to pay for the franchise, but on the basis of "..the prices that the franchisee
would charge and the services the franchisee would provide the public on award of the
right to be the exclusive seller" (Hanke, 1989, p.199). The franchise would be awarded
for a set period of time, and after the expiration of this period, the open competitive
tendering process would be, theoretically at least, re-activated.
In the mind of its most influential contemporary supporter, Demsetz, the advantages of
franchising are that it provides an alternative to publicly-owned natural monopolies and
that uniquely, it virtually eliminates the need for on-going public regulation and confines
the regulatory exercise to those occasions when the franchise is being re-issued (see, for
example, Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 1989). 7 Dnes (1989) characterises
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franchising as "..the state setting the rules of an appropriate market place for natural
monopolies".
However, franchising also offers scope for pursuing a joint public ownership-private
provision approach to the management of utility services. Under this scenario, the capital
infrastructure (e.g. the pipes, drains, treatment plants etc. in the case of water) would be
publicly owned, with the operational management and supply function being awarded
to the private firm that could provide the service at the best quality/price combination.
This would also obviate the major problem implicit in franchising of dealing with 'sunk
costs' and capital investment (see, for example, Roper & Wright, 1987, pp.165-70;
Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, pp.111-114; IAC (1989) p.F-27, for a discussion of this and
other problems with franchising, such as the specification and monitoring of contracts).
A variant of franchising, as a mix of public ownership and private management, is used
in the water industry in France.
The Major Government's plans for privatising British Rail, as outlined in its White
Paper published in July 1992 (Cm 2012), are partly framed around the franchising
model. It is proposed that passenger services will be run by private companies, operating
under franchises issued by the new Franchising Authority, with the rail infrastructure
being retained in public ownership under the aegis of the new track authority, Railtrack.
The franchises issued to private passenger service operators will contain specific
standards of service targets, including an obligation to meet the requirements of the
Passengers Charter (devised as part of the Citizen's Charter reforms). However, it is
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clear from the White Paper that the Government views franchising as merely an
intermediate step on the road to full privatisation of the British rail system:
In the longer term the Government would like to see the private sector
owning as much as possible of the railway. Powers will therefore be
taken to allow the future privatisation of all BR track and operations.
Department of Transport (1992) p.4
Franchising has also been identified as a possible option for the restructuring of the
Scottish water industry, in the consultation paper published by the Government in mid-
November 1992 (The Guardian, 18/11/92).
(iv) The British Model of Regulation
The recent British model of utility regulation, involving the establishment of an
independent regulator's office (with government department status) to supervise the
operation of privately-owned utility industries, has been developed through the selective
adaptation and, in a number of key respects, the substantial modification of traditional
American systems of utility industry organisation and regulation.
The American experience of utility organisation - with its private ownership/public
regulation configuration 8 - has patently influenced the British Conservative
Government's thinking with respect to the re-structuring of the water and energy
industries. Yet the development of the regulatory framework, in tandem with the de-
nationalisation of the utilities, has departed in a number of significant ways from
American practice. These departures represent, to borrow a phrase from Sir Geoffrey
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Howe's influential attack on the late Thatcher Government, differences of both
substance and sole.
The promotion of competition and the control of monopoly profits are the building
blocks of economic regulation of the public utilities, and one of the more fundamental
differences between the British and American systems is the way that the financial and
pricing structure of the industries is regulated. In Britain, a price-based formula tied to
the retail price index and making provision for efficiency savings - i.e. RPI-X - is
employed as the principal device for ensuring that the utilities are not exploiting their
monopoly power, while at the same time providing an incentive for productive
efficiency. In contrast, American regulators have conventionally used rate of return
("cost-based regulation", Vickers, 1991) as the vehicle for controlling utility profits and
pricing. Littlechild (1988) describes the system as follows:
Under the US system, a regulated company that wishes to change its
tariff puts forward a proposal to the regulatory author4y. The total
revenue which the proposed prices are expected to yield is compared
with the total revenue requirement. The latter is defined as operating
expenses plus depreciation plus allowed rate of return on capital. p.55
Rate of return controls had previously formed part of the British government's financial
management of the nationalised industries (Crew & Kleindorfer, 1979), and this may
have been partly instrumental in the Thatcher Government's rejection of rate of return
as an appropriate system for the regulation of the privatised utilities. Of even greater
significance perhaps was the generally acknowledged limitations of rate of return (or
'cost plus') regulation (see Carney, 1991 for a summary of this critique). In particular,
rate of return regulation is seen to provide no in-built incentive for efficiency or the
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reduction of costs, and because it is directly based on return on capital, it is said to
encourage profligate capital expenditure (described as the `Averch-Johnson effect').
In contrast, the strengths of the Littlechild price cap formulation are seen to lie in the
fact that (a) it acts as a stimulus to productive efficiency both through the operation of
the X factor (where the utilities are required to reduce prices at a rate normally below
the level of inflation) and because the regulated companies are allowed to retain as
profits any efficiency savings made in addition to the designated X target, and (b) that
it is neutral on the question of capital expenditure.
In practice, however, the delineation between these two approaches to economic
regulation has been nowhere as clear cut as it appears in theory, and over time the
British regulators appear to have increasingly applied rate of return calculations in their
analysis of the financial and pricing structure of the utility industries. The methodologies
used by OFGAS in the 1990-91 review of the gas tariff formula and OFWAT in the up-
coming Periodic Review, illustrate the importance that the regulators attach to the
question of what constitutes an appropriate rate of return for the regulated utilities (see
Chapter 6). This serves to reinforce the scepticism of a number of commentators about
the extent to which the British price control instrument differs markedly from the much-
denigrated American approach (e.g. Helm et al, 1988; Weyman-Jones, 1990; Vickers,
1991; Stelzer, 1991).
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As was seen in Chapter 1, the attention given by the Government to the regulatory
framework of the utility industries appeared to accelerate with each successive
privatisation. And indeed this 'filling in' of the detail of the regulatory regime continued
after the completion of the privatisation schedule for the three utilities, with the
enactment of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act (CSUA) 9.
A developmental approach to the elaboration of a regulatory system more directly
relevant to the monopoly conditions under which the utility industries operate (at least
as it applies to 'captive' domestic and other consumers), might be seen as a conscious
expression of a pragmatic and incrementalist philosophy of policy-making, where the
learning of the past informs the practice of the future. Alternatively, it could be viewed
as a belated attempt to compensate for the deficits of earlier policy-making. In this latter
vein, Vickers (1991) adjudges the supplementation of regulatory powers in the later
privatisations and beyond as evidence that the Government underestimated the problems
of market failure in the utility industries.
In terms of their scope, the powers progressively ceded to the regulatory bodies in the
privatisation legislation and in the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 (CSUA),
look broadly similar to those that are available to the regulatory commissions in
America. The energy and water regulators in Britain have strong residual powers in
relation to economic regulation and weaker, but still potentially quite potent, leverage
in the area of social regulation. Figure 3.3 overleaf sets out a schema of British public
utility regulation, indicating the domains and instruments of the regulatory system in this
country.
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There are, however, six major features of the British system which sets it apart from the
regulatory structures in America, namely (a) the importance attached to competition,
(b) the functions ceded to the regulators in respect to industry policy and capital
investment (c) the primacy given to shareholder interests, (d) the informal and
discretionary nature of the regulatory system, (e) the emphasis on personality, and
(f) the closed structure of regulatory decision making. Each of these are briefly
considered below.
(a) Competition
Somewhat ironically, the British approach directs greater attention to the pro-competition
function of the regulatory agencies than appears to be the case in America. Despite their
long history of public regulation of privately-owned utilities, and the claim of Stelzer
(1991, p.60) that the "US favours competition", the Americans have only recently begun
to examine how greater competition might be introduced into the gas and electricity
industries. The ostensible heterogeneity of the public utility structure in the US, with its
mix of publicly- and privately-owned utilities, is deceptive, for to all intents and
purposes the utilities operate as geographical monopolies. The restructuring of the ESI
in Britain and the explicit powers given to the Director General of Electricity Supply to
facilitate the development of competition across the primary sectors of the industry -
including the eventual dismantling of geographical monopoly provision for all consumers
- have no extant equivalent in the American regulatory environment. And the injunctions
on the Director General of Water Services to extend competition where possible in the
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highly naturally monopolistic terrain of water services look positively radical by
comparison with the situation in America.
(b) Industry policy and capital investment
The planning and investment decisions of the public utilities impact not only on the
quality of utility services provided directly to consumers, but they have substantial
'ripple effects' throughout the economy as a whole. Equally, the issue of continuity and
security of supply of energy and water supply involves important questions of national
interest. In addition, decisions taken about current and future methods of producing and
distributing electricity, gas and water often have major environmental implications.
None of these macro-effects necessarily makes the effective development of utility
policy incompatible with a structure of private ownership. But, at a minimum, they
underscore the need for a strong Government policy framework for the industries,
coupled with vigorous and far-sighted public regulation.
The capacity of the existing regulatory framework in Britain to deal with these broader
policy issues, as opposed to narrow economic regulation (based around prices and
competition), is still largely to be determined, but the industry regulators, in general,
have been ceded extremely muted powers in this important domain of public policy.
The Government's rejection of a substantive role for the regulatory agencies in utility
industry policy and development was illustrated, at the outset, in their refusal to admit
the North American device of 'least cost planning' into the regulatory arena. Since the
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middle of the 1980s, least cost planning has been adopted by the majority of American
state regulatory commissions as a mechanism for encouraging a longer-term planning
approach by the energy utilities (Berry, 1992):
New economic institutions are currently evolving in the electric utility
industry to expand the scope of long-range planning. Regulatory
commissions have spurred this evolution through requirements for least
cost planning that take into account improved load forecasting,
conservation and other demand management measures, consideration of
alternative technologies for supplying electricity such as solar power, and
the environmental impacts of power production and consumption. p.783
In Britain, the emphasis on competition and market forces as the drivers of energy
policy, in combination with the operation of the price control formula (which unlike rate
of return regulation, gives the regulatory bodies little formal scope for adjudicating on
the capital structure of the industries) has meant that the electricity and gas regulators
have only limited and indirect leverage over the investment and demand management
practices of the energy utilities. While the water regulator has been given a more
significant role to play in supervising the large capital works programme in the water
industry, this role is primarily confined to a monitoring and auditing function (i.e.
ensuring that the companies are meeting their specified capital investment targets), rather
than involving an active and leading contribution to water services policy.
The limited policy function of the regulators, in tandem with the amorphous role of the
executive and legislative branches of government following privatisation (made more so
by the abolition of the Department of Energy and the Select Committee on Energy 1(Y)
suggests that there is a very real danger of a deep and destructive policy vacuum being
created in the field of utility services in Britain.
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(c) Priority to shareholders
It was shown in the previous chapter that the model of regulation constructed in Britain
gives clear and unambiguous priority - in statute at least - to the interests of utility
company shareholders:
..to secure that licence holders are able to finance the carrying on of the
activities which they are authorised by their licences to carry on
Electricity Act 1989 s.3 (1) (b)
..to secure that companies holding appointments., are able (in particular,
by securing reasonable returns on their capital) to finance the proper
carrying out of the functions of such undertakers
Water Industry Act 1991 s.2(2)(b)
The regulators' duties with respect to the protection of consumers are secondary and
subject to the fulfilment of primary duties such as those cited above. Under the
American system, regulators are mandated to seek a balance between shareholder and
consumer interests, "to ensure reliable service at just and reasonable rates" (O'Leary &
Smith, 1989, p.224). The thrust of the American approach is outlined by two
Commissioners on the New Mexico utility commission:
Regulators understand their duty to balance the interests of rate-payers
[i.e. utility consumers] and shareholders when making a decision. They
understand they have an economic function to set price, but they act in
an environment of inputs, constraints, and concerns that are not
economic in nature.. in performing the task of balancing the interests of
the ratepayer and the investor, [the regulators] are responding to the
mandate given them by their state legislators. This mandate of
"balancing" implies that the criterion of fairness be considered. This
objective may not make it possible for the economic criterion of efficiency
to be achieved.
O'Leary & Smith in Nowotny et al eds. (1989) p.224
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In contrast, the British model requires the regulators to give primacy to shareholders in
the event of conflicts of interest arising between the stakeholders in the utility industries.
In this sense, regulation for consumer protection has been treated very much as a
secondary and contingent dimension in the structure of utility regulation in Britain.
While the "just and reasonable" test used by American regulators is manifestly
subjective and open to quite different interpretations (and hence has been criticised on
the grounds that it gives rise to regulatory uncertainty), it does provide a means of
building equity and distributional considerations onto the framework of utility regulation,
and it has apparently been used in this way by some utility commissions in America.
In addition to a requirement to give precedence to shareholder interests, the British
regulators are bound by the stricture that no "undue discrimination" or "undue
preference" be given to particular classes of consumers in the fixing of tariffs. This has
the effect of circumscribing the scope for regulatory intervention aimed at assisting
groups of consumers who experience specific problems in accessing, or maintaining
access to, utility services and it effectively forecloses the option of pursuing equity
objectives as a part of regulatory policy-making.
Theoretically, an attempt by one of the regulators to intervene in this way would be
open to legal challenge; although the position of the courts in Britain on "undue
discrimination" is largely untested and ambiguous (Sharpe, 1992). Certainly, the prospect
of a legal challenge is likely to have the effect of deterring the regulatory bodies from
taking action which positively discriminates in favour of low income consumers,
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irregardless of the equity merits of doing so. This was evidenced in the Director General
of Gas Supply's position on the use of funds generated through the 'E factor' in the
British Gas tariff review (see Chapter 6).
It can be seen in Figure 3.3 above, that the regulators have a duty to give particular
attention to the needs of certain sections of the population - namely elderly and disabled
consumers, and in some instances, customers living in rural areas. Although action on
behalf of elderly and disabled is also limited by the "undue discrimination" in tariffs
constraint, this statutory mandate gives the regulators a formal point of leverage over
the utility companies on their policies and practices vis-a-vis these groups of consumers.
If these provisions were introduced on the basis of 'vulnerability' and special needs, it
could be argued, from an equity perspective, that low income customers generally should
have been included under this protective net (Fitch, 1992). Measures to include similar
provisions for low income consumers in the Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill in
1991-1992 were rejected by the Government (see Chapter 7).
(d) Emphasis on informal processes and discretion
Despite the scope for the use of discretion in determining "just and reasonable" rates,
the US system of regulation is highly formalised, rule-bound and legalistic in its
approach to regulatory decision making (Stelzer, 1991). By comparison, the British
model of regulation is seen to be rather more informal, fluid and discretionary in
character. Indeed in the view of one commentator at least, the British approach stands
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the danger of "evolving into an informal system of rule-making which operates through
negotiation and bargaining in the shadow of the law" (Veljanovski, 1991, p.9).
The distinguishing ambience of the British regulatory system arises firstly, from the
largely non-statutory mechanisms used to regulate the privatised utilities and secondly,
from the highly personalised style of regulation that has been employed.
Although the privatisation legislation, and more latterly the Competition and Service
(Utilities) Act, provide the structural outline of regulation, much of the working
machinery is to be found in secondary legislation (regulations) and most importantly,
in the licences issued to the utility companies. But even the licences do not provide the
sort of operational detail needed to build a functioning regulatory system, and much of
this has had to be established in situ by the regulators themselves. Following Swann in
Button & Swann (1989), the British approach might be defined as essentially de facto,
as opposed to de jure, regulation; with its absence of a precise statutory framework and
its attendant reliance on quasi-legal instruments and negotiation.
The fact that, under the British model, the regulators have considerable room for
manoeuvre and scope to determine much of the shape of the regulatory regime is likely
to be both a strength and a weakness. The substance of its strength resides in the ability
of the regulators to shift the focus of regulatory attention into fields not originally
envisaged, or overlooked, by the Government at the time of privatisation, and to quickly
adapt to changing circumstances and conditions. There is evidence that this has
happened, to the benefit of domestic consumers, in the regulation of the gas industry,
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and some initial indications that this may happen in the water industry as well (see
Chapters 6 and 7). The excursions of the regulators into domains beyond those originally
included in their orbit has led to claims that the regulators have breached the terms of
the "regulatory bargain" struck between the government and shareholders at the time of
privatisation (Veljanovski, 1991).
The primary weakness of the discretionary, evolutionary model of regulation lies in the
fact that the rules and decision-making criteria can be opaque, elusive and ever-shifting;
with a consequential negative effect on 'due process' and a denuding of the ability to
externally monitor regulatory activity. It can also give rise to arbitrary styles of
regulatory policy making. This interacts closely with the issue of style.
(e) Personality-driven model
At the level of style, the British model of regulation differs most notably from its
American progenitor in its reliance on, what could reasonably be described as,
'personality-led regulation'. In other words, much of the focus, and certainly the
character, of the public bodies set up to regulate the privatised public utilities in Britain,
imitates the persona of their respective directors.
The general modus operandi of the Office of Gas Supply, Office of Water Services and
Office of Electricity Regulation - which simplistically might be categorised as
confrontation, suasion and laissez faire respectively (see Chapters 6 & 7) - mirror the
interventionist philosophies and personalities of their Directors General at least as much
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as the different structural arrangements and environmental conditions of the three utility
industries concerned 11 . This contrasts with the way that the state public utility
commissions operate in the US, where the legal and structural framework of regulation
practice, rather than the predilections of individuals, determines the shape and substance
of regulatory control. In America, of course, the apex of the regulatory agency is usually
occupied not by one individual but by a number of elected or appointed commissioners.
The emphasis on personality in the emerging British model of regulation may reflect the
relative novelty of external regulation in British public policy and hence be simply a
transitional phase. Thus in line with a Weberian thesis of organisational development,
the charismatic/individual leadership model of regulation may shift over time towards
a more formal and institutionalised approach. Or alternatively, as Walker (1990)
hypothesises in his amusing article Enter the Regulators, it may have arisen as a result
of the imprecise brief given to the first generation of utility regulators, as well as being
somehow consistent with the way things have been traditionally done in the British
polity 12. 
'Regulation as individual rather than system' might also have been seen as
somehow more expressive and symbolic of the independence and autonomy of the
regulatory regime. Whatever the reason, the individually-centred nature of the regulatory
system is enshrined in the original legislation:
The Acts of Parliament which carried out the privatisations and
established the powers of the regulatory agencies lay the various duties
upon the Directors of the various industries [sic] and not upon the
regulatory agencies as corporate bodies. Each agency is there to assist
the Director and not legally to share in the decision-making process.
HoC Library Research Division (1991) p. 1
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Clearly, to be effective, regulation needs to be a dynamic and adaptive process, with
scope being given to the regulatory body to make changes in the regulatory regime in
line with changing conditions and with strategic shifts in the behaviour of the regulated
companies. Swann (in Button & Swann, 1989, p.7) implies as much when he says:
Regulatory structures tend to be capable of considerable flexibility of
interpretation, and their actual impact in particular cases is very much
in the hands of the regulatory agency. .Because of this, de facto
regulation may change even though the regulatory statute (the de jure
element) may not have been modified.
Yet whether this should involve the centralisation of regulatory decision making power
around individuals to the extent that has occurred in Britain is another matter. The
highly personalised style of the utility regulatory structures is likely to mean that the
system of controlling and monitoring the behaviour of the privatised utilities will be
idiosyncratic, and even arbitrary. The individualistic style of the regulatory machinery
will invariably lead to problems of succession, with possibly disruptive philosophical
shifts in emphasis following a change in regulator.
It could also act to constrain public access to, and understanding of, the arcane workings
of the regulatory system and might create "some worrying gaps in the lines of public
accountability" (Walker, 1990, p.158). There is a particular danger of this happening in
the relatively closed decision making environment of British utility regulation.
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0 Closed structures for regulatory decision-making
In America, a quasi-judicial process, involving public hearings and formal opportunities
for consumer input and advocacy, is used for determining pricing and other major
regulatory decisions (Waterson, 1988; Stelzer, 1991):
In all cases the PUC [State Public Utility Commission] reaches a
decision after a series of public hearings, in which the utility must
present its case, and at which intervenors can present countervailing
views, and indeed can cross examine the utility representatives. This
process allows consumers, either directly, or more commonly through
their representative bodies, to have a direct input into the decision
making process. [author's emphasis]
Brown (1986) p.10
The American system has been criticised on the grounds that it is expensive, litigious
and leads to interminably protracted decision making. On the positive side, however, it
has clear advantages in terms of transparency of decision making and potential openness
to a plurality of interests and viewpoints.
The American 'rate hearing' approach to the setting of tariffs and performance standards
was spurned by the Government as an appropriate way of regulating the privatised
utilities. The quinquennial tariff review process, centring around closed negotiations
between the regulator and the industry, with provision for public consultation at the
discretion of the regulator, was instituted in its stead 13. Weyman-Jones (1990, p.70)
explains the rejection of public hearings in the regulation of the electricity supply
industry as follows:
It is clear that minimizing the burden and transaction costs of regulation
has been the dominant factor in the choice of mechanism for UK
electricity distribution, and one of the main arguments used is the need
to avoid prolonged enquiries into the nature of the utility's costs. Hence,
any mechanism which required the regulator to duplicate in public the
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cost calculation and optimization procedures of the utiliO) has been
rejected.
The absence of a formal public arena for the determination of major regulatory policy
could be offset, to some degree, by the regulator adopting an inclusive strategy on
information dissemination and decision making. Though, the problem with this, as with
the British model generally, is that it places an untoward reliance on regulatory fiat, for
to paraphrase Beesley (1991, p.154), the reasoning of the regulators is disclosed at their
choice.
On paper at least, the British model of regulation looks less substantial than that used
in America. It could be argued, however, that the emphasis in the British model on
informality, flexibility, discretion and expedition in decision making, might be to the
ultimate advantage of utility consumers; for in the hands of the 'right' regulator these
attributes could be exercised to better effect than would be the case using the more
belaboured and legally constricted American approach. But the fundamental dilemma is
that in its strength lies its weakness; for the British model appears to be all-too-heavily
reliant upon tapping a continuous supply of dominant regulatory personalities of capacity
and goodwill.
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PART 2: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS IN REGULATION
Regulation is a means of exercising social control (Dugger, 1989) over strategically
important and publicly sensitive areas of the economy; and the characteristics of the
public utilities are such that irrespective of the structural and ownership changes effected
- including the advent of competition - a degree of regulation will always be required.
The model of regulation introduced in Britain in the wake of the privatisation of the
public utilities has a set of features which give it the appearance of being a rather fragile
instrument for social control and consumer protection.
But even if the regulatory approach were quite different, there are a number of
seemingly endogenous problems in the regulatory task, which in themselves present
formidable barriers to the exercise of effective control over the utility industries.
Two of the most salient and discussed aspects of regulatory failure are the principal-
agent dilemma, and the related problem of regulatory capture and these issues, central
to the theory of regulation, are considered below. The best defence against the problem
of regulatory capture lies in the superstructure of accountability devised for the
regulatory bodies, and the Chapter concludes with a discussion of this important matter.
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(i) The principal-agent problem 
The principal-agent construct as it relates to the field of regulation was first elaborated
by Crew & Kleindorfer (1979), and it attempts to provide a broad analytical framework
for understanding the relationship, interaction, and points of tension and conflict between
the major organisational participants involved in the production of utility services. Under
normal competitive conditions, the distinction between 'principal' and 'agent' in the
production and supply of goods is likely to be less important, as these functions are
usually encompassed within the one organisation or firm 14. However, because in
natural monopoly industries there is a need to introduce a layer of regulatory control,
which is separate and independent of the actual production of utility services, a clear
delineation exists between the structure and functions of the 'principal' (be it a
government department or a specific regulatory body) and those of the 'agent' utility
industries.
In this context then, the central problem becomes one of devising a means of ensuring
that the 'standard-setting principal' can exert leverage and influence over the behaviour
of the 'service-delivery agent'. This is outlined succinctly by Crew & Kleindorfer (1979,
p.129):
The problem facing the principal is to choose appropriate incentives and
set behaviourial limits for the agent so as to balance the agent's better
knowledge of uncertain states of the world against divergences in
preferences between principal and agent.
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Crew & Kleindorfer (1979, Figure 9.1) have elaborated a model of the principal-agent
relationship, under a regulatory scenario involving a utility commission, and this is
illustrated in the figure below.
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Figure 3.4: Crew & Kleindorfer's Principal-Agent Model
It is apparent in the model that the regulatory body's ability to exert influence over the
behaviour of the public utility will be largely determined by its capacity to collect, and
make sense, of a complex array of information about the utility's financial and service-
delivery performance. And yet it is in this domain that the regulator is likely to be at
a considerable disadvantage. As Sir Gordon Borne, the past Director General of Fair
Trading has said the "problem facing any regulator is that he cannot be as well-informed
as the business(es) he is regulating" (Borne, 1991, pp.11-12).
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The information asymmetry 15 that exists in the relationship between 'principal' and
'agent' arises, first and foremost from the utility's far superior operational knowledge
of the industry; which carries with it the danger that the utility can, with virtual
impunity, 'massage' the data that it is required to make available to the regulator. This
is particularly likely to be the case in single producer markets, such as that presently
applying in the gas industry in Britain, for as Helm & Yarrow (1988, p.v) state, "..the
firm will be in a monopoly position with respect to the supply of relevant information
to the regulator". The well-documented battles between the Director General of Gas
Supply and British Gas over the release of information necessary for the former to carry
out his regulatory functions, is illustrative of this problem. Although, according to the
Director General, the flow of information from the company has improved over recent
times:
At the outset of our relationship with BG the company showed a natural
reluctance to share information with us. .In regard to our extensive review
of the tariff price formula we are pleased to record that BG has made
available information of the most sensitive kind of the type which it
would never have considered providing five years ago. McKinnon (1991)
pp.4-5
In those utility sectors where there are a number of producers operating - which is the
case in water and electricity - the regulators have an ability to tap multiple information
sources and to carry out "yardstick comparisons" between different companies 16•
However, this can give rise to another set of problems related to information
management and information overload.
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The difficulty for the regulatory body in collecting and analysing the information it
receives from sources within and outside the regulated organisation, is compounded by
the fact that the field of public utility services is highly technical and complex. Another
factor which contributes to the difficulties in information management is that there will
inevitably be a marked inequality between the level of human, technological and
financial resources available to the regulator and that of the utility companies. Figure
3.5 shows the staffing and budgets of the regulatory bodies. The number of staff
employed in the three utilities over the same period was British Gas: 80,000, Water and
sewerage companies: 53,000, ESI: 105,000 (rounded figures).
REGULATOR STAFFING BUDGET
al
NO. OF
COMPANIES
OFFER 214 11.2 14 *
OFWAT 132 6.29 33
OFGAS 40 1.9 1
TOTAL 386 19.39
a Excludes generation and second tier supply licences
Note 1: Staffing - OFFER end 1991, OFGAS 1992 (post CSUA - previously 28), OFWAT end March 1992;
Budgets 1991/92
Note 2: OFFER - around one-third in head office; OFWAT - around 90 in head office; all OFGAS based in
central office
Note 3: In addition to their staffing establishment, the regulators also make extensive use of outside
consultants.
Figure 3.5 Resources of the public utility regulatory bodies
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The regulators' success in keeping pace with the regulated companies will also be
conditioned by the expertise that they have at their disposal. Up to this point in time,
the great majority of staff employed in the regulatory bodies in Britain have been from
the civil service - most often from the Department of the Environment and the now-
defunct, Department of Energy. Relatively few appointments have been made from
within the utility industries (although there are indications that this is changing) and an
even smaller number have been made from within the consumer and community sector.
Information asymmetry is identified by a number of commentators, as the underlying
cause of regulatory failure, regardless of the model of ownership and regulation (for
example, Weyman-Jones, 1989: UK nationalised industries; and Helm et al, 1988: US
energy utilities). Significantly, Helm et al. (1988, p.57) suggest that the information
asymmetry characteristic of successive British government's attempts to manage the
nationalised utilities will become even more acute as a result of privatisation:
Information necessary to assess efficiency appears, if anything, less
readily available than before. If neither shareholders nor customers can
monitor this, however, then the effectiveness of the RPI-X system will turn
on whether or not the regulatory authority can determine what constitutes
an efficient level of performance, and may design the regulatory price
ceiling accordingly.
The likely presence of major information blockages in the interaction between regulators
and utilities, reduces the former's ability to exert influence and control over the
operation of the industries. Yet paradoxically, the other most commonly cited problem
in the principal-agent thesis is that 'principals' can be too assertive in imposing their
preferences on 'agents', which in turn impacts negatively on the latter's performance and
efficiency. This has been one of the major criticisms directed at the previously
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nationalised industries in Britain; where the government as 'principal' has been charged
with intruding upon the commercial prerogatives of the utility industries. Weyman-Jones
(1989, p.286) summarises this critique when he says:
..the fundamental breakdown of government-utility relationships in the
UK is not based on questions of allocative efficiency but rather on
principal agent problems of management, authority, and control.. the
industries have always been seen as instruments of macro-economic
policy; in the 1970s they were used to implement price and income
policies against inflation, and in the 1980s they have been seen as a
constraint on monetary policy, because nationalized industry borrowing
for investment has impinged on the Treasury's ability to conduct open-
market operations in government debt.
The excessive - and what has been seen as illegitimate - use of influence and sanctions
by governments and their functional departments in the past, prompted the call for the
structural separation of the regulation and production functions in the public utility field;
the clearest expression of which is privatisation.
The disjunction of regulation and ownership - or put another way, control and
performance - might appear to further compound the principal-agent problem, but it is
often asserted that the reverse of this occurs and that an "incentive gain" (Helm &
Pearce, 1990, p.12) is achieved by both regulator and producer alike. This is attributed
to the fact that on the one hand, an independent regulator is able to adopt a more
vigorous and less partisan posture; while on the other, the utility industry is released
from the invidious task of balancing commercial considerations with the ephemeral
policy priorities of the government of the day.
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Whether these incentive gains are sufficient to offset the possible increase in information
asymmetry that will result from governments' relinquishing operational control of
natural monopolies, is open to doubt, however. For, as Vining & Weimer (1990, p.5)
point out, the privatised utility now "has an incentive to withhold information that would
change the decisions of the [regulatory] parties". That is, the privatised utility has much
to gain by restricting the flow of information to the regulatory body, particularly when
this information might be used to moderate profit levels, or to enforce higher (and more
expensive) standards of service provision. The likelihood of this occurring is
acknowledged by Helm & Pearce (1990, p.12):
On the other hand, access to the relevant information to monitor
performance is much reduced [compared to public ownership] and there
may be an offsetting cost created by the strategic behaviour of
regulatees.
The fundamental problem, under the principal-agent formulation, is how to institute a
system of external control that is effective, but does not, at the same time, introduce
perverse incentives into the operation of the utility agency. It is an open question at this
stage as to whether the privately-owned utility/external regulation model will deal with
this conundrum more satisfactorily than was the case under nationalisation.
Principal-agent analysis need not only be confined to regulator-utility organisation
interaction. It could, for example, be applied to the relationship between consumers as
a generic group and regulatory bodies, which purport to represent their interests. In this
case, as Crew & Kleindorfer (1979) note in passing, consumers would constitute the
'principal' with the regulator being the 'agent' responsible for communicating and
enforcing their preferences in the supply of utility services (with the utilities themselves
being a form of `sub-agency'). Aspects of this principal-agent relationship will be
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explored in later chapters. However, it is relevant here to touch on two issues which
impinge upon the likely character of the consumer-regulator relationship in contemporary
public utility policy and management.
The first is that the symbiotic connection between consumers and regulatory body, under
the arrangements introduced as part of the utility privatisation programme in Britain, is
rather more ambiguous than the principal-agent metaphor above would suggest.
Whitworth (in PIRC, 1989, p.15) makes this point in relation to the water regulator.
He or she is. not as many people believe, a consumer watchdog. The
Director's role is to promote the public interest..this is by no means
always the same thing as the consumer interest and there will frequently
be conflicts between the points of view of the industry, the shareholders
and the consumers.
Of course, as the discussion in Part 1 showed, the public interest criterion itself is
subject to the obligation on the regulators to ensure that, at the end of the day, the utility
companies remain commercially viable. This, in conjunction with the multiple
constituency basis to the mandate held by British utility regulators, means that the
presumption about regulatory agencies acting incontrovertibly in favour of the consumer
interest will not necessarily hold.
Secondly, experience in the US indicates that the notion of regulatory bodies as active
'agents' under the direction of consumer 'principals' is at odds with part of the reality
of regulation. In his explication of "an institutionalist theory of regulation" based on US
practice, Kling (1988) asserts that the empirical outcomes of regulation have often
favoured the industries being regulated at the expense of consumers and the public
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interest. Regulation which aids the regulated industries and possibly harms the public
interest is dominant in his view because,
..since it is prone to producing obvious and concentrated benefits but
obscure and diffuse costs, lid has a political advantage over [public
interest-oriented] regulation. Asserting the public interest usually involves
an extra information burden, and more substantial mobilization
difficulties, relative to efforts on behalf of a special group.
Kling (1988) p.206
An important aspect of the "mobilization difficulties" implicit in consumer-oriented
regulation, is that domestic consumers have little of the organisational and collective
power enjoyed by the producers of utility services or indeed, of large industrial and
commercial users - yet the ability to take organised action is patently critical to the task
of exerting influence as 'principals' 17.
In order to be effective then, regulators need access to a comprehensive range of
information sources on the performance of utility industries, along with an informed
understanding of how the public interest (and consumer interest sub-sets of this) can best
be served through the regulation-industry nexus. But considerable conceptual and
practical barriers stand in the way of realising these pre-requisites to successful
regulation.
The heavy dependence of regulatory bodies on the information provided direct by the
utility industries, in order to carry out their control and monitoring functions; as well as
their alleged inclination to define the public interest as a refracted image of the
commercial interests of the industries themselves, has led to the assertion that they are
vulnerable to regulatory capture.
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The regulatory capture thesis 
The theory of regulatory capture was originally articulated by Stigler (1971). In essence,
the theory asserts that regulators are likely to be subject to significant pressures from
dominant interest groups (most notably from the industries being regulated) which can
result ultimately in a reversal of the regulatory paradigm, where the levers of control are
exercised not by the regulator but the regulatee. In its more extreme form, it is posited
that the evolution of regulatory structures in the first place has been largely the product
of a desire to protect and preserve the interests of monopoly and quasi-monopoly
producers (Swann, 1988; Melody, 1989).
Most attempts to analyse the dynamics of regulatory capture do not start from the
position that regulators consciously set out to collude with regulated industries (the
conspiratorial view just cited above aside). Rather, the process of regulatory goal
displacement occurs subtly and gradually, over time, as the regulators start to identify
with the companies or as they become increasingly more reliant on the information
output of the utility industries. So, although regulators may begin with a public interest
or consumerist mission, this is said to dissolve progressively as their world view and
operational bonds become interwoven those of the regulated industries.
The theory of regulatory capture draws attention to the implicit dangers in any system
of regulation (i.e. goal displacement and co-option). Yet it is important to recognise that
there is little empirical evidence to support the view that it is an inevitable feature of
regulatory practice (Brown, 1986). It also has a tendentious edge, in that it has been
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used by radical liberal theorists to buttress the case for deregulation and the universal
application of free market regimes. Nevertheless, it does underline a potential problem
in the public regulation of utility industries. The possibility of regulatory capture is
likely to be substantially reduced, however, under arrangements which maximise the
positional and informational independence of regulatory agencies.
Positional independence requires that the regulatory body be functionally and
operationally separate from both the industry and government (for 'capture' can occur
from both sides), and that the regulator have complete operational command over the
management of his/her brief and resources. This does not imply, of course, that the
regulatory body should be outside the machinery of government. In the opinion of
Walker (1990, p.154), the fact that the current utility regulation bodies in Britain are part
of the structure of government is a positive advantage:
the new regulatory offices are fully part of the state; their administrative
culture is Whitehall's; regulatory 'capture' - a problem the economists
have worried over - appears not much of a danger in the sense that
Ofgas personnel do not come from and have no personal experience of
the gas industry; the organizational culture of the OF7:.gives the
impression of being pre-Thatcherite, fully statist, in the sense that the
staff consider they have a mission pro bono publico.
Nor, more importantly, does it imply that the regulators should occupy a position of
independence which removes them from conventional lines of political and public
accountability. The dangers in this are considered in the conclusion to this chapter.
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The development of informational independence on the part of the regulator will be
contingent upon the degree to which he/she is able to secure the resources required
(i) to collect data on the performance of the utility industry, separate from that provided
by the industry itself ("..reliance on a single, interested source for information increases
the risk of regulatory capture", McHarg, 1992, pp.390-1), (ii) to interpret, analyse and
corroborate the information made available from industry sources and (iii) to compare
the performance of individual companies across a wide range of economic and social
indices. There is evidence that the regulators have become increasingly conscious of the
need to do this, as exemplified by the Office of Gas Supply's extensive use of external
consultants in the gas tariff review and in the Office of Water Services decision to
employ "independent certifiers" to audit the financial and service performance data
provided by the water companies. The Director General of Water Services has also
initiated a number of surveys on customers views of the water industry (see Chapter 7).
The provision in the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992, requiring the
regulatory bodies to undertake research on consumer views as part of the development
and monitoring of standards of performance, potentially strengthens the informational
independence of all of the regulators. Yet, as Coote (1992, p.6) cautions consumer
research should be used as a complement to, and not a substitute for, more active forms
of consumer engagement:
[hiring] a polling organisation to carry out market research_avoids any
danger of individuals getting together as groups of citizens, or any
obligation to enter into a dialogue or to negotiate with them. It keeps
pouer in the hands of the body commissioning the research, uhich
remains free to formulate the questions, interpret the answers and decide
uhat to do about the results,
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The information requirements of the regulatory function demands a proactive
information search strategy on the part of the regulators, for the "wider the range of
sources, the greater the independence and effectiveness of the regulator" (Helm et al,
1988, p.59). Regular recourse by the regulators to the formal consumer bodies set up for
each of the industries will form an important information source. But this, in itself, will
not be sufficient, for as is shown in Chapter 7, the composition of these bodies does not
reflect the broad cross-section of domestic consumers; and most notably low income
consumers. Consequently, the regulators will need to obtain on-going access to the views
of service deliverers who interact on a day-to-day basis with utility consumers (e.g.
welfare rights and advice agencies) and with low income consumers themselves. Thus
far the Director General of Gas Supply has displayed a rather stronger commitment to
'community outreach' of this sort than have his regulatory colleagues.
The absence of the equivalent to 'rate hearings' in the British system of regulation,
which Brown (1986, p.10), assessing the American experience, sees as "a vital safeguard
against 'capture' of the regulators by the regulated industries", is likely to be a
substantial barrier, not so much to information gathering, but to information 'integrity';
and is one which the three Directors General will have to work hard to overcome.
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CONCLUSION: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE BRITISH REGULATORY
SYSTEM
Another difficulry for regulators is that their decisions are taken in secret
with outsiders in no position to judge whether or not consumer interests
have really been protected. That may be inevitable in view of the need
for commercial confidentiality but it also places everybody in an
awkward position_ Regulators are largely protected from political
interference by Statute. Parliament has not really exercised accountability
over them. Occasionally Regulators appear before Select Committees to
describe their work but the appearances are neither frequent nor
detailed enough to constitute effective controL Even the public hearings
organised by American regulators are completely absent from the UK
scene. Yet in the long run it is unsatisfactory for such major decisions
over such a large part of the economy to be taken by a small number of
individuals so completely free from outside interference or accountability.
HoC Library Research Division (1991) p.2
As this and the previous chapter have shown, public utility regulation intersects directly
and indirectly with major areas of public policy, for example, environmental policy and
infrastructural planning. It also results in distributional outcomes which affect society
as a whole and, in particular, impacts upon the quality of life of low income and other
disadvantaged groups of consumers. Because of its importance and place in the polity,
utility regulation should be firmly attached to the fabric of political and imblic
accountability.
In America, the lines of regulator accountability appear to be rather more clear cut than
is the situation in Britain, i.e. via democratically elected regulators and through
structures for open decision making. In Britain, more weight seems to have been placed
on the need for independence than on clarity of accountability.
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At a superficial glance, the British regulatory model appears to provide an intricate and
elaborate system of formal and informal accountability, as Figure 3.6 overleaf, outlining
the major players in the British regulatory environment, seems to suggest. But this
merely serves to disguise a reality where at best, the utility regulators' accountability is
confused, and where at worst, the regulators stand the danger of being accountable to
everyone and no-one.
The accountability problem in the British system is best illustrated through looking more
closely at the primary formal line of political accountability. Each of the Directors
General are technically accountable to Parliament, but beyond the presentation of their
annual reports to Westminster, no mechanisms have been established to ensure that this
actually takes place. The Select Committee system in the House of Commons is one
obvious arena where the regulators might be made to account for their actions (Hawes,
1992), but outside the Energy Committee's examination of the Director General of
Electricity Supply as part of its inquiry into the consequences of electricity privatisation,
the regulators have been generally immune from investigation through this means.
Indeed, the abolition of the Energy Committee in 1992 potentially widens the hiatus
between parliamentary overview and regulatory action.
In reality, the most powerful political influence on the activities of the regulators is not
Parliament but the respective Secretaries of State. Under the legislation, the relevant
Secretary of State has the power to appoint the regulator and has residual powers in key
areas such as the issuing of licences and references to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission.
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PLAYERS IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Effectively a microcosm of the contemporary State
1. LEGISLATURE:
Parliament: to whom regulators are notionally accountable, expenditure is voted by Parliament, annual
reports presented to Parliament
Parliamentary Select Committees: ad hoc investigations of policy framework and regulatory machinery
e.g. House of Commons Trade and Industry Select Committee, Environment Select Committee, ex-
Energy Committee
2. EXECUTIVE:
Secretary of State: "the directors are appointed by and are answerable in broad terms to the appropriate
Secretary of State. If the director does not carry out his duties satisfactorily, he can be replaced." Lord
Reay, Lords debate on CSU Bill, 9/3/92, Co1.1193
Treasury: approves expenditure of regulatory bodies (funds raised through licence fees)
3. JUDICIARY:
High Court - Judicial Reviews: review of legality and validity of procedures used in regulatory
decision-making (but not of substantive policy/decisions)
4. ECONOMIC REGULATION AND AUDITING QUANGOS:
Monopolies and Mergers Commission: key institutional bulwark to utility regulators' powers - referral
if actions of utility companies seen to be against "the public interest", settle disputes over licence
modifications
Office of Fair Trading: enforcement of general competition law and consumer protection
National Audit Office: "The Comptroller & Auditor General has been given the financial audit of these
bodies and the National Audit Office will soon need to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of
their operations." Beauchamp (1990, p.58)
5. OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES: Environmental or "Quality regulators"; Department of Social
Security, European Community, local authorities
6. MEDIA: primary non-institutional vehicle for regulator public accountability
7. INTEREST GROUPS, including consumer interest groups:
* source of external information and monitoring
* source of specialist policy advice on consumer issues
* point of additional leverage on the utility companies
* prompter of regulatory vigilance and action (aids regulator's evaluation of own effectiveness,
accountability & independence)
* support in political arena re. strengthening regulatory powers, resources etc.
Consumer councils/committees: responsible for following up individual complaints, monitoring
company practice, input into consumer policy
Public Utilities Access Forum: community sector-regulator forum on low income consumer issues
Independent consumer & advocacy organisations e.g. National Consumer Council, Consumers'
Association, National Right to Fuel Campaign, Age Concern
Community services organisations: e.g. citizen's advice bureaux, welfare rights & money advice
groups
Figure 3.6: Players in the regulatory environment
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The significance of the Secretary of State is clearly recognised by the Director General
of Electricity Supply: "..in important respects the power that I have derives from or is
constrained by the Secretary of State" (Littlechild, in Veljanovsld, ed. 1991, p.116).
The apparent gap between the theory and practice of the regulators' political
accountability may explain the hesitancy of the last Secretary of State for Energy when
questioned on the matter during the Energy Committee's investigation into electricity
privatisation:
(Mr McAllion) Is the Director General accountable to yourself?
(Mr Wakeham) He is accountable, I think to Parliament, ([somebody
can tell me ([that is correct. He is accountable directly to Parliament,
yes, but he publishes his reports and he certainly will-
(Mr McAllion) If he is directly accountable to Parliament, surely he will
be directly accountable to Parliamentary Select Committees?
HoC, Energy Committee, 1992c, paras 352-3
The evident danger in the rather confused lines of formal accountability is that it will
result in an 'accountability vacuum', whereby the decisions of the regulators are not
subjected to any form of political scrutiny at all. Alternatively, the scope for intervention
by the Secretary of State potentially threatens the very independence upon which the
edifice of British utility regulation centrally rests.
Outside the political arena, the primary institutional device for examining the actions of
the regulators lies in the process of judicial review. But this is essentially confined to
questions of procedure, i.e. whether or not the regulator has exceeded his/her legal
powers or "remit" (Emery & Smythe, 1986, p.23f). It does not generally encompass the
review of instances of substantive decision making, unless some breach of statutory
power has occurred 18•
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The judicial review process is likely to be constrained also, in the view of a number of
commentators (e.g. Beesley, 1991; Veljanovslci, 1991), by a reluctance on the part of the
courts to intrude too deeply into the terrain of the regulatory agencies, and by "the fact
that, where discretion is so wide, there are few pegs on which to hang an application for
review" (McHarg, 1992, p.392). The extent to which this may indeed be the case could
well be tested in the near future, if the power and coal unions succeed in their
application for a judicial review of the Director General of Electricity Supply's alleged
failure to ensure that, in signing long-term gas-fired generation contracts, the RECs have
been buying power economically (The Guardian, 16/10/92) 19.
Ideally, of course, the regulators will be accountable to the consumers of utility services.
Generally, however, this line of accountability is indirect and is refracted through
intermediary bodies such as the consumer committees, interest groups and the media.
As such, the strength of the accountability nexus between the regulatory agencies and
utility consumers will be heavily dependent upon the capacity of these intermediary
bodies to represent effectively the collective, and in some instances the divergent,
interests of domestic consumers. The decision to establish consumer committees under
the wing of the regulator, in the water and electricity industries, potentially weakens the
degree to which these bodies can call the regulator to account (see Chapter 7).
But the most significant structural barrier to the regulatory agencies establishing a strong
accountability relationship with ordinary consumers, lies in the fact, as shown earlier,
that the regulators have, what might be described as, an 'antecedent set of
accountabilities' to the shareholders of the private energy and water companies.
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During the passage of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill, the National
Association of Citizen's Advice Bureaux sought to include an amendment requiring the
relevant Secretary of State to set standards of performance for each of the regulators.
This was seen as a way of adding a measure of transparency and external accountability
to the regulatory system. The amendment was opposed by the Government on the basis
that:
„if he is to perform his duties effectively, the director must, in our view,
retain his independence of the political process. For the Secretary of
State to set performance standards for the regulator as the amendment
envisages would involve him in second-guessing the director and would
compromise that independence. Lord Reay, HoL, 5/3/92, co1.1097
If, ultimately, the effectiveness of the regulators as 'principals' in the social control of
the privatised utilities, and the solidity of their defence against 'regulatory capture' by
the industries, is dependent upon the clarity of the lines of accountability that exist
between them and their political and public constituencies, then the British system looks
fundamentally flawed. As much as anything else, the British model of regulation seems
to be founded on trust. This may turn out to be an unsound principle around which to
build a structure of economic and social regulation in an area as vital as the public
utilities.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 3
1. "..efficiency implies that the correct combination of goods will be produced and that
each good will be produced with the minimum input of resources. The former is referred
to as allocative efficiency. The latter may be termed productive efficiency." Swann
(1989) p.48
2. The aim of maximising social welfare is not usually pursued by a monopolist. The
traditional motivation for a monopolist is the maximisation of profit, which, in the
absence of competition, is typically inconsistent with economic efficiency.
Crew & Kleindorfer (1979) p.119
3. "a Community Service Obligation should be defined as arising when the Parliament
or the executive government expressly requires a government business enterprise to carry
out an activity which it would not elect to provide on a commercial basis, or which
would only be provided commercially at a higher price." Economic and Budget Review
Committee (1991) p.xvii.
4. Interestingly, Demsetz (who is a leading Chicago School neo-liberal theorist) alludes
to the limitations of conventional economic theory when he says:
The claim may be a bit strong, but what economic theory we possess is
specialized to explaining the decentralized, private ownership economy.
Even macroeconomics presumes private decentralized reactions to
quantities that are supposedly controlled by central authorities, such as
money supply, taxes, and government expenditures. Our theory not only
takes wants and technology as given, it also takes decentralized private
ownership as given. The theoretical role of the state, except for recent
work on the theory of democracy, is largely normative and limited to
resolving externalities, that is, to making the system work better from the
perspective of underlying private demands for goods and services. It is
not a predictive theory of the central management of 'public" wants.
Demsetz (1989) "The Social Variable in Economic Analysis", p.41
5. Taylor (1990) touches on this in his essay on free market economic analysis and
practice over the 1980s:
What has been mobilized., is a political language which does not seem to
recognise the idea of a social effect or social cost at all, but which is
concerned to offer an alternative and differently focused account. pp.7-8
6. Not only are there likely to be different sub-sets of utility consumers with possibly
different interests, but as Pollitt (1988) suggests in his discussion of consumerism in
public service provision generally, potential and future services users, as well as
members of the public affected by the (positive or negative) externality outcomes of
service provision, constitute important 'consumer constituencies' whose interests need
to be taken into account in public policy.
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7. Yet it is hard to see how contract compliance - beyond the re-issuing of the franchise
every x number of years - could be monitored minus regular regulatory oversight. It
would clearly be unsatisfactory for consumers to have to wait ten years or more before
major service problems could be corrected.
8. "The vast majority of electricity, natural gas, television, and local telephone service,
plus large amounts of water, public transportation, and other services are provided by
privately owned and governmentally regulated public utilities." Sherman (1989) p.3.
Although paradoxically, the overall structure of American utility industries now has a
far greater public ownership component than Britain.
9. See McHarg (1992) for an analysis, from a legal perspective, of the Competition and
Service (Utilities) Act 1992. On the overall impact of the Act, McHarg concludes as
follows:
On balance, the Act is a slight improvement on the current position as
respects both competition and consumer protection. But its significance
lies more in what it omits than in what it contains, which emphasises
rather than remedies the flaws in the United Kingdom's regulatory
policy. p.396
10. The House of Commons Select Committee on Energy was disbanded following the
abolition of the Department of Energy. The functions of the Department of Energy have
been subsumed within the Department of Trade and Industry (with the exception of
Energy Efficiency which has gone to Department of the Environment and is subject to
the Environment Select Committee).
The Select Committee on Energy's role is now notionally encompassed within the Trade
and Industry Committee. Dr Michael Clark (Conservative - Rochford), who was
Chairman of the Energy Select Committee is the only member of that committee who
is a member of the Trade and Industry Committee. The ex-Clerk of the Energy
Committee, Dorian Gerhold, has been appointed Clerk of the Trade and Industry
Committee. [Source: Trade and Industry Committee Press Notice, 15th July 1992]
Members of the Select Committee on Energy tried to resist the Government's disbanding
of the Committee, including moving an early day motion signed by 88 Mps. In the
debate in the House of Commons on 30th June 1992, Michael Clark and Alex Salmond
(also an ex-member of Energy Committee) stressed the continuing need for the
Committee in order to monitor the consequences of electricity privatisation.
11. The way that regulatory policy in Britain has become refracted through personality
is illustrated in Rhoclri Morgan's suggestion during the debate on the passage of the
Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill that the ideal regulatory situation would consist
of:
„regulators who have the statutory powers that Stephen Littlechild has
in the electricity industry, combined lvith Ian Byatt's brains and James
McKinnon's teeth." HoC, 16/1/92 co1.1151
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12. "But this, it might be said, is the British, the small 'c' conservative way - you can,
though you probably have no need to, extract rules ex post from the ongoing behaviour
of people as they go about their business. Put that another way: the rules are implicit
Nowhere is it stated that gentlemen do not remove their jackets in the dining room at
the club, but members know." Walker (1990) p.157
13. The clash between the American and British 'political culture' is reflected in
Stelzer's comment that:
..our British friends think we are quite mad to allow lawyers and
intervenors to stretch hearings over years, perhaps decades. We, in turn,
think they are quite undemocratic to rely on closed negotiations between
the regulator and the regulated, to deny many parties an opportunity to
be heard, and effectively to deny all parties the right to appeal decisions
of the regulator - a single Director, not even a commission. Stelzer
(1991) p.69
14. Although the relationship between the owner/shareholders ('principal') of a firm and
its managers and staff ('agents') might be seen as broadly analogous. And similar
problems of communication and control have been identified in the separation of
ownership and management by Vining & Weimer (1990).
15. "We believe that this information problem is at the heart of the economics of
regulation." Vickers & Yarrow (1988) p.80
16. In relation to electricity, Weyman-Jones (1990, p.70) concludes that "[from] being
a key part of the initial draft licences, yardstick regulation has been all but abandoned".
The monopoly role of British Gas in the provision of gas negates, of course, the facility
to undertake "yardstick regulation". The Director General of Water Services has
expressed particular interest in the use of "comparative competition" as a surrogate for
real competition in the high naturally monopolistic domain of water services (Byatt,
1990a, p.88). But the setting of substantially different K factors, along with the marked
geographical and environmental variations between different companies, will serve to
limit his ability to employ the yardstick method.
17. "Of the three different interest groups - the licensed water and sewerage companies,
their shareholders and consumers - the consumers have the weakest voice. They are not
organised, they have no economic power and frequently they are individuals who are ill-
equipped to take on the machinery of business". Whitworth (PERC, 1989) p.15
18. The three procedural areas that fall within the ambit of judicial reviews are outlined
by Hoffland and Nicol (1992, pp.178-9):
. An illegal decision is one where the decision-making body has not been
given the legal power to do what it has done - ie, (fit has gone outside
its remit or what it was set up to do.
. An irrational decision is one which is so unreasonable that no reasonable
authority could make it (in legal jargon this is `Wednesbuty' unreasonableness,
named after the court case in which the principle was established.
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• Procedural impropriety means procedural unfairness - ie, breaches of the rules
of natural justice.
19. Under the terms of their licences, the RECs have an obligation to purchase
"electricity at the best price reasonably obtainable having regard to the sources
available" (Condition 5). The Director General is responsible, of course, for enforcing
the licence conditions.
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CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC UTILITY
PRIVATISATION
INTRODUCTION
Before 1979 there was a general acceptance that what were then called
public utilities - water, electricity, gas - are best provided for a society
by one kind or another of public ownership. The New Right substituted
and acted so far as it could on the ideal of shareholders, entrepreneurs,
and in general what is called free enterprise. Honderich (1991) p.88
The sale of the public utilities in Britain could be seen to represent the zenith or nadir,
depending on one's point of view, of the privatisation programme carried out under the
leadership of Margaret Thatcher. The privatisation of the utilities - particularly, water
and to a lesser extent, gas and electricity - had been seen by many to take the
Government, and in turn the public, into previously uncharted waters 1. The
denationalisation of the utilities overturned key dimensions of "the 1940s settlement"
(Gamble, 1989, p.2) and directly challenged beliefs, built up over forty years, about the
role of government in strategic areas of the economy and about the immutability of
public control of the utility industries.
The privatisation programme began fairly unambitiously, with the National Freight
Corporation being the sole industry specifically identified for sale to the private sector
in the Conservative Party manifesto in 1979 (Conservative Central Office, 1979). It was
only during the second term of the Thatcher Government's period of office that attention
began to be directed towards the privatisation of the public utilities 2. The culmination
of the privatisation programme was achieved during Mrs Thatcher's third term, with the
sales of the complex water and electricity supply industries.
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While there is little evidence that the sale of the public utilities was carried out
according to some pre-established 'blueprint', each of the three privatisations appeared
to share a number of common policy objectives; although the weight and emphasis given
to particular objectives seemed to vary from one privatisation to another. In this Chapter,
the economic and political objectives explicit (and in a couple of instances, implicit) in
the Conservative Government's utility privatisation programme will be outlined.
In addition to isolating the primary elements in the Government's political investment
in privatisation - e.g. fiscal management, promoting dispersed share ownership and
re-structuring trade unionism - there is another important dimension to the politics of
privatisation which needs to be considered. This might be described as the ideological
framework (or "macro-politics") of privatisation. The first part of the chapter will
explore a number of the predominant themes on the New Right agenda of social change,
as these form the contextual backdrop against which public utility privatisation has
occurred.
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PART 1: THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF PRIVATISATION
it is futile to question the present economic policy framework solely at
the instrumental level, without analysing the merits of the underlying
value judgements and hence of neo-liberalism.
Helm (1986) p.xviii
The political and economic environment within which utility privatisation is located,
cannot be understood without an appreciation of the major tenets of New Right political
philosophy, for as Gamble (1989, p.4) says "[o]ne of the sources of inspiration for the
privatization programme was the ideas of the New Right". As well as being organically
related to New Right theory, privatisation has become the 'flagship' of the New Right
approach to governance, as advocates such as Veljanovski (1987), Pine (1988), Letwin
(1988) and Redwood (1988) have pointed out.
The prescriptions of the New Right have come to dominate political discourse in many
Western post-industrial societies since the mid-1970s; although they have received their
fullest airing (in a policy implementation sense) in Britain and the United States over
the past thirteen years. The factors that have given rise to the ascendency of New Right
political and economic ideas during the 1970s are seen to include, the failure of
Keynesian demand management to deal with the volatile mixture of high inflation and
high unemployment ('stagflation'), the 'fiscal crisis' of the contemporary state
(O'Connor, 1973) 3, international economic instability following the OPEC oil crisis in
1973, the demise of US economic leadership, and the inability of 'social democratic'
governments to adapt to national and global changes in economic and social
development (Walker, 1984b; Gamble, 1988, 1989).
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A combination of the apparent failure of social democratic/Keynesian policies (and their
markedly more collectivist alternatives) and the beguiling simplicity of neo-liberal
prescriptions for economic and social progress, has put New Right theory not only in
the forefront politically in some countries, but has led, arguably, to it gaining an almost
universal monopoly in the realm of political ideas. Governments across the globe and
across the political spectrum have sought to import parts of the New Right "package",
under various guises such as 'economic rationalism' and the 'social market', over recent
years.
The body of theory encompassed under the definitional umbrella of the New Right often
appears to lack a sense of unity and internal consistency (King, 1987; Dunleavy &
O'Leary, 1987; Gamble, 1988, 1989). Among the major intellectual strands of the New
Right are, eighteenth century laissez faire economics, public choice theory,
libertarianism, and authoritarian conservatism. The interaction between these disparate
elements is not always harmonious; and this provides a creative dynamic in New Right
thought as well as a potential source of internecine dispute.
The extent to which New Right theory represents a qualitatively different
weltanschauung from that shared by right-wing theorists in the past need hardly concern
us here (see, for example, Willetts, 1992 on this question); except to acknowledge that
it offers a more potent attempt to articulate a sustainable anti-collectivist theory than has
hitherto been the case. In part, this is the result of the New Right's ability to forge an
effective coalition (and to some extent, dialectic) of radical liberal and conservative
thought. It is also because the intellectual rigour of their arguments is ostensibly superior
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to that which pertained in the past (naturally this excludes figures like Adam Smith,
Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill). Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987 p.74) capture the
essence of this latter attribute of the New Right when they state:
What makes the New Right distinctive is its philosophical and theoretical
sophistication. Its supporters have fully accepted that liberal and socialist
ideas need to be combated with all the available arguments mustered by
the social sciences. When they justib, traditions, as they often do, New
Right authors appeal to social science research and argument, not simply
to received wisdom or eternal verities.
What then are the central precepts of this more elaborate intellectual counter to the
various manifestations of collectivism (on a continuum from social democracy to
communism) which have dominated political thought and action for much of the first
seventy years of the twentieth century? In this discussion, which is of necessity more
synoptic than comprehensive, the following elements of New Right theory will be
considered:
* Core values
* The role of the market
* The role of the state
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(0 Core values 
The links between private property, markets and liberty is a strong one
and is the primary defence of privatisation.
Veljanovski (1987) p.206
Like their socialist opponents, New Right theorists frame their political and economic
prescriptions around a set of core values concerning the human condition. This
constellation of values is a combination of libertarian and conservative positions; and
for all the elaborate phraseology used, they amount to a number of relatively
straightforward (if largely untestable) propositions about the nature of human behaviour
and motivation. The 'values centrepiece' in the New Right world-view concerns a
radically re-defined concept of citizenship rights (Gamble, 1988), built upon the trinity
of individualism, freedom and property rights.
As might be expected in a reactionary body of thought (in the literal rather than
ideological sense), the New Right vision of citizen rights is premised upon a critique of
the way that the notion of citizenship rights has been expressed and enacted in dominant
social democratic regimes over much of this century - and reaching their apotheosis in
the three decades after the Second World War.
Of particular concern is the way that basic economic rights (such as the individual right
to own and control property) have been complemented with, and even subordinated to,
an array of political and social rights (Marshall & Bottomore, 1992; Roche, 1992).
The extension of political rights to traditionally powerless groups in society such as
women and ethnic minorities, and the evolution of social rights - embodied primarily
in post-war Welfare State (King, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Roche, 1992) - has led
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to both the accretion of claims and expectations and the growth of state power. For New
Right theorists like Hayek, many social programmes, particularly those with any sort of
distributional intent, lead to the extensive use of state coercion (e.g. taxation) and results
in the infringement of individual property rights. Inequality in their view, is a
fundamental staple of the free economy (and by extension, the free society), for without
it the structure of property rights as well as the basis for economic growth and social
advance is undermined:
The range of what will be tried and later developed, the fund of
experience that will become available to all is greatly extended by the
unequal distribution of present benefits; and the rate of advance will be
greatly increased ([the first steps are taken long before the majority can
profit from them. Many of the improvements would indeed never become
a possibility for all if they had not long before been made available to
some. If all had to wait for better things until they could be provided for
all, that day would in many instances never come. Even the poorest today
owe their relative material well-being to the results of past inequality.
Hayek (1960) p.44 4
The New Right alternative to a set of values emphasizing collectivity, social rights and
entitlements, is their concept of citizenship in the free market economy. Here the
dimensions of citizenship are conceived in a highly circumscribed form, with a strong
emphasis on economic and legal rights (both of which are encapsulated in the concept
of 'civic rights'). A rather more ambiguous position is taken to political rights, reflecting
traditional conservative distrust for democratic institutions (Honderich, 1991 asserts that
conservatives have "never or very rarely indeed been democratic by choice", p.124), as
well as the empirically-based critique of the performance of the political system by
public choice theorists. What is noticeably - and in their view, justifiably - absent is the
dimension of social citizenship 5.
210
The point of central reference in New Right political philosophy is the individual in
society rather than the 'society of interdependent individuals' position characteristic of
opposing political ideologies. In fact, the notion of society itself is markedly problematic
for radical liberal theorists. While the bald "there is no such thing as society" view
expressed by Margaret Thatcher may represent an over-simplification of the New Right
stance (Willetts, 1992), the treatment of society as an autonomous entity, or organising
principle, is explicitly dismissed. As Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987 p.90) state, for the New
Right, allusions "to collectives, or collective behaviour, which suggests that there are
entities other than individuals which have goals, purposes or needs are 'holistic'
fallacies". In the intellectual 'patchwork quilt' of New Right theory, however, this
negative and relatively incoherent formulation of society, is partly offset by the
ascendent place that society - of a hierarchical, almost feudal kind - is given in
traditional conservative thought. The importance of this fusion of ideas will be seen in
the discussion of the role of the state below.
Not only does the individual - and by implication the prerogatives of the individual -
occupy the focal point in the lens through which all human behaviour and social action
should be judged, but he or she is accorded a particular set of attributes in New Right
philosophy. The way that these attributes determine individual behaviour and express
themselves in relationships between individuals, is central to the intellectual
superstructure of New Right thought; so it is necessary to briefly expound these
propositions here.
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Fundamentally, the individual is seen as essentially self-interested - or to use the more
value-neutral terminology of economics, utility maximising - and rational (the "homo
economicus" of the public choice theorist Buchanan 6). In unison, these characteristics
make for self-conscious and purposive action on the part of individuals designed to
further their own personal interests. Individual interests, however, cannot be satisfied in
isolation and they inevitably require a degree of interaction with other self-interested and
rational actors. Within a social context made up of such individuals then - according to
the logic of radical liberal theorists - the maximisation of personal interests will be best
achieved through an explicit form of voluntary exchange and co-operation. Put another
way, human beings are selfish rather than altruistic by nature; yet ironically, through
pursuing their own self-centred ends they are required to engage in co-operation and
accommodation, which can further everyone's interests and result in socially constructive
outcomes. This, in simple terms, is the logic that underpins the concept of the free
market. It also provides its legitimation, for the validity of the marketplace as the most
functional form of social organization, is centred around, as Veljanovski (1987 p.36)
says:
..the paradoxical assertion that a spontaneous order will arise as a
incidental by-product of what on the face of it appears an antisocial
motive (greed)and an anarchical system (competition) without conscious
direction.
The individual in interaction with others then, is (like the market) largely
self-regulating. Hence there is little need for externally-imposed constraints and controls
- with the exception of the maintenance of a system of rule compliance in order to
ensure that everyone 'plays fair'. While law and order is integral to the effective
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operation of individual voluntary exchange (particularly with respect to the preservation
and protection of property rights), the emphasis must invariably be on maximising
personal freedom. For radical liberal theorists, the operation and allocational efficacy
of the free market - which for them is very much a metaphor for life generally - is
likely to be profoundly retarded, if the scope for individual action is unnecessarily
constrained.
Freedom (or liberty 7) is a concept which occupies a salient place in the pantheon of
liberal values. Yet as many critics of New Right philosophy (and indeed, opponents of
'old Right' philosophy, such as Tawney, Titmuss and Marshall) have asserted, for all
its rhetorical importance, freedom is perceived in an extremely limited and negative way.
Freedom, in the sense of absence of coercion, rather than freedom as opportunity to
participate (economically, politically or socially), is the paramount objective of liberal
politics 8. In the view of Hayek, other interpretations of the concept of freedom amount
to a very dangerous form of intellectual quibbling:
It has been with the help of this equivocation that the notion of collective
power over circumstances has been substituted for that of individual
liberty and that in totalitarian states liberty has been suppressed in the
name of liberty. Hayek (1960) p.16
Yet even categorising the New Right position as 'freedom against', is to over-simplify;
for the notion of the absence of coercion is often confined to the economic sphere of
life, as opposed to other domains of human activity. Arguably, for instance, the
centralised and interventionist use of state power in the area of civil liberties by the
Thatcher Government (Hillyard & Percy-Smith, 1988; Honderich, 1991, pp.122-3) stood
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in stark contrast to its unremitting attempts to liberalise economic relations in Britain
in the 1980s.
Be that as it may, the negative view of freedom articulated by the New Right is
substantially consistent with the internal logic of their social vision. Essentially, the onus
is on the individual to create her/his own opportunities (or 'freedom to') through
market-related exchanges and as long as she/he is free from unjustifiable constraint in
accessing the market, the allocation of rewards in this process is seen to be
fundamentally fair, despite the fact that they will generally result in quite unequal
outcomes:
It cannot be denied that the Rule of Law produces economic inequality -
all that can be claimed for it is that this inequality is not designed to
affect particular people in a particular way Hayek (1986) p.59
The suggestion then, that the outcomes of the "invisible hand" of the market should be
moderated through external action, in order to create opportunities for particular groups
in society, is perceived as a direct threat to the inviolable freedom of others to maximise
their return from market exchanges, as well as a basic infringement of property rights.
The right to hold, use and dispose of property (physical, human, informational or
otherwise) is the central dynamic in New Right's social order. Private property in its
various forms, constitutes the 'currency' for exchange and reward in the economic and
social system, and it provides at the same time "a guarantee of individual autonomy"
(Gray, 1986, p.66). Because of its centrality in the social order, any attempt to interfere
with the individual's right to accumulate and use the property they legitimately acquire
through market interactions (apart from basic levels of taxation to finance law and order,
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defence and the provision of "public goods") is generally viewed with abhorrence by
members of the New Right.
New Right theorists also draw, what is for them, an important distinction between
'common property rights' and 'private property rights'. Private property, based on
exclusivity and transferability of use, should form the dominant form of tenure in a free
market economy; with as little recourse to common property as possible. Almost by
definition - and this is relevant to the New Right's position on nationalisation - common
property is intrinsically inferior as a mode of ownership to private property. Seldon
(1990 p.127) expresses this view as follows:
Socialists have persistently avoided acceptance of the truth that public
property destroys the essence of property. By diffusing  nominal but
ineffective public ownership it changes real ownership into paper
ownership. Changing private identifiable property into public un-
identifiable property is to destroy the incentives to protect, conserve,
improve and render it productive by using it profitably in making goods
and services for which consumers will pay.
In the context of the argument about property rights, privatisation serves two important
purposes. First, it shifts the locus of ownership away from 'dysfunctional' state forms
and second, through the public sale of shares in the utility companies, it extends
individual property rights (Redwood, 1988).
215
(ii) The role of the market
the competitive market has several features which render it uniquely
congenial to a liberal individualist society. The coordination it effects
among human activities is, firstly and above all, non-coercive. Each
agent adjusts his plans to the plans of others by reacting to the
information about others' preferences and resources that is transmitted
to him through price signals. The outcome of these adjustments is the
tendency to coordination or equilibrium which is a feature of
unhampered market activity.. It is a form of coordination which is finer
than any achievable by central planning and one which at no point
abrogates the liberty of individuals. Gray (1986) p.69
There is a danger in presenting a synoptic account of the New Right's position on the
roles of the state and the market, to do so in an almost caricatured black and white way.
Indeed the analogy of a music hall melodrama, where the black-cloaked and
unredeemably evil figure of the state incessantly seeks to steal the virtue of the
white-garbed, beautiful and all-too-innocent free market heroine, often seems to be
present in the minds of some advocates of the New Right position themselves (e.g.
Clarke, 1987 and Veljanovski, 1987). However, while it may appear possible ultimately
to distil the essence of New Right thought as "the market, good", "the state, bad"; the
substance of their views are rather more sophisticated and complex than this.
Although the New Right's position on the free market is relatively clear and unequivocal
(but the nexus between the free market model and contemporary capitalism is less so);
their view on the role of the state - particularly from the perspective of practical politics
- is ambiguous and at times, ostensibly contradictory. The benefits of moving from
clarity to apparent imprecision are perhaps dubious, but it may be useful to begin with
the New Right's clearer conception first.
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The market - built on a foundation of voluntary exchange, competition and open and
unrestricted access - is universally viewed in New Right thought as an unrivalled
mechanism for efficient production, distribution and consumption. Its intrinsic efficiency
lies in the fact that through actively facilitating competition it ensures that a close
relationship exists between (i) the need for goods and services and their production and
(ii) the cost of producing goods and services and the prices charged for them.
Remarkably, according to free market advocates, this complex pattern of preference
communication and 'signalling' is achieved naturally and spontaneously, without the
need for highly elaborate and formal systems of co-ordination and planning (Adam
Smith's "invisible hand"):
There is perhaps no single factor contributing so much to people's
reluctance to let the market work as their inability to conceive how some
necessary balance, between demand and supply, between exports and
imports, or the like, will be brought about without deliberate control.
Hayek (1960) p.400
The virtues of the market are held to reside not only in its unique efficiency, but also
in its impartiality. As a conduit for the allocation of opportunities and rewards, the free
market is seen as neutral, in that it doesn't discriminate amongst actors in the market
on anything other than economic grounds (e.g. the saleability of their product). As
suggested earlier, the outcomes of market processes (i.e. individuals in competition) will
often be unequal, but this is seen to have little to do with the internal working or logic
of the market itself. The essential 'amorality' of the free market in New Right thought
is outlined by Gamble (1988):
A significant feature of these arguments is the abandonment of the claim
that the pattern of rewards and incomes which is the outcome of markets
is in any sense just. Hayek denies that the question has any relevance.
The set of general rules that define the market order can be considered
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just but not the outcomes themselves, because these depend on luck,
chance, accident, effort, skill, inherited wealth, inherited talents and
many other factors. For Hayek and many of the New Right the market Ls
a lottery. p.53
The claim that the operation of the free market is aloof from questions of morality or
justice, is used as a defence against the critique that the market produces and reproduces
inequality. It is also used as an argument for the intrinsic merit of the 'spontaneous
order' of the market, relative to value-driven (but misguided) alternatives, such as state
intervention aimed at influencing distributional outcomes 9. Intruding upon the value
neutrality of the market not only disrupts the incentive structure, which acts as the
dynamo for competition, efficiency and economic growth. But it also 'politicises' the
market by coercing it to discriminate in favour of particular groups, on the basis of some
externally-imposed set of moral criteria (see Hayek, 1960, Chapter 6). The denial of
endogenous market injustice represents a significant divergence of New Right theory
from traditional conservative thought, at least of the "One Nation" kind, for the latter
recognises the need for ameliorative action to offset instances of market failure.
The consonance between this highly idealised model of the free market and the working
model of contemporary Western capitalism, is substantially under-explored by New
Right theorists. Yet clearly the issue is an important one; for the unfettered, insular
world of small business undertakings envisaged by Adam Smith and the recent inheritors
of his world-view is, in both a temporal and structural sense, a long way removed from
the transnational, corporate oligopolies that dominate the international economy in the
late twentieth century. Despite their expressed anxiety over the influence of monopoly
power (see below) in the marketplace and the frequent nostalgic glances back to a
previous era of primitive capitalism, New Right theorists largely approach the issue as
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an act of faith. That is, capitalism in whatever guise is seen as somehow expressive of
free market principles. The fact that this is patently not the case in many instances is
either blithely ignored, or tendentiously argued away by the assertion that, for all its
flaws, contemporary capitalism still represents a vastly superior mechanism for
production and distribution than any extant alternatives.
The existence of monopolies or single producer markets acts as a clear constraint on the
free play of market forces, and this is recognised by New Right theorists.
The enforcement of competition law and the proscription of monopoly practices by the
state is viewed as necessary in order to protect the integrity of the market economy.
The existence of natural monopolies in areas such as electricity distribution and water
supply is seen in orthodox economics as an example of market failure, and this has been
often used as the justification for public ownership. Not so though, with most New Right
theorists, who argue that confronted with the unenviable choice (or "evil", Friedman,
1962, p.28) of public or private monopoly, private monopoly is to be preferred because,
..a state monopoly is always a state-protected monopoly - protected
against both potential competition and effective criticism..
and that the
„machinery of monopoly becomes identical with the machinery of the
state, and the state itself becomes more and more identified with the
interests of those who run things than with the interests of the people in
general.
Hayek (1986) p.146 and p.147
It is generally accepted, however, that private monopoly provision of essential services
would be likely to require a degree of public regulation 1°.
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(iii) The role of the state
Privatisation is at the vanguard of a world-wide movement in thinking
and politics about the legitimate role of the state in an industrial society
of the 1980s. Socialism in whatever form has both lost the battle of ideas
and has been forsaken as a practical solution to the immediate industrial
problems that most economies are now confronting.
Veljanovski (1987) p.204
There is a conventional picture of British history as the steady, and
apparently inexorable, spread of state involvement in the economy and
society, at least until the 'extremist' Conservative government in 1979
uniquely committed to reversing this trend.. This is bad history. One could
identijy a series of turning points in British history when men of
property, representing our tradition of individualism, have resisted the
encroachment of the state. Willetts (1992) p.7
The New Right's articulation of the function of the state is altogether more ambiguous
than its concept of the market. Although the Hobbesian leviathan never appears to be
far from mind, a variant of the Minotaur would perhaps be a more appropriate metaphor
for the state in New Right thought; for it is clearly seen to have two parts - one of
which is considerably less terrifying than the other.
In order to understand the nuances of the New Right position on the role of the state,
it is first of all necessary to summarise their critique of the post-War social democratic
state. The primary ingredients of the critique of the state are outlined by Dunleavy &
O'Leary (1987 p.47):
State intervention is criticised on three main grounds: because in practice
it produces worse results than do market solutions; because
administrative and bureaucratic methods are inherently inferior to
markets as a means of allocating resources; and because it is
objectionable on moral grounds.
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Given the New Right's deification of the market, it is hardly surprising that any
alternative to market-based production and distribution - particularly one involving active
interference with the market organism and private property relations - would, almost by
definition, be seen to be less efficient and effective. And much of the case against the
involvement of government as a producer is built, almost in its entirety, around this
central belief. However, some analyses of the detrimental effects of state involvement
in the economy - either as a central planner or producer - adopt a more developed
position. In particular, they draw attention to (i) the problems of planning, (ii) the
absence of competition, and (iii) the comparative performance of state-run enterprises.
The notion of centralised planning is anathema to most New Right theorists, with much
of the intellectual assault against it led by the Austrian School under the leadership of
the late Freidrich Hayek. Planning is viewed with abhorrence not only because it
intrudes upon the natural workings of the market and reduces entrepreneurial freedom
("planning against competition", Hayek, 1986, p.31); but also because it assumes a level
of cognitive skill that human beings generally don't possess (and it is here that the
Hayekian thesis intersects with 'disjointed incrementalist' approach of Lindblom, 1959,
and others). Given the finiteness of human knowledge then, any attempt to apply
planning solutions amounts to little more than the tyrannical imposition of the views and
vested interests of the few (e.g. senior bureaucrats) on the majority. Dunleavy &
O'Leary (1987 p.131) encapsulate the New Right position on planning when they state:
Economic activity should remain private, because markets are a powerful
'discovery system' which achieve co-ordination and social learning
without coercion and without trying to attain the kinds of impossible
synoptic knowledge of how a whole economy works which state planning
demands.
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In conjunction with their dismissive attack on the planning ambitions of post-War social
democratic governments (which in their assessment includes the Macmillan and Heath
governments in Britain), New Right theorists have been highly critical of the corporatist
processes through which this planning was attempted. The formulation of public policy
via the triad of government, business and unions resulted essentially, in their view, in
the institutionalisation of inefficient practices and the promotion of short-term,
ineffective policy responses (such as prices and incomes policies) aimed largely at
satisfying elite vested interests.
The non-existence of competition, which is characteristic of much state production
(whether it be in the industrial or social welfare arenas), substantially inhibits efficiency
and productivity. The effective monopoly that many state-based enterprises enjoy,
enables them to remain unreceptive to preference and price signals; hence they place
both consumers and potential competitors in a highly disadvantaged position. This
according to New Right advocates is in direct contrast to the open, consumer sovereign
nature of the private market.
This absence of competition and the ability to persevere with inefficient management
practices, minus the sanction of bankruptcy or 'hostile takeover', is adjudged to be the
cause of the poor performance of public enterprises relative to private sector firms.
Although the evidence on the comparative performance of public and private enterprises
in sectors like utility services is inconclusive (these studies are cited in Part 2), this does
not inhibit critics of the public sector from using this line of reasoning as a supposedly
empirical buttress to their more a priori arguments.
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The second major element of the case against the state, namely that administrative and
bureaucratic methods of allocation are inferior to market processes, has a more
empirically hard-edged basis, i.e. public choice theory.
The public choice approach "is a perspective on politics that emerges from an extension
and application of the tools and methods of the economist to collective or non-market
decision-making" (Buchanan, 1989, p.13). While the public choice school, is not the
exclusive preserve of the New Right (as Dunleavy & O'Leary 1987, Dtmleavy, 1991
make clear), its insights have been utilized to greatest effect by opponents of state
provision.
The starting point for public choice analysis is that actors in the public sphere - officials
and politicians - exhibit the same rational, utility-maximising behaviour as that expressed
by individuals in the private market. Hence, in contrast to classical public administration
dictums, public sector actors are seen to be essentially motivated not by obscure notions
of public service, but by self interest.
Due to the absence of a direct financial profit motive, the public choice argument runs,
the utility-maximising behaviour of public sector actors will be expressed in perverse
ways. That is, rather than productivity and efficiency being the reference point against
which performance is judged (for there is little reward for these, it is suggested, in the
public sector), factors such as size of organisational territory and budget become the
performance criteria. Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987 p. 114) amplify this interpretation of
bureaucratic behaviour as follows:
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The key difference between firms and state agencies concerns what it is
that their managements try to achieve. In private firms (even those which
are inefficiently run), decisions are still made with a view to increasing
profits, since managers' earnings are often profit-related. But in
government agencies bureaucrats' welfare is more likely to be closely
linked with the size of their budget than the earnings of their bureaux.
Increased appropriations create more jobs for government officials,
improve promotion prospects, strengthen demand for their services, make
it easier to run agencies and improve their prestige and patronage
abilities. .Hence the central objective of all government officials is to
maximize their agency's budget.
Not only does the capacity to secure resources effect the fortunes and standing of
officials in government departments, but it also influences the progress of ministerial
careers as well. And even if a government minister actively sought to reduce the scope
and size of his/her departmental domain, the control that officials exercise over
information would seriously retard their ability to do so. In this "Yes Minister" world
of bureaucratic imperialism then, political accountability through the democratic process
is almost non-existent.
Alongside these inherent difficulties in controlling the supply side of government, are
the deficiencies in the demand side of democratic governance. For public choice
theorists, politicians as utility-mwdmisers, purchase electoral support through trading
ever-escalating promises, minus serious consideration of their public expenditure impact:
..why did the economists of the thirties, forties, fifties, and into the sixties
take the Keynesian theory of policy seriously? Why did they fail to see
the elementary point that elected politicians will seek any excuse to
create budget deficits? Buchanan (1989) p.21
Voters, who are also utility-maximisers, effectively conspire with politicians in this
fiction that the 'ante' can continually be raised, because they don't directly relate the
costs of the promised additional programmes to the taxes they pay. Or if a section of
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the electorate do, they are likely to be out-voted by a majority coalition of interests who
stand to gain by the introduction of new programmes. Hence the affection in New Right
circles for public financing devices - such as the now-discredited community charge -
that draw a stronger nexus between consumption and taxation.
The conclusion that many public choice theorists arrive at from all this is that the
failings of democratic governments as managers of the public purse are so deeply
entrenched and pervasive that they should be entrusted with as few responsibilities as
possible. At a minimum, it demands that the taxation powers of governments and the
administrative fiat of state bureaucracies should be circumscribed within tight
constitutional boundaries:
When persons are modeled as self-interested in politics, as in other
aspects of their behaviour, the constitutional challenge becomes one of
constructing and designing framework institutions or rules that will, to
the maximum extent possible, limit the exercise of such interest in
exploitative ways and direct such interest to furtherance of the general
interest. Buchanan (1989) p.22
For the New Right, public choice theory adds a dimension to its critique of the state that
it otherwise would not have; a dimension that is at the one time, ostensibly
empirically-based and morally satisfying. The latter benefit is derived from being able
to 'tunnel under' the moral high ground traditionally held by advocates of collectivism,
i.e. that public sector activity is informed by an overriding commitment to public service
and the pursuit of the public interest. Public choice theory (it is believed) has not exactly
revealed the state Emperor to be without clothes, but it has shown, damagingly, that the
garb worn is not distinctly different from that found on any entrepreneur walking the
streets of the City on any given day.
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The empirical validity of public choice insights into the political and administrative
process has been subjected to increasing challenge by political scientists in recent years:
"the great majority of empirical researchers are by now agreed..that the hypothesis
concerning the predominant role of self-interest in Western politics cannot be upheld"
(Lewin, 1991, p.98), "..the appeal of budget-maximizing models has not been grounded
on detailed empirical support" (Dunleavy, 1991, p.223 - see also Orchard, 1989) 11 . Yet
this has not appeared to diminish its use in the counterattack against dirigiste models of
the state.
The final aspect of the New Right's critique is its fundamental moral objection to state
intervention as an infringement of individual liberty and freedom. In addition, state
involvement in the allocational process tampers with the reward structure (through
equality-oriented measures) and undermines individual responsibility. The basis for this
moral angst over state incursions into the market place was summarised earlier and
therefore does not warrant repetition here. However, the legitimacy of state intervention
in areas outside the economic market, is a matter of some debate within the New Right
itself; with radical liberals and conservatives adopting somewhat different stances. It is
to these apparent tensions in the New Right conceptualisation of the state in a free
economy that attention will now be turned.
Much has been made, in the extensive literature on the New Right, of the differences
between its two dominant strands - radical liberalism and conservatism - over the
appropriate role of the state [see for example, Johnson, 1987; Gamble, 1988, 1989; Hill,
1990; Willetts, 1992 12 ; Heywood, 1992; Hayek also articulates the major lines of
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division in his famous Postscript to The Constitution of Liberty, "Why I Am Not a
Conservative]. What then are these contrasting viewpoints on the state and are they
significant sources of internal tension for governments influenced by New Right ideas,
such as those led by Margaret Thatcher and John Major in Britain?
Put simply, the logic of the purist radical liberal view of the centrality of the free
market in society would suggest that the state has a very marginal role to play. Because
the market in its free and unfettered form is the most efficacious vehicle for production
and distribution, the presence of the state in the market should be minimal, if evident
at all. Equally, most of the current set of so-called non-market functions performed by
the state (such as social welfare, environmental protection and corrections) could quite
easily be converted into market transactions by handing them over to the private sector.
The primary legitimate role for the state under this view is that of protecting private
property through the provision of law and order:
In no system that could be rationally defended would the state just do
nothing. An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed
and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other. Hayek
(1986) p.29
Its major function must be to protect our freedom both from the enemies
outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens: to preserve law and
order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets.
Friedman (1962) p.3
Yet even the maintenance of a framework of rules for fair trading in the market - which
many New Right theorists would see as a state function - would be more satisfactorily
performed via the self-regulatory behaviour of market institutions in the opinion of some
advocates of the radical liberal position. Clarke (1987, p.89) conveys the spirit of this
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extreme end of the anti-statist position when he says "I believe that nothing now done
by the State could not be more successfully done by the market" 13•
The fact that it is possible to talk about the "extreme end" of a set of views, in itself of
course, suggests that the radical liberal position on the state ranges over a continuum.
But, by and large, radical liberals are united in their belief in a minimalist state;
although the detailing of the specific functions of the minimal state varies.
As a conceptual model of an idealised role for the state in contemporary Western
society, it is grossly under-developed and its lack of intellectual substance can, with
some validity, be parodied as 'the state is the collector of residue activities spurned by
the market'. The theoretical edge to the New Right's formulation of the state is
provided, as King (1987) suggests, by the classical conservative political tradition.
In the conservative world-view, the state occupies a clear and unequivocal position as
the defender of traditional values, authority and social order. Without a strong and
omnipresent state, representing ruling class interests, society would dissolve into anarchy
and chaos.
As the preserver of tradition and values, the state provides both the continuity and
structure necessary for the ordered functioning of human society; as the residual holder
of the accumulated wisdom of historical precedent, the power and legitimacy of the state
is unassailable. This conception of the state in conservative thinking goes back at least
to the end of the eighteenth century and was probably most coherently and eloquently
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expressed by Edmund Burke in his famous attack on the French Revolution and the
nascent British 'left' (Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790).
In practical terms, the conservative conception of the role of the state may not appear
to be markedly different from the less anti-statist end of the radical liberal continuum.
The core function of the state in both perspectives is to protect property rights:
The state's authorio) must be especially exercised to maintain property
relations and the rights of property owners. Authority and discipline must
also be reasserted in schools and in families. The egalitarian
consequences of post-war social citizenship rights must be reversed:
social hierarchy should be accorded its `proper' role in society.
King (1987) p.22
What makes the conservative formulation of the state fundamentally different however,
is the fact that it is accorded a dominant, positive role (as opposed to its peripheral and
reactive position in radical liberalism) and the way that the state is given entry into the
private domain of relationships and values (such as the family) even at the expense of
individual liberty: "In general, it can probably be said that the conservative does not
object to coercion or arbitrary power so long as it is used for what he regards as the
right purposes" (Hayek, 1960, p.401).
While the conservative position provides a sense of legitimacy for the presence and
operation of a strong state, is this sufficient in itself to explain away the obvious
tensions that exist in the New Right approach to the state? For as Gamble (1988) states:
The idea of a free economy and a strong state involves a paradox. The
state is to he simultaneously rolled back and rolled forward.
Non-interventionist and decentralized in some areas, the state is to be
highly interventionist and centralized in others. pp.28-29
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Finding a solution to this paradox involves more than the unpicking of a theoretical
puzzle; for it relates directly to the development of an understanding of the mechanics
of Thatcherism and its seemingly ambiguous use of state power.
In seeking to explain how the tension between free market principles and an
interventionist state - reflected in the practices of recent Conservative Government in
Britain - has been 'resolved', three possible (and not necessarily, mutually exclusive)
hypotheses present themselves:
1. That centralised and assertive intervention is required in the short-and
medium-term to clear the way for the full flowering of the free market economy.
2. That interventionist state activity is a necessary and inevitable corollary of a
free market economy.
3. That the paradox is not really a paradox at all.
Brief consideration will be given to each of these hypotheses.
The first hypothesis is suggested by Gamble (1988) in his analysis of the first eight
years of the Thatcher Government and runs roughly as follows. Because the Thatcher
Government took office in an economic, social and political environment dominated by
the precepts of social democratic regimes developed over the preceding thirty-odd years
(which he describes as "social democratic hegemony"), a sustained period of clearing
out was required. In this context, the Government had to intervene quite heavily in order
to open up the free market, to remove the vestiges (and vested interests) of social
democracy and to transform individual attitudes and behaviour. This latter imperative
is summarised by Gamble when he says, "It [Conservative Government] seeks to reshape
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the institutional framework of the free economy. The citizens have to be forced to be
free and enterprising, otherwise there is no guarantee they will be so" p.35. The
implication of this hypothesis is that after the period of re-education and reassertion of
the primacy of the market is completed, the firm hold of government will be relaxed,
thereby enabling the liberal minimalist state to be achieved.
The second hypothesis, in contrast to the previous one, suggests that regardless of the
ambitions of radical liberals, a strong state is virtually endogenous in free market
capitalism. The following comment by Polanyi in his study of the history of modern
capitalism (quoted in King, 1987 p.87) expresses this view:
the introduction of free markets, far from doing away with the need for
control, regulation and intervention, enormously increased their range.
Administrators had to be constantly on the watch to ensure the free
working of the system. Thus even those who wished most ardently to free
the state from all unnecessary duties, and whose whole philosophy
demanded the restriction of state activities, could not but entrust the
self-same state with the new powers, organs and instruments required for
the establishment of laissez-faire.
The infrastructure of state regulatory bodies established in tandem with the privatisation
of the public utilities, seems to support the validity of this assertion_ Although, as shown
in the previous Chapter, the character of the regulatory agencies is such as to suggest
an air of impermanence and transience - i.e. muted regulatory structures and formal
statutory protections in favour of an individualistic and discretionary model of
regulation, and an emphasis on creating a competitive market environment. If this is so,
it would add weight to the first proposition rather than the second.
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The third hypothesis challenges whether a paradox in the free market/strong state
relationship exists. While it is true that there is an apparent conflict between radical
liberal values and conservative statism, this is only because the state is viewed as a
unitary, homogeneous entity. Clearly, where there is little differentiation between the
disparate roles of the state, a tension exists between the "more state" and the "less state"
positions of the conservatives and radical liberals respectively. However, in reality
neither strand of New Right thought views the state in this unified way. Rather, to put
it somewhat simplistically, the state is perceived in two parts, i.e. the pro-free market
dimension of state activity (e.g. monetary control, law and order, defence, monopoly
regulation) and the anti-free market dimension (e.g. economic and energy planning,
public ownership and production, state-dominated social welfare provision). And all New
Right protagonists, despite some differences in emphasis, are united in their objective
of seeing the former role of the state enhanced at the expense of the latter.
What each of these hypotheses have in common is a recognition that the state performs
an important function as a facilitator of, and residual support for, the market economy.
The practice of the Thatcher and Major governments suggests that this is also recognised
by the power-brokers in the Conservative Party. King makes a similar point when he
concludes:
The theoretical contradiction between liberal minimalism and
conservative activism has never been resolved intellectually but its
success electorally and programmatically is sufficient for the
Government. p27
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From this review of New Right theory, it can be seen that the privatisation of the public
utilities is likely to occupy a centrally important place in the New Right project for
structural social change. For it, at the one and the same time, enshrines the principle of
`commodification' as the basis of individual interaction in society (i.e. premised
essentially on market-based exchanges), extends individual property rights, promotes the
ascendency of the market, and crystallises the shift in the role of the state from producer
to 'enabler'.
The extent to which aspects of this agenda has been translated into explicit political and
economic objectives in the British privatisation programme will now be considered.
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PART 2: THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THE
PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
INTRODUCTION
In Part 1, the ideological context of privatisation was discussed. The tenets of neo-liberal
political philosophy underpins the 'intellectual logic' of privatisation, just as the
prescriptions of the New Right theory on the roles of the market and the state might be
seen to form the 'meta-objective' of privatisation. At the level of practical policy-
making, the privatisation programme has been motivated by a set of broadly related, but
rather more concrete, political and economic objectives, such as promoting wider share
ownership, reducing the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and improving
the operational efficiency of public utility industries.
The existence of a set of 'second order' policy objectives, founded on a strong
ideological thesis about the respective roles of the state and the market, does not
necessarily mean that the privatisation programme has been directed according to a pre-
determined and coherent agenda. Indeed in the view of most commentators, the
privatisation policies of the Thatcher and Major Governments have been characterised
less by consistency and coherence than by heuristic and adaptive responses to political
and financial exigencies (Kay et al, 1986; Gamble, 1989; Marsh, 1991) 14. Certainly,
it is apparent in retrospect that the emphasis given to the achievement of particular
economic, financial and political outcomes has shifted at different stages of the
programme (see Figure 4.1 overleaf).
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THE BRITISH PRIVATISATION PROGRAMME
PUBLIC SECTOR SALES 
	
MAJOR OBJECTIVES 
"Competitive industries"
	
* Disposal of market-based industries
(e.g. Amersham, National	 * Revenue-raising
Freight, Cable & Wireless)
"Market dominant enterprises"
	
* Efficiency/competition
(e.g. British Telecom, British	 * Revenue-raising
Airways)
"Natural monopolies"
(e.g. water authorities, 	 * 'Popular capitalism'
regional electricity 	 * Free market hegemony
companies, British Gas)
Figure 4.1: The British privatisation programme
The seemingly fluid nature of the arguments used by Conservative governments over
thirteen years of privatising endeavour is possibly deceptive, however. For regardless of
the different weight given to economic objectives in particular instances of privatisation,
it is possible to discern, over the life of the programme, a dominant strand of political
imperatives. In the earlier phases of the programme, the financial, but quintessentially
political issue, of fiscal management and public expenditure occupied a prominent place
in the Government's motivation for denationalisation. This was displaced in the 1986-
1990 period by an explicit elaboration of the "popular capitalism" and "share-owning
democracy" thesis 15 , which had been little more than a sub-text in earlier
privatisations. Finally, there is evidence that the core motivation for the programme in
more recent times has reverted back to PSBR-management objectives. The over-riding
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political theme of the programme is noted by a number of commentators, for example:
Privatisation originated as a political and financial strategy, the
economic rationale was appended later. Whitfield (1992) p.128
..the government's aims in relation to privatization have changed
substantially over time. As they have changed, and the political aims
have become more important, so the government has offered incentives
to ensure successful asset sales and broader share ownership. Marsh
(1991) p.461
The nature, balance and congruence of the objectives of the privatisation programme
also raise important questions at the level of political theory. In particular, whether the
dominance of political factors indicates, ultimately, that the privatisation programme is
a classic expression of "statecraft" (Gamble, 1988) driven by short- and medium-term
political objectives, or alternatively, a "hegemonic project" (Hall & Jacques, 1983; Hall,
1988; Jessop et al, 1988) aimed at long-term ideological domination. This is a field of
inquiry substantially beyond the scope of this thesis, however, the question of the
hegemonic character of the privatisation programme is considered in the conclusion to
this Chapter.
The multiple objectives of the privatisation programme will be discussed in this part of
the Chapter. The objectives that will be examined are:
Economic
# consumer sovereignty
# efficiency
Political
# fiscal management
# creating a share-owning democracy
# reducing trade union power
# defeating collectivism
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a. Privatisation - the economic arguments
The core economic arguments used to justify the privatisation of public utilities and
other public enterprises take as their starting point a critique of the defects of public
ownership, and revolve centrally around two major issues: (i) the constraints on
economic freedom arising from the existence of government-run monopolies and the
associated failure of these industries to treat the interests of consumers as paramount and
(ii) the seemingly endemic inability of public enterprises to optimise allocational and
productive efficiency. These arguments have been articulated in varying forms by
representatives of the Government (e.g. John Moore, in a series of speeches to the City
in 1983 and 1985, John Redwood, 1988 and the water and electricity privatisation
White Papers), as well as by academic economists such as Beesley & Littlechild (1986),
Curwen (1986) and Veljanovslci (1987, 1989b).
(i) Economic freedom and "consumer sovereignty" 
the main prize, if competition can be increased, is for the consumer.
Moore (1985) p.90)
In the view of the proponents of privatisation, the existence of large nationalised
industries, with effective monopoly power over demand and supply, acts as a severe
brake on the exercise of individual economic freedom. This constraint on freedom is
manifest in two major ways; firstly, it inhibits the ability of "corporate individuals" (i.e.
private sector firms) to gain a market share of the those parts of the production and
service economy controlled by the nationalised industries and secondly, as a result of
this absence of a free market (or even a marginally open one), the individual consumer
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has no capacity to exercise choice in the purchase of goods and services supplied by
public sector enterprises.
Choice is reified as the passport to consumer sovereignty and ultimately, service quality.
Therefore, in the absence of choice the consumer is 'captive' and exposed to the
vagaries of a producer-dominant service system. Producer domination in turn engenders
an insensitivity towards, and a disinclination to respond to, the needs and predilections
of consumers. This is perceived to be one of the most pervasive features of the
nationalised industries:
The nationalised industries have also unfortunately not been very good
at satisfting their customers.. Services often did not seem to match needs
or expectations. Moore (1983) p.83
Juxtaposed against this metaphor of a complacent set of public monopoly providers
(which, it should be said, has some basis in fact - see Annexe 1) is the inherently
responsive and customer sensitive facility of the private sector: "privately owned
companies have a greater incentive to produce goods and services in the quantity and
variety which consumers prefer" (Beesley & Littlechild, 1986 p.38). The introduction
of similar incentives - related to the existence of competing sources of supply and the
requirement of profit-maximisation in the interests of shareholders - into the erstwhile
nationalised industries would secure a framework of rights and protections for consumers
unattainable under public ownership.
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As with the characterisation of the free market economy generally, the concept of
consumer sovereignty has as much untruth to it as it has truth. In order for consumer
sovereignty to have practical, and not just rhetorical, meaning a set of pre-conditions are
necessary. These include (i) the existence of a range of product choice, conditioned by
the actual preferences and needs of consumers (rather than, as is often the case, both
preference and product being 'manufactured' by the producers themselves 16), (ii) the
absence of significant levels of information asymmetry between producers and
consumers, (iii) the sensitivity of price to consumer demand (producers as 'price takers'
and not 'price makers') and (iv) the ability for consumers to exit without financial or
other loss. Only rarely, in most commodity markets, do these pre-conditions apply (see
Forbes, 1987, Table 4-1 pp.69-70 for an assessment of the "theory and reality of the
exchange environment").
(ii) Improving efficiency
Public enterprises perform relatively poorly in terms of their competitive
position, use labour and capital inefficiently and are less profitable.
Moore (1985) p.83
What hampers the [electricity] industry is its structure and its position
in the public sector. Electricity privatisation White Paper Cmnd. 9734
The market as facilitator of consumer sovereignty has carried the most symbolic potency
in the economic case for privatisation (as reflected in the way that it has been frequently
invoked by the Government in support of privatisation initiatives 17) but the case for
denationalisation is built substantially around the efficiency argument.
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For advocates of privatisation, the efficiency performance of public enterprises is almost
invariably overshadowed by that of their private sector counterparts, or in the absence
of counterparts (as in the case of monopolies), by the prospective private businesses that
should displace them. This is despite the fact, that the empirical evidence accumulated
over a quarter of a century of research - particularly in the US - is anything but clear-
cut. Studies which have compared the economic performance of public utilities under
different ownership conditions fall almost equally into two camps: with approximately
half concluding that there is little discernable difference in performance, and the other
half split evenly between those that conclude marginally in favour of publicly-owned
utilities and those that conclude marginally in favour of privately-owned utilities.
For an overview of public/private sector comparative performance studies see Yarrow,
1986; Waterson, 1988; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Weimer & Vining, 1989; Donahue,
1989 and Nelson, 1990; for specific studies see Meyer, 1975; Pryke, 1981, 1986;
Millward, 1983, 1986; Dtuisire et al 1988, 1991; McGowan, 1988; and Thompson et al,
1991.
The putative inefficiency of public enterprises - particularly as manifested in low rates
of return on capital investment relative to that obtained within the market generally - is
said to be the result of two factors.
Firstly, their monopoly or quasi-monopoly position within the public sector affords them
protection and insulation from the economic rigour of market forces. Hence poor
management practices, bad investment decisions and low levels of worker productivity
escape the sanctions that apply to firms in the private sector; namely, takeover or
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bankruptcy. Even under a regime not characterised by these deficient commercial
practices (and many critics of the nationalised industries concede that the performance
of these industries improved substantially from the mid-1970s onwards), the monopoly
character of public sector enterprises has a propensity to give rise to productive and
allocative inefficiency because - in the absence of competition - they can effectively
regulate supply and price. The similar criticism, it should be said, is levelled at private
sector monopolies by economic theorists; albeit often without the same degree of
vehemence.
Secondly, the fact that the industries lie within the province of government is viewed
as detrimental to their economic performance. A good part of the failure of the
nationalised industries had been attributed to (i) the lack of congruence between
long-term investment planning and short-term political and fiscal priorities, (ii) the
constraints on the nationalised industries gaining access to investment capital from the
private sector, and (iii) the sheer incapacity of politicians to be able to make good
business decisions. Notwithstanding the framework for the operation of the nationalised
industries developed by Herbert Morrison - i.e. controlled by 'public spirited'
businessmen and bureaucrats theoretically at arm's length from the government of the
day - a review of their forty year history tends to confirm the view that repeated
incursions into the operational decision-making of the nationalised utility industries by
successive governments acted to the detriment of their economic performance (see
Annexe 1).
241
The economic viability of the nationalised industries has been also affected, it is often
asserted, by the burden of "non commercial objectives" that they were traditionally
obliged to meet:
The most likely explanation for the poor peiformance of the public
enterprise activities is that they are in public ownership. It could have
had a harmful effect by inducing the belief that the activities should act
as social services and take the national interest into account. Pryke
(1986) p.117
One manifestation of this is the cross-subsidisation of costs from commercially viable
to less-commercially viable sectors (for example, the urban subsidisation of rural
electricity costs), and it has been viewed with particular abhorrence by economists and
advocates of denationalisation alike as it confounds the principle of allocative efficiency.
Generally it is held by all but the most partisan of privatisation proponents, that the
mere transfer of monopoly industries from the public to private sectors is insufficient
in itself to achieve either the consumerist or efficiency outcomes attributed to the free
market, for ownership is not the key variable (Helm et al, 1988; Dunsire et al, 1988;
Cullis & Jones, 1989; Parry, 1990; Parker & Hartley, 1991; Bibby, 1992). In order for
these outcomes to be realised, privatisation should be accompanied by the dis-
assembling and restructuring of public monopolies, with a view to stimulating
competition in production and supply:
The long-term success of the privatisation programme will stand or fall
by the extent to which it maximises competition. If competition cannot be
achieved, a historic opportunity will have been lost. Moore (1985) p.92
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The effective promotion of competition is pivotal, as John Moore attests, to the success
of the privatisation programme. Competition is the engine by which the force of change,
in the structure and output of one-time public sector activities is to be driven. The
advent of competition in hitherto closed and insulated enterprises, it is asserted, will lead
to a veritable chain reaction of positive effects, like increased productivity and
efficiency, greater public accountability and enhanced consumer power. Without
competition the linch-pin between the promise and delivery of privatisation is broken:
The evidence is ovenvhelming that where corruption, negligence, or the nature
of the service itself undercuts competition, the benefits of privatization shrink or
vanish. Efforts to compensate by other means for the missing discipline of
competition will seldom be fully successful. Those public services for which it is
technically or politically impossible to keep contractors in a state of healthy
insecur4y offer, at best, limited potential for privatization. Donahue (1989)
p.218
b. The political objectives of the privatisation programme
In reviewing the history of the Conservative Government's privatisation programme, it
would seem that economic objectives have been largely subordinate to political ones.
Although, there has been an attempt to achieve a greater degree of balance between
these two sets of policy objectives in the more recent privatisation of the electricity
supply industry.
From the sale of British Telecom onwards, Ministers of State, other government
spokespersons and external supporters of the programme (e.g. the Institute of Economic
Affairs) increasingly drew attention to the non-economic benefits of denationalising the
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utilities; such as the promotion and dispersal of share-ownership and the permanent
overturning of dirigiste and socialist conceptions of the role of the state. Equally, the
economic rationale for denationalisation - competition, efficiency, lower prices etc. -
which seemed tenable in the earlier privatisations, became (until the ESI privatisation
at least) more and more difficult to sustain and to justify as the framework and
mechanics of utility privatisation evolved. Four of the major elements of the political
agenda of privatisation - fiscal management, "popular capitalism", reducing trade union
power and the defeat of collectivism - will be discussed in the following section.
(0 Fiscal Management
As elsewhere in the world the difficulties in reconciling revenue with
expenditure in the government accounts provided considerable impetus
to those of us arguing for a large [privatisation] programme and helped
by enabling it to be built into the framework of the national budget. It
became something all wings of the Conservative Party could agree on,
left and right, as it made available more money both for spending
programmes, and for the tax cuts dear to the hearts of both sections of
the party. Redwood (1988) p.147
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the development of a secure revenue stream
from public asset sales has formed an integral part of the Government's fiscal
management strategy (Heald, 1984; Hogwood, 1992). The growth in privatisation
receipts contributed to the reduction in the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
(PSBR) during the decade of the 1980s 18. During the Chancellorship of Nigel Lawson,
it also afforded the Government some scope for making tax cuts, without the
concomitant necessity of making politically unpopular cuts in public expenditure
(Johnson, 1992).
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The "accounting conventions" (Kay et al, 1986) employed by the Government to use
privatisation proceeds as an offset against current expenditure and the failure to set this
income against future loss of revenue (that would have been derived from the industries
had they remained in public ownership) has drawn considerable criticism (see Levacic,
1987; Heald & Steel, 1986; Curwen, 1986; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988).
To the end of September 1992, proceeds from the privatisation of state enterprises
totalled in excess of £46 billion, with over £43 billion of this being generated from the
period 1984/85 (sale of British Telecom) onwards. Figure 4.2 overleaf illustrates the
growth in privatisation receipts between 1979 and 1992. Figure 4.3 shows the annual
level of the PSBR over the same period.
It can be seen from the chart that from 1987/88 to 1990/91 the PSBR was a negative
figure (effectively a Public Sector Debt Repayment), which is attributable, in part, to the
substantial revenues obtained from asset sales. For example, privatisation proceeds in
1988/89 contributed over half of the PSBR of -£14.7 billion 19 . It could be
hypothesised that the comparatively healthy state of the PSBR during these years gave
the Government financial manoeuvring room to further other political objectives. Helm
& Powell (1992, p.91) allude to this in relation to the ESI privatisation in 1990-91: "The
maximisation of revenue from the sale was less important than in telecoms and gas, as
the public sector borrowing requirement became a public sector debt payment."
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Privatisation Programme Proceeds
Pounds Billion
1979/90	 1981/22	 1983/84	 1995/99	 1987/88	 1989/90	 1991/92
1860/ 81	 1962/63	 1964/65	 1968/67	 1960/69	 1990/91	 1992/93
1992/93 end of September only
5otrces: C;50 Financial Stet let ice, Terry IL JacKeon C19623
Figure 4.2: Privatisation proceeds 1979-1992
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Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
Pounds Bill (on
1973/90	 1904/22	 1923/94	 1905100	 1927/09	 1908/90	 1901/92
1300/01
	
1982/85	 lawn	 1985107	 1983/00	 1990/91	 1922/95
1982/95 end of September only
Source* CSO Financial Statistica
10
3
-5
-10
-15
-20
Figure 4.3: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 1979-1992
In particular, the temporary release from the PSBR-related concerns would have enabled
the Government to focus more directly on the objective of widening of share ownership,
which could only be progressed at some financial cost (e.g. providing incentives and
discounts to attract new entrants to the equity market). It also took the pressure off the
Government to maximise revenue returns in the sale of the water and electricity supply
industries.
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The recent return to high PSBR levels reflects the impact of the economic recession
(Johnson, 1992), as well as the abandonment of strict monetarist approaches to fiscal
management (a process started under Chancellor, Nigel Lawson in the mid-1980s). But
in common with its predecessors, the Major Government is heavily dependent upon
maintaining the level of privatisation receipts - £5.5 billion in 1993-94 and 1994-95
(HM Treasury, 1992, Table 1.1)) - to notionally reduce public expenditure. As the
supply of nationalised industries dries up, these revenue targets will become increasingly
harder to attain (Hogwood, 1992).
Beyond the short-term expedient of raising revenue, it was argued by the Government,
that eliminating the ex-nationalised industries' call on government loan finance (for
capital works), through changing ownership and facilitating the industries' access to
private capital, would reduce the "crowding out" of private sector investment by the
public sector. As a process of re-locating the source of investment capital demand,
privatisation of the ex-nationalised industries has indeed achieved this end. However, the
overall effect of this change in the locus of demand on the capital market generally is
probably insignificant, for as Kay et al (1986) suggest:
Traditional crowding-out arguments are clearly not applicable here and
to the extent that there is an effect it is to change the composition, rather
than the total, of private sector borrowing. p.29
The more tangible, and politically relevant, effect of shifting the locus of investment
demand is that it removes the capital debt of the newly-privatised companies from the
Government's fiscal balance sheet. This was particularly important to the Government
in the case of the water industry and was, arguably, the crux of its motivation for selling
the industry. In the absence of privatisation, the projected ten-year capital investment
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requirement (£26 billion at 1989 prices) would have been added to public sector debt
and would need to have been financed through increases in charges, or out of taxation
revenue, or both 20 • Through privatising the water industry the Government has been
able to relieve itself of a debt-heavy sector, as well as distance itself from the inevitably
adverse popular reaction to annual real-term increases in water charges related to the
capital investment programme.
(ii) Creating a Share-Owning Democracy
The British Telecom issue did more than just enable Britain to establish
the world's first large scale privatisation programme. It also led by
chance to the invention of part of popular capitalism., the only way to be
sure of a great success in the market place was to attract a new wave
and generation of investors. The idea of seeking a large new generation
of small savers came out of the exigencies of a marketing campaign to
sell the world's largest ever equity offering. .It was only after this the fill
significance of what had been done became clear..At last the prospect
opened up, not merely of individuals owning a direct stake in the country
through the ownership of their own land and houses, but also through
direct ownership of a part of industry itself
Redwood (1988) p.147
The use of the privatisation programme as a means of extending share ownership within
the workforce of the ex-nationalised industries and amongst the public at large, has
become more explicit as the programme has progressed. The "Tell Sid" marketing of
British Gas shares heralded a new agenda in the privatisation process and a desire to
widen share ownership was given as part of the rationale for water and electricity
privatisation in the relevant White Papers. More recently, the National Audit Office
reports on the sale of these industries (1992a, 1992b), elevates share ownership as a
primary objective in both cases.
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The emphasis given by the Government to stimulating public interest in the sale of the
nationalised industries began in relative indifference and concluded, in the case of the
later public utility sales, in high fervour. Amongst the means used by the Government
to engender public interest in the sale of the public utilities were (i) the substantial
discounting of shares at flotation, the use of customer incentives such as bill vouchers
and bonus shares, and the orchestration of slick and expensive publicity campaigns.
The political benefits for a Conservative government in broadening the individual
shareholder base of the equity market are reasonably self-evident. In establishing "a
rentier interest in the market" (Clarke, 1987, p.71) it is probable that members of the
electorate who hold shares would be more receptive to the pro-market policies of the
Conservative party:
The political dimension of this [privatisation] has not escaped
Conservative Party Central Office. TSB created about 1.5 million
shareholders; 1.2 million retain shares in BT and another 5 million in
BG..This suggests that the average constituency electorate will have
about 20,000 shareholder voters, which could make a difference in
marginal seats. Veljanovski (1987) p.68
McAllistar & Studlar (1989), in an analysis of voting patterns in the 1987 General
Election, lend empirical weight to the thesis that the Conservative party is likely to be
the electoral beneficiary of share ownership in the privatised industries. In this study,
the researchers concluded that the Conservative party "gained 10 per cent more of the
vote among new share owners, compared to those who had never owned shares, while
Labour lost 9 per cent of the vote, net of other things" (p.172). Although the aggregate
net gain for the Tories from the privatisation shareholder vote was relatively small - 1.6
per cent 21 - it would constitute, as McAllistar & Studlar acknowledge, a not
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insignificant factor in a tight electoral contest; such as that which occurred in the 1992
General Election.
The political advantage accruing to the Conservatives from dispersed share ownership
would also be in evidence in a situation where the Labour Party (or any other party with
a prospect of winning government) sought to renationalise privatised industries where
a substantial level of equity is held by individual investors; as this would "[threaten] not
only the gentleman in the pin stripes but the voter in the bus queue" (Redwood, 1988,
p.39). So, even if the direct political pay-off for the Conservative party is relatively
small in terms of additional votes, dispersed share ownership has the effect of applying
a brake on the range of alternative policy options available to future governments and
effectively places re-nationalisation and public ownership in the "no go area" of politics.
Short-term electoral advantage aside, broadening share ownership might also be viewed,
along with the sale of council housing (under the rubric of "popular capitalism") as a
project aimed at longer-term ideological objectives. The inculcation of an anti-state, pro-
market and entrepreneurial culture was manifestly part of the agenda of Thatcherism
(Keat, 1991) and the extension of property relations through equity and home ownership
was seen as a primary mode of achieving this. Empirical studies into the values and
attitudes of British population suggest, however, that the impact of this ideological
project has been limited (Jowell et al, 1990, 1991; ICM 'State of the Nation' polls The
Guardian 17/9/90, 14/9/92) and that "the hold of this ideology on the population at large
seems no better assured now than it did ten or more years ago" (Hill, 1990, p.32).
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Despite the transparency of its political motivations, the Government vigorously denied
that it was seeking partisan advantage through the sale of public utilities. While the
stimulation of entrepreneurial attitudes was acknowledged, the need for this - if Britain
was to remain prosperous - was seen to be so self-evident as to be beyond questions of
party politics.
Part of the case buttressing the Government's share-owning objective also revolved
around the notion of consumer sovereignty. The consumer is most 'sovereign', it was
asserted when she/he can influence the policies and practices of producer firms as a
shareholder and 'owner'. Ironically, the powerlessness of small shareholders vis-a-vis
management in monolithic corporations, has been used as a metaphor for the failings of
the contemporary democratic state by some neo-liberal public choice theorists. But the
impotency of minor, individual shareholders in the corporate domain was never
acknowledged by the Government. Nor was the fact that a highly dis-aggregated form
of equity control is held to be less effective in promoting management efficiency
compared to more concentrated forms of equity holding:
A large number of unorganized shareholders is much less effective in
keeping managers up to scratch, because each shareholder has only a
minor stake in the firm and confronts large costs in trying to make
himselfiherself expert in the firm's affairs. The `residual income
recipients' become inactive because they are so internally fragmented,
and each shareholder confronts a collective action problem in doing
anything about declining performance. Collectively shareholders are
better off if they can impose their wishes on the firm's managers, but
individually it is irrational for any one shareholder to try to improve
matters. Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987) p.113
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(iii) Reducing Trade Union power
They are using their power in a manner which tends to make the market system
ineffective and which, at the same time, gives them control of the direction of
economic activity that would be dangerous in the hands of government but is
intolerable if exercised by a particular group. They do so through their influence
on the relative wages of different groups of workers and through their constant
upward pressure on the level of money wages, with its inevitable inflationary
consequences.
Hayek (1960) p.272
The [nationalised] industries' performance on both productivity and
manpower costs has also been disappointing. Public sector trade unions
have been extraordinarily successful in gaining advantage for themselves
in the pay hierarchy by exploiting their monopoly collective bargaining
position.
Moore (1983) p.82
The weakening of the power of the trade union movement had been a major policy goal
of the Thatcher Government over the decade of the 1980s (King, 1987; Gamble, 1988;
Hill, 1990; Metcalf, 1991). The policy instruments which the Thatcher Government used
to debilitate the industrial and political strength of trade unions included, the use of state
power to suppress strike action (reaching it's apotheosis in the miner's strike of
1984-85), the introduction of a range of legislative measures to control the power of
union leadership, the termination of the corporatist relationship between government and
the Trades Union Congress which had existed over much of the post-war period, and the
privatisation of the nationalised industries.
Traditionally, the nationalised industries had been a stronghold for the trade union
movement; with a proportionally high membership relative to employees in the private
sector and a capacity, due to their strategic location in key industrial sectors of the
economy (for example, energy, transport and water services), to negotiate successfully
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substantial improvements in wages and working conditions (see Harris, 1983 for a
discussion of this in relation to the NUM). Importantly, the conditions achieved by
workers in the nationalised industries often had a vanguarding effect, where the benefits
they achieved ultimately flowed on to employees in other sectors of the economy. This
nexus between monopoly union negotiating power (with a concomitant ability to win
award changes without necessarily any increase in productivity) and the general
escalation of worker demands throughout the economy, was one that the Thatcher
Government was keen to sever. Privatisation of the major strategic industries potentially
provided a platform from which to achieve this.
The Thatcher Government was, arguably, at its strongest and most assertive in the
industrial relations field and the ability of successive governments under the leadership
of Mrs Thatcher to moderate the claims of the trade unions has been one of its most
noteworthy achievements (Gamble, 1988; Vane , 1992). The union movement was
placed very much on the defensive throughout the 1980s and its failure to marshal
significant public support in the face of a sustained assault upon its traditional
prerogatives, was paralleled by a decline in its own membership base. In 1979, union
members made up 54.4% of the eligible population, whereas in 1984, this had fallen to
45.8%. Even accounting for unemployment, union membership as a proportion of the
working population had dropped by around 5% over this period (Halsey, ed. 1988
pp.188-189). The membership of unions affiliated with the TUC fell by almost a third
between 1979 and 1989 (Metcalf, 1991) 22.
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Trade union power in Britain has patently declined since 1979, but the part that the
privatisation programme has played in this is by no means clear. A number of
commentators have argued that the effect of privatisation on the trade union movement
has been relatively minor (Thomas, 1986; Marsh, 1991). Yet there are at least three
areas where privatisation could be seen to have had some impact.
First, the process leading up to privatisation - the 'liberalisation' stage - where
nationalised industries have been obliged to introduce more efficient, commercial
regimes has led to the rationalisation of work practices and the shedding of labour in
some industries (Pint, 1990). In the water industry, for instance, the number of workers
employed across England and Wales between 1985 and 1989 fell by around 11 per cent;
over three-quarters of which were craft and manual jobs (Water Prospectus, 1989).
The 'down-sizing' process in a number of the nationalised industries has also been used
as a form of role model to encourage other parts of the public sector to adopt a more
streamlined and productivity-conscious approach:
The government appear to have cleverly used the threat of privatisation
to reduce wage demands, restructure public industries and push through
voluntary and compulsory redundancies. Cox (1987) p.163
Second, evidence suggests that some sectors of the work force in the privatised
industries, particularly the low-skilled, are being negatively affected by the privatisation
process (Thomas, 1986). And this has certainly been the case in the different, but
associated arena of "contracting out" (PSPRU, 1992). If as Thomas claims, the
nationalised industries tended to equalise the working conditions of skilled and low
skilled workers in this sector (through collective bargaining), then it is probably not
surprising that the eradication of what might be seen as a form of 'wage cross-
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subsidisation' would become an early target of a profit-conscious management in the
newly privatised industries.
Third, the emphasis that successive governments have given to the equity participation
of employees in the privatisation of their own industries, through free and discounted
shares, suggests that the promotion of 'worker capitalism' has become an important
dimension in the battle to eradicate trade union militancy. Workers, it could reasonably
be held, would be less likely to make 'irresponsible' demands for improved wages and
working conditions and would be less receptive to the idea of industrial action, or even
union membership, when they have a direct investment in the profitability of their
company. The way that the Thatcher Government promoted the National Freight
Consortium as the 'new wave' worker-management concept lends support to the
hypothesis that the shop floor itself formed part of the battleground in the fight against
collectivism.
The provision of "transfer payments to the employees of the privatised firms" (Pint,
1990, p.283) via employee share ownership schemes, has also been an effective strategy
for weakening trade union resistance to the privatisation programme. Outside the issue
of individual equity, the trade union movement at a central level is substantially
implicated in the privatisation programme as large corporate equity holders, as
Veljanovski (1987, p.69) points out:
Trade unions are also major institutional investors. The control of
pension funds ensures that the trade unions themselves have a vested
interest in the performance of the stock market. Since BT and British Gas
now make up significant sections of the quoted stock prudent portfolio
management requires that trade union pension funds hold a number of
BT and British Gas shares.
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(iv) Defeating Socialism and Collectivism
..privatisation will be the technique finally to neutralise all socialist
ideas. If liberal politicians (which in our country means Tories) have the
flair, they can employ privatisation and deregulation policies to dissolve
their political opponents' intellectual coherence and interest group bases.
Clarke (1987) p. 67
More than any other British government in living memory, the Thatcher Government
made a concerted and conscious attempt, not only to undermine the electoral base of the
major opposition party (which is presumably the object of all governments), but to
demolish the moral and philosophical edifice of the Left in Britain.
Thatcher made no secret of her wish to see socialism destroyed as an
effective political force in Britain, and a two-party system organised in
which both parties fully accepted the legitimacy of capitalism and
markets. Gamble (1988) p.221
• The privatisation programme occupies a critical place in the challenge to the legitimacy
of collectivist solutions to economic and social problems in contemporary British
society. The development of a pro-market constituency through the policy agenda of
"popular capitalism" is aimed explicitly at this end.
Equally importantly, the denationalisation of public enterprises strikes - both
symbolically and literally - at the very heart of "the socialist objective", expressed
through the original Clause 4 of the Labour Party Constitution (public ownership of the
means of production, distribution and exchange). The intellectual and physical
momentum of the privatisation programme over the past eight years, not only served to
reinforce the belief that governments should not be entrusted with a direct role in
industrial production - it has helped to elevate this belief to the status of a 'political
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truism'. And the Labour Party's rather anxious attempts to re-define its position on
nationalisation and the public utilities, initially via the muted concept of "social
ownership" and later, by its proposals to strengthen the public regulation of privatised
industries (Looking to the Future, 1990; Labour Opportunity Britain, 1991), underlines
the extent to which the anti-collectivist idea has become a dominant feature of the
macro-political landscape. It was more than simply partisan optimism that led
Veljanovski to conclude in 1987:
We are, it seems, witnessing not only a change in the terms of the
political debate but the re-emergence of a consensus in Britain revolving
around the ideas of the right rather than the radical left. p.208
Apart from the problem of breaching the anti-collectivist 'ideological consensus', future
governments of a socialist persuasion are likely to encounter significant practical
problems if they attempt to re-nationalise the privatised industries 23. The options, for
a hypothetical radical socialist government of the future, in returning the privatised
industries to the public sector would be:
1. To renationalise without compensation
2. To renationalise with the payment of compensation on the basis of orieinal
price paid for shares
3. To renationalise with compensation based on current share value
The first option would probably be politically suicidal; the second would, in the light
of the windfall increase in the value of most privatised company shares, be only
marginally less so; and the third would be extremely expensive 24. The difficult
economics of renationalisation was not lost on the Labour Party in the 1992 General
Election campaign; as evidenced by the ever-receding time frame for fulfilling the
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party's manifesto commitment to bring the water industry back into public ownership.
In effect, through discounting the share price of most of the privatised enterprises, the
Thatcher Government effectively stymied the ability of future governments to
renationalise without huge financial, and probably political, costs. This dimension of the
politics of privatisation, is highlighted by Vickers & Yarrow (1988):
..renationalLsation on less than fair terms would be a process in which
the losers would know that they had lost but the gainers would not know
that they had gained in relative terms. The Chairman of the Conservative
Party, Mr Norman Tebbit, probably had these considerations in mind
when writing to BT shareholders in 1986 asking them to think how much
a Labour Government would cost them. This suggests that a side effect
of the privatisation program has been to make more visible some
consequences of various electoral outcomes for the distribution of wealth
in the U.K p.181
CONCLUSION: PRIVATISATION AS STATECRAFT OR HEGEMONY?
Traditionally British governments develop their ideas whilst in opposition
and then stay in office until they run out of steam, or do a U-turn and
collapse through their internal tensions. Mrs Thatcher's government was
attempting in-flight refuelling - a distinctly tricky task Willetts (1992)
p.60
Taken individually or collectively, the factors influencing privatisation policy could be
seen to represent a fundamentally pragmatic approach to government, or what Gamble
(1988) refers to as "statecraft". That is, the privatisation programme was framed around
a set of short- and medium-term political and economic objectives designed essentially
to retain Conservative Party control of government. The major implication of this view
is that given that the privatisation agenda has evolved from a set of short-term political
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exigencies, it is likely to be adhered to only as long as these exigencies hold. Put
another way, privatisation is an expression of pragmatic politics and it will be pursued
as a policy framework by the Government while it is in its interests to do so. However,
as soon as the political costs begin to outweigh the political benefits, privatisation policy
will be abandoned.
An alternative to the analysis of privatisation as an expression of "statecraft", is the view
that it forms a core position in the ideological and political vanguard for change in
Britain - change aimed ultimately at establishing New Right hegemony over the British
polity 25 . Hence in contrast to the previous formulation which suggests a heuristic and
almost accidental origin and 'career' for the privatisation programme, it is perceived
here as part of an explicit and concerted attempt to re-structure the role of the state and
indeed, to restructure social relations generally. This view does not rule out the influence
of political pragmatism in the history of the privatisation programme, but would largely
see this as modifying the timing and marketing of change (for example, in the gradualist
'liberalising' incursions, by successive Conservative governments, into the National
Health Service) rather than substantially altering the dominant precepts and objectives
of the re-structuring programme.
Whether the public utility stage of the privatisation programme has been indicative of
either the process of Tory statecraft or a manifestation of a hegemonic project (aimed
at complete ideological, political and economic domination), is not only a question of
theoretical interest but one of practical importance. It is theoretically interesting in that
it seeks to explain the motivational basis of the Conservative Government and to provide
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an understanding of the way that New Right ideology and government policy-making
interact. It is of practical importance because it may provide insights into the way that
privatisation policy is likely to proceed in the future; as well as potentially giving clues
as to how a counter political strategy might be developed. For example, if privatisation
is essentially being driven by pragmatic imperatives (like enhancing electoral
popularity), it could be suggested that the course of the privatisation programme will be
determined by the extent to which the immediate political benefits of the programme
outweigh the political costs. Conversely, if a more hegemonic purpose exists, short-term
political costs may, within limits, be tolerable (and hence, largely irrelevant) in order to
achieve longer-term, structural change.
Setting the question is considerably easier than actually answering it! And like the
question itself, the explanation for this has both a theoretical and practical part.
Theoretically, there is a distinct problem in determining where statecraft ends and
hegemony begins (i.e. how can the two be delineated in practice). A problem not
resolved by Gamble (1988) for instance, in his statecraft-cum-hegemony conclusion on
Thatcherism. The conscious effort of the Thatcher Government to expand share
ownership, for example, could clearly be viewed as an illustration of statecraft; in that
it was oriented at broadening the constituency of support for the Conservative Party,
thereby potentially extending its tenure in government. Equally, this
means of broadening political support, in conjunction with an apparent attempt to
re-shape attitudes and values, could be seen as part of a drive towards hegemony. If a
hegemonic project can be identified by the way it seeks to displace a pluralist set of
values in society by a monopoly of dominant values, then the efforts to inculcate an
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entrepreneurial, market-driven culture over the course of the 1980s could be taken as
evidence that such a project was in place under the leadership of Mrs Thatcher.
An additional, if related, theoretical problem lies in trying to locate the temporal - as
well as perhaps, the physical - origin of hegemony. That is, is a political regime only
hegemonic if it commences with a hegemonic project in mind, or can it begin with a
statecraft-orientation but become hegemonic over time? In other words, in order to be
seen as hegemony is it necessary for the Thatcher Government to have been founded at
the outset on a clear programme of domination (of which privatisation formed an
instrumentally important part), or can this programme evolve over the period of its
governance?
If the former, then despite the bravado of some of its New Right supporters, it would
be difficult, on the basis of its electoral platform and its initial policy positions, to
conclude that the Conservative Government led by Margaret Thatcher was an example
of a hegemonic project: "The manifesto for the 1983 election was bland and vague.
Those who imagine that Mrs Thatcher believed in some sort of Maoist permanent
revolution will find their views refuted by that anodyne document" (Willetts, 1992,
p.58). If the latter, then there is a case to be made for the use of the word hegemony in
conjunction with the term Thatcherism.
It could be argued, of course, that any explicitly reformist government, if in power long
enough, is likely to display, over time, hegemonic characteristics. The more secure and
extended a government's hold on political office becomes - particularly, governments
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operating from a relatively coherent ideological base - the more its weltanschauung is
likely to permeate the institutional and value fabric of society at large.
From a practical (or more precisely, empirical) perspective, providing an answer to the
question of statecraft or hegemony, is limited by the relatively short history of the
privatisation programme. The interpretation of political forces in history is invariably
sounder when it is based on a long lens of retrospective vision, and this is necessarily
even more so with a concept as elusive as hegemony. The judgement that a social
democratic hegemonic project was being established (which is often held to be the case
concerning the post-war consensus, e.g. Hall & Jacques, 1983; Jessop et al, 1988;
Gamble, 1988), could hardly have been made with any precision during the time of the
Attlee Government, or indeed during the early years of the Churchill Government which
succeeded it.
The core part of the Government's privatisation programme (i.e. from the sale of British
Telecom onwards) has a history of only eight years. And the resilience over time of the
major structural changes effected in the public utility sector remains to be tested.
Equally, the continuing zeal of the Conservative Government, under a change of
leadership, for the task of redefining the role of the state has yet to be fully determined.
The Major Government appears to have eagerly taken on the mantle of privatisation it
inherited from Mrs Thatcher and has continued to extend the programme into new
domains, e.g. British Rail and British Coal.
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Mrs Thatcher's Government successfully resisted popular opposition to the utility
privatisation programme, most notably in the sale of the water authorities, which in itself
could be taken as evidence against the statecraft thesis. The outcome of the current
attempt by the Major Government to restructure British Coal, involving a combination
of privatisation and demolition by market forces, will in the face of strong popular
dissent, provide a test of whether its commitment to the reform agenda is anywhere near
as strong as that of its predecessor.
All this may appear to be leading up to an equivocating and inconclusive "let history
decide" approach to the question of the driving motivation in the Conservative Party's
privatisation programme. However, it is possible in the author's opinion, to be a little
more suggestive than this.
To argue that the privatisation programme is no more than an exemplar of pragmatic
politics or statecraft is to ignore both the way that New Right ideology has informed
successive Conservative governments' conception of the role of the state in a free
market economy and the depth to which this re-structuring of the state in Britain is
26.being implemented	 Obviously, the emergence of privatisation as an essential
element in the re-casting of state relations, has been partly heuristic in nature. And
patently at times, the Government has acted pragmatically in the manner in which it has
approached the programme. But this strain of pragmatism should not be equated with
malleability of purpose. The privatisation programme, it is suggested, has been, and
continues to be, driven by a coherent and integrated ideological agenda; although the
timing and detailing of its implementation is likely to be essentially situational.
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To this extent, the programme could be viewed as one dimension of an incomplete
hegemonic project.
In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to evaluate some of the outcomes of the
programme in the light of the government's political and economic objectives. Primary
emphasis will be given to an appraisal of the public utility asset sales (relevant to the
issue of fiscal management), share ownership and the financial performance of the
private utility companies. The substantive issue of the direct outcomes of energy and
water privatisation for domestic consumers forms the basis of Chapters 6 and 7.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1. Prior to 1947/48, there had been extensive private sector involvement in the electricity
and gas industries and up to 1989 and beyond, a quarter of households in England and
Wales received their water supply from private water companies.
2. The 1983 Conservative Party manifesto referred to the Government's intention to sell
the majority holding of British Telecom. However, no specific commitment was made
regarding the privatisation of British Gas (Conservative Central Office, 1983).
3. Under the 'fiscal crisis' thesis, governments were said to be confronted with
contradictory and irresolvable claims, in particular the demand for greater public
expenditure (to meet rising public expectations) in tandem with a resistance to increased
taxation (which was needed to finance new fields of state provision).
4. Seldon (1990) in his panegyric on capitalism makes a similar argument:
The history of Europe demonstrates that inequality is necessary to reveal
progress by different people and reward those who take the risks of the
unknown by exerting effort and initiative to discover new ways of solving
known tasks or new tasks to solve, but it is also essential to stimulate
emulation, from which all eventually gain. p.153
5. "Social citizenship' refers to those rights and duties of citizenship concerned with the
welfare of people as citizens, taking 'welfare' in a broad sense to include such things
as work, education, health and quality of life" (Roche, 1992, p.3). Honderich, 1991,
refers to these as "social freedoms", pp.119-20.
6. "Individuals are modelled as behaving so as to maximize utilities subject to the
constraints they face. .Individuals must be modeled as seeking to further their self-
interest, narrowly defined in terms of measured net wealth positions, as predicted or
expected." Buchanan (1989) p.20
7. Hayek uses the two interchangeably (1960, endnote 1, p.421)
8. "The time-honoured phrase by which this freedom has often been described is
therefore "independence of the arbitrary will of another." Hayek (1960) p.12
"As liberals, we take freedom of the individual, or perhaps the family, as our ultimate
goal in judging social arrangements." Friedman (1962) p.12
9. "Here, however, Hayek makes an important distinction between 'the competitive
order' and 'ordered competition'..for he wishes to emphasize that the aim of social
policy should not be to order (i.e. restrict) competition so as to achieve particular
economic or social goals but to define the rights and duties which make competitive
markets possible. The ills that the critics of the market attribute to it stem from the
failure properly to define the institutions necessary for its operation and the reliance on
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(macro-economic) policy which hinders rather than helps the working of the
'competitive order'. Kukathas (1989) p.95
10. The probability is that wherever monopoly is really inevitable the plan
which used to be preferred by the Americans, of a strong state control
over private monopolies, if consistently pursued, offers a better chance
of satisfactory results than state management. This would at least seem
to be so where the state enforces a stringent price control which leaves
no room for extraordinary profits in which others than the monopolists
can participate. Even ([this should have the effect (as it sometimes had
with American public utilities) that the services of the monopolistic
industries would become less satisfactory than they might be, this would
be a small price to pay for an effective check on the powers of monopoly.
Hayek (1986) p.147
If the technical monopoly is of a service or commodiol that is regarded
as essential and if its monopoly power is sizable, even the short-run
effects of private unregulated monopoly may not be tolerable, and either
public regulation or ownership may be a lesser evil. Friedman (1962)
p.29
11. Letwin provides a thorough review of the empirical evidence on the three leading
public choice questions: does the voter mainly follow the dictates of his pocket-book?,
do politicians mainly strive to maximize their votes? and do bureaucrats try to maximize
their budgets? Athough he challenges a number of the major insights of public choice
theory, Dunleavy believes that "it is too powerful an analytical tool-kit to neglect or
abandon" (p.5). His application of the public choice approach emphasises the "bureau-
shaping" and "preference-shaping" characteristics of the political system.
12. Willetts (1992 p.52) claims both these traditions for the Conservative Party: "Those
who try to identify what is singular about Thatcherism by presenting it as a rejection of
traditional conservatism are, quite simply, wrong." Heywood (1992, p.77) seems to
concur "..liberal doctrines, especially those about the free market, have been advanced
by conservatives since the late eighteenth century and can be said to constitute a rival
tradition to conservative paternalism."
13. The British liberal academic Gray (1986, p.77) sees the conception of the minimum
state as advocated by Nozick as "indefensible and, indeed, only partly coherent", and
goes on to argue that:
Advocacy of the minimum state is, in any case, not to be found in most
liberal writers. Most liberals, acknowledge that the liberal state may have
a range of service functions, going beyond rights-protection and the
upholding of justice, and for this reason are not advocates of the
minimum state but rather of limited government. pp.73-4
14. Although this is denied by one of the Government's leading spokesmen on
privatisation during the mid-1980s:
267
The privatisation programme is coherent and well
thought-out...Privatisation hands back to the people of this country,
industries that have no place in the public sector. Moore (1985) p.93
15. "In his 1986 Budget Speech, the Chancellor reaffirmed the Government's aim `to
create a popular capitalism in which more and more men and women have a direct
personal stake in British business and industry'." Lee & Saunders (1988) p.38
16. "For this to be so [consumer sovereignty], consumer preferences would at the very
least have to be generated independently of the plans and activities of producers. Yet
in reality, it might be argued, the reverse is increasingly the case, given the massive
resources available to modern capitalist enterprises in their attempts to shape and control
the 'choices' of consumers, including the growing sophistication and effectiveness of
marketing and advertising techniques. It is production that determines consumption, and
not vice versa: the sovereign consumer is a fictitious being." Keat (1991) p.7
17. "private water authorities will have greater incentive to ascertain the needs and
preferences of customers, and to tailor their services and tariffs accordingly.."
Water privatisation White Paper Cmnd. 9734
"Customers will be given new rights, not just safeguards."
Electricity privatisation White Paper Cmnd. 322
18. Which was part of the Government's monetarist strategy aimed at reducing interest
rates (Johnson, 1992).
19. "Privatisation receipts peaked both in real terms and as a ratio to net public
expenditure in 1988/89, when privatization receipts were the equivalent of 4 per cent of
net public expenditure" Hogwood (1992) p.122. Hogwood also points out that income
from sales and land (primarily local authority housing) has been an important part of the
Government's fiscal strategy over the 1980s. Receipts in this area also peaked in
1988/89 at £2.45 billion.
20. Lord Gilmour identifies this as a key motive of the Government in privatising
British Telecom:
„British Telecom were faced with the difficulo, of financing its vital
investment programme of expansion. To increase the PSBR by over
£1,000 million was unthinkable, yet the Treasury would not allow British
Telecom to raise the money from the market on the grounds that as it
was government owned it would be borrowing on privileged terms. Given
Treasury obduracy, the only way out was to sell British Telecom.
Gilmour (1992) p.96
21. Mc Allistar & Studlar also calculated that the sale of council houses netted the
Tories just under 1% of the total vote.
22. From 12,173,000 in 1979 to 8,405,000 in 1989. Metcalf, 1991, Table 1, p.20
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23. Beyond the obvious financial problems, the House of Commons Library Research
Division (1991) point out the considerable legislative hurdle, which would particularly
inhibit a minority government: "The privatisation legislation was designed so that an
incoming Government with [a] different view of the objectives of public utilities could
not implement major changes without further primary legislation." p.29
24. At the end of August 1992, the market capitalisation of the water and regional
electricity companies was £9.7 billion and £8.5 billion respectively. This represented a
85% (water) and 64% (RECs) increase in their value compared to that at the date of
sale. See Chapter 5.
25. "..hegemony means 'moral and philosophical leadership', leadership which is
attained through the active consent of major groups in society" Bocock (1986) p.11. A
more explicit definition is given in the editor's foreword to the same volume:
At base, hegemony is all about ideology. But it is. ideology writ large: the
idea of an all-encompassing dominant ideology whose scope extends
throughout all social, cultural and economic spheres of society. p.7
Writing in the mid-1980s, Bocock questions the belief that the Thatcherite project was
hegemonic:
Mrs Thatcher's position appeared vulnerable in electoral terms, but more
importantly, in the context of the problematic of hegemony, she had lost
the capacity to lead in moral and philosophical terms - even if it is
supposed that `ThatcherLym' was ever really hegemonic. p.128
26. Public utility, or physical service sector, privatisation is but one manifestation of this
re-design of state-market-citizen relations. In some ways, the changes being effected in
the health services, personal social services (particularly community care), and the
machinery of public adminstration (e.g. creation of quasi-autonomous agencies under the
"Next Steps" initiative) constitute even more profound expressions of the ideological
project.
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF
THE PRIVATISATION OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
INTRODUCTION
The character of the political and economic objectives of the privatisation programme,
representing as they do, a set of diffuse and shifting policy priorities, would suggest a
priori that the Government's success in meeting these objectives woztid be likely to be
mixed.
If for no other reason, the privatisation programme will result in variable outcomes due
to the fact that a number of the objectives upon which it is premised appear to be
incongruent, or even in conflict. One example of this, which has drawn the most
comment, is the inherent conflict between the objective of obtaining the best price for
the industries at the point of sale and the objective of creating a competitive framework
for the operation of the privatised utilities:
The aim of selling public enterprises to raise revenue and that of
privatising them in order to maximize efficiency, by placing the firms in
a competitive environment, are in conflict. The greater the market power
of a newly privatised firm, the higher are likely to be its profits and so
the greater its stock market valuation. If a public enterprise has its
market power reduced by being broken up into several parts and has its
protective regulations dismantled, it will be unable to earn monopoly
profits. As its share value on the Stock Exchange will be lower it will
fetch less for the state coffers.
Levacic (1987) pp.266-7
Other examples of tension between the disparate policy objectives in the programme
include, trying to encourage wider share ownership (inevitably involving a degree of
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discounting) at the same time as attempting to maximise the returns to Treasury, and
seeking to release essential service industries from state intervention in tandem with
promising consumers new rights and protections.
Another factor complicating the attainment of the Government's preferred outcomes is
that in some instances - notably in the natural monopoly sectors of the public utilities -
the predominant economic objective (i.e. the creation of a vigorous competitive
environment) is simply incompatible with the existing, and, for the medium-term at
least, future structure of the industries themselves.
In this Chapter, the outcomes of the privatisation of the public utilities in relation to
three core objectives will be assessed: (i) maximising revenue from the sale of the three
utilities, (ii) extending share ownership, and (iii) improving the economic performance
of the utility industries. In doing this, data is presented on the macro-distributional
effects of utility privatisation; which will contribute towards answering the fundamental
question of "who have been the winners and the losers in utility privatisation?"
The direct impact of privatisation on domestic consumers is considered in Chapters 6
and 7.
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1. REVENUE FROM THE SALE OF THE PUBLIC UTILITIES
The extent to which maximum proceeds were generated from the sale of the utilities is
an issue of considerable importance; not only for the limited evaluative reference point
of whether the Government's stated objectives were achieved, but for the broader public
interest perspective of how historically accumulated and publicly-funded assets have
been valued and sold.
In the earlier utility privatisations - British Telecom and British Gas - the Government
was heavily criticised for selling these industries for substantially less than their actual
worth (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Bishop & Kay, 1988; Buckland, 1989; Chapman, 1990;
Whitfield, 1992). The aggregate loss (including flotation costs) in these two sales has
been estimated, conservatively, to be in the order of £2.5 billion 1 (Vickers & Yarrow,
1988). Writing in 1988, Bishop & Kay concluded that:
The flotation process is the subject of much self-congratulation between
Government and its financial advisers. We are less impressed. The fact
that there is excess demand for a product which can be sold tomorrow
at a substantial premium on today's price is not a measure of the
product's popularity. Still less is it a testimony to the skill of the retailer.
The fixed price issues have been sold at substantial - in some cases
absurd - discounts.. p.35
While being less explicit in its criticisms of the sale process, the official Parliamentary
auditors, the National Audit Office, concluded in relation to British Gas that "it is
difficult to say whether the Department [of Energy] maximised the sale proceeds"
(NAO, 1987, p.15). In particular, it raised queries about the Government's expenditure
on underwriting costs and shareholder incentives, and questioned whether the
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Government had managed to strike the best bargain with the directors of British Gas,
on behalf of British taxpayers.
Against this background of concern about the under-valuation of the privatised industries
(which was regularly replayed in the media), it might be expected that the Goverment
and its City advisers would seek to strike a discernably better bargain in the water and
electricity privatisations. But if anything, evidence from these sales indicates that the
reverse occurred (see below).
The question of what is the 'true value' of utility assets is a vexed one. The Labour
Party has consistently argued that the utilities should be valued according to the
replacement costs of their assets (e.g. in House of Commons debates on the 16th January
1991 and 2nd July 1991). On this basis, the water companies, for example, would have
been valued at £34,503M [current cost] and £8,665M [historical cost] (NAO, 1992a,
Table 6). The Government, supported by the National Audit Office, has dismissed this
as a hypothetical and massively unrealistic valuation and argued that the "accounting
value of assets is not..a reflection of the underlying value of the company to investors,
particularly in an industry like water where capital assets are highly specialised.
Investors assessment of the value of a company is based on the expected stream of
future dividends.." (NAO, 1992a, p.25).
A simple measure conventionally used by economists to assess the extent to which the
privatised industries have been valued correctly at sale, entails comparing the offer price
with the effective market capitalisation of the industries (based on share price) at the end
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of the first day of trading on the Stock Exchange. This will invariably produce a
valuation much lower than that based on asset replacement at current cost, but it
provides an indication of the how the market values the industries immediately they
come up for sale. Figure 5.1 shows the effective market value of the energy and water
utilities at the end of trading on the first day of sale.
Water
companies
RECs Gens BG Total
Offer
M/Cap.
£5239M £5181.6M 2 £3597.9M £5603M £19,621M
Premium
Day 1
19% 21% 21% 10%
Premium £
equivalent
995.41M 1,088.14M 755.56M 560.30M 3,399M
M/Cap end
Day 1
£6,234M £6,270M £4,353M £6,163M £23,021M
Figure 5.1: Effective Market Capitalisation of the Public Utilities
It can be seen from this that the market value of all of the utilities appreciated
considerably over the course of the first day's trading on the Stock Exchange and that
the accumulated under-valuation of the energy and water utilities, according to this
measure, was in the region of £3.4 billion.
The first day's trading indicates the market's immediate response to the privatisation
sales, but a more accurate measure of the industries' valuation might be obtained over
a longer time-frame, when the market has had an opportunity to settle down. The initial
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response of the market may artificially inflate the value of the industry, or conversely
may not capture the full value of the industry being sold. In both the water and ESI
sales, the Department of the Environment and the Department of Energy respectively,
used a three week "aftermarket" period to adjudge whether the objectives of the sales
had been achieved (NAO, 1992a; 1992b). The movement in utility share prices over the
first full three weeks of trading on the Stock Exchange is outlined in Figure 5.2.
Premium (fully paid)
end 1st day after 1 week after 3 weeks
British Gas (£1.35) 10% 11% 11%
Water companies (£2.40) 19% 21% 28%
RECs (£2.40) 21% 22% 20%
Generators (£1.75) 21% 21% 18%
Figure 5.2: Increase in Public Utility Share Prices over first three weeks 3
Using a three week period then to estimate the market value of the utilities, reveals that
the utilities were effectively worth a total of £23,389 million, which is around £3.8
billion (or 19%) more than the gross proceeds the Government obtained from their sale.
By the end of August 1992, the total market capitalisation of these companies was £33.7
billion, some 72 per cent higher than the gross proceeds received in the sales 4.
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The Government justified the apparent under-valuation of the public utilities 5 on the
grounds (i) that they were selling into an "untested market", (ii) that the utilities -
particularly the water industry - represented an "investment risk" (NAO, 1992a, p.9), and
(iii) that a small premium on the shares (around 10%) was necessary in order "to
promote wider share ownership" and "to ensure a healthy aftermarket in the shares of
each company" (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 1992, p.vii).
The untested market argument would hardly seem to hold much validity from the period
after the flotation of British Telecom, where the 'market acceptability' of a modestly-
priced utility was immediately apparent in the way that the issue was heavily over-
subscribed 6. The dimensions of the risk factor appear, in retrospect, to have been
grossly over-rated by the Government and its advisers. This is underlined by the
extremely high level of investor interest in the water industry at flotation and
subsequently; to the point where water shares are described as having "been an
outstanding investment to date" and "1992's top performing sector" (Investors Chronicle,
4/9/92, p.58). Also significantly, the Director General of Water Services, in his analyses
of the capital structure of the water companies (19911; 1992o) has consistently
characterised the water industry as "low risk". The third argument, concerning the need
to ensure a 'modest premium' in order to encourage investors, reinforces the point made
earlier about the inherent contradictions in the rationale and objectives of the
Government's privatisation programme.
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The direct beneficiaries of the discounted sale of the utility industries have been the
individuals and institutions who invested in privatisation shares. Substantial profits were
made by those investors who sold their shares within the first few weeks after the sale,
although the actual premiums gained would have been rather higher than those cited in
Figure 5.2 above, as these are based on the price of fully paid up shares 7. For investors
who have retained shares in the privatised utilities, the discounts built into the sales have
provided the platform for a sustained growth in the value of these equities, as illustrated
in Figure 5.3 overleaf 8. On the other side of the equation, the loss of substantial sums
of public revenue in the sales has been manifestly to the detriment of taxpayers in
general.
The gross proceeds of the sales do not represent, of course, the actual amount gained
in public revenue from these receipts, for costs such as underwriting and banking fees,
advertising and marketing, and shareholder incentives have to be deducted. In addition,
debt write-offs, taxation relief and 'incidental payments' to the privatised industries have
to be taken into account. Once this is done the amount obtained from the sale (i.e. net
proceeds) looks even less satisfactory than that quoted earlier. This is most noticeably
the case with water privatisation, where the net proceeds of the sale change from
£3,594.4 million (the official figure) to minus £1,578 million. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 on the
pages that follow, set out the balance sheets of the sale of the water and regional
electricity companies.
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Figure 5.3: Movement in the value of utility shares
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It would seem difficult to conclude, on the basis of an examination of the balance sheets
of these privatisations, that the objective of maximising the returns to the public purse
from the sale of the utilities was actually achieved. Yet surprisingly, that was more or
less the conclusion drawn by the National Audit Office in its reviews of the water and
ESI sales (1992a; 1992b); although the National Audit Office did criticise the
Government for not making provision in the sale of the ESI for the "clawback" of
excessive profits in the first year 9.
The findings of the National Audit Office, however, have to be viewed in the light that
(a) it has no remit to examine the broader policy context of the sales ("the Office cannot
question matters of policy", Beauchamp, 1990, p.55), (b) its frame of reference in
evaluating the sales is confined to the objectives set by the initiating department (many
of which were in direct conflict with the public revenue imperative, i.e. "to promote
wider share ownership", "to ensure a healthy aftermarket", "to maintain the momentum
of the privatisation programme" [NAO, 1992a1, and "to complete the sale of the
electricity industry during the lifetime of the Parliament"), and (c) a number of its core
findings bear more than a hint of qualification (for example on the sale of the RECs,
"..the valuation of the companies' assets was reasonable in the circumstances of this
sale, NAO, 1992b, p.2 author's emphasis).
281
The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (1992) possibly came closer to
the fundamental public interest question of whether the taxpayer got value for money
in the sales, when it stated in relation to water privatisation that:
We note that the water companies' shares maintained a premium of some
20 per cent on a fully paid basis during the first six months of trading
and performed above the general stock market trend. These factors
indicate that the Department achieved their objective of a full take-up of
shares with something to spare. p.xvi 1° (author's emphasis)
The use of evaluative measures applying a broader 'public interest test' to the utility
sales, would be likely to conclude in a manner similar to that of Vickers & Yarrow
(1988) at an earlier stage in the privatisation programme:
Whatever the underlying motives of policy makers may have been, it is
hard to see how their methods of selling state assets can be judged other
than a failure in terms of the general public interest and in view of the
opportunities available. Their short-run success in political terms is
another matter. p.193
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2. EXTENDING SHARE OWNERSHIP
The extension of share ownership has been one of this Government's
central aims - and privatisation makes a major contribution to its
achievement. The ownership of shares gives individuals a direct stake in
the success of British industry. Conservative Research Department (1991)
p.97
I believe that there are significant advantages in transferring the water
authorities out of public and into private ownership. By making the
transfer there will be genuine public ownership of a kind that does not
exist today.
Ian Gow, Second Reading Debate on the Water Bill, HoC 8/12/88, Col. 511
As the previous chapter argued, the Government's "popular capitalism" agenda became
increasingly important over the life of the utility privatisation programme. This has been
evidenced subsequently in the fact that official ex post facto accounts of the privatisation
process, such as those produced by the National Audit Office, have elevated widening
share ownership above fiscal management and other objectives. The success of the share
ownership campaign, which has been instituted at substantial direct and indirect costs
to the Exchequer, constitutes therefore an important test of the efficacy of the
privatisation programme. In conjunction with providing an answer the question, "has the
Government extended the participation of individual investors in the stock market?", an
analysis of the pattern of share ownership created by the public utility sales, adds
another piece to the distributional jig-saw puzzle on the winners and losers in the
privatisation programme.
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At a superficial glance, the campaign appears to have been an outstanding achievement
for the Government. The number of adults owning shares has increased from less than
5 per cent in 1979 (Grout, 1987) to around 22 per cent in 1992 (NOP, 1991), with much
of this growth being attributable to the sale of privatised industries 11 . And the level
of over-subscription in the share offers at each successive flotation attests to the success
of the Government in stimulating public interest in the equity market 12•
But on closer examination, the achievement of "popular capitalism" is something of a
mirage. This is illustrated in the following facts and figures:
# the majority of people who owned shares in privatised companies held only
one privatisation issue - 57% (NOP, 1992, Table 10A).
# substantial numbers of individual investors sold their privatisation stocks in the
period immediately following the flotation of the privatised companies and
continually thereafter - e.g. the number of shareholders in the water industry had
halved within seven months of the sale (House of Commons Committee of
Public Accounts, 1992). [see below]
# the bulk of shareholders have only a small tranche of equities - both by
volume and value (NOP, 1992, Table 30A)
# the long-term decline in the level of individual ownership of the stock market
has not been arrested by the share ownership campaign i.e. 54 per cent in 1963,
28 per cent in 1981, 21 per cent in 1989 (CSO, 1991c, Table 2).
Beyond general rhetorical injunctions to the British public "to go forth and buy", the
Government has never been very explicit about what it is actually trying to achieve in
the quest for universal share ownership (a fact which drew criticism from the National
Audit Office in the RECs sale 13). But, if the Government was seeking to use the
privatisation sales as a device for (i) stimulating interest in the share market generally
(i.e. people would move on to buy tranches of stocks in addition to their privatisation
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holdings), (ii) prompting investor/customer engagement in the on-going management of
the privatised companies and (iii) countering the domination of institutional players in
the stock market (i.e. pension funds and insurance companies) - all of which would seem
to be constituent elements of a share-owning democracy scenario - then, the figures
above add up to anything but success. Significantly, the chairman of the London Stock
Exchange recently concluded that "[w]ider share ownership is a delusion - what we have
is a lot of investors owning a few shares, basically in privatisation stocks" (The
Observer, 2/8/92).
An analysis of the pattern of individual shareholdings in the utility industries, over time,
does little to support the late Ian Gow's claim that privatisation will lead to "genuine
public ownership". Not all of the privatised utilities provide details on the shareholder
composition in their Annual Reports, so it is difficult to assemble an aggregate picture.
But amongst those that do, there is evidence of a clear trend away from individual small
investor equity in the companies; which was relatively small even at the outset. Figure
5.6 (overleaf) provides some illustrative examples of this. The withdrawal of the small
investor has been complemented, almost invariably, by an increased concentration of
ownership amongst large investors. In reality, the small individual investor and the
'customer shareholder' 14 occupy very peripheral places in the ownership structure of
the privatised utilities. And rather than changing the composition of equity holdings in
Britain, the sale of the utility industries appears to have simply mirrored, as well as
entrenched, the domination of the institutional sector in the stock market generally.
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Total No. of Equity held by
Shareholders individuals
%
Equity held by
small Shareholders
Equity held by
large Shareholders
SHARE OWNERSHIP IN THE UTILITY INDUSTRIES 15
British Gas: *
1987	 3,111,872 35 27 59
1988	 2,903,416 32 25 66
1989
	 2,695,450 30 22 68
1990	 2,480,564 28 20 69
1991	 2,178,855 25 18 73
Thames Water: **
1990	 391,896 26 23 54
1991	 331,844 23 19 65
1992	 306,165 20 17 71
South West Water: ***
1990	 57,249 19 16 75
1991	 43,166 14 13 77
1992	 39,876 13 11 73
Norweb:
1991	 286,340 N/R 19 75
1992	 228,263 N/R 15 79
Midlands Elect.
1991	 353,809 26 20 31
1992	 284,629 17 17 50
* At privatisation, 4.55 million shareholders
** At privatisation, 680,816 shareholders
*** At privatisation, 129,064 shareholders
N/R = Not reported
Sources: Company Annual Reports
Figure 5.6: Changes in the pattern of utility share ownership
286
The distribution of individual share ownership follows, not surprisingly, the major
contours of inequality in British society:
..shareholders were drawn disproportionately from men, from people in
the middle age-groups, from those in the professional and managerial
socio-economic groups, and from those with higher income levels.
1988 General Household Survey (1990) p. 165
The 1987 and 1988 General Household Surveys on share ownership found inter alia that
people with a gross weekly income of £50 or lower were almost six times less likely to
own shares than people in the highest income group, and that the level of share
ownership was twice as high in the South East England compared to the North of
England.
Both surveys found that the proportion of people in manual socio-economic groups and
with lower incomes holding shares, was marginally greater in the case of privatisation
stocks than for shares generally. But this was hardly of a sufficient order to suggest that
privatisation has acted as an egalitarian influence on the stock market in any substantive
way.
The most recent survey carried out by NOP for the Treasury (January and February
1992) largely confirms the earlier GHS findings (although it did not collect income data,
and hence is not comparable along this dimension). Along the key axes of class, gender,
age and regionality, the NOP survey reveals a similar degree of inequality of
participation in the equity market as that identified in the GHS. Interestingly, the results
of the NOP study do not appear to support the earlier finding that privatisation issues
engendered marginally greater involvement amongst manual socio-economic groups.
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Social class AB was five and three times more likely to hold privatisation shares than
social classes DE and C2 respectively, whereas they were four and two and a half
times more likely to hold shares generally. One explanation for this could be that more
people in the manual socio-economic group (compared to other groups) cashed in their
shares between 1988 and early 1992, possibly as a result of the impact of the recession
and rising unemployment. The pattern of share ownership according to social class, in
the NOP survey is illustrated in the bar chart below.
Figure 5.7: Share ownership by social class
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Irrespective of the minor differences between the results of the three surveys on share
ownership, it would seem obvious that the benefits of privatisation shareholding (and
as Figure 5.3 in the earlier section indicated, these have been considerable) have not
been equally shared amongst the population. Overall, the share ownership campaign has
tended to simply re-trace, rather than re-draw, the extant dividing line of property
ownership and property rights in British society.
In the previous section, it was seen that British taxpayers incurred a considerable
financial loss through the sale of the utility industries. In this section it is apparent that
the prospect for recovering some of this loss, at an individual level, through ownership
of discounted privatisation shares has been disproportionately distributed across the
population. So whatever else the privatisation programme has achieved, or might achieve
in the future, it could hardly be said to have advanced the cause of social justice in
Britain. In his recently published account of the Thatcher years, Lord Gilmour (1992)
suggests that the Government could have adopted an alternative approach to "popular
capitalism", which would have resulted in a far less regressive outcome:
The best and fairest way of carrying out privatization would have been
that suggested by Samuel Brittan..his scheme was that, instead of state
assets being sold to investors, shares in them would be given to all adult
citizens in equal numbers. p.101
it would have helped to mitigate probably the worst feature of
Thatcherism: the treatment of the poor. It would also have been far the
most ethical method. After all, in theory, the nationalized industries
belonged to the nation. Therefore privatization on the Brittan plan would
merely have given to the people in one form what they already owned in
another. By contrast privatization by sale deprived those not rich enough
to subscribe of part of their property. If the left had ever perpetrated a
similar confiscation on the rich, the right would have howled with
righteous rage and pain. p.102
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3. ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PRIVATISED
UTILITY COMPANIES
The drive for improved efficiency lay at the heart of the Government's economic case
for privatisation of the public utilities. But in the view of most commentators, change
in ownership, in itself, is not a sufficient condition for achieving greater efficiency, and
that in order for this to be realised, competitive forces need to be introduced into the
operating environments of the utilities. Studies of the utilities privatised in the 'first
wave' - i.e. British Telecom and British Gas - generally confirm the hypothesis that
privatisation minus substantive competition results in few, if any, efficiency gains
(Bishop & Kay, 1988; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Dunsire et al, 1991). Indeed this latter
study, which examined the economic performance of a wide range of both privatised and
(still) nationalised enterprises concluded, suggestively, that even the advent of
competition does not guarantee improved performance:
..neither investigation supports the simple assertion that change in
ownership necessarily changes enterprise performance, even in its
sophisticated form, where capital market change is assumed to be
accompanied by increased competition and improved managerial
incentives. Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't. Dunsire et al (1991)
p.38
The retention, at privatisation, of the geographical monopoly structure of the public
utilities (with the exception of electricity generation, and electricity supply to large
users), would suggest then that the signs were not terribly propitious for a significant
lift in the efficiency performance of the industries. In fact this seems to be a conclusion
that the Government itself formed, at least in the case of the water industry, for the
"efficiency targets set by the Secretary of State [in the setting of the K factor] implied
a reduction of around 3 per cent per year in the base level of operating costs. This target
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was broadly in line with the performance aims set for the former water authorities"
(OFWAT, 1992o, p.22).
It is still much too early in the case of the later utility privatisations to properly assess
the efficiency outcomes that have occurred since the change of ownership. Very few
analyses of the economic performance of the water and electricity supply industry, based
on empirical research, have emerged thus far; and the few studies that have been
published focus primarily on the performance of the industries immediately preceding,
or around the time of, privatisation (e.g. United Research, 1990; Thompson et al, 1991).
In this section, three selected aspects of the economic performance of the three utilities
will be briefly elaborated - i.e. profitability, executive salaries (relevant to the question
of management incentives), and employment. These are all elements which contribute
to the mosaic of economic performance, but just as importantly from the perspective of
this study, they interact with the issue of the distributional consequences of the
privatisation programme. They also form significant parts of the landscape of the
privatised utilities which should be kept in mind in the analysis of the consumer-related
effects of privatisation in the two chapters that follow.
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(i) Profitability
In most studies into the comparative performance of public and private enterprises the
levels of profit achieved by the industries is used as an indicator of economic
performance and efficiency. However, it is debatable whether profitability - particularly
for industries operating in monopoly or quasi-monopoly conditions - is a relevant
measure of efficiency. The two sides of the debate are reflected in the following
quotations:
Given some degree of market power, it might be expected that private
firms will tend to be more profitable, but this in itself has no direct
bearing on the question of economic efficiency. Vickers & Yarrow (1988)
p.39
11.the conventional interpretation is used, then the high profitability
levels achieved by any firm or group of firms in the industty clearly
would represent the marginal valuation of capital. Accordingly, one could
argue that the low profit levels of public firms mean that capital is used
less efficiently and that privatization has the potential to improve the use
of society's capital resources.
Hutchinson (1991) pp.105-6
Irregardless of the issue of whether profitability should occupy a place amongst the
indices of efficiency, it is clearly important to the direct stakeholders of utility industries
- management, shareholders and consumers. Managers and shareholders benefit directly
from rises in company profit and conversely (in theory at least) suffer the disbenefits of
poor profit performance. Whereas for consumers the flow of benefits tend to run the
other way with, for example, the achievement of a high level of profitability possibly
suggesting that the utility provider is gaining "monopoly rents" through excessively high
charges.
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By any standard the profit performance of the public utilities since privatisation, as
indicated in Figure 5.8, has been remarkable.
PUBLIC UTILITY PROFITS SINCE PRIVATISATION
% increase
British Gas 1985/86-1990/91 99
Water companies 1988/89-1991/92 137
RECs 1989/90-1991/92 47
Generators 1990/91-1991/92 24
Sources: Company Annual Reports
Figure 5.8: Privatised utility company profits
In all the utilities (with the exception of British Gas), because of the short time-frame
between privatisation and the release of the most recent profit results, the 'efficiency-
related effects of privatisation' would seem to be a highly implausible explanation for
this vigorous profit growth. In any case, a major acceleration in profits has tended to
occur during the early stages of privatisation. For example, water industry profits grew
by over 90 per cent in the first full year of privatisation (1989/90 to 1990/91), and the
RECs performed some 22 per cent above the projected profit level set out in the
Prospectus at the time of privatisation. This would seem to add further weight to the
view that these two industries were significantly under-priced at sale. Alternatively, it
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may indicate that the efficiency strictures, set for the companies (the K and X factors)
as part of the privatisation settlement, were particularly unchallenging.
In the case of the RECs, it has been suggested that the ability of these companies to
exceed the Prospectus profit forecasts by some margin is attributable to "their success
in conning the Department of Energy in the pre-privatisation negotiations (OFFER staff
in interview with researcher, July 1992) 16• The National Audit Office report on the
sale of the RECs (NAO, 1992b) also implied that this was the case. In his explorations
into the capital structure of the water industry, the Director General of Water Services
has regularly reminded the water companies that the privatisation settlement has been
very much in their favour (OFWAT, 19911; 1992o; 1992z).
Figures based on average increases in profits in the water and electricity supply
industries also disguise profits out-turns well in excess of the norm, for example, those
achieved by companies such as Northumbrian Water, Welsh Water, South Wales
Electricity and Manweb. Figures 5.9-5.11 illustrate the year-by-year performance of
British Gas and the individual profit performance of the water and regional electricity
companies over the period of privatisation.
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Figure 5.9: British Gas profits
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Figure 5.10: Water company profits
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•Figure 5.11: Regional electricity company profits
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The privatised companies have responded to negative media and public reaction to these
profit figures by arguing that sustained profit growth is necessary if the industries are
to secure the level of capital investment required to accommodate future demand and
to upgrade the existing infrastructure, and in order to be able to deal more effectively
with environmental externalities (e.g. Carney, 1991). Because of the scale of the capital
works programme, this argument has rather greater validity in the water industry than
in the other utility sectors. But even in the water industry, just on 38 per cent of the
water companies' profit, £450 million (on a current cost basis), was reinvested in the
business in 1991/92. This did, however, represent a substantial increase from 1990/91,
when only 25 per cent of profits was retained in the business (OFWAT, 1992z, p.10).
In addition to enlarging the pool of finance available for investment in capital and plant
(and increasing the size of dividends paid to shareholders), profit growth also potentially
adds to public revenue receipts, through larger payments of corporation taxation and the
like. But artificially low rates of taxation can also have the effect of increasing company
profitability. The taxation paid by the water and electricity companies in England and
Wales is shown in Figure 5.12 overleaf. It can be seen in this Figure that the water
industry has fared particularly well, in terms of a light taxation impost, relative to the
electricity industry; which in turn partially explains its strong profit performance. The
lower rate of taxation paid by the water companies is the result of the tax allowances
agreed to by the Government at the time of privatisation 17 . The total amount of
taxation paid by the ten water and sewerage companies in 1991/92 was £143 million.
By comparison, the water industry generated some £636 million in 'public profit' in its
last year under public ownership (1988/89).
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Privatised Utilities - Taxation
£A4
1990/91 1991/92
Water services companies: 128 143
Proportion of Pre-tax profit (%) 9.4 9.5
RECs: 332 409
Proportion of Pre-tax profit (%) 29 28
Generating companies: 241 266
Proportion of Pre-tax profit (%) 34 30
National Grid Co: 126 163
Proportion of Pre-tax profit (%) 33 33
Note: Includes all forms of taxation, including overseas taxation. The latter is likely to represent only a very
small proportion of the total taxation paid, for example, it represented just over 2% in the case of Severn
Trent Water in 1991/92.
Sources: Company Annual Reports
Figure 5.12: Privatised utility taxation
Overall, the highly profitable early history of the privatised utilities gives credence to
the view that shareholders and management have been major beneficiaries of the
privatisation programme. The extent to which domestic consumers have benefitted
similarly - in terms of reduced tariffs and/or improved services - is the subject matter
of Chapters 6 and 7.
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(ii) Executive salaries 
A very tangible measure of the rewards for management in the privatisation process is
obtained by examining the movement in executive salaries over the period leading up
to, and following, privatisation. Most reviews of the privatisation programme have
considered this issue (e.g. Bishop & Kay, 1988; Chapman, 1990; Whitfield, 1992; plus
copious numbers of media reports) and as the evidence is clear and the explanations
fairly self-evident, there is little need to devote much space to it here.
A dramatic change in the level of salaries paid to top executives has invariably formed
part of the immediate fall-out of privatisation. In the water industries in 1990, for
instance, the highest paid director in the Southern, Welsh and Yorkshire water
companies received salary increases in the order of 209%, 74% and 59% respectively
(Company Annual Reports, 1991).
The chairmen of the regional electricity companies similarly made major salary gains
in the year immediately following privatisation. This is illustrated in Figure 5.13.
It is important to note that these figures does not include other elements of the executive
remuneration package, such as pension contributions and executive share options.
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Figure 5.13: Increase in REC chairmen salaries
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Executive salary increases have usually been justified on the grounds that (i) senior
managers in the nationalised industries were notoriously under-paid relative to their
private sector counterparts and therefore changes were required in order to achieve some
form of parity, (ii) the industries' would be constrained in their ability to attract talented
management expertise unless high salaries were awarded and (iii) salaries needed to
reflect the greater responsibilities of senior executives in the more commercially exposed
and higher-risk environment of the privatised utilities. The latter argument in particular
has been contested by commentators, and even The Times had occasion to fulminate on
the subject:
High private sector remuneration is only justified by a high level of
personal risk-taking and a significant personal contribution to increased
profitability by the executive concerned. It is the reward for enterprise
and wealth creation. That is why it is so objectionable to see heads of
privatised near-monopolies being rewarded as if they were buccaneering
captains of industry, when many of the industries they run are not
performing well, and their prices were being manipulated by the
regulators to make sure they were profitable.
The Times Editorial 24/9/91
In the water industry there are indications that, after the initial remunerative
haemorrhage, the level of executive salary increases has abated. The average increase
in salary for the highest paid directors in the water companies in 1991 was 14 per cent,
with the highest rise in South West Water of 39 per cent (Company Annual Reports,
1992). In the light of media and public hostility to the earlier round of salary rises, this
relative degree of moderation may reflect the power of public opinion. The average
increase in 1991 was still, of course, someway above the level of wage increases in the
economy generally.
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(iii) Employment
Data on aggregate changes in employment in the privatised utilities is easy enough to
gather, but how to interpret it is another matter. One person's "over-manning" is
another's "service quality", just as one person's "productivity and efficiency gains" is
another's "personal and social dislocation". And the extent to which job losses or
increases can be directly attributed to privatisation per se, and not to other variables like
general economic growth or decline, changes in demand and the advent of new
technologies, is highly problematic. A further compounding factor is that in virtually all
cases the nationalised public utilities experienced a sustained level of labour shedding
over the decade leading into privatisation (Whitfield, 1992; Hogwood, 1992) 18 • The
same is true also for the industries that presently remain in the public sector such as
British Coal and British Rail (Bishop & Kay, 1988, Table 24).
Nor does the post-privatisation employment trend itself run entirely one way; on first
glance at least. The picture portrayed in Figure 5.14 (overleaf) is one of an overall
reduction in employment (-4.5%) in the public utility sector since privatisation.
But taken individually, the trend in the water industry runs counter to this, with a net
increase in employment of 13 per cent since 1989, just as do a couple of the regional
electricity companies. In fact the aggregate figure for the RECs masks variations across
the companies, with the 'ends of the axis' being represented by East Midlands with a
net increase of 10 per cent in its labour force and Manweb with a net decrease of 17 per
cent. Even so, the predominate pattern is one of labour shedding, with ten out of the
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twelve companies having reduced their workforce since privatisation (Company Annual
Reports, 1992).
Figure 5.14: Changes in employment in the privatised utilities
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Those utilities with the largest job losses since privatisation have been British Gas
(-11 per cent) and the generating companies (-23 per cent) 19 and the unequivocal
message given by management in both these sectors is that the reductions in personnel
will continue apace over the next several years at least (see for example National Power,
1992 p.9; The Guardian, 18/11/92 and 20/11/92).
Most of the water and sewerage companies have embarked upon extensive
diversification programmes since privatisation, most notably in areas like waste
management, process engineering 20 and leisure management. These extensions to the
"non-core" area of the water companies' business have been made largely through taking
over and purchasing existing enterprises. The against the trend employment record of
the privatised water industry can be explained, therefore, after a closer analysis of the
distribution of employment across the "core" and "non-core" activities of the companies.
Again not all companies report this, so an aggregate picture is hard to obtain; but Figure
5.15 (overleaf) gives the data for three water companies, and it is unlikely that this
pattern would be very much different in the other water companies that have diversified
their operations. The table shows that over the period 1990-92, employment in the
"core" water and sewerage activities of the three companies declined marginally overall
(-0.2%), while employment in the "non-core" areas rose handsomely. Most of this
employment "growth" is unlikely to represent new jobs, however, as the great majority
of these jobs would have existed previously and would have been simply added to the
water companies' establishment as a result of takeovers and mergers. Whitfield (1992)
suggests this has happened elsewhere in the privatised industries:
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Many privatised companies have increased their workforce since
privatisation, but this is almost entirely due to takeovers and
mergers.. The underlying trend in the core business is still downwards.
p.268
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN THE WATER INDUSTRY
1990
W&S Other
1992
W&S Other
Thames 7688 61 7562 1786
North West 7100 0 7035 1166
Wales 3397 314 3547 1149
Total 18185 375 18144 4101
Growth in W&S -41 -0.2%
Growth in Other Activities 3726 993.6%
Sources: Company Annual Reports
Figure 5.15: Employment change in the water industry
In some instances, privatisation will have an employment-related impact well beyond
the organisational boundaries of the utility industries themselves. This is probably no
where more apparent than in the electricity industry, where the move away from using
domestic coal as the primary fuel in electricity generation, will have a consequential and
profound impact on the level of employment in the coal industry. It has been estimated
by the Henley Centre, for example, that the decision to close thirty-one of the remaining
pits in Britain (now temporarily deferred) would have the effect of making 31,000 mine
workers - and possibly as many as 63,000 other workers - redundant (Henley Centre
analysis, The Guardian, 21/10/92).
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It would be a gross over-simplification to attribute the general decline in employment
in the public utility sector to privatisation alone, however, labour-shedding has
constituted a significant means of securing efficiency gains in many of the utility
companies. Regardless of the economic justification for this, those workers in the public
utilities, and in associated industries like coal, who have been made redundant over
recent years could hardly be included amongst the beneficiaries of the privatisation
programme.
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CONCLUSION
Nearly all the industries were sold off for much less than they were
worth.. Thus the government was a negligent guardian of public assets,
failing to look after the interests of the collective public. Yet individual
members of the public profited mightily from the government's lax
generosity. The cut-price sales provided a considerable boost to the
private wealth of those who subscribed to them. Gilmour (1992) p.103
This chapter has shown that a fair measure of disharmony exists between the outcomes
of the privatisation programme and the objectives enunciated by the Government. In
general, the Government failed to realise, in the sale of the industries, an appropriate
return on the decades of accumulated public investment in the utility industries.
A significant part of the financial benefit accruing from utility privatisation has been
appropriated by the shareholders of the privatised companies, in the form either of
windfall gains on the value of shares or inflated dividends. This, in combination with
the flawed implementation of the Government's wider share ownership programme, has
meant that the majority of the British population have been net losers through the sale
of the three industries. And importantly, through the exclusion, by and large, of poor
households from the share ownership programme, the sale of the utilities has merely
served to deepen the level of material inequality in British society.
It is still too early to draw firm conclusions about the financial performance of the
newly privatised water and energy companies, but certainly their profit performance
appears impressive. Arguably, however, the rapid rise in profitability following
privatisation has had more to do with the generous terms of the privatisation settlement
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negotiated between the industries and the Government, than to the efficiency initiatives
of the companies themselves. The way in which these substantially increased profits
have been distributed is a microcosm of the privatisation process generally; with the
direction of benefits appearing heavily to favour certain groups (i.e. shareholders and
company executives), at the expense of others (e.g. displaced workers and possibly,
consumers).
As Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987, Sherman, 1989, Vickers & Yarrow, 1988 and Pint,
1990, among others have argued, the privatisation sales could be viewed as a classic
expression of the policy-making art of 'concentrating benefits and diffusing costs' 21.
To this extent, the Government's approach was extremely successful; for its patently
regressive method of relinquishing public assets encountered little effective political
resistance.
It is now time to consider whether the Government's promise of new consumer rights
and prerogatives has had more substance than much of the rest of its explicit rationale
for privatisation.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1. Revenue foregone as a result of discounting shares (£1,814 million), cost of bonuses,
vouchers and free shares (£389 million) and flotation costs (£274 million).
2. The Government will additionally retrieve £2.8 billion from the RECs in staged debt
repayments over 18 years. This is excluded here because it does not form part of the
market capitalisation of the RECs at sale. A similar approach is adopted in the National
Audit Office's (1992b) report:
The Department set the fully paid value of shares at nearly £5.2
billion.. Following the start of dealings, the market valued the shares at
£6.3 billion_ The Department's advisers attribute this to upward
movements in the stock market between the time the offer had to be
priced, when market conditions were uncertain, and the start of dealings.
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The same argument applies to the £2.5 billion British Gas debenture repayable in
instalments to the Consolidated Fund.
3. The equivalent change in the FTSE 100 (as a measure of the general movement of
the stock market) was:
* BG: +3.6% from beginning of trading (8/12/86) to end third week (29/12/86)
* Water companies: +4.8% from beginning of trading (13/12/89) to end third
week (4/1/90)
* RECs: -1.7% from beginning of trading (11/2/90) to end third week (2/1/91)
4. Water companies: £9667B; RECs: £8517B; Generating companies: £5111B; British
Gas: £10406B [Source: Financial Times, 29/8/92].
5. Roberts et al (1991) conclude differently in relation to the sale of the RECs:
The most fundamental criticism of the REC privatisation is not that the
companies were sold too cheap, but that they were sold too well p.82
However, it is difficult to see how this argument can be maintained in the face of the
evidence on market capitalisation.
6. The first issue of British Telecom shares in 1984 was five times over-subscribed (see
Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, Table 7.1).
7. The amounts cited in Table 5.2 are based on the premiums applicable to fully paid
up shares. Initially, investors were required to only make a part-payment on the shares
and hence these premiums do not express the real level of profit made by investors who
sold their shares over this period. The Figure overleaf shows the premiums obtainable
on part-paid shares.
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8.
between.,
Premium (part-paid):
end 1st day after 1 week after 3 weeks
British Gas (0.50) 27% 29% 31%
Water companies (£1.00) 46% 50% 68%
RECs (£1.00) 51% 53% 48%
Generators (£1.00) 37% 38% 31%
9. "In view, however, of the limited track record of the companies and the
correspondingly cautious basis on which forecasts for the first year were made, the
National Audit Office and their advisers, Hambros, believe that it would have been
appropriate for the Department to have explored in detail with their advisers whether
higher net proceeds might have been achievable by making provision for clawback of
a proportion of at least some part of any profits exceeding the forecast or that first year."
NAO (1992b) p.2
10. Robert Sheldon, the chairman of the Committee of Public Accounts was rather more
explicit in his criticism of the sale to the press:
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There is no question that the companies were sold far too cheap. The
speed of the privatisation conveyor belt meant they ended up being
flogged like overripe oranges on a Saturday night. Financial Times,
23/7/92
11. 14% of all adults held privatisation shares, NOP (1992) Table 1A.
12. The shares offered to the public in the flotation of the water companies were 5.7
times over-subscribed (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 1992, p.vi).
12.75 million applications were made for shares in the RECs "..two and a half times the
number of applicants made in connection with any previous privatisation." NAO (1992b)
p.20
13. "..it would, in the opinion of the National Audit Office, have nevertheless been
appropriate for the Department to have set broad target ranges for numbers of applicants
and new shareholders, and taken these also into account in pursuing their objective of
widening and deepening share ownership." NAO, 1992b, p.4
14. For example in Yorkshire Water, the number of customers holding shares at the end
of March 1992 was 53,000, which represents less than 3 per cent of the =metered
premises in the Yorkshire Water region.
15. These figures are generally not comparable, nor are they meant to be. The definition
of small and large shareholders varies according to how the shareholdings are reported
in the company Annual Reports:
* small shareholders are variously defined as:
less than 1001 shares - British Gas, South West Water
less than 1000 shares - Midlands Elect.
less than 501 shares - Thames Water, Norweb
* large shareholders are variously defined as:
100,001+ - British Gas, Thames Water
100,000+ - Midlands Elect.,South West Water
50,001+ - Norweb
16. In June 1992 in a press release, the Director General of Electricity Supply stated:
Companies have certainly made large profits - larger than was expected
when the Government set the price controls. I can well understand
customers' concerns about this. OFFER (19920
17. "Total expenditure qualifying for capital allowances was agreed between the water
companies, Inland Revenue, the Treasury and the Department at £7 .7 billion..These
arrangements meant that, given the scale of the capital expenditure programme, the new
water and sewerage companies would not pay mainstream Corporation Tax, as distinct
from Advance Corporation Tax on dividends for, on average, seven years, although they
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would continue to have unrelieved Advance Corporation Tax on dividends for more than
10 years." NAO (1992a) pp.20-1
18. Employment in the RECs was basically stable over the immediate pre-privatisation
period. Between 1988 and 1990 employment grew an average of 0.3%, although in
seven out of the twelve RECs the level of employment declined (REC Prospectus). The
longer term trend, however, has been unambiguous: in 1982, 89,880 people were
employed in the Area Boards and by 1987, this had fallen to 81,958 (Electricity Council,
1990, Table 54 - Part In.
19. The employment figures for the generating companies are for the first full year of
privatisation i.e. 1st April 1991 to 31st March 1992.
20. Process engineering involves the manufacture and installation "of the filters, reactors
and other hardware that go into sewerage treatment plants" Investors Chronicle, 4/9/92,
p.60
21. When new rules can be drawn up through political acts, new rents can be created
and interest groups will form to seek them.. Those with more knowledge and influence
will usually benefit, but a large number of more di,ffuse and unorganised citizens will
lose. Sherman (1989) p.286
An important feature of the process is that the gainers know that they have gaine4 but
the losers are less aware that they have lost. Vickers & Yarrow (1988) p.180
The more organized and active groups receive benefits and are able to defend their own
interests, while costs are imposed on diffuse, unorganized groups. Pint (1990) p.296
See Table 3.3 "Political implications of policy programmes and politicians' reaction?
in Dunleavy & O'Leary (1987) p.111
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CHAPTER 6: THE CONSUMER INTEREST: THE IMPACT OF
PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION ON DOMESTIC
CONSUMERS
We believe that privatisation offers a good opportuniry to
improve the contract between the water industry and its
customers. National Consumer Council (1989b) p.2
Whatever one thinks about private ownership of supply companies, the
legal arrangements for the supply of gas and electriciry are being
developed to the advantage of consumers (SHAC/WRUG, 1989)
INTRODUCTION
Any attempt to address the question of how domestic consumers have fared under the
privatised utility industry framework in Britain must necessarily be preceded by a major
caveat. Because the privatisation of two of these industries (water and electricity) is a
relatively recent phenomenon, it would be injudicious to be too definitive about the
impact of ownership change. Clearly many of the ground rules - particularly in respect
to the role of the regulatory bodies - are still evolving.
The influence of the regulatory regime on the operation of the industries is still being
tested, not least of all by the regulators themselves. Developing practice experience may
strengthen the ability of the regulatory bodies to act as catalysts for consumer-oriented
reform of the industries; conversely, under the 'regulatory capture' thesis, the regulators'
effectiveness may recede over time, in line with their growing connections and
familiarity with the utility industries. At an industry level, the structural, policy and
practice changes effected by the new companies in the wake of privatisation (a form of
'Hawthorne effect') may weaken in impact over time (Dunleavy, 1991). Alternatively,
it may take several years to achieve the kind of 'customer conscious' culture change that
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is seen to characterise the private sector (United Research, 1990; Lockwood, 1991;
James Cape! Research, 1992).
Given the highly-charged political environment in which these ownership changes have
been affected, it is manifestly in the interests of both the Government and the privatised
industries to project a strong image of 'customer care' during the formative phase of the
restructuring process. This would serve to allay public anxiety about the possible impact
of the private control and provision of utility services, as well as win belated popular
support for the privatisation programme.
Equally, the interests of opponents of the Government's privatisation programme lie in
applying the most negative gloss possible to the behaviour of the privatised industries
and to the actions of the regulatory agencies. This oppositional instinct to 'damn
outright' has been in evidence in House of Commons debates on privatisation, such as
those conducted on the water industry and the electricity and gas industries in June and
July 1991 respectively.
As a consequence, it will be a number of years before an evaluation of privatisation
along any dimension - be it in regard to efficiency, or competition, or consumer
outcomes - will be able to be completed with confidence. The evaluative task is
rendered all the more difficult through the absence of comparable 'before' and 'after'
data in a number of areas, and by the fact that it is impossible, obviously, to predict
what might have happened had the utility industries remained in public ownership.
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However, in acknowledging this it is possible, even at this reasonably early stage, to
identify a number of patterns and impacts, related to privatisation and the advent of
independent regulation, in the key domestic consumer domains of (i) prices, (ii) debt and
disconnection, and (iii) standards of service and consumer representation. The three parts
of Chapters 6 and 7 examine the evidence on outcomes, to date, in these areas.
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PART 1: PRICES AND TARIFF SYSTEMS
..a system of economic regulation will be designed to ensure that the benefits of
greater efficiency are systematically passed on to customers in the form of lower
prices and better service than would otherwise have occurred. Secretary of State
for the Environment et al (1986), p.1
Greater competition will create downward pressures on costs and prices, and
ensure that the customer, not the producer or distributor, comes first. Secretary
of State for Energy (1988), p.16
Price - along with service quality - is the domain of public utility practice of most
immediate importance and relevance to consumers. The issue of price is important in
any instance of producer-consumer interaction, but this is particularly so in areas of
natural monopoly, where there is an ability to charge monopoly prices (either directly
through raising tariffs or indirectly through attenuating service quality) independent of
consumer demand and conventional market forces. Not surprisingly, there appears to be
a direct correlation between the importance attached by domestic consumers to the
question of utility prices and socio-economic status (see, for example, DoE, 1991a;
MORI, 1992; and Part 3 in Chapter 7). The structure and level of energy and water
tariffs has a critical bearing on the extent to which these services can be accessed by,
and are affordable to, low income households in Britain.
In the public marketing of the utility privatisation programme, the Government regularly
drew attention to the way that domestic consumers would benefit through lower prices
for utility services (as reflected in the quotations from the White Papers above). In this
section, the pricing outcomes for domestic consumers in the three utility areas will be
reviewed. As each of the utilities has had a somewhat different recent history in respect
to pricing, they will be considered individually in order of privatisation.
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1. GAS
(i) Tariffs over the first five years of privatisation
The regulation of prices for domestic gas consumers, as with the other utilities, is built
upon the RPI-X formula first developed by Professor Stephen Littlechild for British
Telecom. Over the first five years of its privatised existence, British Gas was allowed
to raise its prices for tariff consumers, i.e. consumers purchasing less than 25,000 therms
(in 1991, the average annual consumption for domestic consumers was 651 therms,
British Gas, 1992c, p.35), by the retail price index minus 2% under the formula
regulated by the Office of Gas Supply (OFGAS). Notably, the standing charge was
exempt from this constraint and could be raised by the level of the retail price index
each year.
In the view of a number of commentators, the initial price cap set for British Gas
represented a rather modest efficiency target for a national monopoly provider:
Taken as a whole, the pricing constraints imposed on British Gas can
hardly be described as stringent. The implicit target of a 2 percent per
annum reduction in nongas costs should not prove to be onerous. Some
demand growth over the five-year period was predicted in the prospectus
for the share issue and, given the existence of scale economies, this
should lead to reductions in real unit costs even in the event that internal
efficiency is not improved. Moreover, the nationalized BGC was set a
target of reducing its real net trading costs per therm by 12 percent
between financial years 1982-1983 and 1 986-1 987 and managed to meet
this target within the first three years of the four-year period. Vickers &
Yarrow (1988) p. 265
The formula was seen to be particularly generous in light of the provision enabling
British Gas to automatically pass-through to tariff consumers any increases in the
purchase price it paid for gas from off-shore suppliers.
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Domestic Gas Tariffs: Average 1986-92
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the year-on-year movement in prices for gas tariff customers
between 1986 and 1992.
Figure 6.1: Changes in domestic gas tariffs 1986-92
319
Between 1987 (the first full year of privatisation) and 1991, British Gas prices for
domestic consumers rose by 19.5 per cent. As the cost of living increased between these
years by 31.6 per cent (Department of Trade and Industry, 1992, Table 54), domestic
gas tariffs effectively decreased in real terms by just over 12 per cent. At the same time,
British Gas moved progressively towards the development of uniform standing charges
across the country, involving above average increases in standing charges for consumers
in the North of England and the Midlands between 1987 and 1991 (25 per cent and 24
per cent respectively, compared to 13 per cent for the rest of Britain); although these
were still below the actual level of inflation for the period.
The reduction in gas tariffs over the first five year period has been attributed as much
to "the fall in gas purchase costs that had occurred as a result of the fall in world oil
prices" (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988, p.279) as to any efficiency savings effected by British
Gas. Commenting on the 4.5 per cent reduction in tariffs in 1987, for example, Sir Denis
Rooke, Chairman of British Gas stated:
Last year we felt the full benefit of the 1986 oil price falls which, in line
with the price formula under our authorisation to act as a public gas
supplier, produced a reduction in the price of gas to tariff customers.
British Gas (1988) Chairman's Statement
Indeed it might be argued that British Gas had even greater scope for reducing tariffs
(on the basis of cheaper gas purchasing costs) than those actually achieved over the
1987-90 period. Between 1987 and 1991 the average price of natural gas (inclusive of
the gas levy) purchased by British Gas increased by five per cent, from 17.85 pence per
therm to 18.79 pence per therm (Department of Trade and Industry, 1992, Table 63).
Once inflation is taken into account, the average price of natural gas was 27 per cent
cheaper in 1991 compared to 1987 (i.e. 5% minus 32%).
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Translating this fall in gas costs to the tariff market (gas costs represent around 40 per
cent of British Gas' costs in supplying this sector, OFGAS, 1991d, p.6) reveals that the
'full equivalent price' in 1991 of £100 worth of gas (at 1987 prices) was £108.32,
whereas the actual price charged by British Gas was £112.10 [see table below]. In other
words, tariff prices between 1987 and 1991 increased by over 3 per cent more than
would have been necessary had the full saving on gas purchase costs been passed
through to tariff consumers.
£100 worth of gas, of which
	 £40 represents gas purchase costs (G)
£60 represents operating costs (0)
£100 total costs (T)
Gas purchase costs = -27%
Operating costs = RPI +32%
Full discount of gas purchase cost savings 1987-91 (i.e. what it actually cost British Gas):
Gas purchase costs
[G * -27%]
Operating costs
[0 * 32%]
Total (T)
Actual tariff
Difference
£29.20
£79.20
£108.40
£112.10
£ 3.70 (3.3%)
Figure 6.2: The reduction in gas purchase costs and domestic tariffs
The validity of the assertion that the efficiency target set for British Gas at the time of
privatisation was not particularly onerous, was effectively acknowledged by the Director
General of OFGAS in his review of the gas tariff formula:
..the judgement of OFGAS and its consultants was that British Gas
achieved this [efficiency gains under the old formula] without showing
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any signs of being an organisation under serious cost pressures. Nor, on
examination, did OFGAS find any reason to believe that these cost
savings were one off in nature or a simple squeezing out of pre-
privatisation 'fat". OFGAS (1991d) p.12.
This, in conjunction with the consistently high levels of profit generated by British Gas
between 1986 and 1991 (as shown in the previous Chapter), gives credence to the view
that, while domestic consumers have benefitted from decreases in tariffs during the first
quinquennium of privatisation, the fall in tariffs could well have been greater had British
Gas been subjected to a more testing price cap. In relative terms, tariff consumers have
not experienced anything like the price gains that have been made by large users in the
contract market, who have been subjected to a marginally more competitive gas supply
environment. This is illustrated in Figure 6.3 for the period 1988 to 1991.
Figure 6.3: Changes in gas tariffs for all sectors 1988-91
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(ii) The review of the gas tariff formula
During 1990-91, the Office of Gas Supply carried out a major review of the formula
regulating British Gas' charges to tariff customers. Although the process of consultation
used in the review has drawn some criticism from consumer and community sector
organisations 1 , it is generally acknowledged that the package of measures announced
by OFGAS in April 1991, should result in more substantive gains for domestic gas
consumers over the second five years of privatisation (from April 1992) compared to
those achieved during the first quinquennium. There is, however, the prospect that the
settlement agreed between OFGAS and British Gas during the review could be subject
to re-negotiation, following the recent referral of British Gas to the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission (see below).
Under the revised tariff formula, the regulator has set a more demanding efficiency
target for British Gas. The new price cap (X) on charges to tariff customers has been
raised from the original minus 2 per cent to minus 5 per cent (i.e. the Retail Price Index
minus 5%) 2. This should result, according to the Director General, in gas prices being
"15% or more lower than they would otherwise have been at the end of five years"
(OFGAS, 1991h). The re-setting of the level of X has been complimented with the
introduction of three other changes in the regulatory regime which will impact directly
on domestic consumers: a change in the way that gas purchasing costs can be passed
through to consumers, provision for the pass-through of energy efficiency costs, and the
modification of British Gas' Authorisation incorporating standards of performance
(Condition 13A). The first two of these will be discussed below, the third is considered
in the next chapter.
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In the first of these measures, the regulator has removed British Gas' ability to pass-
through fully increases in gas purchase costs to tariff consumers. The free hand of
British Gas in dealing with gas purchase costs under the previous formula was identified
as a significant issue requiring action, by a number of organisations including the Gas
Consumers Council, during the tariff review consultation:
Of particular concern is the pass-through of costs of new gas as this
automatic cover reduces the incentive for BG to negotiate the cheapest
price for new contracts. There may even be an opportunity for British
Gas to pay over the odds for gas to keep out competitors as the higher
price can be passed on automatically to tariff customers.
Gas Consumers Council (1990) p.3
From April 1992, the allowable pass-through of wholesale gas costs has been indexed
(using a "gas price index") and is subject to a one per cent reduction each year ('RPI-
T). This provides a hitherto absent efficiency incentive for British Gas:
The advantages of a gas cost price cap are essentially the same as those of the
RPI price cap - that is, the arrangement gives British Gas a clear incentive to
improve its purchasing efficiency because lower costs will lead to higher profits.
OFGAS (1991d) p.7
This will become increasingly important as the cheaper sources of gas supply from the
Southern Basin gas fields in the North Sea 'dry up' and as existing long-term contracts
between British Gas and gas producers are renewed.
Measures to stimulate energy efficiency serve two, not necessarily complementary,
policy agendas. Firstly, they meet a set of environmental imperatives aimed at protecting
the global environment, through reducing energy consumption. Secondly, they occupy
a important place in the strategy to address fuel poverty, for when targeted effectively
energy efficiency programmes raise the end-use quality of energy services to low income
households; although this may not necessarily result in a net reduction in energy
consumption (Boardman, 1991a; Owen, 1990; NEA, 1991).
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As a corporate sponsor, British Gas has a history of involvement in community-based
energy efficiency and energy conservation programmes; exemplified by its financial
support for the major energy efficiency charity, Neighbourhood Energy Action.
However, up until the 1991 review of the gas tariff formula there was neither the
regulatory framework, nor the economic incentive for energy efficiency to be treated as
a core operational activity of British Gas. Indeed the thrust of economic regulation
worked in the reverse direction, with the structure of economic rewards weighted in
favour of inefficient, and at times the profligate, use of gas (OFGAS, 1991e).
Under the revised tariff formula, British Gas will in future be able to designate areas of
energy efficiency expenditure and, with the approval of the Director General OFGAS,
pass-through these energy efficiency costs to tariff consumers:
It enables expenditure on energy efficiency measures to be passed
through to consumers in the same way as gas purchasing costs. This
allows British Gas to view expanded gas sales and greater energy
efficiency as equally competing commercial alternatives. OFGAS (19920
p.4
The administration of 'E factor' funds and projects will be the responsibility, following
the announcement by the Government in May 1992, of the Energy Saving Trust. In the
first year of operation, British Gas will contribute £6 million for three pilot projects, one
of which is explicitly directed at low income households 3. In addition to British Gas,
the regional electricity companies in England and Wales and the two Scottish electricity
companies, have 'signed up' as participants in the Trust, although they have not as yet
committed any funding towards its operation.
The 'E factor' initiative has been warmly welcomed by both the energy conservation and
fuel poverty lobbies (e.g. Association for the Conservation of Energy in submission to
the House of Commons Energy Select Committee, 1992b and the National Right to Fuel
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Campaign, 1991), and the Office of Electricity Regulation has been urged to introduce
a similar device in the electricity industry (Boardman & Houghton, 1991). Yet, as an
effective measure aimed at reducing either carbon dioxide emissions or fuel poverty (or
a combination of both) the 'E factor' and its Energy Trust corollary are likely to
constitute an inadequate policy response.
The 'E factor' methodology, with its emphasis on market incentives rather than
regulatory controls, falls well short of the 'least-cost planning' approach to energy
investment and resource management (Brown, 1990; Berry; 1992) employed in many
parts of North America. But even as a mechanism for stimulating market-led decisions
in favour of energy efficiency, its structure of incentives is flawed; for although
explicitly identified expenditure on energy efficiency is compensated through the price
formula, any loss of income associated with reduced energy demand is not. As revenue
foregone through lost sales of energy will form the major potential cost of energy
efficiency programmes for gas and electricity companies, the inability to pass these
losses on through the pricing formula is likely to act as a significant deterrent
to expansive and imaginative energy efficiency activity on the part of companies
concerned 4. The 'E factor' in other words, only tinkers at the margins of the incentive
structure of the price formula, and it does little to modify the dominating tenor of the
reward and profit structure of the privatised energy industries, which is fundamentally
predicated on a capacity to sell more energy rather than less.
From a fuel poverty perspective, the use of the 'E factor' to generate large sums of
money for projects directed specifically at low income households, is constrained by the
requirement that both the regulators and the utility companies avoid being seen to give
'undue discrimination' and 'undue preference' to particular classes of consumers
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(Sharpe, 1992). While the creation of an independent trust to administer `E factor' funds
may obviate some of these problems, trust funds (which are effectively being provided
by all consumers) will need to be distributed in an 'even-handed' way, in order to avoid
the charge that the generality of consumers are being taxed to fund services for the
benefit of one sub-set of consumers only.
The levying of an `E factor' surcharge on the tariffs of low income households (along
with domestic consumers generally) to finance measures to promote energy efficiency
in affluent households, raises important equity considerations. The `E factor' has the
potential to become a form of disguised carbon tax - one directed only at domestic
consumers (i.e. it excludes the franchise sector of the energy market not subject to price
regulation) and without any off-setting compensation for low income households via the
income security system.
The extent to which the 'E factor' will form no more than "a marginal consideration in
the marketing strategy of BG or the first step on the road to regulation for energy
services" (Roberts, 1992, p.13), and the nature of its impact on low income households
is unclear at this point, as the development of the concept is still at a very formative
stage.
What is clearer, however, is that the package of measures developed by the regulator in
the gas tariff review, constitute in aggregate a far superior settlement for the domestic
consumer than that achieved at privatisation. And the achievement of the Director
General of Gas Supply is rendered all the more noteworthy by the knowledge that the
revised tariff formula was introduced in the face of considerable opposition from British
Gas; particularly following the announcement of the Office of Fair Trading's (OFT)
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proposals for the separation of the distribution and supply businesses of the company
in October 1991 (see OFGAS 1991 Annual Report; Powe, 1992; OXERA, 1992, for
accounts of the difficult progress of the tariff review negotiations).
The positive outcomes for domestic consumers have been obtained only after assertive -
some would say belligerent - action on the part of the regulator. An example of this was
the attempt by British Gas in March 1992 to meet the new price formula conditions by
freezing, rather than reducing, tariff charges and it was only after OFGAS threatened
enforcement action (OFGAS, 1992c) that the company agreed to reduce its tariff by 1.7p
or 3 per cent (from 1st July 1992). Reflecting on these events, the Director of the Gas
Consumers Council concluded that:
A reduction of this size can only mean that British Gas either got its
sums wrong or decided to hoodwink its customers. Either way, British
Gas has boosted the regulator's reputation and has dented its own
credibility.
GCCb, 1992
At the time of writing, the story of the torturous negotiations and attempted re-
negotiations of the new tariff formula continues to unfold. British Gas' understandable
hesitancy (from the point of view of protecting shareholders' interests) to concede too
much, appeared to turn to recalcitrance as the implications of the OFGAS tariff and OFT
competition review began to sink in. The company expressed concern, in particular,
about the simultaneous loss of dominance of the contract gas market (demanded by the
OFT) and the reduced profitability of the increasingly important tariff sector of its
business (through the RPI minus 5% revision to the formula) 5. It argued that the
ground rules had changed substantially between the drafting of the conditions of the
tariff review and their implementation; that is, in April 1991 it was an integrated entity,
whereas by April 1992 (when the new formula came into effect) it was facing (a) the
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imminent separation of its transmission division, (b) a reduction in its share of the
contract gas market to 40 per cent (by 1996) and (c) the loss of its supply monopoly to
users above 2,500 therms per year under the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act
1992. Because of this, it proposed that OFGAS re-consider the terms of the tariff review
agreement.
(iii) The MMC Reference
The impasse between British Gas and the regulatory bodies resulted, at the end of July
1992, in the Director General of Gas Supply using his powers under the Competition
and Service (Utilities) Act to refer British Gas to the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission. Initially the scope of the reference covered only the question of
determining an appropriate set of financial arrangements for the operation of the gas
transmission network. But the terms of the MMC inquiry were subsequently widened
to encompass a full review of the gas market, following the issuing of parallel references
by the President of the Board of Trade and the Director General of Gas Supply
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1992a, 1992b; OFGAS, 1992g, 1992h).
The reference by the President of the Board of Trade was made at the behest of British
Gas itself - but apparently, only after failing to get the Department of Trade and
Industry to intervene to prevent the OFGAS reference on the transmission network going
forward to the MMC (OFGAS policy officer, PUAF meeting, 22/9/92). In the view of
the Director General of Gas Supply, the action of British Gas to widen the scope of the
enquiry, represents a strategic move aimed at putting the results of the tariff formula
review "back into the melting pot in the hope that an outcome would emerge which was
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more favourable than the one the company had already signed up to" (PUAF Newsletter,
October 1992, p.5).
Partly in order to meet the terms of the new formula, but also, possibly with a view to
strengthening its position leading into the MMC investigation, British Gas announced
in August 1992 a further reduction in tariff prices by 2 per cent from the 1st October.
The two 1992 pricing changes represent an effective reduction in gas tariffs, over a full
year, of 3.25 per cent 6.
Whether the pricing and standards of service reforms obtained through the tariff review
will be sustained over the longer term is now effectively in the hands of the MMC.
Certainly it is possible that some of the elements of the package could be revised, in
light of the quite different gas market that may emerge after the release of the results
of the MMC review sometime in the Spring 1993. It is quite likely that the MMC will
recommend major changes to the competitive framework of the gas industry. In the
opinion of some observers, it is by no means self-evident that domestic consumers will
be amongst those sectors who stand to gain most from a more competitive gas market.
The Gas Consumers Council, in particular, has cautioned that the break-up of British
Gas and the introduction of competition in the tariff sector could result in higher tariffs,
regional pricing and declining service quality for domestic consumers (GCCa, 1992;
Powe, 1992; PUAF, September 1992; see also NEA, 1992d).
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2. WATER
(i) Domestic water tariffs since privatisation
Amongst the three utility areas under study, the water industry has probably attracted
the greatest amount of public and media attention since privatisation. The sharp increase
in water charges since 1989 has been a significant stimulus to this increasing interest in
the activities of the water companies. In contrast to the energy utilities, above inflation
price increases were explicitly structured into the economic framework of the privatised
water industry at the outset. In setting the K factor in the price formula, the Government
made provision for water and sewerage charges to increase by some 4-5 per cent each
year in real terms until the end of the century. Price increases of this order were
required, it was argued, to underwrite the costs of the £26 billion (1989 prices) ten-year
capital investment programme of the water industry.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 (on the next two pages) show the movement of water charges over
recent years. It can be seen in the table (Figure 6.4) that average household bills for
water and sewerage have risen at a consistent rate above the Retail Price Index, despite
the fact that the Director General of Water Services negotiated a voluntary abatement
by all but one of the water companies 7 of a sixth of their K factor increase in 1992/93.
This action on the part of the Director General followed widely-expressed concern about
the level of profits generated by the industry in 1990-91:
in a situation where bills are rising rapidly, customers will not expect
companies to make unnecessarily high profits and in particular to pay
out excessive dividends..lt is up to management to decide on dividends,
but if companies were to use the present position to pay out dividends
above those anticipated when the K factors were set they would need to
be ready to answer pointed questions from customers and from the
regulator.. (OFWAT, 1991e)
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Average Household Water & Sewerage Bills
1989/90
£
118.80
Annual increase %
Unmeasured
Increase above RPI %RPI increase %
1990/91 134.27 13.02 7.7 5.32
1991/92 154.57 15.12 9.7 5.42
1992/93 169.56 9.70 4.3 5.40
The average water & sewerage bill for the 3% of households on metered supply in
1992/93 was £205 i.e. 21% higher than for unmeasured households
Source; Derived from CRI (1992); OFWAT (1992a)
Figure 6.4: Average household water bills 1989-92
Substantial political capital was made out of the Director General's successful
negotiation of the K abatement. But the actual affect of this on the profits of the water
companies would have been minimal, as it was more than offset by the real terms
decline in construction costs - "15 per cent below the level assumed in 1989" (OFWAT,
1992z, p.4). As construction costs represent a major component of the companies'
capital expenditure, the fall in these costs would have provided substantial savings. The
impact of the fall in construction costs on company profits was illustrated in the Director
General's determination on South West Water's application for an interim adjustment
to their price cap (this is discussed in some detail in endnote 8)•
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WATER CHARGE S
Av. Household Bill
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 . Charge	 _....._ Ann . Av. . % Inc.
Source: Vater Services Association
Figure 6.5: Domestic water tariffs 1982-92
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Figure 6.5 gives a longitudinal picture of water charges and shows that the increases in
recent years are part of a longer term trend that has been in evidence since the water
industry entered its 'commercialised' course in the early 1980s. The figures before and
after privatisation are not strictly comparable because (i) current charges exclude the
'environmental service charge', which since 1989 has been funded out of general
taxation revenue to partly finance the National River Authority (see Macrory, 1989,
p.13) and (ii) previously, additional capacity/infrastructure costs were spread across all
consumers (with a component for this in each consumer's bill), whereas it is now paid
directly by new consumers through Infrastructure Charges 9. The exclusion of these
elements would make the shift in the curve after 1988/89 somewhat sharper.
(ii) The explanations for rising water charges
The increases in water charges, since privatisation at least, have been invariably
attributed by the Government, industry sources and OFWAT, to the costs associated with
upgrading the infrastructure and environmental standards of the water services industry.
This official rationale for the sustained water price increases experienced over the past
four years (and into the future) was reiterated by the Under-Secretary for State for the
Environment in a House of Commons debate on the water industry in June 1991:
Privatisation has not of itself caused an increase in water charges. Privatisation
has involved identibdng all the requirements to ensure that the water industry
meets agreed domestic and European Community standards, and costing those
requirements and agreeing a capital programme to put them right.
HoC (18/6/91) col. 157
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Undeniably the cost of the capital programme has been the primary contributor to the
rise in water charges, but there have been other forces at work as well. The higher rate
of return required by the private water companies (compared to their publicly owned
predecessors) and other factors associated with privatisation has had an influence on the
current level of charges in England and Wales. Certainly this appears to be the view of
water consumers themselves. In the OFWAT-commissioned MORI survey carried out
between November 1991 and January 1992, the predominant explanation for future price
increases related directly or indirectly to privatisation.
What do you think will be the main reasons for the water bills going up
by more than the rate of inflation?
Because of privatisation 28
To pay shareholders/make money and profits 20
Increased directors'/managers' salaries 9
Total 'privatisation effect' 57
Source: MORI (1992) p.81
Figure 6.6: Consumers' views on the 'privatisation effect' and water bills
Although the Director General of Water Services has been at pains to point out that this
survey finding reflects the fact that "customers have a poor understanding of the reasons
for the real increases in bills" (OFWAT Annual Report, 1992), his own analyses of the
capital structure of the water industry tends to belie the view that the 'privatisation
effect' has been insignificant. In his two major excursions into this area - the Cost of
Capital (OFWAT, 19911) and The Cost of Quality (OFWAT, 1992o) consultation papers
- the Director General has emphasised that the return on capital obtained by the water
companies need not necessarily be as high as that set at the time of privatisation:
The Secretaries of State worked on the basis of a 7% real pre-tax return
for the water and sewerage companies. For most of the water only
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companies an 8% figure was used. For the smallest companies the rate
was 8.5%. p.v
Taken together..these returns on debt and equiry would suggest a
weighted average cost of capital of perhaps 5% to 6% in the longer term
for a water and sewerage company. The rates could be a little higher for
the small independent water only companies. p27 (both OFWAT, 19911)
A reduction in the rate of return on capital is justified, in the Director General's view,
because the water industry is a low risk area of commercial activity and it has a highly
stable revenue-raising capacity (OFWAT, 19911). A future rate of return at the level
envisaged by the Director General (above) would be similar to that applied by OFGAS
in its review of British Gas' tariffs. Predictably, the water industry has vigorously
contested the assumptions underlying the Director General's calculation of an
appropriate rate of return and has countered that a "level of at least 9.5 per cent is
justified given the risks to which the water companies are exposed" (Water Bulletin,
6/12/91).
In his more recent Cost of Quality paper, published as part of the consultative process
leading into the 1994 Periodic Review of the price formula, the Director General
identified three future water charging scenarios based on different assumptions about the
standards of environmental quality expected of the water industry. In the paper, the
Director General concentrates primarily on the impact that environmental improvements
will have on household bills in the future; representing the latest stage in his long-
standing campaign to make the cost of environmental policy, as it affects the water
industry, more transparent and to give customers "..the material on which they can make
informed judgements about the quality of the service they want and the price they are
prepared to pay" (OFVVAT, 1992o) 1°.
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However, the paper also contains data on the financial structure of the water industry
of more immediate relevance to the issues being considered here. If a sterner efficiency
target (from 3% to 5%) and a lower rate of return (weighted average of 6%) were set
for the industry, this would have a significant moderating effect on average household
bills in the future. This is outlined in Figure 6.7.
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL CHANGES ON FUTURE WATER CHARGES
PROJECTED INCREASE IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD BILL [REAL TERMS]
ENVIRONMENTAL TARGET:
	 1992/93 - 1999-2000
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - LOWER
	
£215 (+27%)
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - UPPER
	
£230 (+36%)
PURE AND GREEN
	
£255 (+51%)
[AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD BILL IN 1992-93: £169]
PROJECTED INCREASE IN AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD BILL MINUS EXISTING EFFICIENCY
TARGET
ENVIRONMENTAL TARGET:
	 1992/93 - 1999-2000
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - LOWER	 £202 (+20%)
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - UPPER
	
£217 (+28%)
PURE AND GREEN	 £242 (+43%)
HIGHER EFFICIENCY TARGET AND LOWER RATE OF RETURN MEASURES: IMPACT UPON
PROJECILD WATER CHARGES
% SAVING ON BILL REVISED
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - LOWER 8.8 £183
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - UPPER 8.3 £198
PURE AND GREEN 7.5 £223
PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN AVERAGE BILL UNDER HIGHER EFFICIENCY TARGET AND
LOWER RATE OF RETURN [REAL TERMS]
1992/93 - 1999-2000
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - LOWER
	 8
PROGRESS MAINTAINED - UPPER
	 17
PURE AND GREEN	 32
Calculated from data in OFWAT (1992) The Cost of Quality, Figures 5, 8 & 9
Figure 6.7: The impact of future financial changes on water charges
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Under this set of financial adjustments, household bills would continue to increase, but
at a substantially reduced rate relative to alternative economic regulation scenarios. The
calculations contained in Figure 6.7 also have another implication. For they suggest that
because of the "generous" terms of the privatisation settlement (Investors Chronicle,
4/9/92; National Utility Services, September 1992), consumers have been paying more
for their water than has been strictly required under the capital programme. Consumers
in England and Wales appear to have been paying, in effect, a 'privatisation premium'
in their water bills over the last four years.
In releasing the review of capital investment and financial performance of the water
companies at the beginning of October 1992, the Director General of Water Supply
declared his intention to make a "formal reduction" of 2 per cent in the level of K for
the majority of water companies in 1993-94. This will have the effect in many cases,
but by no means all (see Endnote 11), of moderating the rise in water tariffs in 1993-94
by a broadly similar amount 11 (OFWAT, 1992z). This action - essentially involving
an incremental revision of the economic and financial assumptions made at the time of
privatisation, to the advantage of consumers - presages, possibly, the sort of changes that
could be introduced, following the completion of the Periodic Review of the price cap
in 1994.
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(iii) Variations in domestic water tariffs
An examination of average annual household bills across the country provides only part
of the picture of tariff change since privatisation. Two of the most significant changes,
from the perspective of domestic consumers, have been (i) the moves towards full cost
apportionment, or what OFWAT describes as 'de-averaging' and (ii) the relationship
between standing and variable charges.
Ever since the demise of the Water Charges Equalisation Act 1977 differential water
and sewerage charges have been levied across different parts of England and Wales. The
case for differential tariffs, based on the variable costs of supplying different localities,
is argued on the grounds of efficiency and 'economic fairness'. Full cost recovery in line
with the marginal costs imposed on the water and sewerage systems is ostensibly fairer,
as people pay the actual cost of supplying water services to their homes, and it removes
cross-subsidisation and promotes allocative efficiency. Similar arguments underpin the
economic case for universal water metering. The Office of Water Services has actively
encouraged the water and sewerage companies to move towards 'de-averaged' charging
systems, such as differential tariffs based on geographical location (zonal charges),
seasonal tariffs and tariffs for different classes of consumers (OFWAT, 1990c; OFWAT
charges control staff in interview with researcher, July 1992). Severn Trent and Thames
Water have introduced zonal tariffs and South West Water is considering introducing
seasonal tariffs.
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WATER & SEWERAGE CHARGES: Regional Companies
Average Household Bill
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The gradual move towards more differentiated tariff systems across the country is
reflected, at an aggregate level, in Figure 6.8. As can be seen from the chart, variations
in the level of average household bills have increased over recent years.
Figure 6.8: Variations in domestic water charges
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Whatever the merit of the economic argument, the extension of cost apportionment tariff
systems will result in higher price increases for some sectors of the domestic and non-
domestic consumer population. And they further corrode the nexus between water
charges and 'capacity to pay'.
The standing, or fixed charge, element has always been proportionally much higher in
the water industry than is the case in the energy industries. Because they provide a
secure and predictable income stream, high standing charges are manifestly attractive
to the water companies. However, they discriminate in a regressive manner against low
consumption households, and under the still prevailing rate-based system of charging,
against consumers living in low rateable value properties. They also confound the
driving economic principle of cost apportionment according to use of the system.
For these reasons, the Director General of Water Services has prompted the companies
to review their tariff structures so that standing charges cover only billing and associated
costs and he has argued that "broadly similar standing charges [should be levied] across
all companies" (OFWAT, 1991u). In particular, the Director General has been anxious
to see the disparity between measured (i.e. metered) and unmeasured standing charges
removed, as higher standing charges for measured supplies acts as a disincentive to
customers taking up the metering option (OFWAT, 1992j). Figures 6.9 and 6.10
(overleaf) list the standing charges for the ten water and sewerage companies and
indicate the percentage change in standing charges between 1990/91 12 and 1992/93.
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Figure 6.9
	 Domestic Standing Charges (Water & Sewerage) - Unmeasured
1992/93 (E)
	 Increase 90/91-92/93 %
Anglian
	 57.93	 20
Dwr Cymru
	 134.16	 27
North West
	 25.00	 18
Northumbrian
	 64.00	 60
Severn Trent
South West	 55.00	 22
Southern	 41.50	 26
Thames
	 35.00	 17
Wessex	 38.00	 46
Yorkshire	 42.00	 40
Average	 54.70	 30
Sources: Water Services Association (1992); CRI (1992)
Figure 6.10
Anglian
Dwr Cymru
North West
Northumbrian
Severn Trent
South West
Southern
Thames
Wessex
Yorkshire
Average
Domestic Standing Charges (Water & Sewerage) - Measured
1992/93 (£)
	 Increase 90/91-92/93 %
69.93
	
-16
96.00
	
-19
99.00	 9
96.00	 26
28.32	 25
91.40	 16
74.00
	 28
50.00	 19
70.30	 23
54.00	
-23
72.90
	 5
Sources: Water Services Association (1992); CRI (1992)
The Figures indicate marked variations in the levying of standing charges across the
companies and show that practice is still a long way short of the uniformity desired by
the Director General. Importantly, unmeasured standing charges - which apply to all but
three per cent of domestic consumers - have risen ahead of the rate of water price
increases generally, i.e. 30 per cent compared to overall price rises of 26 per cent over
the period. The average standing charge for metered households remains substantially
higher than that for unmetered households, although these have increased at a rate well
below prices overall.
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(iv) Water metering
Under section 145 of the Water Industry Act 1991 water companies have been prohibited
from using rateable value-based charges after the 31st March 2000. This legal constraint
(arising from the introduction of the ill-fated community charge), in conjunction with
the new commercial orientation of the privatised water companies, has given rise to a
search for charging alternatives. The most frequently cited substitute mechanisms are
metering, flat rate charge or 'licence' (effectively a 100% standing charge) and a 'new
generation' property-related charge.
Metering is the option most favoured on economic pricing grounds (OECD, 1987;
Patterson, 1987; Gadbury, 1991; Rees, 1992), but the ability to adopt consumption-based
charging systems is constrained, in the short- and medium-term, by the absence of
metering technology in most domestic properties. Only 3 per cent of households in
England and Wales were metered in May 1992 (OFWAT Information Note No.13). The
proportion of metered domestic households in England and Wales will rise very
gradually over time - independent of future regulatory or other policy actions - as water
and sewerage companies are generally installing meters in new domestic properties. It
has risen from 1 per cent of households to its current level since privatisation.
The impact that the introduction of universal metering would have on household water
and sewerage bills is obviously impossible to determine precisely at this stage; although
clearly there would be a substantial one-off direct or indirect increase in charges
arising from the cost of installing meters in domestic premises (estimated on average to
be around £200 per household 13). And households currently metered are already, on
average, paying 21 per cent more than unmetered consumers, although the higher
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standing charge accounts for much of this. The overall distributional impact of universal
metering in all likelihood would be uneven, with smaller households in high rateable
value properties experiencing a net decrease in their water bills, and with the reverse
applying to larger households in low rateable value properties.
The final results of the metering trials conducted in twelve areas throughout England
will not be available until 1993. Preliminary results of the metering trials indicated that
"about 65% of households in the small trial areas are paying less than or the same as
their previous RV bill.. [with] about 20% of households paying more than 20% over their
previous RV bill" (National Metering Trials Co-ordinating Group, 1990, p.iv). Data from
the metering trials will not be a reliable guide to the impact of volumetric charging on
domestic consumers generally though, as the composition of the households in the
twelve trial areas is not representative of the population as a whole (see below), and the
tariff structure used in the trials has not reflected the full costs of metering:
It should be remembered that the trial tariffs didn't attempt to recover
the full costs of the meter installation (or allow for any savings). In a full
scale meter installation the tariffs might look somewhat different.
National Metering Trials Group (1992) pp. 2-3
It is most unlikely that a nation-wide metering installation programme - akin to the
programme to connect households to natural gas in the 1960s - would be embarked upon
because of the huge capital costs involved (estimated at around £4 billion 14)• However,
domestic metering of a more incremental kind has attracted a number of powerful
sponsors in recent years - not the least of whom are the Department of the Environment
(DoE/Welsh Office, 1992) and the Director General of Water Services - and it will
almost certainly become increasingly prominent as a method of water charging.
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The Office of Water Services initiated a major national debate on water metering in
November 1990, which at the time of writing still has some way to run. The
consultation process on Paying for Water had a number of strands, of which only three
will be considered at length here, i.e. consumer attitudes to metering, the position of the
water companies on the metering issue, and the views of the community sector.
OFWAT used two approaches to gathering the views of consumers on metering: through
opinion polling and through the use of its ten customer services committees. In
combination, the outcomes of this information search provided less than conclusive
evidence that metering is the charging method preferred by the majority of consumers.
In the OPCS Omnibus survey 46 per cent of consumers supported metering, compared
to 25% rates, 21% banding, and 9% licence fee (OFWAT, 19910 ' 5. A result which
showed, as OFWAT itself pointed out, that "at least as many people favoured one of the
other choices" (OFWAT, 1991u p.16). The fragility of consumer support for the
metering option was emphasised in the survey finding that 59 per cent of those
expressing a preference for metering, changed their view when it was suggested that
metering could be accompanied by an additional charge of up to £30 on top of the
current average bill. Indeed the reliability and interpretation of the survey results
generally is clouded by OFWAT's warning that the survey results "need to be treated
with caution. It would appear that many respondents had not thought through the issues
before the interview; and modified their views as the interview progressed" (OFWAT,
1991u, p.15).
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A second OFWAT survey, which involved inviting customers to return a postal
questionnaire included with domestic (unmeasured) water bills in February & March
1991, is an even more suspect guide to consumer preferences for different charging
methods 16. Although 64 per cent of the nearly 290,000 people responding to the
survey supported metering (OFWAT, 1991u), the self-selected nature of the exercise
makes any interpretation of the results perilous. Yet, as in the OPCS survey, there was
little support for metering at anything other than the most minimal of additional cost;
and only 15 per cent of respondents favouring metering indicated that they would be
willing to pay up to £29 for metering costs (OFWAT, 1991u).
A third survey, not formally conducted as part of the Paying for Water consultation, and
directed primarily at gathering consumer views on more general water services matters,
indicated that whether or not metering is the charging system most favoured by
consumers in abstract few had actually seriously considered having a meter installed:
All customers who were aware of the meter option [40% of the sample]
were asked the likelihood of their installing one in the next year or two.
Very few (7%) seem likely, 20% say they are not very likely to and 69%
say they are not at all likely to install a meter (7596 of those in the DE
social grade say they are not at all likely to install, compared with 59%
of those in the AB social grade). MORI (1992) p.67
Submissions to OFWAT in the Paying for Water consultation by each of the ten
regional Customer Service Committees (based on local public consultations) also failed
to offer clear support for one charging method over another. Although five CSCs
favoured metering, four of the other five CSCs supported a form of property banding,
with the remaining CSC expressing no overall preference (OFWAT, 1991f; OFWAT,
1991u). The CSCs in favour of metering were Anglian, Wessex, Wales, Southern &
Thames, while the CSCs in support of property banding were Central, North West,
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Yorkshire & South West. Northumbria CSC indicated that it was firmly opposed to both
metering and flat-rate charges.
Within the water industry itself, there appear to be only a small number of water
services companies who favour metering as the sole device for levying water charges.
In submissions to OFWAT, most companies expressed a preference for charges based
on the new council tax, along with selected metering. Only two companies - Dwr Cymru
and Northumbrian - supported the use of flat rate charges (The Guardian, 29/4/91), and
interestingly, these two companies currently levy the highest standing charges for
unmeasured supply.
The industry's general reluctance to introduce widespread metering arises from a number
of concerns including, the capital costs involved, the possibility that metering will result
in widely fluctuating and depressed revenues through reduced demand (e.g. in a wet
summer), and consumer hostility. But measures by the water companies to move away
from the commitment to meter new properties have drawn a sharp response from the
regulator. This was exemplified in June 1991 when, following advocacy by the
Yorkshire Customer Service Committee and Sheffield City Council, the board of
directors of Yorkshire Water decided to amend the company's policy on the
compulsorily metering of new housing estates, in favour of offering consumers a choice
about charging methods. Following intervention by the Director General of Water
Services, however, the company quickly rescinded this decision.
The regressive impact of volumetric charging on low-income households has been - and
will continue to be - at the nub of community and consumer sector concerns about
metering. Metering could particularly affect large families and households containing a
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disabled member or members, but its impact is likely to be more generalised than this.
Potentially, all households presently living in low rateable properties would face steep
increases in their water and sewerage bills if they became metered. Because of these
equity implications, metering has been opposed by most of the major consumer and
welfare organisations, such as the National Consumer Council, the National Association
of Citizens Advice Bureaux, Age Concern and the Child Poverty Action Group 17.
The opposition of community services and consumer groups to metering is in contrast
to the position adopted by some sections of the environmental movement, with
organisations, like CPRE declaring strong support for water metering on conservation
grounds. Friends of the Earth, however, has recently indicated that it does not support
a national programme of domestic water metering (Water Bulletin, 13/11/92, p.3). The
Department of the Environment/Welsh Office discussion paper Using Water Wisely,
released in the summer of 1992, advocated water metering on environmental grounds.
In the view of two commentators, at least, "..the introduction of environmental issues
into the metering debate is a red herring. Domestic household metering as a method of
charging for water is unlikely to tackle this environmental problem effectively but
metering will have impacts on poverty and equity which carry major implications for
social policy" (Childs & Huby, 1992, p.2). As Chapter 2 illustrated, empirical evidence
on the relationship between pricing and water consumption is ambiguous and often
difficult to interpret (see OECD, 1987; MMBW, 1991 for a review of studies in different
countries). But the overall trend of the data seems to suggests that "water demand is
highly price inelastic" (Mann, 1989, p.166) and that very substantial price increases are
required before consumption is reduced to any significant extent (MMBW, 1991; Martin
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& Wilder, 1992). This is particularly the case with water used inside the home, as
opposed to more 'discretionary' outside use.
In its submission to the OFWAT consultation, the National Consumer Council favoured
the use of flat rate charges, despite its explicitly regressive impact, because
[the] ease of administration makes the licence fee far more likely to be
integrated into the social security system than any other. That being so,
then whatever regressive effects it may have in them)) would be heavily
offset by the fact of its being rebated for those on low incomes.
NCC (1991) p.18
Neither the NCC's position on water charging, nor its remarkable expression of faith in
the capacity of the social security system, and more particularly the Government, to
respond to changes in water tariffs, drew much support from other consumer and
community sector organisations.
Addressing the environmental agenda, the NCC proposed that "leakage repair" would
prove more cost effective as a conservation measure than water metering. It is estimated
that somewhere between 20 per cent to 25 per cent of water in England and Wales is
lost through leakage; although paradoxically in the absence of metering the accuracy of
this estimation (and the locus of the leakage) is rather uncertain (DoE/Welsh Office,
1992).
The National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux concluded that while it was
opposed to water metering, it was also unable clearly to support either of the alternatives
to metering being proposed by the Director General. In addition, it argued somewhat
cryptically that the Director-General's powers "need to be strengthened in order to
ensure a stable base on which to place public policy for help with water charges for
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those on low incomes or high levels of water dependency" (Covering letter to
submission Paying for Water, 1991).
The fears expressed by community sector groups about the impact of metering on low
income households appear to have been corroborated in the DoE/OFWAT-commissioned
study on The Social Impact of Water Metering published in three volumes, some six
months behind schedule in September 1992 18 . Despite the fact that the study was
conducted in the socio-demographically unrepresentative metering trial areas 19, it
clearly revealed that a small, but by no means insignificant, proportion of households
experienced acute deprivation and/or financial hardship as a result of the advent of
metering.
At first glance the study showed, as expected, that there were winners and losers under
metering, and that there is a strong correlation between higher bills and household size.
However, it was obvious from the in-depth interviewing phase of the study (Second
Report) that some of the 'winners' under metering were only so because they had
sharply reduced their water consumption, in some cases at a considerable cost to quality
of life. Also, it was found "that with the exception of retirement pension recipients
(many of whom are one-person households), those receiving social security benefits,
were more likely to report that they were paying much more." (OFWAT, 1992t, First
Report p.4-18)
Overall, the correlation between "financial hardship" as defined in the study (i.e.
problems paying water bill, large increases in charges relative to rateable value
equivalent, difficulty paying water bill and difficulty meeting household expenses) and
income was found to be less direct than the association between "financial hardship" and
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family size and medical conditions. This could well be attributed the significant under-
representation of low income households in the sample group (see Endnote 19). But in
the other category of "social hardship" as defined in the study (i.e. reductions in personal
hygiene-related water use, worry about using water, perceived reduction in hygiene
levels), low income households were markedly over-represented. This suggests that often
low income consumers made heroic (if possibly misguided) efforts to reduce their bill
by reducing their water consumption; at times involving a severe curtailment in their use
of water with potentially serious personal hygiene and public health consequences.
In essence, the study underlines a fundamental problem with volumetric charging. In that
for all its apparent commercial logic and the arresting appeal of its use of 'the simple
fairness test' (i.e. you pay for what you use), and for all its laudable environmental aims,
it will be poor households who disproportionately bear the costs; if not in extra charges
then in reduced quality of life. More affluent consumers have an inherent capacity to
absorb the additional costs of metering, either by paying more in water charges, buying
water efficient appliances, or by reducing discretionary use (particularly outside the
home). Most low income households do not have a similar capacity. Interestingly, most
of the equity implications of the data contained in the Second Report, were either down-
played or ignored by the authors in their Summary report and recommendations.
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3. ELECTRICITY
We are still unable to answer the question we posed in 1988 - 'whether
or not the privatised electriciO, supply industry is likely in aggregate to
have lower costs, and hence be able to offer its consumers lower prices,
than would be the case if the industry remained in public ownership'.
HoC Energy Committee (1992a) para 167
(i) Electricity tariffs since privatisation
Changes in the movement of electricity prices since privatisation are inordinately
difficult to track. This is partly the result of the complex structure of price controls in
the ESI, which the Director General of Electricity Supply himself has described as "not
easy to understand, nor is it straightforward to check whether or not a licensee is
complying with them.." (OFFER, Annual Report, 1992). But it is also because, in
contrast to his counterpart in the water industry 20, the electricity regulator (until
recently at least 21 ) has shown little inclination to make the pricing systems transparent.
Nor has he been prepared to publish, on a regular basis, comparative data on electricity
tariffs across the country. The journey towards answers about electricity prices is
rather less direct than in the case of water, and far more circuitous than it should need
to be 22.
For much of the 1980s, electricity prices for domestic consumers declined in real terms,
largely as a result of the fall in coal purchase costs. In the period immediately preceding
privatisation, domestic electricity prices rose in excess of the rate of inflation. The
Government-initiated increase in prices leading into privatisation had two purposes. The
first related directly to the sale of the industry, with the Government seeking to enhance
the commercial attractiveness of the ESI to potential investors:
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..there was a rise in the price of electricity at the time when electriciry
was privatised because we had to strike the right balance between the
interests of the consumer, the interests of the taxpayer and the interests
of the shareholders and we set the prices at the time of vesting to give
a return on the assets employed of 5 per cent..
John Wakeham, Secretary of State for Energy, HoC Energy Committee (1992c)
para 336
The second purpose was to 'factor in' a degree of pricing surplus so that electricity
tariffs could be maintained at a politically acceptable level in the years immediately
following privatisation. This was explained by Dr Dieter Helm, in evidence to the Select
Committee on Energy, in the following way:
..the Government raised the price level in advance of privatisation, in a
series of steps, in order to fossilise-in a price level which then would not
rise by more than inflation.
The subsidiary price cap (Licence Condition 3C) was introduced with the explicit
purpose of keeping electricity prices for domestic and small business users to the level
of inflation for the first three years of privatisation. The three year life of the price cap
was based on the duration of the contracts drawn up between the generating companies
and British Coal (and the 'back to back' contracts between the generating companies and
the RECs) in April 1990. But it is possibly not coincidental that this three year period
was also sufficient to cover the time up to and beyond the next General Election. Figure
6.11 (overleaf) illustrates the movement of electricity prices between 1979 and 1992.
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Figure 6.11: Domestic electricity prices 1979-92
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Despite the intent of the subsidiary price cap, electricity prices for domestic and small
business consumers rose by an average of 10.5 per cent in 1991/92, which was well
above the prevailing rate of inflation. The excessive price rise in April 1991 was an
artefact of the methodology used for calculating the rate of inflation, whereby regional
electricity companies based their price increases on a forecast level of inflation for the
year to October. Thus through a combination of (i) under-estimating inflation in the
preceding year 23 (with provision being made in the licence for the 'catching up' of lost
revenue through low inflation forecasts) and (ii) over-estimating inflation for the
forthcoming year, tariffs rose by some 6.8 per cent above inflation in 1991.
The above inflation rise in tariffs in 1991 made something of a nonsense of the
subsidiary price cap and caused acute embarrassment both to the Government and the
regulator. In October 1991, the Director General wrote to the majority of the regional
electricity companies "pointing out that the rate of inflation was turning out to be
significantly lower than the rates which they had assumed in setting prices for
1991/92..[and] that, on the basis of the information that they had previously provided,
it seemed likely that they might breach one of their price controls (the 3C subsidiary
price cap)" (OFFER, 1992d). The Director General was asking, in effect, for some of
the excess to be returned to electricity consumers. In the event, eight RECs exceeded
the subsidiary price cap and while four of the companies agreed to return the full
amount in reduced charges in 1992/93, the other four demurred; although they did
ultimately agree to return a proportion of excess revenue raised (see Figure 6.12
overleaf). The inability of the regulator to enforce a repayment in full from all of the
companies reflects, in part, the obscure wording of the supply licence, with phrases like
"use its best endeavours" and "circumstances that are unavoidable" (Department of
Energy, 1990a, pp.49-52). And it was on this basis that the four companies maintained
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that they had no legal or moral obligation to respond to the Director General's request.
In addition to the licence wording problem though, it might be argued that the Director
General displayed less robust and assertive negotiating skills than might have been
required in the circumstances in order to protect the interests of consumers 2A.
The 1991/92 Miscalculation of charges
The eight companies who exceeded the Condition 3C subsidiary price cap in 1991/92 were:
Amount exceeded cap
£m
Amount "returned"
(through limiting charges)
Eastern 15 3 (20%)
London 4 4 (100%)
Manweb 2 2 (100%)
Northern 5 4 (80%)
Norweb 9 5 (56%)
Seeboard 6 6 (100%)
Southern 12 5 (42%)
Yorkshire 6 6 (100%)
TOTAL 59 35 (59%)
This variable pattern of money "returned" was not accidental and clearly reflected a difference of opinion:
"Four companies (London Electricity, Manweb, SEEBOARD and Yorkshire Electricity) have said that, by
charging less next year and having a smaller increase in tariffs, they will return to their tariff customers any
excess made this year. They will make an accounting change which has the effect of reducing the maximum
amounts the control permits them to charge next year.
The other four companies (Eastern Electricity, Northern Electric, NORWEB and Southern Electric) have
argued that their charges already meet their licence condition. This is because the 3C price condition requires
best endeavour to meet the price cap, but the cap does not apply if certain of the licensee's costs have risen
so as to have a material and adverse effect on the profits of its supply business (as distinct from the profits of
its business as a whole).
These companies have nonetheless agreed to share some [author's emphasis] of the benefits of lower
inflation with tariff customers by holding next year's charges below the permitted maximum. The amounts
concerned are comparable to those of the other four companies concerned." p.3 [This may have been the case
in absolute money terms, but not in proportion to the excess revenue generated through excessively high
tariffs]
Source: Electricity Price Controls paper (1992)
Figure 6.12: The 1991/92 miscalculation of electricity charges
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The effect of the 'claw back', in conjunction with a reduced level of inflation, resulted
in domestic electricity tariffs rising on average by 2 per cent (in absolute terms) in
1992/93. Over the period from April 1989, average domestic electricity tariffs have
increased by 28 per cent, while inflation has risen by 24 per cent. This above inflation
increase in domestic tariffs is rendered all the more perplexing when it is considered that
in 1991, the price of coal was 27 per cent cheaper in real terms than it was in 1988 25
(Department of Trade and Industry, 1992c, Table 63). As the cost of coal represents
around 22 per cent of the cost of a unit of electricity to domestic consumers (National
Power, 1992, pp.6 & 16), it might be expected that the unit cost to domestic consumers
would have fallen by around 8 per cent (in real terms) on the basis of coal costs alone.
Whereas, in fact, domestic tariffs rose in real terms by 7.8 per cent over the period 1988
to 1991. This indicates that either the generating companies have not passed on coal
purchase savings to the RECs and retained the savings as additional profit, or that the
latter have not passed on electricity savings to domestic consumers, with similar profit
gains (or indeed a combination of both).
Another explanation for the inverse relationship between coal prices and domestic
consumer tariffs might lie in the way that the generation and supply companies have
differentially distributed the benefits of savings in purchasing costs between classes of
consumers. It could be hypothesised that the supply companies (which includes the
generating companies, for they supply a significant proportion of electricity direct to
industrial customers) are more likely to direct these benefits to the 'over 1 MW' sector
where competition prevails, than to the 'captive' franchise sector of the market. The
validity of this hypothesis seems to be borne out in Figure 6.13 overleaf.
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Figure 6.13: Changes in electricity prices 1989-91: major sectors
The recent rise in electricity tariffs for major industrial electricity users
(e.g. ICI), primarily as a result of the termination of a number of Government subsidy
schemes 26 , has prompted the Major Energy Users Council to call for the abolition of
the 'fossil fuel levy' (Financial Times, 29/7/92). As discussed in Chapter 1, the 'fossil
fuel levy' was introduced at the time of privatisation to financially support the nuclear
power sector. Currently, the levy adds 11 per cent to all electricity bills. The deleterious
impact of this surcharge on electricity bills is likely to be felt just as keenly by low
income households, as it is by industrial and commercial users of electricity in Britain.
358
As in the case of the water industry, there is evidence that variations in domestic tariffs
across the country have widened since privatisation. This is particularly evident in
standard rate tariffs, as shown in Figure 6.14.
Variations in Domestic Tariffs
Standard Rate
	 pence per therm
December 1989
	 Lowest tariff
	
Highest tariff	 Difference %
Birmingham (MEB) Liverpool (Manweb)
6.358	 7.276	 14
December 1991
	 Birmingham (MEB) Cardiff (Sth Wales)
7.536	 8.96	 19
Economy 7
December 1989
	 Nottingham (E Mid) Plymouth (SWEB)
4.428	 4.85	 10
December 1991
	 Nottingham (E Mid) Plymouth (SWEB)
5.282	 5.927
	
12
Notes: Based on 5,000 kWh per annum - the average electricity consumption for all households in the 1986
English House Conditions Survey was 4,435 kWh per annum (DoE, 1991b); Tariffs include unit rate and
standing charge
Source: Derived from Department of Trade and Industry, 1992c, Table 57
Figure 6.14: Variations in domestic electricity tariffs
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(ii) Domestic tariffs post the subsidiary price cap
From the account above, it can be seen that the subsidiary price cap has not brought
great advantages to domestic consumers. But even the minimal protection of the
subsidiary cap will not exist after April 1993, when the price control reverts to the
conventional RPI-X+Y formulation (Licence Condition 3B). This will enable the RECs
to increase tariffs above the level of inflation as most have plus X factors (average +1.3
per cent) for distribution charges, and more importantly, to pass-through the full cost of
purchasing electricity. The general supply price control (3B), though, is due for revision
by April 1994 and a number of its existing elements are likely to change (see below).
Theoretically, in a market where purchase costs are falling (e.g. arising from the decline
in coal prices) domestic consumers stand to benefit from lower tariffs. However, it is
by no means certain that electricity purchasing costs will continue to fall; firstly, because
of the increased use of what is likely to be more expensive forms of electricity
generation (i.e. nuclear, coal-fired power plant fitted with expensive flue gas
desulphurisation equipment and arguably, gas-fired 27 power plants) and secondly,
because full cost-pass-through [Y] provides no incentive for the RECs to purchase
economically. Nor does it encourage the companies to adopt energy efficiency-oriented
models of electricity supply. As Helm & Powell (1992, p.103) conclude the
"..introduction of a Y element assigns considerable risk away from the regional
electricity companies towards their customers." It was for these reasons that the now-
defunct House of Commons Select Committee on Energy in its examination of the
Consequences of Electricity Privatisation recommended that the subsidiary price cap be
retained until full competition is introduced into the ESI:
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Controls on supply revenue from franchise customers ought however to
continue beyond 1993, since these customers are dealing with a
monopoly supplier for an essential service, and in our view such controls
should remain in existence after each reduction of the franchise until the
Director General is satisfied that there is fair and effective competition
in supply to customers who have ceased to be part of the franchise. This
could mean price controls of some sort continuing beyond 1998. [author's
emphasis]
HoC Energy Committee (1992a) para 86
The Office of Electricity Regulation is currently in the process of reviewing the supply
price control formula, and according to the Director General all of the factors alluded
to above are being considered in the review (OFFER, 1992y). The decision taken by the
Director General on the Y cost-pass-through element of the formula, in particular, will
have a major bearing on future electricity prices, as the costs covered by V 28 represent
around 95 per cent of the cost of supplying electricity to consumers.
(iii) Competition and metering in the domestic sector
The Director General of Electricity Supply has set tremendous store on the advent of
competition in the ESI. And the efficacy of competition, as a mechanism for creating
the sovereign domestic consumer, was a dominant theme in his consultation paper on
Metering published in January 1992. In this paper (OFFER, 1992b, pp. 28-37), Professor
Littlechild sketched a post-1998 world of advanced metering technology, opening up an
ever-expanding horizon of consumer choice and lower prices; which has been described
colourfully by the Investors Chronicle as:
Offer's literally millennial vision is of a Britain where, by the year 2000,
even domestic consumers can shop around RECs for current, measuring
their juice use with portable radio meters". 19/6/92
361
New metering technology potentially offers a number of significant advantages to
domestic consumers - not the least of which could be the elimination of the specific-
purpose and arguably stigmatising, prepayment meter 29, along with an ability to
externally monitor self-disconnection. However, the Director General's paper glossed
over two critical questions related to the introduction of a technology-led competitive
regime in electricity supply. Namely, (i) who would pay for the installation of advanced
metering technology in domestic households? and (ii) would the RECs be particularly
interested in competing for business in the domestic sector anyway?
Even if OFFER's optimistic estimate of £50 to £60 per meter were to hold true (the
most advanced meters currently available cost between £110 and £130), this additional
cost would still present a formidable entry barrier to many low income households,
particularly if consumers were expected to pay the cost 'up-front'. The technology itself
is likely to be complex and could be difficult for certain groups to use e.g. the elderly,
people with disabilities and people from non English-speaking backgrounds. The
Consumers' Association (1992e) raised this issue in their response to the metering
consultation paper:
Not all domestic consumers are able to use highly technical appliances.
It is important, therefore, that the trial test the ease of use among
different groups of consumers, for example, the elderly and disabled, to
ensure the needs of all consumers are taken into consideration. p.2
A danger clearly exists, under the advanced metering scenario, that two classes of
domestic consumers will be created, i.e. those with the means and ability to make use
of the technology and hence take the competition (and tariff) gains on the one hand, and
those without who will be locked into monopoly supply and possibly higher electricity
tariffs, on the other.
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But it is possible that these concerns will remain only academic ones, for the vision of
restless competition amongst the RECs and second-tier suppliers for domestic consumer
business may turn out to be fanciful. The supply of domestic electricity is the least
profitable part of the RECs commercial activity, and in the financial year ending 31st
March 1992, six of the twelve RECs in England and Wales actually incurred losses in
their supply businesses (OFFER, 1992y, Figure 1). For this reason a number of
commentators (including the Select Committee on Energy, 1992a, paras 80-84) have
expressed the view that the prospect of a domestic electricity 'free market' in 1998 is
hardly likely to cause enormous excitement amongst the supply companies:
While technical advances in metering may, in fact, enable this
[competition post 1998], it is unlikely that suppliers will pursue the vet))
small electricity user in the same way that Mercury is now extending its
domestic telephony market share. The price to the consumer of a unit of
electriciy is roughly the same as a unit telephone call, but,
proportionately, the marginal costs of supply are much greater for the
electricity company..Medium sized commercial consumers may eventually
gain the benefits of choice, but these are unlikely to be extended to
domestic consumers, who will remain customers of the monopolistic
RECs. Roberts et al (1991) p.92
Equally, it may transpire that domestic consumers themselves find little merit or cost-
benefit in constantly monitoring their fuel costs and 'shopping around' for their
electricity supply.
The issue of competition and choice is considered in a broader conceptual context in
Chapter 8.
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CONCLUSION
No benefits of any kind can be seen for [water] consumers who are forced to pay
monopoly supplier prices escalating above inflation.
National Utility Services (1992) p.1
During the first period of privatisation, each of the three utility industries experienced
a fall in a number of their core underlying costs, i.e. gas and coal purchasing costs in
the fuel utilities and construction costs in the water industry. This, in combination with
the putative efficiency gains from privatisation, should have resulted in lower domestic
utility tariffs over this period than was actually the case. The fact that domestic
consumers did not benefit as directly as they might have suggests that either the original
privatisation settlement was structurally flawed, or that it was not designed with the
interests of domestic consumers in mind. Either way, it could be asserted with
justification that, over the first period of privatisation, domestic consumers in Britain
have been paying a 'privatisation premium' in their utility bills.
The tariff review process affords the regulatory bodies an opportunity to re-define the
terms of the privatisation settlement, and to allocate the financial benefits accruing from
reduced costs and structural efficiencies more equitably amongst the industries and their
sub-sets of consumers. The gas regulator took a significant step in this direction in his
review of the tariff formula in 1991, although the resilience of price/service package is
likely to be fully tested in the current MMC inquiry into the gas industry. The water and
electricity regulators are both in the early stages of reviewing the price formulae in their
industries. It remains to be seen whether they will be similarly successful in re-
negotiating the financial settlement to the advantage of domestic consumers. Of course,
price forms only one dimension of the utility services 'package', and it is to the other
key aspects of the relationship between domestic consumers and the utility industries
that our attention will now turn.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 6
1. The Consumers' Association was particularly strident in its criticisms of the later
stages of the review process: "Ofgas has not, in our view, been open about its
negotiations with British Gas on the proposed changes to the formula at any stage. With
only the agreed changes to comment on, we cannot assess whether compromises were
reached in discussions between Ofgas and British Gas, and if so, whether such
compromises were in the best interests of consumers. .We consider it unacceptable that
the review of the price formula was undertaken in a manner that makes it impossible for
Ofgas to take account of the comments made during the consultation period".
Consumers' Association (1991a) pp.1-2
2. Stated fully the new formula is RPI-5+GPI-1+E; with GPI-1 representing the cap on
the pass through of gas purchase costs, and E being the energy efficiency factor
(OFGAS, 1991g).
3. The three pilot projects are: (0 owner-occupier condensing boiler scheme, (ii)
residential CHP scheme for housing associations and local authorities, and (iii) the
owner-occupier affordable heat scheme. The latter "will provide funds to enable gas
fires, wall-heaters and water-heaters to be made available to "fuel poverty" households,
to provide efficient, affordable heat input." OFGAS (19920 p.14 In November 1992,
the Government appointed Lord Moore [John Moore - who has been quoted at length
in Chapter 41 as chairman of the Energy Trust.
4. Commenting on US least cost planning regulation, Berry (1992, p.781) states the:
"the conventional wisdom. .to least cost planning is that utilities must be able to profit
as much from conservation and demand management as from building power plants
before they will actively seek to lower their Kwh sales". Amongst the "five pillars of
financial wisdom" cited by Berry for providing financial incentives for electricity
utilities to undertake conservation seriously is "Recovery of lost net revenues attributable
to decreases in Kw and Kwh sold due to demand management" (op cit).
5. The domestic tariff market has become an increasingly significant segment of British
Gas' revenue earning capacity in the years following privatisation.
Revenue from gas sold (EM):
1986 1991
Domestic 4285 5777
Total revenue
from gas sold 6999 8300
% 61.2 69.6
[Source: British Gas (1992) Financial and Operating Statistics for the year ended 31
December 1991, London]
6. 3% (1st July): applicable over 3 quarters = 2.25%; 2% (1st October): applicable over
2 quarters = 1.00%. Total = 3.25%
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7. South West Water's K factor was increased from 6.5% to 11.5% following an
application for an Interim Adjustment arising from its increased environmental
obligations (OFWAT, 1991x)
8. Director General's Determination on South West application for interim adjustment
in December 1991 (OFWAT, 1991x): "The fourth change which I have taken into
account is the movement of the economic factors such as labour and energy costs, since
1989 when price limits were originally fixed. These cover actual changes which have
taken place, compared with the assumptions which were made in 1989, and revised
assumptions for the period up to 1994-95. The changes reduce the allowable amount by
£25m over the five years from 1990-91 to 1994-95." [author's emphasis]. In fact the
summary table attached to the determination indicates changes in "economic
assumptions" as follows:
1990/91: -£9m
1991/92: -£12m
1992/93: -£6m	 [all in 1991/92 real terms]
For comparison, South West's profit before tax in 1990/91 was £85m (thus cost
reduction 'windfall' represented around 10% of profit in that year) & £90m in 1991/92
(hence 1991/92 'windfall' represented 13.3% of profit in that year). This suggests, in
effect, that all the companies have benefited by an equivalent fall in these costs - over
this period, with a concomitant gain in profits! And these are not related to efficiency,
which is the rationale used for retaining unanticipated profits e.g "if a firm succeeds in
increasing its efficiency beyond what was predicted it will be able to retain the extra
profits until its price limits are revised at a periodic review." OFWAT Information Note
No.5: Comparing Company Performance. Was this 'windfall' sufficient justification for
the Director General to make an Interim Adjustment to K (downwards) for all
companies? He is legally empowered to do so "if the impact of economic assumptions
is different from that assumed in the initial determination", but it needs to "exceed, in
total, 10% of turnover" (both Information Note No. 8: The K Factor - What it is and
How it can be changed). And South West's 1990/91 turnover = £139 (i.e. change in
economic assumptions for that year 6.5%). The companies made voluntary reductions
to K in this charging year of 16% in real terms. But does this fully cover the savings
made [using South West as a guide around 13% of profits in 1991/921 plus the 'inflation
factor' (as in electricity companies). RPI is based on twelve months to November 1991
for charges beginning April 1992, and therefore the inflation figure used would have
been somewhat higher than the actual (as also would have been the case the year
before).Even if all this adds up, the companies still got to keep the 1990/91 'windfall',
despite the fact that it was not efficiency-related.
9. Infrastructure charges were introduced at the time of privatisation and involve the
levying of a charge on new properties, to purportedly take account of the consequential
impact of development on the demand for enhancements to the existing water services
infrastructure. The charges were set by the Secretary of State at privatisation and are
contained in the Instrument of Appointment (licence). The charge is levied in addition
to normal connection charges. The application of infrastructure charges has been
criticised because inter alia:
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* there are massive variations in the level of charges between areas e.g. £233 in
York compared with £1216 in the rest of Yorkshire (CRI, 1992, Table B.7)
* the flat-rate nature of the charge applied to all new properties takes no account
of the differences in demand actually created e.g. a one-bedroom flat attracts the
same charge as a five-bedroom house
* they act as a disincentive to developers embarking on new housing and other
development projects (see House-Builders Federation, 1992)
* they result in horizontal and inter-generational inequities: "[they] represent a
cross-subsidy from new customers to customers generally" (OFWAT Annual
Report 1991, p.3'7)
The Director General of Water Services has indicated that he wishes to reduce the levels
of infrastructure charges in the review of the price cap (ibid).
10. See HoC Library Research Division (1991) pp.25-27 which provides an account of
the 'dispute' between Ian Byatt and Lord Crickhowell (chairman NRA) in late 1990 on
the cost of environmental improvements.
11. "Broadly similar" because the companies have the ability to 'carry over' the K
amount voluntarily abated in 1992/93 (or indeed in earlier years) to water charges in the
following year. Yorkshire Water has, for example, 0.8% to 'carry over'; but its 'carry
over' amount is overshadowed by North East (3.4%), Dwr Cymru (1.7%) and Southern
(1.4%). If these amounts are carried over in full by the companies concerned, they will
clearly neutralise the effect in 1993/94 of the Director General's decision.
12. 1990/91 is used as the baseline year as it was over this period that the Director
General started to exert pressure on the water companies about standing charges.
13. But "..there is a hard core [of properties] of 5 to 10 per cent where the costs would
be much higher, perhaps up to £1,000 per property." National Metering Trials Group
(1992) p.2
14. David Gadbury, chairman of the National Metering Trials Group, The Observer,
14/6/92.
15. 54% of respondents favoured metering if the alternatives were only banding and a
licence fee. It is also worth noting that there was "a very clear preference for meters
amongst the more professional groups and less support for meters in the less
professional groups". OFWAT (19910.
16. The survey has been criticised by independent market researchers for among other
things, loading the questionnaire in favour of metering, and skewing the sample by
failing to provide reply paid envelopes (Water Bulletin, 1217/91).
17. The Consumers Association, in contrast to most other consumer/community sector
organisations, has given its support to the concept of domestic metering.
18. It was reported at the October meeting of the Yorkshire Customer Service
Committee meeting that this delay was partly caused by the Department of the
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Environment, which sought to hold up the publication of the study until after the
discussion paper Using Water Wisely had been released.
19. 32% of households were in the AB (professional & managerial) group compared to
17% for Britain generally; only 6% were in receipt of income support - a third of the
national figure; 35% of households had a gross annual income over £20,000 compared
to 22% in Britain. Home ownership: 83% buying or owning compared to 74% in
Britain; 9% local authority housing compared to 24% nationally (Social Impact of
Metering Summary report, p.3) See Tables 3C, 3H, 3J Social Impact of Metering First
Report. And the bill paying analysis in the "hardship" sample study was further biased
by the absence of South Normanton data: "This meant that households with data
available had a more affluent profile than the potential hardship sample as a whole."
Second Report p.6-1
20. The water industry peak bodies - the Water Services Association and the Water
Companies Association - also provide substantially superior information on prices
compared to the body representing the electricity companies, the Electricity Association.
21. The Supply Price Control Review Consultation Paper (OFFER, 1992y) released in
early October 1992 places some of this data in the public domain for the first time.
22. This has the important consequence, as the NCC pointed out in its evidence to the
Select Committee on Energy, of excluding electricity consumers from this fundamentally
important arena of industry decision-making.
23. "The 1991/92 jump [in average earnings] is a legacy of the privatisation process.
When the companies set tariffs in March 1990 for the 1990/91 period, they had to
estimate the change in the RPI to October 1991. The Government, keen to keep price
rises in line with the contemporary inflation rate of 6%, "encouraged" the RECs to use
an estimate of 5%. In the event, inflation was 10.9% and the companies made good the
shortfall in 1991/92." James Capel Research (1992) p.12
24. The Director General also appears to have made a rod for his own back when he
said in relation to the subsidiary price cap in his formal statement on The Regulatory
System and the Duties of the DGES in October 1990, that "[i]f the outcome proves to
be different from these assumptions, then (provided that a REC has suffered an increase
in its allowed costs per unit supplied, which results from unavoidable circumstances and
which would materially increase and adversely affect the profits of its supply business)
a REC would no longer be bound by the subsidiary price cap for that year." (para 5)
25. Coal prices per tonne: 1988 £47.11, 1991 £43.47 i.e. a fall in price of 8%; plus
inflation = 27% cheaper in real terms. At privatisation, the Government negotiated a
contract between the generating companies and British Coal based on RPI minus 5%.
This contract is currently being re-negotiated and will almost certainly result in even
lower coal prices: It is believed that, in parallel negotiations with the 12 regional
electricity distribution businesses, the generators are confident that the coal deal will
enable them to offer a package that should reduce energy costs from the present price
of 3.15p per unit to less than 2.8p a unit. The Observer, 12/7/92
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26. "The most intensive users of electricity previously benefited from the Qualifying
Industrial Consumers Scheme (QUICS), which protected the largest users from the full
CEGB Bulk Supply Tariff, and subsequently the Large Industrial Consumers Scheme
(LICS), which provided transitional support in the first year after privatisation. In effect,
their electricity consumption was cross-subsidised by smaller customers." HoC Energy
Committee (1992a) para 19
27. The figures on the relative cost of gas and coal-fired electricity generation are
something of a 'moveable feast' and are very difficult to pin down precisely. The
Director General of Electricity Supply is due to report on this issue - which is of
fundamental importance to the future of the domestic coal industry - in December 1992.
In its evidence to the Select Committee on Energy (1992a, Table 4, para 51), PowerGen
estimated that the cost of gas-fired electricity generation was between 2.64 (p/kWh) and
2.89 (p/kWh), whereas the cost of coal-fired generation [existing large inland coal-fired
using British coal] was 2.20 (p/kWh), and for coal-fired power with flue gas
desulphurisation 2.73 (p/kWh). The figures for coal are based on the running costs of
existing coal-fired stations and the economics of power generation is likely to change -
in favour of gas - when existing coal-fired plants need to be replaced. However, even
this will depend on the future movement in gas prices:
There is also a serious question about whether the gas price charged for
new capacity is likely to hold in the long term.. Higher gas prices would
call into question both the investment in gas plant and the coal
redundancies. Christopher Huhne, The Independent on Sunday 18/10/92
In an address to the November meeting of the Public Utilities Access Forum, the
Director of the Gas Consumers Council (Ian Powe) provided the following estimates of
the relative costs of generating electricity:
* Existing coal-fired plant with flue gas desulphurisation: 2.7p-4.1p per kWh
* New coal-fired plant with flue gas desulphurisation: 3.6p-4.2p per kWh
* New gas-fired plant (existing 15 year contracts): 2.3p-2.7p per kWh
He also pointed out, however, that gas prices are likely to rise in the future as greater
use is made of more distant North Sea fields and exports from other countries.
28. In addition to electricity purchase costs, which is the largest item (around 60%), Y
also covers distribution charges (around 25%); fossil fuel levy (around 10%); payments
for the use of the National Grid (4%); and payment for the administration of the Pool.
(OFFER, 1992y, pp.8-9 and Figure 2, p.10).
29. "It would also be possible to use the same kind of meter for both credit and
prepayment customers. This would provide cost savings in that a change in payment
method would not necessitate a change on meter. It would also avoid invidious
identification of a customer's payment method by type of meter." OFFER (1992b) p.34
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CHAPTER 7: THE CONSUMER INTEREST: THE IMPACT OF
PRIVATISATION AND REGULATION ON DOMESTIC CONSUMERS
(CONTINUED)
PART 2: DEBT AND DISCONNECTION
Changes in the level and structure of energy and water charges will have a
disproportionate impact on low income households simply because, as Chapter 2
showed, expenditure on utility services occupies a more prominent position in the
budgets of these households than it does within the population generally. Increases in
utility tariffs therefore, would be likely, a priori, to lead to greater levels of indebtedness
and payment default, resulting ultimately in a growth in the number of disconnections.
Conversely, the impact of reductions in tariffs would be manifested in a moderation in
debt and disconnection.
But to draw this direct causal link is to over-simplify, for movements in tariffs are only
one part of the complex web of intersecting variables at play in utility debt and
disconnection. Other factors at work include (i) the policy and practice of the utility
companies regarding payment arrangements and options, debt retrieval and the like,
(ii) the advent and use of technologies which enable the simultaneous maintenance of
supply and recovery of debt and (iii) the degree to which social security benefits are up-
rated in line with increases in utility charges. All of these factors need to be taken into
account in examining the question of utility debt and disconnection 1.
370
(i) The context of debt and disconnection
The correlation between fuel debt and low income has been well established (see for
example, Boardman, 1991a, 1991b; Berthoud and Kempson, 1992; City of Liverpool,
1991). It has been estimated that in 1991, some 7 million households in Britain
experienced fuel poverty, and there is both empirical (Boardman, 1991b) and case-
related evidence (NACAB, 1991b;) that the number of households living in fuel poverty
has increased over the recent years.
If a rough indicative measure of the number of households experiencing difficulty
paying fuel bills can be constructed on the basis of the number of households with
prepayment meters, on fuel direct, or that have been disconnected, it can be seen below
that over three million households in Britain fell into this category in the first half of
1992. It should be noted that there is an element of 'double counting' in these figures
as, for example, some households will use prepayment meters as a method of paying
both their electricity and gas bills.
Households experiencing difficulties paying fuel bills
Prepayment meters
(June 1992)
Fuel direct
(May 1992)
Disconnections
(Year ending June 1992)
Total
2,918,124
291,285
50,440
3,259,849
[Sources: GCC, 1992; OFFER, 1992; Benefits Agency, 1992]
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By comparison with energy, there has been a dearth of empirical work in Britain on the
interaction between water consumption and poverty; with the OFWAT-commissioned
study on the social impact of water metering constituting one of the first (if limited)
excursions into this field. There are, however, strong indications that water charges now
occupy a much more significant, and problematic, place in the budgets of low income
households than has been the case hitherto (for example, Social Security Advisory
Committee, 1990 2, 1992; NACAB, 1992a; Huby & Dix, 1992). Tangible measures of
the increased manifestation of water debt (often described as 'water poverty') can be
found in the way in which water companies are making greater use of the courts and
their disconnection powers to retrieve outstanding debt (see below), and in the
escalation in the number of direct payments for water being made through the social
security system for income support recipients in debt. From the May quarter 1990 to the
May quarter 1992, the number of direct payments for water increased from 32,499 to
126,979, a rise of over 290 per cent. This is shown graphically in Figure 7.1 on the next
page.
The rise in water-related debt, as reflected in Figure 7.1, might be seen to mirror the
substantial increases in water charges over the past three years; but there have been
other influences as well. Foremost among these have been (i) the 1988 social security
change in the payment of water bills - previously the water rates of income support
recipients were paid in full, now recipients have to pay directly out of their weekly
benefit and (ii) the abandonment by many local authorities and housing associations of
the system of collecting water charges with the rent. The practice of tenants paying their
water bills with their rent has the advantage of protecting them from disconnection, but
it does result, in some instances in eviction or threatened eviction because of non-
payment of water charges (NACAB, 1992a).
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Figure 7.1: Direct payments - water
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As with fuel there appears to be a strong correlation between water debt and socio-
economic status. In the 1992 OFWAT survey on The Customer Viewpoint, 3 per cent
of the customer sample (i.e. 123 respondents) had received a court summons for the
non-payment of water bills in the past. Sixty-six per cent of these respondents had a
gross household income of less than £10,000 (compared to 44% of the entire sample)
and 58 per cent identified themselves as being in social class DE (compared to 33% of
the full sample). The nexus between low income and water debt is underlined in the
casework of citizens advice bureaux throughout the country (NACAB, 1992 and
NACAB Social Policy Bulletins), in OFWAT's examination of the problem of debt and
disconnection (OFWAT, 1992g) and in the results of recent research into water debt
commissioned by Welsh Water (Welsh Water, 1992 3)•
The social security system has been slow to respond to the problems being experienced
by low income households as a result of rising water charges and the other changes
alluded to above. The Social Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) had been arguing
since 1990 that the Government make provision for water tariff increases in the annual
uprating of benefits. In the wake of the 1988 social security changes, water along with
housing costs was excluded from the system of increasing benefits in line with inflation
(the "Rossi" Index). In October 1991, the Secretary of State for Social Security
announced that water charges would in the future, be included in the "Rossi" index for
uprating benefits. This did not, however, address the water payment deficit experienced
by beneficiaries over the previous three years, as the SSAC pointed out in its Annual
Report:
It should be noted, though, that there remains a shortfall in the income
of those receiving income related benefits as no recompense was made
for the period from 1988 to 1991, although water charges increased
dramatically in that time. SSAC (1992, p.18)
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Nor does the notional element belatedly included in benefits to cover water charges
appear to correspond with the actual water bills of many low income households. Fitch
(City of Bradford, 1992) estimates that the water element paid to social security
beneficiaries is currently £2.25 per week, whereas the average household water bill in
England and Wales is £3.25 per week. In some parts of the country, consumers are
paying bills well in excess of this average figure, with for example, consumers in the
South West Water area paying on average £4.38 per week (Water Services Association,
1992). In Autumn 1992, both the water industry and the OFWAT Customer Service
Committees called on the Government to increase the water element in social security
benefits (Welsh Water, 1992; Water Bulletin, 13/11/92; OFWAT, 1992ai).
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(ii) Disconnections for debt in the privatised energy and water industries
Prior to privatisation, fears were held by community sector and consumer organisations
that the advent of explicitly commercial regimes in the utility industries would lead to
a more stringent approach to the handling of consumer debt. And that this, in
conjunction with anticipated price increases, would be likely to result in the industries'
making greater use of their disconnection powers as a means of dealing with payment
default. In actuality, the management of consumer debt by the privatised utilities, to
date, has been rather more variable, and in the case of the gas and electricity industries
at least, more favourable, than this 'worst case' scenario might suggest.
Over the initial period following the privatisation of British Gas, and during the lead up
to the sale of the water industry, a more assertive approach to payment default by
domestic consumers was indeed in evidence. Domestic gas disconnections rose from
35,626 in 1985 to 60,778 in 1987, an increase of 70% in the first two years of the
industry's privatisation. This increase was the result, in the view of British Gas, of
worsening socio-economic conditions generally. But this argument was substantially
refuted by the research of the Gas Consumers Council (1988) and, as reflected in the
subsequent insertion of a new condition on debt and disconnection in the Licence of
British Gas in early 1989, ultimately discounted by the regulator himself.
Disconnections (domestic and non-domestic) carried out by regional water authorities
rose by 25% between 1986/87 and 1988/89 4. This understated though, a longer-term
trend in water disconnections which coincided with the industry's 'commercialisation'
in 1982, where disconnections rose from 1,171 in 1981 to 9,187 in 1987/88, almost an
eight-fold increase (AMA, 1989).
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The electricity industry was the exception to this pattern of increased recourse to
disconnection at or around the time of privatisation, as the number of domestic
disconnections had been in gradual and continuous decline since 1986 and remained that
way over the period of privatisation. The greater availability of token prepayment meter
technology in the ESI compared to the gas industry may explain the downward trend in
disconnections over this period (until recently, equivalent technology did not exist in the
water industry - see below). Support for this thesis can be found in the fact that the
prepayment meter became the critical element in the reversal of the disconnection trend
in gas.
Responding to general community sector alarm and a request by the Gas Consumers
Council to take action about the escalation in gas disconnections, the Director-General
of Gas Supply introduced in a modification to British Gas' operating licence (known as
Condition 12A) in April 1989. Condition 12A largely precluded the company from
disconnecting a domestic customer experiencing difficulty paying their gas bill until a
prepayment meter had been offered as an alternative payment arrangement (OFGAS,
1989b). The effect of this was to move the customer from paying for gas on credit, to
paying for it in advance, with the meter calibrated to recover past debt. As a result of
this change to the way that British Gas was allowed to pursue debt-recovery, domestic
disconnections dropped from a peak of 61,796 (or 4 disconnections for every 1,000
domestic customers) in the year ending 31st March 1988, to 19,266 in the year ending
31st March 1990 Oust over 1 for every 1,000 customers).
The dramatic success of the OFGAS-enforced licence modification encouraged the
Government to add a similar provision, with almost exactly the same wording, to the
draft licences of the regional electricity companies during the passage of the Electricity
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Bill. This subsequently became Condition 19 of the supply licence (Code of Practice on
methods for dealing with tariff customers in default). Figure 7.2 shows the domestic
disconnection trends in the two industries over the past decade.
Figure 7.2: Gas and electricity domestic disconnections
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The part played by prepayment meters in reducing the level of gas disconnections for
debt is visually apparent in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.3: Prepayment meters and gas disconnections
In the electricity industry, it would be unlikely to be coincidental that the number of
disconnections in England and Wales fell by 43 per cent between July 1991 and June
1992, while at the same time, the number of domestic customers paying for their
electricity via token meters rose by 41 per cent. Another illustration of the strong
correlation between prepayment meters and disconnection is found in the fact that in the
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June quarter 1992, the RECs with above average falls in the rate of disconnection were
also those with above average rates of prepayment meter installation during the quarter
(64%). Whereas in those RECs with a below average decline in disconnections, the level
of prepayment meter installation for the quarter was also below the average (39%).
The Condition 12A and Condition 19 licence changes, and their impact in reducing
disconnections, have been universally welcomed by consumer and community services
agencies in Britain. Yet despite the broad intent of these codes of practice, which is to
effectively eliminate withdrawal of supply because of inability to pay, a total of 50,440
households were disconnected by either electricity or gas companies in the year ending
June 1992. In the case of gas, the decline in the rate of disconnection has hovered
around the same level (just over 1 per 1,000 domestic customers) since March 1990.
Theoretically, if Conditions 12A and 19 were being implemented to their optimum, the
number of domestic disconnections should be very low indeed; involving only those
consumers who have vacated properties without notifying the utility companies and
those who for one reason or another refuse to pay their bills when they have a capacity
to do so. This, of course, is based on the view (which has been supported by empirical
research from Berthoud, 1983 onwards) that the proportion of 'won't pay' as opposed
to 'can't pay' consumers is extremely small.
The factors that underlie the continuing residual of domestic disconnections have yet to
be effectively identified, despite the efforts of the regulators (and OFGAS in particular)
to find plausible explanations. An inability to make contact with the defaulting consumer
has been identified by the industries and the regulators 5 as the source of the problem.
According to British Gas, "over 95% of customers disconnected have made "no contact"
with the company" (OFGAS note on Gas Debt and Disconnection to PUAF, 29/4/92).
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The "no contact" issue has been a long-standing one in the utility industries and
Berthoud identified it as a major barrier to the resolution of debt problems in his
seminal study of the operation of the voluntary codes of practice in 1983 (see Annexe
1, Part 3). While consumer advocates agree, as the companies argue, that without contact
it is impossible to offer the customer either a pre-payment meter or to come to some
arrangement over the payment of debt, there is less consensus over whether "no contact"
is the cause of the problem or merely a symptom, and over where the onus of
responsibility for making contact lies (i.e. with the consumer or the utility):
There is a risk in dwelling upon no contact as a problem. It is arguable
that the focus of concern should be on involuntary disconnectionfor debt,
and that no contact is an explanation for such disconnection. The
explanation is one that is offered by suppliers, and the notion of no
contact comprises a multitude of administrative and legal considerations.
Perhaps observers should remain agnostic about the status of no contact
as a problem, especially as suppliers are the main source of data about
the issue, and information about it is collected and released in
accordance with their requirements and interests. PUAF (1990a)
The National Right to Fuel Campaign (1989) and the Gas Consumers Council (1991),
amongst others, have questioned whether the utility companies make sufficient efforts
to contact consumers in default, and have sought clearer regulatory directions to the
companies regarding the steps that need to be taken to establish customer contact.
The number of reconnections within a short period has been seen as a possible indicator
of failure on the part of the companies to pursue contact as actively as they might, and
certainly it raises questions about the validity of disconnection in the first place.
Amongst the sample of gas disconnection cases regularly monitored by the Gas
Consumers Council, the proportion of domestic consumers reconnected within 28 days
has been consistently in the region of 37-40 per cent, which "must represent a
considerable waste of time and resources for British Gas and a cost to all consumers,
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in the long run.." (GCC, 1991d). In 1992, British Gas commissioned the Policy Studies
Institute to carry out a qualitative research project on "no contact" and the results of this
research are due to be released towards the end of the year.
In the June quarter of 1991, 35 per cent of domestic customers disconnected by the
electricity companies in Britain were reconnected within one month (OFFER, Customer
Accounting Statistics, 1992). But an even more disconcerting figure can be found in the
fact that two and a half thousand households remained disconnected over the twelve
months up to June.
Despite the acoss-the-board downward trend in disconnections, individual company
performance varies greatly as Figure 7.4 (overleaf) shows. The ability of a REC like
Norweb to implement what amounts virtually to a "no disconnections" policy (in
1991/92 only 218 customers were disconnected) is heavily predicated on the prepayment
meter 'solution'. Norweb has adopted a vigorous policy on the installation of
prepayment meters for customers in default, which apparently has involved installing
them without the agreement of, or even in some cases, without the presence of, the
customer concerned.
Until recently, British Gas' capacity to reduce disconnections much below the March
1990 level had been constrained by an absence of appropriate coinless prepayment meter
technology. This, however, is likely to change in the future with the mass production
and installation of the new Quantum meter. Developed by Landis & Gyr, the Quantum
prepayment meter is a card-operated system with a number of the hi-tech features
envisaged by Professor Littlechild in his metering consultation paper (see Gas World
International, April 1992 and BG video The Quantum System). The meter is currently
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being tested throughout the country and British Gas plan to install around 20,000
Quantum meters per month from 1993 onwards. The charge the consumer will have to
pay for the installation of the Quantum meter has yet to be determined by British Gas.
Regulatory action and community sector advocacy notwithstanding, the prepayment
meter has manifestly been the key to the progress made in reducing the number of gas
and electricity disconnections. Without the advent of coinless prepayment meter
technology, it is doubtful that the dual objectives of reducing the level of domestic
energy disconnections and enhancing the commercial capacity and freedom of the utility
industries could have been reconciled.
As well as giving customers in default the facility to remain on supply, prepayment
meters have clear advantages for the utility companies. They provide a continuous
revenue stream in advance of the consumption of energy, which contrasts with the way
that revenue is raised from the bulk of consumers 6, and they give the utilities a secured
way of retrieving debt with minimal costs:
[prepayment meters] improve the cash flow of the supply business
compared with quarterly payment methods, since payment is
received..prior to consumption of the electricity.. Consequently, the more
customers that choose these payment methods [prepayment meters and
direct debit], the better the cash flow of the supply business, and the
lower the necessary return of the supply business (OFFER, 1992y, p.37). 7
From the consumers point of view, however, prepayment meters are not without their
costs. These are manifested in the additional charges borne by consumers paying for
their electricity or gas through prepayment meters. First, generally in the form of higher
standing charges (and sometimes higher unit charges); prepayment meter customers of
Yorkshire Electricity and Northern Electricity, for example, on economy 7 tariffs pay
an additional 44 per cent and 46 per cent respectively on their standing charge. Second,
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in the financial and 'opportunity costs' incurred by consumers having to travel to
purchase supplies of tokens/cards to operate the meters 8•
At another level, a major and rather more insidious cost has been identified. The
increasing use of prepayment meters has been paralleled by rising concern about the
possibility of self-disconnection amongst households unable to afford to buy the requisite
tokens to operate pre-payment meters (e.g. Community Energy Research et al, 1990;
Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992). By its very nature the level of self-disconnection
within the community will remain largely hidden and undetected; although two
qualitative studies - one in Leicester and the other in Birmingham and Bristol - have
provided evidence that users of gas and electricity prepayment meters tend to ration their
use of energy (Law et al, 1990; Birmingham Settlement et al. See also Huby & Dix,
1992 9). Self-disconnection, in the sense of cutting back on essential energy use, can
occur whether people have prepayment meters or not, but in the more recent
Birmingham and Bristol study, it was found that self-disconnection "appears to be
particularly prevalent among households with prepayment meters - especially when the
calibration is set high to recover a debt" (Birmingham Settlement et al, p.94).
The two studies present somewhat different accounts of the reaction of consumers to
prepayment meters. The Leicester study concluded that they assist with the more
immediate problem of managing energy costs:
They.. [enable] consumers to be aware of the real costs of their fuel needs
and to better budget for these. They are on the whole liked by those
consumers who were using them. Law et al (1990) p.33
The Birmingham and Bristol study found that while prepayment meters helped low
income households manage their fuel bills, this was often only because they "forcibly
alter[ed] the priority of repayment of debts" (p.17) and that attitudes "to prepayment
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meters ranged widely from strong support to militant antagonism.. [the] most common
perspective on prepayment meters was that they were a means to an end - typically debt
repayment" (Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992, p.92).
From a social policy perspective, prepayment meters have more of the attributes of a
'quick fix' than a considered and effective approach to improving the access of low
income households to essential utility services. Most fundamentally, they do little, in
themselves, to address the underlying causes of fuel poverty. And they have the
propensity to simply 'privatise' the disconnection process, through the consumer rather
the company acting as the mechanism for disconnection when fuel can no longer be
afforded. Prepayment meters also serve to reinforce the social division of utility service
access through creating a second (and potentially stigmatised) class of gas and electricity
customer.
Until recently prepayment meter technology has not been available to the water industry.
However, this is likely to change in the future as trials on "budget metering" 10 are
currently being conducted by a number of water companies; the largest of which is the
OFWAT-supervised trial of the Schlumberger budget meter by Severn Trent Water
involving 3,000 households 11 . The Director General of Water Services has expressed
a strong interest in the development of 'pay as you go' systems "because budget meters
may, in principle, have a valuable role to play in avoiding disconnection" (OFWAT
Annual Report, 1992, p.40).
Beyond the current technological constraints which, for the present, limits the extended
application of prepayment metering systems in the water services industry, major
reservations have been expressed about the use of this approach to debt management in
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the water industry, given the possible public health consequences of self-disconnection
from water supply (Public Utilities Access Forum, 1990b).
Until an equivalent to the gas and electricity industries' alternative to disconnection can
be developed, more conventional measures have had to be applied in the privatised
water industry. As a result of a House of Lords amendment to the Water Bill, Condition
H (Code of Practice and Procedure on Disconnection) was added to the licences of the
water companies. Under Condition H, the water companies could only disconnect
domestic consumers after an application for a county court order on the repayment of
the debt and if this order for repayment of the debt was subsequently breached. At the
time, this appeared to represent a reasonable protective device for low income
consumers. It was also a considerable advance on the pre-privatisation situation, where
regional water authorities could disconnect consumers virtually without notice and minus
any real form of external accountability.
Domestic water disconnections fell by just over 10% in 1990/91 to 7,560 (OFWAT,
19910. Total disconnections (domestic & non-domestic) by all 39 water companies fell
from 15,255 in 1988/89 to 9,092 in 1990/91 - a reduction of 40%. Despite this
substantial drop in the overall number of water disconnections, the Director-General of
the Office of Water Services warned that "the picture is a patchy one and the level of
disconnections remain stubbornly high for some companies. There is reason to believe
that the reduction in the level of disconnections is a temporary phenomena, as
companies adapt to the requirements of Condition H, and that disconnections can be
expected to increase." (OFWAT, Annual Report, 1991). This, indeed, turned out to be
the case.
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The Director General's caution, in the face of what looked to be a promising decline in
disconnection trends in the industry, was stimulated by firstly, a knowledge. that "the
companies were going softly, softly over the first couple of years of privatisation"
(OFWAT policy officer in interview with researcher, July 1992) and secondly, by
evidence of the negative unintended consequences of the operation of Condition H
(Perchard, 1992). Through precipitately issuing summons for county court determinations
(often after only the most minor instances of payment default, NACAB, 1991a;
OFWAT, 1991b), many of the water companies were able to breach the protective intent
of Condition H.
In 1990/91, 900,000 summonses were issued by the water companies (representing
approximately one in every twenty-three domestic and non-domestic premises in
England & Wales); of which approximately half were brought to judgement. In a
subsequent letter to the managing directors of the water companies (MD54), the Director
General pointed out the seeming profligacy of this approach to the use of the courts.
And he drew attention to the impost that this style of debt management placed on
customers experiencing problems in paying their water bills:
Because the court's costs and the company's legal costs in serving the
summons can be recovered from the customer this means that each of
those customers had to pay an additional £30 on top of their existing bill
- a not inconsiderable burden for families struggling on a low income.
OFWAT (1991b) pp. 32-3
The regulator also announced the setting up of a special working group to review the
implementation of Condition H and to recommend changes to its operation. The working
group published its report in April 1992. While the working group rather surprisingly
stopped short of recommending an immediate overhaul of Condition H, it indicated that
this could occur in the future if the water companies failed to implement the published
guidelines. Unfortunately, OFWAT appears to be making only a half-hearted effort to
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check company compliance with the Guidelines, leaving it essentially up to the relatively
ill-equipped regional Customer Service Committees to monitor their implementation.
A synopsis of the OFWAT Guidelines on Debt and Disconnection is produced below,
not only because it summarises the flaws in present industry practice but also because
it is viewed by some members of the community sector as being a useful 'model' code
of practice.
OFWAT Guidelines on Debt and Disconnection (1992g)
Reports on deliberations of a joint regulator/industry/CSC working group. Sets out guidelines for
company practice, focusing on eight areas:
1. Contact with customers - to make contact with customers who are in arrears as soon as
possible and "seek to agree with them affordable payment arrangements to pay off the
arrears." p.3
2. Payment options - companies should consider extending the range of payment options
available (generally very limited currently), including introduction of frequent payment
scheme.
3. Payment facilities - measures required to assist customers who do not hold bank
accounts (reports PSI finding that 20% of adults do not have bank or building society
accounts); including assisting customers to meet the costs of "individual transaction
charges" (e.g. in Post Office, 70p counter fee charged).
4. Debt recovery timetable - considerable variation in company practice currently: "The
approach currently adopted by some companies can only be described as leisurely." p.9
"Companies should avoid delay whilst giving customers adequate time to respond to the
various stages in the debt recovery timetable." p.4 Timetable should consist of at least 5
stages (see p.4) and "..the disconnection visit should be preceded by at least one attempt to
make direct personal contact with the customer." p.4
5. Information - sets out details of the information that should be provided to customers at
the reminder (or final notice) stage and at the pm-summons warning stage (p.4) and
includes an example text.
6. Direct payment from income support - "Companies should take positive steps to find out
whether or not customers in arrears are in receipt of income support and, therefore, eligible
for direct payments from benefit." p.5
7. "Non-standard" payment arrangements - "..it is both reasonable and sensible that
companies should take into account ability to pay when negotiating payment arrangements
to clear arrears." p.12 Suggests seeking advice from local advice agencies and money
advisers in relation to this.
8. Pm-disconnection visit - "Few companies attempt to make contact, prior to the visit to
disconnect, other than by letter or other written communication." p.13
Figure 7.5: OFWAT Guidelines on debt and disconnection
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The need for urgent action to deal more effectively with the mounting problem of water-
related debt was reinforced less than two months after the release of the Guidelines with
the publication of the disconnection figures for 1991/92. Over the space of a year
domestic disconnections rose from 7,673 to 21,286; an increase of 177 per cent. In
proportional terms, water disconnections had reached a level akin to those for gas and
electricity (over one in every thousand domestic water consumers). Over the same
period, the number of summonses issued by the companies fell to just over 600,000,
although the actual number of judgements remained roughly the same as the previous
year (in excess of 400,000). Figure 7.6 overleaf shows the trends in water disconnections
since 1984.
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Figure 7.6: Water disconnections
The variable disconnection practices of the water companies, alluded to by the Director
General in MD54, is illustrated in Figure 7.7 on the page that follows. The variations
are even more extreme in the water only companies - with six companies having a rate
of disconnection in excess of two per thousand domestic customers in 1991/92. The
South Staffordshire water company in the Midlands led the way with a disconnection
rate of almost eight in every thousand households.
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Figure 7.7: Domestic water disconnections since privatisation
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As a device for protecting water consumers from disconnection, Condition H has been
a signal failure, and as a mechanism for assisting low income consumers in debt
negotiate arrangements based on capacity to pay, it has "made the plight of customers
worse" (OFWAT Director of Consumer Services, PUAF meeting, September 1992). John
Winward sums up the misadventure of Condition H well when he says:
For many years, consumer organisations argued that disconnection by
water undertakings should only be allowed after recovery for debt had
been sought through the county court. Since the passage of the Water Act
1989, this has effectively been the policy applied to the industry. It
rapidly became apparent, however, that the policy was flawed. Rather
than providing an independent body which could review the facts of each
case and establish a repayment schedule, the courts have proved an
extremely blunt instrument. The great majority of cases are never
reviewed in detail; the consumer either clears the debt or fails to respond
to the summons. At the same time, the courts have imposed additional
costs on the consumer, and in some cases introduced significant delays.
Winward (1992) pp.2-3
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(iii) Related issues in debt and disconnection
Action to retrieve serious debt is, in effect, the terminus in the relationship between the
consumer and the utility company. It can either represent the end of the contractual
relationship (at least temporarily) through disconnection, which in the context of
essential services, leads to deleterious consequences for the consumer concerned. Or it
can form the beginning of a re-negotiated relationship - one that is more attuned to the
financial circumstances of the utility consumer. Therefore the measures that make up the
chain of interventions to resolve the problem of utility debt are as important to the
framework of consumer protection as are specific prescriptions about disconnection
itself. Indeed they may be even more important for, from Berthoud's work in the early
1980s through to the operation of Condition H in the water industry, the message is
clear. Action to circumscribe the disconnection powers of the utilities will be ineffective
at best and positively harmful to the indebted consumer at worst, unless it is
complemented by an array of measures aimed at confronting the underlying problem of
managing fuel and water payments on a limited income.
The problem of fuel and water debt has been conventionally perceived by the utility
industries to be one for the social security system to deal with, and along the demand
dimension (i.e. whether households can obtain access to requisite amounts of water and
energy and whether they have sufficient income to continue paying for these services)
this view has some, but by no means incontestable, validity (see Chapter 8). On the
supply side, however, (i.e. how utility services are provided and how low income
consumers can be assisted to marshall their limited resources to maximum effect in
purchasing and paying for utility services), the utilities have a direct and significant role
to play. The provision that the utilities make for flexible and varied payment options,
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the method and frequency with which they bill customers, the levels of debt repayment
set, the extent to which they engage the assistance of social security and social services
agencies in support of the consumer in financial difficulty and the general attitude that
they adopt to customers in debt, all exercise a considerable influence on the
epidemiology of fuel and water debt.
Studies that have sought to document or assess the performance of the privatised utilities
in this area suggest that the energy and water industries have some way to travel before
the rubric of "customer care" attains much meaning for low income consumers
(NACAB, 1991b, 1992; Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992; OFWAT, 1992g; Berthoud
& Kempson, 1992). It should be said, however, that many of the defects identified
mirror those exhibited over many years by the nationalised precursors of the present
utility companies (see Annexe 1 Part 3). In their modus operandi regarding low income
consumers, the publicly-owned energy and water industries were generally no better, and
possibly in a number of respects, worse than their privatised counterparts.
In relation to payment and billing methods, analyses of current practice have shown that
some utility companies have been reluctant to develop payment schemes which meld
with the budgeting requirements of low income households; the water industry in
particular has displayed a marked reluctance to move away from the annual and bi-
annual billing cycles towards more frequent payment systems. Untoward reliance is
placed on estimated readings, which often results in low income households having to
confront unanticipated large utility bills. Estimated readings are particularly rife amongst
the RECs and the Director General of Electricity Supply has stated that the original
performance standard (at least one "firm reading" a year) requires revision (OFFER,
1992x).
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The actual terms of an agreement reached by the company and the customer for the
recovery of debt will have a major bearing on whether the agreement succeeds or not.
But the logic of setting a debt repayment timetable in line with the customers capacity
to pay in order to optimise the prospect of debt recovery, seems to have escaped a
number of companies. Case evidence from CABx and the Birmingham and Bristol study
(Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992) indicates that the short-term commercial
imperatives of the utility companies often overrides their longer-term commercial
interests (i.e. the eventual recovery of the outstanding debt and maintaining the customer
on supply), and seriously undermines the fragile budgeting systems of low income
households. Most companies aim to complete the debt recovery process within twelve
months, irrespective of the size of the debt or the customers capacity to pay. Often the
level of repayment is set well above the standard used by the Benefits Agency for direct
payments (£2.15 per week for each utility debt). Access to fuel direct itself is a problem
for some eligible consumers i.e. those on income support with arrears greater than
£42.45. This is notably the case for electricity consumers, as the RECs have balked at
the additional administrative costs involved, preferring instead the prepayment meter
option (PUAF, 1990a, 1991b; Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992).
Disconnection action is an expression of a fundamental breakdown in the relationship
between the utility and the consumer. If the debt recovery systems used by the
companies were being applied effectively and sensitively, it would be a rarely applied
sanction, as the gas and water regulators have often pointed out. Although, in a context
of rising utility tariffs (as in water), even the most dexterous of debt recovery
methodologies will run up against the reality that some households lack sufficient
income to meet their utility and other debts. When disconnection does occur it should
follow a process that is both transparent and accountable, and should not penalise the
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consumer beyond the termination of supply. Yet neither of these conditions presently
apply in the utility industries.
Transparency and accountability in the process is precluded by the fact that the
disconnection codes of practice are not published (and hence not subject to public
scrutiny), nor are they generally made available to consumer and welfare organisations
who are often in the position of needing to advocate on behalf of customers who are
facing imminent disconnection 12. The argument used by the companies - and by,
implication the regulators - that the publication of the disconnection codes (or
"methods") would enable certain customers and their advocates to exploit the system,
is based on the false premise that the utility consumer world is inhabited by masses of
'wont pays', and it looks particularly frail when juxtaposed against the common law
principle of "due process". It also ignores the infinite human capacity for ingenuity. It
would take, for example, little more than the studied observation of a neighbour's
experience of disconnection to unpick the lock of the Manweb code set out on the next
page.
Currently, the disconnected consumer effectively confronts a situation of 'double
jeopardy', for in addition to losing supply, he or she is required to meet punitive
disconnection costs. In water, for instance, disconnection charges range from £25.50
(Yorkshire) to £73 (Wessex) amongst the water and sewerage companies, and from £15
(York, Chester and Cambridge) to £80 (Hartlepools and North East) amongst the water
only companies [CRI, 1992, Table B.7]. These financial penalties are obviously designed
to act as a deterrent against the wilful non-payment of utility bills. But in their impact
they primarily serve to compound the financial difficulties of those groups of consumers
whose problem is not one of wilfulness, but lack of income.
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MANWEB'S CUSTOMER IN DEFAULT PROCESS
BILL SENT
16 DAYS LATER NO RESPONSE
	 REMINDER/FINAL NOTICE SENT [Unless customer who has
paid last three most recent bills prior to a reminder "sent a
polite notice instead of the Reminder/Final Notice]
17 DAYS LATER NO RESPONSE * 	 NOTICE (CP1): ADVISES CUSTOMER OF CODE OF
PRACTICE & OFFERS THEM A CHOICE OF EITHER (a) A
SPECIFIC PAYMENT ARRANGEMENT OR (b) A CARD
METER
12 DAYS LATER STILL UNPAID ** 	 DISCONNECTION NOTICE SENT (CP2) BY FIRST CLASS
POST "notifying them of the date on which we intend to visit
the premises to disconnect the supply and remove the meter"
"The CP2 notice states that at this visit we will be prepared to
install a card meter unless it is not safe or practical to do so"
5 WORKING DAYS LATER	 DISCONNECTION VISIT
TOTAL = 50-52 DAYS
[* "where the bill remains unpaid 33 days after billing"; ** "by the 45th day after billing"]
NO EFFECTIVE CONTACT "If there is no adult at home with authority to give our
disconnection operative access or if access is refused, he will
leave a letter (CP3) at the premises which advises the customer
that we now intend to apply for a Warrant of Entry under the
Rights of Entry (Gas and Electricity Boards) Act 1954. The
cost of this visit will be added to the customer's account
"The customer will always be notified, by first class post, of the
date on which we intend to visit the premises with a
Magistrates Warrant"
Additional expense of obtaining and actioning the Warrant
added to customer's account
BUT NOTE: "For customers who are continually late in settling their bills or late in agreeing to payment
arrangements, it would be impractical to follow Procedure 1 every quarter. Therefore, we will only apply it
once in any 12 month period". p.5 Procedure 2 brought into play - more 'streamlined': Disconnection Notice
sent after 28 days from billing (see p.50
Source: Manweb Licence Condition 19: Methods for Dealing with Domestic Credit Customers in Default
Figure 7.8: Manweb's customer in default process
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Despite the substantial defects in the debt management procedures of the utilities, there
are signs that some modest improvements are being effected in this area; although this
varies across the industries and between the companies. The slow transformation of
British Gas is probably the best exemplar of 'improving practice' (Birmingham
Settlement et al, 1992; Berthoud & Kempson, 1992; interviews with consumer and
community sector organisations). Whether this has much to with the forces for change
within the companies themselves is a moot point. Certainly, the contribution of the
regulatory bodies, underpinned by vigilant and effective advocacy of the community
sector, has been important. The same applies to the development of systems of consumer
protection generally across the three industries, as the next part of the chapter reveals.
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PART 3: CONSUMER PROTECTION AND CONSUMER REPRESENTATION
Consumer protection is meaningless if it is so complicated and
inaccessible to ordinary people that they remain either unaware of their
rights or unable to act on them. Whitworth (PIRC, 1989, p.14).
With respect to consumer rights, and to a lesser extent, service quality, the privatised
utility industries began from what was a relatively unambitious base. During their forty
years or so under public ownership, the water, electricity and gas industries had often
been perceived as complacent, and even dismissive, in their approach to 'customer care'.
In the context of the 'new consumerism' 13 of the late 1980s and 1990s (Taylor 1990;
Keat, 1991), demands have been placed on the providers of public and essential services
to display a greater consciousness of consumer matters. The Conservative Government's
Citizen's Charter (1991b) is symbolic of the rhetorical shift from producer-led to
customer-driven models of service delivery. The changes effected in the consumer
orientation of the privatised utility industries then, have to be viewed against this
broader socio-political and cultural canvas.
Policy and organisational change, driven by consumerist objectives, often seem to be
premised on an assumption that there is a homogeneity of interest amongst all
consumers which transcends social class, income or relative need. But programmes built
on this assumption stand the danger of overlooking the different, and at times even
conflicting, sets of interests that exist amongst particular groups of domestic consumers,
in their desire to respond to a dominant and standardised 'customer prototype'.
Consumerist approaches also tend to focus more on procedural rights (e.g. the keeping
of appointments and the answering of complaints) than on questions of access,
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affordability and equity. An examination of the 'social division' of service standards and
quality prescriptions is an important dimension in the analysis of consumer protection
and consumer representation in the privatised utilities. It will be introduced into the
discussion in section (ii) below and taken up at greater length in Chapter 8.
(i) Consumer protection: the convergence of regulatory responsibilities
Regulating for quality is every bit as important as regulating price in monopoly settings.
In the absence of quality regulation, monopoly service providers have an opportunity to
offset the impact of price controls on profits, by making savings in the level and quality
of service provided to the consumer (Helm, 1988 and in evidence to the Energy Select
Committee, 1992c). In the first period of utility privatisation, with British Telecom and
British Gas, the Government adopted a 'light touch' or 'hands off' approach to quality
regulation; with the regulators being given quite muted consumer protection powers
(Rovizzi and Thompson, 1992). The regulatory provisions for consumer protection were
strengthened in the water and electricity privatisations; and more recently, the Citizen's
Charter legislation affecting the utilities, the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act
1992, has added further weight to the quality regulation powers of the four utility
regulatory bodies. The decision by the Major Government to 'top up' the powers of the
regulatory bodies would seem to indicate a belated recognition that the original powers
given to a number of the regulators were insufficient for the task of quality regulation.
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Partly because of the limitations in the regulatory framework, privatisation was initially
attended by very few service-related gains for domestic consumers. This was emphasised
in a number of well-publicised surveys by organisations such as the Consumers'
Association, which showed that most consumers believed that very little had changed
in the service performance of the utilities in the years immediately after privatisation.
For example, the Which? survey taken in July 1989 (i.e. some three years after the birth
of British Gas Plc.) found that "only one in ten said the service had improved [since
privatisation] - the majority thought nothing had changed, or thought it was too early
to say" (p.312).
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an accretion of power by both the
telecommunications and gas supply regulators in the area of consumer protection, as
they sought to correct the deficits in their statutory powers in situ. Through a
combination of negotiation, persuasion and threat, the telecommunications and gas
regulatory bodies managed to stretch the boundaries of their legislative mandate. Both
regulators have had success in incorporating quality of service criteria into the price
control mechanism - directly in the case of OFGAS, indirectly in the case of 01 , 1EL -
(OFGAS, 1991e; OFTEL, 1992a, 1992b), despite the fact that they have encountered
resistance and opposition from the companies concerned:
Because of British Gas' resistance to change and a lack of a purposefuL
dynamic approach to customer service it has been a slow, difficult process to
reach agreement with the company on many of these [i.e. customer protection]
issues. OFGAS Annual Report, 1991, Section 1
The additional duties imposed on British Gas by OFGAS, including the introduction of
"key service standards" along the lines of those in the electricity and water industries
(see below), following its 1991 review of the gas tariff formula (OFGAS, 1991g) is a
concrete illustration of the evolving strength of the regulatory machinery.
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In the tariff review, the gas regulator sought to correct a fundamental deficit in the
original Authorisation of British Gas, namely that "there is no guarantee that lower
prices will not be achieved at the expense of lower standards of service" (OFGAS,
1991g, p.3). Persistent calls by the regulator over the previous couple of years for the
voluntary introduction of a clear and comprehensive system of service standards, had
drawn an inadequate response from British Gas. Even though British Gas published a
long-awaited customer standards statement in 1990, Our Commitment to Banishing
Gripes, this was seen to lack both clarity and measurability:
OFGAS did not consider that the published commitment ["Our
Commitment to Banishing Gripes"] covered the full area of services.
Furthermore the services described in the document were qualified in
relation to service delivery by the use of words like "normally" and "so
far as possible". OFGAS (19910 p.2
The inability of British Gas to evaluate its service performance was further compounded
by the absence of an effective information base on customer services:
The review of the tariffformula revealed that British Gas did not operate
an adequate system for monitoring and controlling the provision of
specific services. Thus British Gas has no assurance at present that best
practices are consistently applied by all its service sector staff in its gas
supply business, or that it is meeting service performance targets. If
British Gas itself is unable to have that assurance it is in no position to
provide it to its customers and OFGAS. OFGAS (19910 p.3
In order to overcome the limitations of the 'rolling negotiation' approach to standard-
setting (and in order to move towards a position of regulatory parity with the water and
electricity industries), the Director-General OFGAS introduced a new condition
(Condition 13A) into the British Gas' Authorisation in October 1991, with effect from
1st April 1992. Condition 13A places a duty on the monopoly gas supplier to establish,
publish and monitor a set of tariff customer performance standards relating to:
# Customer contact
# Obtaining a gas supply
# Continuity of supply
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# Emergency services
# Appointments
# Customer accounting
The performance standards required under Condition 13A were subsequently published
by British Gas in a series of brochures in 1992 (British Gas, 1992e, 1992f, 1992g).
These new standards of service cover both overall and individual performance targets.
Overall standards encompass broader areas of practice - such as the recording of
customer contacts, answering telephone calls within a specified period of time, capacity
to deal with gas escapes and monitoring differences between actual and estimated gas
usage by tariff customers - where the company is required to meet service targets
between 90 and 100 per cent of the time (British Gas, 1992e). Individual standards
establish a more testing target (100 per cent in all cases) and relate to selected areas of
the direct interface with consumers, for example, replying to correspondence, keeping
appointments, connecting and interrupting supply, and requests for special meter
readings. Failure to meet an individual standard can result in the payment of
compensation, on request to the customer concerned, generally in the form of a credit
to the customer's account (British Gas, 1992e).
Provision has been made in seven of the 18 designated individual standards for fixed
compensation payments to customers (£10-£20). In the tariff review, the Director
General of Gas Supply decided against setting the level of compensation himself (as is
done, effectively, by the water and electricity regulators 14) and left it up to British Gas
to determine:
OFGAS' examination of customer services in other countries during the
review indicated that the imposition of external penalty payments would
not suit the operation of the Total Quality Management concept [being
introduced by British Gas]. It is also self evident that externally imposed
penalties are by their nature somewhat inflexible and could be expensive
to administer. They could also be open to abuse by either British Gas or
its customers. OFGAS, (1991e), p.5
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The quality regulation powers secured by OFGAS in the tariff review were subsequently
formalised, in the separate Citizen's Charter policy initiative of the Government under
the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992 (resulting in amendments to section 33
of the Gas Act). Ironically, this belated move by the Government to correct the deficit
in the gas regulator's powers was not particularly welcomed by OFGAS:
it created something of a dilemma for us, we had to decide do we scrap
what we've got and transfer it over to regulation under the Act or to
continue with 13A..it muddied the waters and personally it was a bit of
a nuisance. (OFGAS officer in interview with researcher, July 1992) 15
As shown in Chapter 1, the privatisation of the water and electricity industries was
accompanied by a stronger framework for quality regulation than that established for gas
in 1986 16. The extensions to the consumer protection mandate of the water and
electricity regulators in 1988/89 might be viewed as a manifestation of regulatory 'policy
learning' in what is still a comparatively new field of public intervention in Britain.
The three primary regulatory devices adopted for influencing service delivery by the
water and electricity utilities are: (i) enforceable codes of practice and (ii) overall
standards of performance and (iii) guaranteed standards of performance schemes.
The codes of practice form part of the conditions of the operating licences of the
companies, and are hence enforceable. Within the electricity industry, the RECs are
obliged to produce and publish codes of practice in relation to:
- the payment of bills e.g. information to consumers re. how bill constructed,
security deposits, alternative systems of payment, process for handling disputed
bills (Licence Condition 18)
- methods for dealing with domestic tariff customers in default, including
disconnections procedure, arrangements for paying outstanding debts, referrals
to social security & social services (Licence Condition 19)
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- services to the elderly and the disabled i.e. that companies identify and respond
to the particular needs of these consumers (Licence Condition 20)
- complaint handling procedures i.e. company mechanisms for dealing with
consumer grievances (Licence Condition 23)
- a code on the efficient use of electricity i.e advice to consumers on the efficient
use of electricity, including the provision of a telephone advice service (Licence
Condition 22)
The three codes of practice in the water industry are broadly similar, with Conditions
G & H in the Instrument of Appointment of the Water and Sewerage Undertakers being
equivalent to Conditions 18, 19 & 23 in the Public Electricity Suppliers' licence.
The third code relates to the procedure for dealing with leakages in metered domestic
premises. Curiously, no provision had been made in the licence for a code on services
to the elderly and the disabled; a situation which the Director-General drew attention to
in his 1990 Annual Report:
British Telecom, British Gas and the electricity supply companies are
each required under the terms of their respective licences to produce a
code of practice on services for the disabled and elderly. Similar
provision has not been made in respect of the water companies, even
though the need for it is arguably every bit as important. Ofwat has
completed a survey of the services provided by the water companies for
the disadvantaged The results are very disappointing. Only a handful of
companies would seem to recognise the particular problems faced by
such groups of customers.. OFWAT (1991) p.52
In September 1991, OFWAT produced a set of guidelines on services for disabled and
elderly customers, which imitated some of the features of the British Gas code for these
two groups of consumers - for example, setting up a register of disabled and elderly
customers, providing a password system for company staff calling at the customer's
home, assisting with aids and adaptations, and helping with bill reading (OFWAT,
19910). However as guidelines, they have none of the regulatory force of enforceable
codes.
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In the case of both the water and electricity companies the initial drafts of most of the
codes of practice were rejected by the regulators, partly at the behest of the community
sector:
None of the submitted customer or disconnection codes were sufficiently
well written, complete and accurate to meet the basic requirements of
Conditions G and H. Suggested modifications were sent to the companies
and as a result revised drafts were submitted. OFWAT Annual Report
(1991) p.51
The initial submissions made by the companies were disappointing and
the Director General declined to approve them. OFFER made
suggestions for improvements to each of the Codes. OFFER Annual
Report (1991) pp.57-8
The statutory consumer committees were formally involved, with varying degrees of
success, in the screening of the draft codes of practice (see section (iii) below).
After representations to the regulators, selected national consumer and community sector
organisations and bodies such as the Public Utilities Access Forum, were given access
to some of the draft codes. There was general agreement amongst these organisations
that the draft codes were defective and required substantial reworking. Although the re-
drafted codes of practice were finally approved by the water and electricity regulators
some fifteen months and nine months respectively after the date of privatisation,
disaffection was expressed about the limited nature of the consultative process. This was
directed, in particular, at the electricity regulator:
..communiry representatives [other than the regional consumer
committees] were only invited to comment on a limited number of draft
codes. No response to our comments were received from OFFER,
although a response was promised by the summer of 1991, nor were our
comments sought before the finalised Codes were approved and
published. Barbara Montoute in Foreword to Fuel Rights Handbook
1992193
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The efficacy of codes of practice as instruments for protecting consumers is ultimately
dependent upon the rigour with which they are monitored and enforced. With the partial
exception of the flawed Condition H code (water customers in default), the regulators
have been dilatory in initiating action to monitor the codes of practice. The reason for
this, on the part of at least one of the regulators, appears to be a reluctance to move too
deeply into the operational domain of the privatised companies:
It is a feature of the regulatory regime as a whole that regulation
(including monitoring) is kept to a minimum consistent with the Director
General's statutory duties. Accordingly, the framework for the monitoring
of the Codes of Practice will reflect the Director General's wish that
information requirements from the Companies should be kept to the
minimum possible consistent with effectiveness.
OFFER (1991e) section 11
The other two primary weapons in the regulators' consumer protection armoury are the
setting of overall and individual standards of performance (the latter are usually
described as "guaranteed standards schemes"). The standards of performance in water
and electricity operate in a manner broadly similar to those devised more recently for
British Gas; although in the former, the overall standards, up to this point in time, have
been based on targets set by the companies themselves. In the electricity industry,
eight overall standards of performance have been set by the regulator: reconnection of
supply following faults, correction of voltage faults, new connections, reconnection after
payment of bill (for disconnected customers), moving, changing and reading meters, and
responding to written complaints. Different targets have been established for each of
these eight standards and for each of the RECs, with the target rate of completion for
most of the standards in the range of 85 to 100 per cent (OFFER, 1992x, pp.17-21).
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ELECTRICITY GUARANTEED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
1. Supplier's fuse failures: repaired within 4 hours of notification during working
hours (£10)
2. Restoring electricity supplies after faults: supply to be restored within 24 hours
(£20)
3. Providing supply and meter: within 3 working days (£20)
4. Estimating charges: within 10 working days for simple jobs or 20 working
days for most others (£20)
5. Notice of supply interruption: at least two days notice of supply interruption
required (£10)
6. Meter problems: visit or reply within 10 working days (£10)
7. Voltage complaints: visit or reply within 10 working days (£10)
8. Charges and payment queries: a "substantive reply" within 10 working days
(£10)
9. Appointments: all appointments to visit on a day must be kept (£10)
10. Payments owed under Standards: write to customer within 10 working days of
failure (£10)
Note: The penalty payment amounts are those for domestic customers only
Source: OFFER (1992x) p.1
The guaranteed standards cover nine areas of service, which are listed below. In contrast
to existing similar schemes in the water and gas industries, compensation 'payments'
(usually deductions from electricity bills) are automatically made in all but two areas for
failure to meet the requisite standard.
In the second half of 1992, the electricity and water regulators made proposals for
modifying aspects of the guaranteed standards schemes in their respective industries (see
section (ii) below).
Figure 7.9: Electricity Guaranteed Standards of Performance
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Prior to the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act in 1992, the formal enforcement
powers of the utility regulators varied substantially; with the strongest powers held by
OFFER and the weakest by OFGAS. As part of the 'levelling up' intent of the 1992
Act, all three regulators now have similar powers of enforcement. This includes the
ability to determine disputes between customers and the utility companies and to rule
on these disputes with a force equivalent to that of a county court decision. The
regulators can also issue enforcement orders on the companies for breaches of the codes
of practice and for failure to meet the specified standards of performance. In the event
of serious breaches of the licence conditions, the regulators can make references to the
Monopolies & Mergers Commission. In theory at least, major breaches of the licence
conditions could lead to the offending company having its operating licence revoked.
While there has been a convergence in the instruments for quality regulation and in the
powers of the regulators over the past twelve months, the potency of the consumer
protection regime is still likely to be heavily dependent upon how each of the Directors
General interpret their mandate as 'stewards of the consumer interest'. In defending the
interests of domestic consumers, the consumer protection zeal of the regulator will be
as significant as the statutory framework in which he/she operates. This has been
exemplified in the past by the Director-General of Gas Supply, who has managed to
compensate for the deficits in his legislative powers by adopting a vigorous and
publicly-visible consumer advocacy approach to his relations with British Gas 17.
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(ii) Consumer protection - outcomes 
We have not been able to conduct a detailed examination of the new
standards and codes, nor to examine their effectiveness or compare them
with what existed before. We believe that they offer a prospect of
improved standards of service, particularly if they are well published and
enforced, but it is too early to assess their effectiveness.
HoC Select Committee on Energy (1992a) para 28
As illustrated previously, the framework for protecting consumers from reductions in
service quality in the privatised utilities has evolved around the three key instruments
of codes of practice, overall and individual performance standards. This section will
examine preliminary evidence on the quality-related outcomes of the privatised utilities
from the perspective of domestic consumers, including an assessment of the extent to
which these instruments appear to be working. It is still quite early days in the
implementation of these measures and therefore much of the discussion needs to be
qualified. In the case of British Gas, most of the relevant regulatory schemes have only
been in place since April 1992 and hence information on their impact is obviously
extremely limited at this point 18•
At a macro level, public opinion data on the quality outcomes of the privatised utilities
is ambiguous. In the three MORI surveys carried out in 1990 and 1991 for the National
Consumer Council and in late 1991/early 1992 for OFWAT, there was evidence that the
level of satisfaction with the overall service received from the utilities had increased
over time (see Figure 7.10 overleaf). In contrast, the poll conducted by ICM for The
Guardian in July 1991 indicated that the vast majority of respondents interviewed
believed that the utilities had either remained the same, or got worse since privatisation
(gas: 73%, electricity: 88%, water: 85%).
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How satisfied are you with the overall service you receive from..
Net satisfaction %
March 1990 March 1991	 Nov 1991- Jan 1992
British Gas 77 80 85
Local electricity supplier 77 78 83
Local water supplier 58 63 69
Source: NCC (1991a, p.13); OFWAT (1992h, p.2)
Figure 7.10: Satisfaction with public utility levels of service
The differences in these survey results might be explained by the nature of the questions
put to the interviewees. In the ICM survey, people were asked to compare the
performance of the utilities under private and public ownership, whereas in the MORI
surveys, respondents were not asked to draw this comparison. Also the MORI survey
question was focused on perceptions of service, while the ICM survey asked a more
generic question which would have picked up people's reactions to factors such as price.
In fact, when specific questions on price were included in the earlier MORI survey for
the NCC (1990a) and in the OFWAT study, the level of customer satisfaction declined
quite sharply.
A closer examination of the MORI survey data shows that responses to questions about
the general and specific aspects of the performance of the utilities (most notably in
relation to prices) vary according to variables such as social class and income. This is
illustrated in data from the most recent MORI survey for the electricity and water
industries in Figures 7.11 and 7.12 overleaf.
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Figure 7.12: Consumer satisfaction by income: water
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Another indicator of the performance of the utility industries might be found ostensibly
in the volume of domestic customer complaints received by the regulators and their
associated consumer committees over the past couple of years. The most recent
published data is shown below, where it can be seen that the number of domestic
consumer complaints has risen across all three utility industries over the last twelve
months. Significantly, account or billing disputes constitute the largest category of
complaints in all cases. The Gas Consumers Council has recently reported that
complaints about British Gas have dropped by 7 per cent in the first half of 1992
compared to the same period in the previous year, which may indicate that the new
service standards set in the tariff review are beginning to have some effect.
Consumer complaints to the regulatory bodies
OFGAS:	 Increased by 136% [918] in 1991 - largest single category of complaints:
account disputes
GCC:
	 Increased by 4.6% [22,428] in 1991 - largest single category of
complaints: gas bills
OFWAT:
	 Increased by 128% [8,748] between 1990/91 & 1991/92 - largest single
category of complaints: charges or billing related
OFFER:
	 Increased by 19% [16,679] April 1991-March 1992 - largest category of
complaints: disputed accounts
Sources: OFGAS (1992); GCC (1992); OFWAT (1992); OFFER (1992x)
Figure 7.13: Consumer complaints to the regulatory bodies
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While the data on increased complaints to regulatory agencies seems clear enough (with
the recent exception of British Gas), attempts to draw general conclusions about the
performance of the privatised utilities from it is fraught with hazards. The increase in
complaints may have, for instance, as much to do with the increasing profile and
visibility of the regulatory bodies as it does with the behaviour of the utility companies.
This may well explain part of the increase in complaints to the newer regulatory bodies
like OFWAT and OFFER. Conversely, formal complaints to regulators, or indeed to the
industries direct, will not necessarily capture the full extent of dissatisfaction with
service quality amongst consumers. This is particularly likely to be the case amongst
low income consumers. In the OFWAT customer survey, for example, 17 per cent of
customers with incomes below £5,000 stated that they were aware of the existence of
the water regulatory body (only 2% of whom were able to name it), compared to 37 per
cent of the full sample (15%) [MORI, 1992, Tables 251 & 253]. The study also found
that the same group was far less likely to make contact with their local water supplier
(8% compared to 20% of the full sample) [MORI, 1992, Table 371.
At a qualitative level, the evidence on standards of service in the privatised utilities is
hardly conclusive, one way or another. This contrasts with the rather sharper outline of
change in the areas of prices and debt and disconnection since privatisation. The Select
Committee on Energy was unable to conclude, after its investigation into the
consequences of electricity privatisation, whether the quality of service provided to the
domestic consumer had improved or not. Positive accounts of the incipient
transformation of the utility companies into customer care-driven organisations (e.g.
Boys, 1992; Lockwood, 1991; United Research, 1990) need to be counterbalanced
against the views of welfare rights and advice workers in the field (interviews with the
researcher) and the experiences of a number of low income consumers themselves
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(Birmingham Settlement et al, 1992), which suggest that at the level of day-to-day
practice at least, very little appears to have changed. Indeed some organisations maintain
that in certain cases service delivery has deteriorated. The National Right to Fuel
Campaign in its evidence to the Select Committee on Energy concluded that "the
standard of service provided by Public Electricity Suppliers has declined: there are more
estimated bills..in some areas reduced staffing means long delays for telephone queries"
(HoC Energy Committee, 1992b, p.82). And the electricity company with the most
ambitious labour-shedding programme - Manweb - admitted that customer services had
suffered initially as a result of staffing cuts, but claimed that this has since been rectified
(interview with researcher, August 1992).
There are though, two common themes running through these seemingly contrasting
evaluations - (i) that practice varies enormously between and even within the utility
companies, and (ii) that considerable potential exists to improve the quality of utility
service provision. For many people in the consumer and community sector the key to
promoting 'best practice' is held by the regulators and resides in the way in which they
optimise and carry forward their consumer protection function 19• This will necessitate
changes in regulatory instruments employed.
The regulatory instruments - codes of practice, overall and individual performance
standards - in their original form are defective, both as a means of protecting the
interests of domestic consumers generally and for protecting low income consumers in
particular. The codes of practice lack sufficient regulatory clout (as evidenced by the
failure of Condition H in the water industry) and most consumers are unaware of their
existence - in part because many companies have been parsimonious in their approach
to the dissemination of copies of the codes. In an ad hoc survey on the availability of
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electricity codes of practice in company outlets in three cities, the National Right to Fuel
Campaign found that "none of those visited in London or Manchester had any copies
of the Codes, and in Liverpool only 25 per cent had copies" (Barbara Montoute in
Preface to Fuel Rights Handbook 1992193).
The standards of performance, particularly in the water and electricity industries, provide
relatively unchallenging targets for the companies to achieve. A leading example of
which is the untaxing electricity meter reading standard, and recently the Director
General of Electricity Supply has flagged his intention to raise this standard (OFFER,
1992x). They have also been established with only minimal referencing to the views and
service priorities of consumers, and doubts have been expressed about whether the
standards actually address those areas of service of greatest importance to consumers
themselves (e.g. National Right to Fuel Campaign, HoC Energy Committee, 1992b;
OFWAT, 1992i). The requirement, added to the Competition ana' Service (Utilities-Met,
after lobbying by organisations like the Consumers' Association and the National
Consumer Council, that the regulators undertake consumer research prior to the setting
of industry performance targets, should go some way towards rectifying this in the
future.
The guaranteed standards of performance schemes seem to have had more force as
public relations aids than as regulatory instruments designed to act as a deterrent to
service failure. The water industry is the most striking illustration of this, where the total
compensation paid out by all water companies in 1990/91 was less than £3,500 and
OFWAT estimate that "no more than 1%-2% of customers eligible for payments submit
a claim" (OFWAT, 1992y) 20• The poor 'take up' rate in the scheme might be
attributed, amongst other things, to the derisory level of compensation available. The
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companies can, of course, award higher payments, but this is entirely at their discretion.
British Gas has shown more imagination and responsiveness in this regard than the
electricity or water companies. During the framing of the Competition and Service
(Utilities) Bill, OFWAT sought to include a provision giving the regulators power to
direct companies to award levels of compensation in line with the amount of damage
or distress suffered by the customer experiencing service failure, but this was rejected
by officials at the Department of Trade and Industry (OFWAT policy staff in interview
with researcher, July 1992) 21•
In recent reviews of the existing standards of performance in their industries, the water
and electricity regulators have proposed a number of changes to the guaranteed standards
schemes, including adding the requirement that companies make more specific
appointment times and a doubling of the compensation payment in many instances
(OFFER, 1992x and OFWAT, 19921). The Director General of 'Water Services has also
proposed automatic compensation in a number of cases and introduced several additional
provisions, including compensation for flooding from sewers. Notably, he has removed
two inequitable aspects of the original scheme - the barrier to tenants, and customers
more than six weeks in arrears, being compensated under the scheme.
On the whole, the provisions of existing guaranteed standards schemes are weighted
substantially towards the interests of middle class consumers. This is not meant to
suggest that aspects of service delivery like the keeping of appointments and replying
to correspondence are irrelevant to low income households, but that there are other
aspects of their relationship with the utilities that are likely to take precedence.
This was underlined in the OFWAT customer survey, where for example, low income
consumers showed less interest in specific appointment times than did more affluent
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consumers in the sample, but expressed a higher degree of dissatisfaction with the
choice of payment arrangements than other income groups.
During the passage of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill in the House of Lords,
a NACAB-initiated amendment to require the regulators to prescribe standards of
performance specifically relevant to the needs of low income consumers was rejected
by the Government on the grounds that "..under this Bill the directors general can
already set standards for any groups they choose, so that in effect the amendments
would give the directors general no greater powers than they already receive under the
Bill" (Lord Reay, HoL, 5/3/92, col. 1030).
Amongst the regulators, only the Director General of Gas Supply has shown any
inclination thus far to exercise these latent powers. As part of the tariff review, the
regulator introduced a standard requiring British Gas to be more proactive in its efforts
to assist customers in debt:
No later than 3 months after an unpaid bill has been despatched, clear
action will be taken in accordance with Condition 12A to prevent debt
build up. British Gas (1992e, Key Standard No. 27), p.12.
The other two regulators have resisted proposals made by the Public Utilities Access
Forum (e.g. PUAF meeting 22/9/92), to introduce company performance standards
specific to low income consumers. Although the hand of the water regulator may be
forced in this respect, if implementation of the voluntary guidelines on debt and
disconnection fails to have the desired effect.
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(iii) Consumer representation
In the context of monopoly supply of essential services, it is important that domestic
consumers be given structured opportunities to influence the policy and practice of the
utility industries. In the absence of conventional consumer prerogatives, such as the
power to exercise choice and the ability to adjudicate on service quality through
changing supplier, formal mechanisms for representing and articulating the interests of
consumers become a form of consumer sovereignty proxy.
Effective consumer representation is also vitat to the integrity of the tegttlatory system.
Without regular consumer input, the regulators are likely to become detached from the
concrete concerns of the users of utility services. Unless the perceptions of the utility
industries are counterbalanced by the views of consumers, the information asymmetry
problem endemic in regulation will become more acute. Consumer representation should
act, in effect, to keep the regulators honest and accountable; an objective that is rendered
all the more important in the prevailing situation where the regulators' responsibility for
protecting the interests of consumers is secondary to other concerns.
Privatisation provided an opportunity for the extant structures of consumer representation
in the nationalised industries to be substantially revised and enhanced. This was most
particularly the case in the water industry, where the industry-dominated local consumer
committees established under the 1983 Water Act were viewed, almost universally, as
desultory and defective mechanisms for consumer representation.
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As Chapter 1 has shown, there was considerable debate during the passage of the
privatisation legislation about the most appropriate consumer representation model, with
the consumer movement (the Electricity Consumers Council apart) arguing strongly for
the creation of national, industry-specific bodies independent of the regulator. This
model was adopted for the gas industry, but displaced in the subsequent water and
electricity privatisations by a regional, integrated-with-the-regulator's office approach.
More recent attempts by the National Consumer Council and the Consumers Association
(during the passage of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill (see HoC, 16/1192,
co1.1129) and the Energy Committee (1992a, para 138) to have the Gas Consumers
Council model replicated in the water and electricity industries have not been successful.
While the dichotomy is usually drawn between the GCC model and the rest, it is
possible to identify subtle differences in the structure and operation of the consumer
committees in the water and electricity industries, which might suggest that there are
three, rather than two, operational models of consumer representation in the privatised
utilities. Recent changes in the way that the OFWAT CSCs operate, with for example
the chairs taking on an executive function (involving the supervision and appraisal of
secretariat staff, and a degree of delegated control over the committees' budgets),
distinguish them further from their ostensibly 'look alike' counterparts in the electricity
industry. The three models of consumer representation is shown in Figure 7.14 overleaf.
In addition to different structural arrangements, there appear to be significant differences
in the style of the consumer representation bodies. This is exemplified in the contrast
between the customer service committees (water) and the consumer committees
(electricity). The OFWAT committees have the reputation of being much more open,
domestic consumer-focused and independent than those in the electricity industry.
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Consumer representation in the Utilities
national structure with regional branches; organisationally
separate and independent of the regulator; budgetary and
staffing control; functions: policy advice, advocacy,
research, complaints handling; aspects of 'consumer brief'
wider than that of the regulator; national council members
appointed by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
regional structure (CSC secretariat); ad hoc national forum
of CSC chairs; structurally linked to regulator; CSC chairs
exercise limited budgetary and staffing control; functions:
policy advice, advocacy, complaints handling; members
appointed by the Director General on the recommendation
of the CSC chairs
regional structure (OFFER regional offices service
committees); legislative requirement for national forum of
chairs (National Consumers' Consultative Committee); no
budgetary or staffing control; functions: policy advice,
advocacy, complaints handling, delegated determination
powers; members appointed by the Director General on the
recommendation of the CC chairs
Gas Consumers Council
CSCs - OFT VAT
CCs - OFFER
The latter rarely publicise their meetings, limit the distribution of agendas and relevant
papers and do not encourage non-member attendance and participation (the London
electricity consumers' committee is the one apparent exception to this). The quality and
content of the annual reports of the two sets of committees also reflect a very different
philosophy of information dissemination and openness 22. The national council
meetings of the Gas Consumers Council are not open to the general public.
Figure 7.14: Consumer representation in the utility industries
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Despite the virtual unanimity of support within the consumer movement for the
structurally independent model, the superiority of this approach to consumer
representation is not necessarily as self-evident as many of its proponents seem to
suggest.
Manifestly, the siting of consumer committees within the structure of the regulator's
office presents significant threats to the autonomy and independence of action of these
committees. And the experience of at least one of the committees in the water industry,
where the regulator attempted to exercise a degree of censorial control over the sensitive
issue of metering (interview with researcher, September 1992) 23, is illustrative of the
inherent tensions in the unitary model of regulation and consumer representation.
But it does not follow that the existence of these tensions make the model unworkable,
or should cause it to be dismissed out of hand.
While the regulatory body locus for consumer representation presents problems, it also
brings with it particular advantages. Among other things, it structurally reinforces the
regulator's responsibility for social as well as economic regulation and it should make
for a freer two-way flow of information between the regulator and the consumer
committee than would be the case were the bodies are organisationally separate. But
most important of all, the presence of the Director General in the background,
potentially places the consumer committees in a far stronger position of influence with
the regulated companies than would otherwise be the case. Certainly it would seem that
the Customer Service Committees in the water industry believe this to be the case 2A.
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The performance of the Gas Consumers Council and OFGAS (the archetypal model
favoured by the consumer movement) partly confounds and partly supports the
arguments above. The record of the Gas Consumers Council shows that generally it has
been able to use its independence to good effect on behalf of domestic and
industrial/commercial gas consumers; as evidenced for example in its role as a catalyst
for Condition 12A and in the OFT review of British Gas' industrial market. However,
despite its structural autonomy, the GCC has had to exercise caution in deviating from
the policy positions of the Director General of Gas Supply (let alone openly criticising
him), for at the end of the day, it has been substantially reliant upon him to provide the
regulatory leverage to effect change in the gas industry.
It would seem that the Director General of Gas Supply has not required the presence of
consumer committees within his own organisation to alert him to his responsibilities for
social regulation. But as Sir James McKinnon has become more involved in the affairs
of domestic consumers, the respective roles of OFGAS and the GCC have become
increasingly blurred and difficult to disentangle. This gives rise as a consequence to the
danger of either duplication in the functions of the two bodies (e.g. in handling
consumer complaints), or to the possibility that a vacuum will be created in some areas,
as both bodies incorrectly anticipate that the other will take action in particular
instances. Something similar to the latter occurred after the introduction of Condition
12A, where OFGAS assumed that the GCC was pursuing the monitoring of British Gas'
implementation of the new code of practice (and vice versa), with the effect that there
was an unwarranted delay in the follow up action on this important licence change.
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Regardless of the debate over which set of structural arrangements constitute the best
model, the efficacy of consumer structures will hinge ultimately upon the extent to
which they (i) marshal the support and participation of the major groupings within the
domestic consumer population (i.e. their representativeness), (ii) provide a proactive,
independent and informed analysis of the policy and practice issues at the centre of the
consumer-utility interface and (iii) are able to back up their advocacy with powerful
enough sanctions so that the industries take them seriously. And each of the existing
consumer structures in the three industries, as they are presently constituted, is deficient
in one or more of these respects.
The composition of the OFWAT customer services committees is shown on the next
page. The CSCs have been chosen, not because they are better or worse than the other
bodies, but simply because in contrast to the others, information on the backgrounds of
the members of each of the CSCs is published in their Annual Reports. It can be seen
from Figure 7.15 that the proportion of members with a background in business or
commerce is high relative to those with experience in consumer advocacy organisations.
The composition of the electricity consumer committees is unlikely to be any different
in this respect; for a similar profile of strong business representation juxtaposed against
a smaller base of members with consumer advocacy experience is indicated in the two
electricity consumer committee annual reports where membership information is
provided (there are, however, a larger number of members from the pre-existing
nationalised consumer structures on the electricity committees). The absence of direct
representation from low income consumers and minority groups is characteristic of the
water and electricity consumer committees, as well as the Gas Consumers Council. In
recent times, the water and electricity regulators have both declared an interest in
broadening the representative base of the consumer committees.
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Composition of the 10 OFWAT Customer Service Committees
% of all members (n=122)
Female members	 34 [2 out of 10 chairs are women]
Non Anglo-Saxon background	 1
Consumer organisation background 	 15
Community organisation involvement 	 37
Current or ex-local government	 27
Associated with water industry 	 11
Business/commerce background	 37
Farming background	 7
Academics	 6
Declared interest in disability 	 3
Note: CSCs as at 31/3/92
Sources: CSCs Annual Reports (1992)
Figure 7.15: Composition of the Customer Service Committees
The National Consumers Council and NACAB, amongst others, have argued that the
brief of the regulatory body consumer committees and the Gas Consumers Council
should be restricted to protecting the interests of domestic consumers only. This is based
on a view that industrial/commercial consumers often have the means and the structures
to influence the utility industries and the regulators independently of the formal
consumer bodies. There is also a belief that the mandate encompassing all consumers
creates an inherent conflict of interest for the committees, with the consequential fear
that the interests of the least powerful and most disadvantaged will be overlooked.
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As in any consumer representation process, the level of resourcing and support given to
the committees impacts directly on the effectiveness of their work. To date, very little
attention seems to have been given to the need to provide training to the members of
the electricity and water consumer bodies, despite the fact that the majority of members
appear to have had little background and experience in the area of consumer advocacy.
The difficulties faced by relatively inexperienced consumer representatives in the
complex terrain of the regulated industries was amply illustrated in the electricity
consumer committees' inauspicious encounter with the first drafts of the codes of
practice. In 1990, the Director General gave the newly-established committees the task
of examining the draft codes of practice produced by the RECs, which they subsequently
endorsed. Following an outcry from external consumer organisations about the quality
of the codes, the Director General - against the earlier advice of his own consumer
representatives - sent them back to the companies to be re-written. This incident affected
the confidence of the committees and severely dented the credibility of the committees
in the eyes of the consumer movement. The Energy Committee recommended that the
Director General of Electricity Supply examine the level of training and information
provided to the OFFER consumer committees (HoC Energy Committee, 1992, para 138).
The electricity and water committees are serviced by the regional staff of OFFER and
OFWAT respectively; but unlike their peers in the gas industry, they have no capacity
to commission research at a local level on consumer matters. The complaints handling
function of the committees provides an extremely useful casework data-base on
consumer concerns, but without a research budget, they are limited in their ability to
explore issues in greater depth, or to investigate areas of utility policy and practice
independent of those identified by the regulatory agencies. Also in the absence of
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resources for research, the committees have little capacity to check the verisimilitude of
the information provided by the local utility companies. One of the criticisms levelled
at the electricity consumer committees is that their analysis of the utility-consumer
interface is too heavily dependent on the information provided by the RECs themselves
(interviews of consumer sector workers with researcher, July-August 1992).
The British regulatory system has been criticised on the grounds that it is excessively
secretive and closed, and certainly it suffers by comparison with the more open approach
to regulatory decision-making that is generally found in the United States (as Chapter
3 showed). However, for all this, a greater degree of regulatory transparency - from the
perspective of the ordinary consumer - now exists than was the case when the
government acted as the regulator of the utilities. Despite the fears enunciated in Chapter
3 about the possible impact of privatisation on the availability of information, there
appears to be more information about the operation of the utility industries in the public
domain than there was hitherto. And the quantity and quality of data on the industries,
being produced under the auspices of the regulators, could be seen as one of the
emerging strengths of the post-privatisation regime. In this respect, the Office of Water
Services is someway ahead of the field.
The availability of better information on the operation of the utility industries means that
the scope for consumer bodies to comprehend, and hence to influence, the policy context
in which the utilities operate has probably increased over recent years. Arguably, the
consumer committees directly attached to the regulatory agencies (i.e. the OFWAT and
OFFER committees) have an information edge over the Gas Consumers Council, as they
are more likely to be privy to 'in house', and possibly even commercially sensitive,
information in addition to that released for public consumption.
429
Although the Directors General of Electricity Supply and Water Services convene
regular meetings (usually quarterly) of the chairs of the committees, these national fora
have yet to develop any real visibility or force. It is unlikely that this will happen until
such time as they are given, or take, a more substantive and independent role in the
overall regulatory framework.
The potential exists for more effective consumer representation under the regulated
utilities than was the case when they were nationalised. This is almost entirely due to
the buttressing function of the regulatory agencies in support of formal consumer
interactions with the utilities. The Gas Consumers Council has realised some of this
potential, yet whether this can be attributed to its independent status or to its superior
resource base (compared to the other bodies) is debatable. The scope for this potential
to be realised in the more recently established water and electricity committees is
uncertain, although the signs look somewhat more propitious in the former - largely due
to their more open style - than they do in the latter.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION TO THE CHAPTERS ON THE CONSUMER
INTEREST
On the evidence available to date it would be impossible to conclude that the
Government's bold prediction, at the time of privatisation, that consumers would benefit
in terms of lower prices and better services, has been realised. Equally, the evidence
does not support the conclusion, sometimes drawn by political opponents of the
Government, that privatisation of the public utilities has been an unmitigated disaster.
The outcomes for consumers in general, along the four key dimensions of prices, debt
and disconnection, consumer protection and consumer representation, appear to have
been mixed. For the average consumer, privatisation has been the proverbial 'curate's
egg', with a gain in one area seemingly counterbalanced by a loss in another. There is
clear evidence, however, that low income consumers have been affected more adversely
than the generality of consumers, primarily as a result of rises in water and electricity
tariffs, but also because there has been a failure to recognise their particular needs in the
formulation of service standards. Even in the area where low income consumers appear
to have done best - i.e. energy disconnection practice - the gains may turn out to be
illusory, if the changes effected lead to an increase in the incidence of self-
disconnection.
In a number of instances where negative outcomes for domestic consumers have been
apparent, it is difficult to separate out the 'privatisation effect' from other contextual
variables. This is exemplified in the changes to water tariffs; although even here there
is strong evidence to support the view that consumers have been paying a 'privatisation
premium' in their water bills over the past five years.
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The same problem of delineating the 'privatisation effect' holds with even more force
in those areas where positive outcomes have been achieved. The structural changes to
the utilities may well have blown away some of the debris accumulated over decades
of nationalisation. Yet clearly factors such as declining gas and coal purchase costs (not
all the benefits of which have been passed through to domestic consumers) and
technology (in the ambiguously beneficial area of prepayment meters) have made an
important, and from the Government's point of view timely, contribution. Also against
the backdrop of rising consumer expectations, it was probably inevitable that the utility
industries would be required to respond to the demand for improved services,
irrespective of the variable of ownership change.
But unequivocally the primary force for change has been the influence of the regulatory
bodies. To this extent, the results of the utility privatisation programme to date also
illustrate a striking paradox. In that the developing framework of stronger protections
and procedural rights for utility consumers, has been constructed using the instruments
of the State (i.e. public intervention via the regulatory bodies), with the 'invisible hand'
of market forces playing very much a secondary, and by no means always a supportive,
role.
The contribution of the regulators has not, of course, been uniform. The Director
General of Gas Supply and the Director General of Electricity Supply could be seen to
represent the two ends of a continuum of regulatory effort on behalf of domestic
consumers; a continuum ranging from tenacity to torpidity. The water regulator appears
to fall somewhere in between.
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The prospect for future changes to the advantage of domestic consumers will also be
substantially conditioned by the character and vigour of regulatory intervention. In the
case of gas, this will depend as much on the deliberations of the Monopolies and
Mergers Commission as it will on the strong advocacy of the gas regulator. The Director
General of Water Services' incremental incursions into the capital structure of the water
companies and his positioning of consumer concerns towards the forefront in the
Periodic Review could be interpreted as a positive sign for domestic consumers.
Although, his commitment to full economic pricing - in which metering is seen to
occupy a central place - may act to negate any future gains for domestic consumers
under revisions to the price formula. The ability of the electricity regulator to secure a
improved settlement for domestic consumers could well be retarded by his implicit faith
in the power of the market to advance the consumer interest.
The broader implications of the outcomes of the first phase of utility privatisation are
considered in the next Chapter.
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ENDNOTES TO CHAPTER 7
1. A fourth important factor - the impact of energy efficiency measures - has been
excluded from the discussion here as it is well documented elsewhere e.g. Boardman,
1991a, Boardman, 1991b, Boardman and Houghton, 1991.
2. "Mr Barclay [Social Security Advisory Committee chairman] said water rates
although seemingly a small sum, were a cause of growing concern to income support
claimants as a significant part of weekly outgoings; water rates had increased by nearly
16 per cent over the past year, but income support only by 7.6 per cent". The Guardian,
1/8/90
In it's report Direct Deductions and Water Charges (October 1990) the Social Security
Advisory Committee recommended:
that an early opportunity should be taken to increase the rates of
income support by an amount greater than would otherwise be the case
in recognition of the increasing burden caused by the exceptional rise in
water charges. p.16
3. In 1991/92, Welsh Water had the highest rate of disconnections amongst the 10 water
and sewerage companies. This is despite the fact, according to OFWAT consumer affairs
division staff, that the company is probably the most progressive in the country in its
approach to assisting low income customers in debt (interview with researcher,
September 1992).
4. Disconnection figures for the 29 statutory water companies over this period are not
available. In 1988/89, the total number of disconnections (domestic & non-domestic)
carried out by these companies was 6037. This had fallen to 3531 in 1989/90. OFWAT
(1990).
5. Whether or not the 17,710 customers disconnected without making contact with
British Gas genuinely wanted to forfeit their rights to sympathetic treatment, or
would have preferred to discuss a means of keeping their supply, is not known.
Until more light is shed on this issue, OFGAS cannot be satisfied that the
arrangements under Condition 12A are working as they should. OFGAS (1991)
Section V
6. It is usually argued that prepayment meters provide savings compared to credit
payment (e.g. in terms of interest foregone). With the cashless token meters, which are
now becoming the norm, consumers pay for their gas in advance when they purchase
the tokens. In the gas tariff review, however, OFGAS after analysing British Gas figures
on the cost of operating token and coin meters ".. found no justification in the
representations made that token meter costs are less than those of coin meters, and that
token meters should therefore be accorded special treatment". At the same time, the
regulator acknowledged that "..further work is necessary to study the difference in
structure and level between the prepayment and credit tariffs currently used by British
Gas". OFGAS (1991c) p.9
7. The RECs have an added incentive to extend the use of prepayment meters because
currently "the additional revenue associated with the provision of these meters is treated
as an excluded service and is not subject to the supply price cap" (OFFER, 1992y, p.38).
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8. NACAB has cited this as being a particular problem for electricity consumers in rural
areas (NACAB, 1991b). In his response to the NACAB submission, the Director of
Consumer Affairs, OH-ER, stated:
I am particularly concerned by the suggestions that key/card meters are
being forced on customers who live significant distances from dispensing
machines or who have mobil4y difficulties. OFFER (1991)
9. In their study of the operation of the social fund, Huby & Dix explored aspects of the
budgeting behaviour of the low income household sample who had applied to the social
fund. Electricity and gas bills were "the second most common concern identified by
respondents". Like the Birmingham & Bristol study there was evidence of "the
prepayment meter as 'double-edged' sword" i.e. - budgeting device and source of self-
disconnection:
The constant need to economise was an inherent part of managing
income. This was sometimes achieved by imposing limits on consumption.
Fuel consumption, for example, could be set to a maximum of 110, run
on fuel cards. Throughout the week efforts would be made to stay within
that limit. For many in-depth interview respondents, the amount they
chose to pre-allocate provided only a minimal supply which was
controlled by going without heating for parts of the day, not using the
central heating at all, sitting in the dark in the evenings, or going to bed
early. p.27
10. The water industry has adopted the term "budget meter", because according to the
Director of Consumer Affairs OFWAT, as most water bills are paid in advance, the term
prepayment meter has no real currency (PUAF meeting, September 1992).
11. Severn Trent experienced strong resistance from the Birmingham City Council and
had to delay the commencement of the trials on a number of occasions. A £26 fee will
be levied on customers using the meters (payable at .50p per week). According to
OFWAT staff, the company has made a very poor fist of the trials thus far (interview
with researcher, September 1992). Severn Trent was awarded a "Chartermark" by the
Prime Minister for its prepayment experiment in late September 1992.
12. The Scottish fuel poverty lobby organisations, Right to Warmth and Fuel Policy
Forum, have documented the major stages in the debt collection and disconnection
process (which is essentially the content of the codes) for Scottish Power and British
Gas in their recent publication Paying for Fuel by Rachel Harrison.
13. "Consumerism is defined as the organized reaction of individuals to inadequacies,
perceived or real, of marketers, the marketplace, market mechanisms, government,
government services, and consumer policy." Forbes, 1987, p.4 The term, as applied in
this thesis, incorporates this dimension, but is used more broadly to characterise the
relationship between the individual and the market in the satisfaction of wants.
14. In water and electricity, the levels of fixed payments for breaches of the individual
standards were set originally by the Government. However subsequently, the regulators
have the power to apply for variations in the level of payments, as well as for variations
in the provisions of the guaranteed standards schemes themselves. In late September
1992, the Director General of Water Services made an application to the Secretaries of
State for the Environment and Wales for modifications to the scheme in the water
435
industry. This included a request that the level of compensation in some cases be
increased (OFWAT, 1992x).
15. OFGAS' ambivalence about the re-framing of the regulators' powers under the
Citizen's Charter was commented on by an officer from one of the other regulatory
bodies who was a member of the steering group set up by the Department of Trade and
Industry to draw up the legislation:
They were rather reluctant, they thought they had achieved all that they'd
wanted in the tariff review. Interview with researcher, July 1992.
16. Until the advent of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act the electricity
regulator was generally perceived to have the most developed repertoire of consumer
protection powers and the provisions of the Electricity Act were used as the reference
point for 'levelling up' the powers of the other three utility regulators:
In most respects the electriciry regulator, as the latest to be established,
has the best powers. So part I brings the powers of the telecom, gas and
water regulators up to the level of that of the electricity regulator.
Peter Lilley, Secretary for Trade and Industry in Second Reading speech,
Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill, HoC, 18/11/91, co1.41
17. Chapman (1990) describes the Director-General, James McKinnon, as the joint
holder along with Professor Bryan Carlsberg (OFTEL) of the "prize for the most
combatative and most visible of the regulators". p.121. He also eulogises the "British gas
consumer has good cause to thank James McKinnon. .But for him gas prices would be
higher, and British Gas would still be sheltering behind the protective monopolistic shell
with which the Government foolishly endowed it upon privatisation". p.122
18. The Director General of Gas Supply initiated a review into the British Gas service
package at the end of June 1992. The results of the review are due to be announced
towards the end of the year (OFGAS, Letter to agencies on Monitoring and Review of
British Gas' Standards of Service, 29/6/92).
19. The Select Committee on Energy concluded similarly about the electricity industry.
20. In the ESI for the year ended June 1992, the amount paid out under the Guaranteed
Standards scheme was £155,610 (13,711 payments), which "shows that these payments
have not so far represented a significant cost to the RECs" (OFFER, 1992y, p.32).
21. OFWAT's interest in the issue was stimulated by Southern Water's rejection of the
Director General's recommendations on the awarding of compensation in two cases of
foul flooding in 1991 (see OFWAT, 1992, p.25). In July 1992, the CSC chairs issued
a press release calling for stronger compensation powers for the regulator (OFWAT,
19921).
22. None of the Electricity Consumer Committees 1991/92 Annual Reports were in the
OFFER library (3017/92), which possibly may be symbolic of a different attitude to
consumer committees compared to OFWAT, who diligently collect and disseminate
theirs.
Only about half of the 12 Electricity Consumer Committees seem to have produced
Annual Reports in 1990/91 (going by the content of the OFFER library); most of which
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are amateurish little productions (often stencil-type, small, distinctly unglossy). A
summary of the activities of the ECCs are, however, contained in the Director General
of Electricity Supply's annual reports. The Select Committee on Energy recommended
that "the [National Consumers' Consultative] Committee publish an annual report
separate from the Director General's, containing the reports of individual committees
and commenting on the Director General's work where appropriate" (1992a, para 138).
23. According to the chairperson of one of the CSCs, the Director General of Water
Services reacted angrily to the committee's advocacy of alternatives to the compulsory
metering of new domestic properties and tried unsuccessfully to persuade the committee
to change its view.
24. The issue of structure was debated at a recent meeting of the CSC chairs and
according to one of the participants, the chairs strongly supported the retention of the
existing integrated structure because they believed that it placed them in a stronger
bargaining position with the water companies (interview with researcher, September
1992).
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CHAPTER 8: PUBLIC UTILITY PRIVATISATION IN
PERSPECTIVE: POLICY AND PARADIGM CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
The previous three chapters have shown that a substantial hiatus exists between the
promise and delivery of privatisation in the field of energy and water services, up to this
point in time. One of the explanations for this can be traced to the flaws in the terms
of the privatisation settlement, set by the British Government over the period 1986 to
1991. But even more importantly, the current, and in all probability the continuing, gap
between the rhetoric and reality of utility privatisation may suggest that there are
endogenous and irresolvable problems in the model of privatisation and in the paradigm
of consumerism as applied to the provision of essential services like water and
electricity supply.
At the same time, the privatisation of the public utilities has been attended by a number
of positive outcomes for domestic consumers, particularly in the area of explicit service
standards. As illustrated in Chapter 7, these gains could be largely attributed to the
influence of independent regulation; although it would be churlish to deny any part in
this by the utility companies themselves, in their drive for a greater level of 'customer
consciousness'. In substance though, the positive results of the privatisation programme
underline the important function that independent regulatory bodies can play in utility
policy-making and organisation. And this is likely to be the case irrespective of the
ownership and structural configuration of the utility industries.
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This concluding Chapter will seek to draw together a number of the primary threads in
this thesis by answering two sets of questions which get to the nub of the issue of
privatisation of the public utilities in Britain, namely (0 what are the limitations in the
privatisation settlement and the model of utility privatisation and how might these be
corrected?, and (ii) is the paradigm of consumerism appropriate to the domain of public
utility services or should it be replaced with an alternative paradigm of citizenship?
439
PART 1: THE LIMITATIONS IN THE PRIVATISATION SETTLEMENT AND
MODEL
In assessing the character of the privatisation settlement and the efficacy of the model
of utility privatisation introduced in Britain, it is necessary to make a distinction between
the outcomes of privatisation at the point of sale on the one hand, and those that have
arisen subsequently as a result of the implementation of the privatisation regime, on the
other.
As Chapter 5 showed, the financial settlement 'negotiated' by the Conservative
Government on behalf of British taxpayers during the sale of the three utilities was
defective in a number of significant respects. As such it would be hard to conclude other
than that the sale of the utilities represented a net financial loss to the British public
(both in terms of current valuation of assets and future revenue stream) and importantly,
that the management of the share flotation programme had adverse distributional effects.
Despite the negative outcomes of the sale process for the British population at large,
there is little from a public policy perspective than can now be done to correct this
earlier failure, other than the politically unsustainable action of renationalising the utility
companies without compensating shareholders. However, the "social welfare losses
involved in the transfer of money from the state (i.e. UK citizens) to those who obtained
shares" (Waterson, 1988, p.129) does provide a salutatory lesson to the British
Government and to governments elsewhere about how not to proceed with privatisation
sales in the future.
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In contrast, the impact of the post-sale enactment of the privatisation model warrants
further analysis, both because the outcomes in some instances are more equivocal than
is the case with the privatisation sales and because there is scope for introducing policy
changes aimed at correcting existing defects. In this section, four major features of the
privatisation settlement/model introduced in Britain will be briefly discussed; namely (i)
the financing rules of the utility companies, (ii) the regulatory framework, (iii)
competition assumptions, and (iv) market-led utility policy making. These features reveal
problems both in the original privatisation settlement and in the way that the current
model of public utility privatisation has evolved over time.
(i) The financing rules of the utility companies
Under a privatised model of public utility practice, the price - and hence the
affordability - of utility services is ultimately conditioned by the financial structure
within which the utility companies operate. Consequently, policy action aimed at
influencing or moderating utility tariffs (other than through direct public subsidies) can
not be pursued in isolation from the question of what constitutes an appropriate set of
financing rules for private utility providers. These financing rules include such matters
as allowable rates of return on capital, efficiency targets, capacity to 'pass through'
purchasing and other costs, and the 'ring-fencing' of expenditure on core areas of
service provision from non-core activities (diversification).
In Chapter 6, it was shown that the terms of the original settlement between the
Government and the privatised companies substantially favoured the companies,
particularly in respect to the setting of inflated rates of return on capital, unchallenging
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efficiency targets, and generous provision for cost-pass-through (with the exception of
the RECs over the first three years of privatisation in the case of cost-pass-through).
This has resulted, as a consequence, in artificially high tariffs for consumers and
substantial profits for the companies.
The `privatisation premium' that utility consumers have been paying over the past
several years could be viewed as a follow-up to the income transfers made to company
shareholders at the time of privatisation; although this time as consumers rather than
taxpayers.
The key to the formulation of 'fair' utility tariffs for domestic and other consumers (i.e.
where benefits are evenly distributed between consumers and shareholders) lies in a
trilogy of measures involving (a) the determination of rates of return on capital which
recognise the low risk and relatively secure customer base of the utility industries,
(b) the setting of targets which directly reflect the assumptions on efficiency gains to be
achieved through conversion to plc status, and (c) the structuring of cost-pass-through
provisions in a way that provides an incentive for economic and efficient purchasing.
The Government singularly failed to apply these measures at the time of privatisation
for each of the three utilities.
In their various ways, the three utility regulators have expressed muted criticism of the
privatisation settlement (OFGAS, 1991d; OFVVAT, 1992o, 1992z; OFFER, 1992y). In
the last eighteen months, the gas and, to a lesser extent, the water regulator have taken
action, via adjustments to the price formula, aimed at striking a better deal for tariff
customers.
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The Director General of Water Services has been somewhat more explicit in his
criticisms of the original set of financing rules than have his regulatory colleagues,
presumably because under the original price formula in the water industry he has been
presented with the difficult task of 'selling' continuing tariff increases well above the
rate of inflation. But it may also have something to do with the more open
communication style that he has adopted. The water regulator has foreshadowed major
changes following the 1994 Periodic Review of the price formula, although it remains
to be seen whether these can be delivered. It would be most surprising if the electricity
regulator did not seek likewise to stiffen the efficiency targets for the regional electricity
companies in his reviews of the supply and distribution price controls. To this extent,
the corrective action of the regulators could well represent a triumph for independent
public regulation over political expediency and the accumulation zeal of private
enterprise.
It is by no means certain that regulatory action will continue to move irresistibly in a
direction favouring domestic consumers over the longer-term, however. The regulated
companies, shareholders and the City are likely to become increasingly restive about
what they perceive as 'over-regulation' (see, for example, Investors Chronicle, 8/5/92;
Financial Times, 31/7/92; BG chairman, Robert Evans in The Observer, 15/11/92).
Some commentators are already claiming that the modest advances made by the
regulators breach the "regulatory bargain" struck between the government and
shareholders at the time of privatisation:
regulators.. are railing against the original regulatoty bargain by
progressively edging the rules against the utilities. Veljanovsld (1991)
p.22
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(ii) The regulatory framework
The merits in overlaying the operation and management of public utility services with
a system of independent public regulation is probably the most positive lesson to have
emerged thus far from the privatisation programme. Although the regulators have been
hamstrung by a defective structure, they have been able to forward the case of the
general consumer interest. This is not to suggest, however, that all of the utility
regulators have been equally vigorous or effective in championing the cause of domestic
consumers, let alone that of low income households (as illustrated in the previous two
chapters). Indeed the variability in the performance of the regulators - which relates, in
large part, to how they interpret and balance their statutory duties - is an endemic
weakness in the British model of regulation.
The model of public utility regulation in Britain has evolved considerably over the life
of the privatisation programme. From its beginnings in the Office of
Telecommunications and the Office of Gas Supply as a limited device for price
regulation and an even more limited device for social regulation, it has been re-shaped,
over time, into a rather more comprehensive vehicle for economic regulation and
consumer protection. The fact that this has occurred owes at least as much to the energy
and dynamism of the leading regulators (particularly, the past Director General of
Telecommunications and the Director General of Gas Supply) as it does to the graduated
refinement of the statutory framework in later privatisations. As suggested previously,
the need to introduce legislation to supplement the powers of the regulators, well after
the last of the three privatisations had been concluded, could be seen as an implicit
admission by the Government that the regulatory structure introduced as part of the
privatisation settlement was inadequate to the task.
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Under the Competition and Service (Utilities) Act 1992, the powers of the four utility
regulators (including OF 11,L) have been standardised and this is likely to lead to a more
uniform approach to consumer protection across the utility sectors in the future. A 'best
practice' model constructed from the existing strengths of the regulatory bodies would
incorporate the advocacy and community outreach/networking attributes of the Office
of Gas Supply with aspects of the decisional transparency and information dissemination
of the Office of Water Services and, to a lesser extent, the Office of Electricity
Regulation. OFWAT's practice of publishing MD letters and comprehensive comparative
pricing data, and OFFER's excellent customer accounting statistics are features which
should be replicated by all of the regulatory bodies.
Despite a sense of progression in the development of the regulatory framework, and
notwithstanding the endeavour of the individual regulators and their staff, the British
model of regulation continues to display a number of serious flaws which serve, in
aggregate, to denude its strength in the field of consumer protection. These include (i)
the treatment of the consumer interest as a secondary and contingent dimension of
regulation, (ii) the absence of a specific requirement to protect low income consumers,
(iii) the limited power of the regulators in respect to strategic development and
management of utility industry resources, (iv) variable transparency of decision-making,
and (v) the opaque lines of regulator accountability. It will be recalled from Chapter 1
that each of these areas was identified, in one form or another, as substantive gaps in
the regulatory system by community and consumer sector organisations at the time of
privatisation. The fact that they remain unresolved indicates that the degree of regulatory
progression is nowhere near as great as it may seem at a superficial glance.
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It could well be argued, by the Director General of Gas Supply for instance (see for
example, OFGAS Annual Report 1991, p.8), that the absence of formal powers in each
of these areas is essentially academic, as he has been able to achieve progress in most
of them despite the apparent deficiencies in the regulatory framework. And that the
virtue of the British model lies in its ability to adapt to the particularities and
circumstances of each of the utility sectors at any given point of time. But the weakness
in this argument is that the scope and strength of the regulatory regime is substantially
dependent upon the character, values and capacity of the Director General. In the hands
of a Sir James McKinnon this may present no real difficulties, but in the hands of a
lesser regulator, it is may well expose domestic consumers to considerable risk.
Each of the five problems in the existing regulatory structure, mentioned above, have
been considered at some length in Chapter 3, and hence it is unnecessary to reproduce
those arguments here. However, two issues require additional comment - the absence of
a specific duty to protect low income consumers and the constraints on regulatory
involvement in strategic policy-making - the first in the light of the material in the
previous two chapters, and the second as a result of recent events in the coal industry.
This latter issue is considered in section (iv) below.
During the passage of the Competition and Service (Utilities) Bill the Government
rejected an amendment to place a specific duty on the regulators to protect low income
and vulnerable consumers of utility services. The amendments were consistent with the
"standard setting" (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989, p.174) model of British regulation, as
opposed to a more active "redistributional" (ibid) approach to regulation (where, for
example, the regulator would intervene to influence company practice on pricing and
energy efficiency vis-a-vis low income households:
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The purpose of this group of amendments is to enable each of the
Regulators to require that standards of performance to be met by the
suppliers in individual cases are relevant to the needs of the most
vulnerable consumers, and particularly to those who may experience
fficulOt in paying for supply. Such standards could include, for example,
procedures to be followed prior to disconnection, information to be
supplied to customers in debt, offering a choice of payment methods to
low income consumers, and access to token supply points for coinless
pre-payment meters. NACAB (1992b) p.1
Yet, in refusing to admit the amendment on the grounds that the regulatory bodies had
sufficient powers under the legislation to address the needs of this group of utility
consumers if they so desired, the Government missed (consciously or unconsciously) the
essential point of the amendment. For while the Bill gave the regulators discretionary
power to set performance standards in reference to any sector of the consumer
population, the purpose of the amendment was to ensure that each of the utility
regulators would actually make use of their latent powers on behalf of those groups most
disadvantaged in their interactions with utility service providers.
The rejection of the unexceptional NACAB amendment expressed a continuation of the
dominant British theme of maximising regulatory discretion, as well as a disinclination
to treat domestic consumers as other than a homogenous group. Although in saying this,
the Government seems, on earlier occasions, to have had no qualms about explicitly
directing regulatory attention towards the needs of elderly, disabled and rural consumers.
While there may be a case for providing a relatively wide field of regulator discretion
in particular areas of their engagement with the utility industries, the maintenance of
lifeline services to the most disadvantaged group of utility consumers is not one of them.
This is particularly so in a context, where through a combination of factors (not the least
of which is the rise in tariffs), the level of utility debt has increased steeply in recent
years.
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In the absence of a statutory duty to institute measures to protect this sector of the
consumer population, an untoward reliance is placed on the 'social responsiveness' of
the individual regulator. This is rendered all the more problematic by the constraints on
community sector involvement in the relatively closed process of regulatory decision-
making process. Apart from the Director General of Gas Supply, the performance of the
regulators, to date, has hardly been of a character to inspire unreserved confidence in
their ability to act as guardians of the interests of low income consumers. Yet even
OFGAS has been relatively complacent about monitoring the impact of the prepayment
meter 'solution' to debt and disconnection on the consumption behaviour of low income
households. The Director General of Electricity Supply has displayed little observable
interest in the welfare of low income consumers per se. And although the water
regulator has continually alluded to the deleterious impact of environmentally-driven
water tariff increases on the budgets of low income customers, he has at the same time
actively promoted an approach to water charging (i.e. metering) which acts to the
greatest disbenefit of low income households.
The failure to mandate an explicit role for the regulators vis-a-vis low income consumers
also, arguably, sends exactly the wrong message to the utility companies. It implies that
like the regulators they do not need to give particular attention to consumers who are
poor. The companies should be responsive, of course, to the needs of all their customers,
but because of the particular characteristics of some consumers this responsiveness will
often need to be more proactive and sensitive. Nowhere will this be more so than in
regard to those on low incomes. Yet the commercial unattractiveness of the low income
sector of the market (and particularly that sub-set of low income consumers which Fitch,
1992, describes as "difficult customers") will in many instances inhibit the development
of such an approach, unless it is supported by regulatory sanction.
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(iii) Competition assumptions
It is one of the unpleasant facts of life that certain capacities (and also
certain advantages and traditions of particular organizations) cannot be
duplicated, as it is a fact that certain goods are scarce. It does not make
sense to disregard this fact and to attempt to create conditions "as if"
competition were effective. Hayek (1960) p.265
competition..is the Government's ark of the covenant..
Lord Stoddart of Swindon, HoL Second Reading Debate on the Gas Bill,
10/4/86, co1.318
The utility privatisation programme is premised centrally on a form of 'competitive
utopianism', that is, an intuitive belief in the emergence and efficacy of competition in
the utility industries. The advent of competitive forces into the erstwhile monopoly
arenas of gas, electricity and water supply, it is held, will open up new horizons for
industry efficiency and consumer sovereignty, and ultimately eliminate the need for
external regulation altogether.
The extent to which competition will actually become a pervasive feature of the utility
industries in the future, particularly in the area of domestic supply, is unknown at this
stage. Yet as Chapter 6 showed, there is a degree of scepticism amongst commentators
(including members of the past Select Committee on Energy) about whether competition
will flourish in the domestic sector. However, even if competition does develop, it does
not necessarily follow that it will be an =equivocal benefit to domestic consumers in
generality, and to low income consumers in particular. A sense of agnosticism regarding
the merits of competition might be derived from the a priori observation that the
competitive market place has conventionally done little to promote access and equity
objectives; but it can also be supported by more specific concerns related to the
particular characteristics of the utility industries.
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The consumer is currently at a considerable information disadvantage in their
relationship with utility providers and imperfect information, or the problem of being
able to select amongst competing suppliers on the basis of an informed assessment of
price and service quality, is seen as a fundamental barrier to the attainment of consumer
sovereignty:
Without perfect infornu2tion, however, agents are unable to exercise their
choice rationally; nor can they tell whether competitive cost reductions
are associated with an unacceptable reduction in quality. An important
conclusion follows - that the efficiency advantages of competition are
contingent on perfect information. Barr (1987) p.82
Consequently, the present high level of information asymmetry between utility suppliers
and consumers would need to be addressed, in order for competition to function to the
benefit of domestic consumers. Perfect information is expecting perhaps a bit too much,
but certainly consumers would need to be markedly more informed about the utility
market place, as well as their own pattern of consumption and expenditure than currently
appears to be the case (see DoE, 1991a; OFWAT, 1992b).
This will mean, in turn, that consumers are likely to incur higher "transaction costs"
("transaction costs refer to such costs as those associated with discovery, information
gathering, bargaining and enforcement." Miller, 1990, p.722). In contrast to the
supermarket or shopping mall, where the array of consumption choices are laid out
before prospective purchasers, utility consumers will probably need to go to some
trouble to become more fully informed. For some consumers, these transaction costs will
outweigh the benefits gained in terms of price or service quality. For others, either
because of disability, language, or the sheer complexity of the task, the opportunity to
'shop around' for utility services is likely to be foreclosed.
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Future advances in technology, under the Littlechild scenario (OFFER, 1992b), may well
obviate these information search problems for many domestic consumers. But
technology will come at a price, and there is a clear danger that low income consumers
may be excluded from the possibility of exercising choice (via advanced metering
technology) because of an inability to afford access to the technology. This, along with
the prospect of utility suppliers targeting the more commercially attractive and income
elastic sector of the domestic market, would act to entrench the present 'social division'
of utility services in Britain. The removal of the obligation to supply (which would seem
to be a necessary pre-condition for the introduction of open competition in the domestic
sector) could also mean that customers with a track record of debt and payment default
may experience problems gaining access to supply at all.
The received wisdom in competition theory is that the introduction of multiple and
competing suppliers almost invariably leads to decreases in prices. But for some
consumers of utility services, the advent of competition is likely to have the reverse
result. This will be particularly the case for consumers in some rural areas, and may well
also apply - in relation to electricity supply - to consumers in the south of England, as
most electricity is currently sourced from the north of the country. The removal of
uniform tariffs and the elimination of geographical cross-subsidisation would seem to
be an inevitable corollary of the removal of monopoly franchises in the gas and
electricity industries. Under a competitive regime, utility tariffs for customers who have
hitherto been the beneficiaries of a degree of cross-subsidisation will almost certainly
increase, unless public expenditure is deployed to maintain a level of uniform pricing.
On the obverse side, the removal of cross-subsidies will potentially result in a welfare
gain (in the form of lower prices) for consumers who live in areas where the distribution
and supply costs are relatively low.
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creation of a competitive market in domestic utility services, the framework of
regulation will need to be retained and, in some areas, extended if consumers are to be
effectively protected.
There are lessons to be learnt in this respect from the American experience, and in a
highly critical account of the history of telecommunications regulation in the United
States, Melody (1989, p.685) dismisses the idea of replacing regulation with
competition:
Competition is not a substitute for policy and regulation. It is a potential
tool of policy that, under some circumstances, can facilitate the
achievement of the objectives both of economic efficiency and universal
telephone service; under other circumstances it can promote efficiency
at the expense of social policy; under still other circumstances it can
promote neither..
Despite a definite shift toward an increased role for market forces, the
primary influence upon future developments will not be the 'invisible
hand" of the competitive market, but rather the more tisible hands
crafting policy and regulatory decisions.
At a minimum, additions to the regulators' powers in the area of protection for low
income consumers will be necessary, as they are likely to be the group most exposed
under competitive conditions. This will need to be complemented with an extension to
the existing mechanisms for consumer representation, through, for example,
strengthening the resource base and national fora in the electricity and water consumer
bodies, for as McHarg (1992, p.396) states:
Both regulation of monopoly and regulation for competition are complex
tasks vthich have already required increased, rather than less,
regulation..In the improbable event of full competition deieloping,
holt et er, there it ill still be a role for consumer "voice" alongside 'exit;
in order to influence the range of services on offer as well as the ability
to choose betiteen them and to protect those disadtantaged in the
marketplace: utility services are too important for us to be able to
contemplate market failure.
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House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, and in the Government's
unwillingness to cede anything more than a peripheral function to the regulatory bodies
in the domain of energy industry strategic planning.
The limitations of an essentially laissez faire model of energy policy making, as well
as the interconnectedness between major energy-related decisions and other areas of
public policy, were substantially exposed in October 1992 in the Government's decision
to close thirty-one of the fifty remaining coal mines in Britain.
The intersecting factors leading to this decision were extremely complex and included:
# the increasing lack of interest of the major generating companies and the RECs
(all but one of whom are currently investing in electricity generation) in
purchasing locally produced coal as a result of the availability of cheaper
imported coal and because of extensive investment in gas-fired electricity
generating plant
# the Government's interest in maximising the return on the sale of its 40 per
cent stake in National Power and PowerGen sometime after April 1993 - a new
contract between the generating companies and British Coal, involving a reduced
intake of coal at cheaper prices, would further this end by enhancing the
profitability of the generators
# the plans to privatise British Coal have created an imperative to close
unprofitable pits in order to turn British Coal into a saleable commodity
Putting aside the question of the relative influence of each of these factors, the clear
message to emerge from the announcement on the future of British Coal was that energy
policy set adrift in the turbulent waters of the market place will inevitably collide, at
some point, with broader issues of economic and social policy, and the national interest.
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The deleterious impact of the privatisation of the electricity industry on British Coal had
been predicted by a number of energy commentators well ahead of the events of October
1992 (see for example, Vickers & Yarrow, 1988; Robinson, 1989; Fells & Lucas, 1991;
HoC Energy Committee, 1992a). But electricity privatisation has had other negative
policy-related consequences as well, as Fells and Lucas outline in their forthright
analysis of UK Energy Policy Post-Privatisation (1991):
The short-term commercial perspective of the privatized electricity supply
industty conflicts with the public interest in several ways: insufficient
attention to environmental externalities, insufficient or inappropriate
R&D, inappropriate choice of fuel especially by ignoring long term
security from domestic coal or nuclear power. p.vi
The limitations of the market apply especially to climate change; market
forces do not transmit the signals to make the proper allocations. Given
that nuclear energy and renewable energies are the only means of
expanding supply outside the fossil fuel corset; given that they can only
practically be introduced into the electricity supply system: it makes no
sense to burn high grade fossil fuels like natural gas for power
generation. p.77
In their report, Fells and Lucas emphasise that energy policy is simply too important to
leave in the hands of the private sector (and indeed, too strategically significant to
delegate to the industry regulators), and they call for the development of a
"comprehensive energy strategy" (op cit, p.ix) involving direct government intervention.
A more recent review of the state of British energy policy in the wake of the coal
debacle (Jones, 1992) similarly advocates the development of a clear public policy
framework on strategic energy issues, complemented by energy regulatory bodies
directly accountable to Parliament with responsibility for overseeing "tactical issues of
market conduct" (p.38). Although, to delineate between "strategic" and "tactical" issues
in this way ignores the critical interaction between policy making and policy
implementation, and overlooks the important function that economic and social
regulation performs in the practical formulation of utility industry policy.
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In the aftermath of the coal 'non decision', the electricity regulator has been publicly
castigated for not intervening to prevent the exponential growth in gas-fired generating
capacity (the so-called "dash for gas") and for failing to take a strategic view of current
and future energy needs in Britain (e.g. The Guardian, 5/11/92, 7/11/92, 18/111/92,
19/11/92). Yet Professor Littlechild has a point when he argued in his defence that it is
the role of Government rather than the regulator to determine the broad parameters of
energy policy:
For the regulator to have that responsibility would be to confer enormous
power on that person to shape the market and dictate the investment
decisions on which future generations of customers will depend. If there
is to be more general direction about the form and pace at which the
generation market evolves surely it would be better to take that forward
in a more democratic framework OFFER (1992z)
And in letting the market dictate the character and resource content of electricity
generation, the regulator could be seen to be simply adhering to the contours of the
Government's extant energy policy.
The Government's enforced decision to conduct an inquiry into the energy market,
following the clamorous reaction to the coal mine closures, may result in the
development of an energy policy with more substance to it than the vague outline of the
market. But if it is to engage with key areas of economic, environmental and social
policy it will require a substantial redrafting of the original blueprint of electricity
privatisation. At the same time, the Government could constructively use this 'policy
space' to re-think the fundamental paradigm upon which privatisation is based.
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PART 2: REFORMULATING THE PARADIGM
..the project of the 1990s is surely to think and to popularize the task of
reform and reconstruction of free market economies in the name of social
justice but also in the interest of the authentic, rather than merely
ideological, attainment of efficiency in the production and distribution of
goods in a modern international economy. Taylor (1990) pp.3-4
Privatisation of the public utilities has involved more than the transfer of ownership and
the physical re-structuring of the water and energy industries in Britain. It has also
sought to re-define the relationship between the individual and the State and the way in
which individual needs for essential utility services are met. At its heart, the
privatisation programme is founded on the paradigm of consumerism.
Consumerism is built on the central dynamic of `commodification', involving the
ascription of the products and services in society, designed to meet human needs, as
commodities which can be priced and sold through market-based interactions.
Consumerism gives expression to this core relationship of the 'individual in the
marketplace' and articulates a set of procedural rights designed to protect the individual
in engagement with the market. The corpus of these rights are choice, information, the
power of 'exit' and the ability to seek redress in the event of service failure (e.g.
through complaints procedures and compensation measures). This paradigm of
consumerism is enshrined in the privatisation legislation and the Citizen's Charter-
related supplements to the original legislation (the Competition and Service (Utilities)
Act 1992).
But in the context of public utility services characterised, as Chapter 2 showed, by a
composite of features which distinguish them from other commodities (e.g. essentialness,
substitution problems, inelasticity of demand, natural monopoly and positive and
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negative externalities) is the paradigm of consumerism appropriate? It will be argued
here that it is not, both because the consumerist model breaks down when applied to
utility services and because consumerism fails to address the central issue of 'entry' or
access. It will be suggested that a superior alternative paradigm lies in the conception
of citizenship, or more specifically, social citizenship.
(i) The limits of consumerism
The efficacy of consumerism as an organising principle in the public utility arena
ultimately rests on the extent to which choice and 'exit rights' can be realised in
practice. The other procedural rights are in effect secondary and contingent rights, whose
power is only fully realised once the choice and exit conditions are met. For example,
the right to information has little meaning (from a consumerist, 'shopping around'
perspective) if there is no capacity to choose between different service options and
providers. Equally, the ability to complain is likely to have rather less potency in a
situation where the service provider, against whom the complaint is being directed, is
aware that the complainant does not have the option of taking their business elsewhere,
or of substituting one product with another. A right to compensation in the event of
service failure can assist as a proxy in this regard, but unless it is extremely punitive,
it will have none of the power of actually losing custom through customer 'exit'.
It will be obvious from the reading of this thesis, just as it will have been obvious from
the reader's experience as consumers of utility services, that the field of choice available
to domestic consumers of electricity, gas and water services in contemporary Britain is
no wider now than it was prior to the industries being privatised. The inability to choose
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between different water or energy service providers, in tandem with the non-
substitutability of utility services (with the exception of some areas of household energy
use), also manifestly forecloses the opportunity for consumers to exercise their 'exit
rights'.
In essence, the present structure of the utility industries gives domestic consumers about
as much chance of expressing the key attributes of consumerism as did those
seventeenth century travellers seeking to hire a horse from the Cambridge carrier - the
eponymous Mr Hobson - where the choice on offer was the one nearest the door, or
nothing!
It is anticipated, of course, that these severe impediments to the consumerist ideal will
be removed by 1998, in the case of electricity, and probably much earlier in the case of
gas. Only the future will tell if this environment of choice will be created in the
domestic energy sector, although there is some doubt as to whether many of these hopes
will be realised. But leaving aside the issue, to paraphrase Prospero, as to whether this
is such stuff as dreams are made on, it is important to ask whether the extension of
choice will be all that useful to many domestic consumers of utility services. As
suggested in the earlier section, the manufacturing of choice in utility services will be
attended by costs as well as potential benefits. The opportunity costs involved in
becoming informed and discerning consumers may well be high, and the transaction
costs in switching between suppliers could outweigh, for some consumers, the savings
made in reduced tariffs or improvements in service quality. The advent of competition
could also discriminate against those groups of domestic consumers who might be
described as 'information poor', as well as households who are materially poor (they are
in practice, of course, often the same).
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In addition to these practical issues, which cast doubt on the universal benefits of, and
indeed prospects for, choice, in public utility services, the elevation of choice as a
valued end in itself needs to be questioned. The image of the village market, where
sellers openly ply their wares and where customers pick and choose amongst a wide
array of consumption possibilities, has been an important symbolic metaphor of the
market economy in liberal political thought from Adam Smith onwards. But water and
energy services are not like commodities traded in the village market or the late
twentieth century variant, the hypermarket. The capacity to select one's utility services
on the basis of an immediate visual evaluation of the price/quality combination
obviously does not exist. But more importantly, consumers are likely to want a utility
service that is reliable, safe, and value for money, rather than have the ability to exercise
fine graduations of choice equivalent to making a decision between a white striped shirt
or a white plain one. It is the end product rather than the means of getting there will be
of most importance to consumers of energy and water services. Dowding (1992) places
the relevance of choice in perspective when he says:
Increased choice, as opposed to better products or efficient markets, is
not necessarily something to be valued at all. Firstly, the whole notion
of 'increased choice' is problematic and, secondly, it is not obvious that
we should always value it anyway. Rather what we value is getting what
we want. Markets are often good at that, and they do it by offering us a
choice of products; but it is the goods we value, not the choice itself. In
any particular area of public policy the usefulness of the market must be
examined in relation to the ease of shifting from one alternative to
another, the costs of making decisions and the ability of individuals to
have clearly defined preference schedules. Whether or not it brings
greater choice is not something to be valued at all. The value of choice
in the market is merely instrumental in that it enables preferences to be
revealed or discovered. p.314
Even if the conditions of actual, as opposed to rhetorical, choice and 'exit rights' were
to be satisfied in the future, it would still leave untouched the fundamental flaw in the
consumerist paradigm; namely its failure to address the question of access/entry rights.
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Access to water and energy services, sufficient to meet personal needs, is generally
perceived to be the one of the most basic human requirements. Yet clearly, the capacity
to gain, and retain, access to requisite levels utility services is not equally shared by all
individuals and households in contemporary Britain. The 'social division' of utility
services characteristic of Britain (as well as other countries) is related substantially to
the prevailing structure of income inequality, and the consequent disparities which exist
in the ability to pay for energy and water. In addition, most notably in relation to energy
consumption, higher demand costs are imposed on many low-income households as a
result of their living conditions i.e. poorly insulated housing, expensive forms of heating,
inefficient appliances and the like (Boardman, 1991).
Yet in the face of these structural barriers to entry and access, the consumerist paradigm
is mute. Procedural rights are important, but in themselves they are insufficient. A
panoply of procedural rights is largely ineffective in assisting consumers negotiate their
way through the utility service system when, at the core, is the fundamental problem of
fuel or water poverty; as the regulatory bodies are finding out. Consumerism is
essentially an expression of the negative, one-dimensional view of citizenship alluded
to in Chapter 4, it constitutes a repertoire of individualistic protections for those able to
make their way in the economic system. It undercuts the very notion of public utilities
in the sense of collective provision for the collective good. For a more positive
framework of social, as well as consumer, protection we need to look elsewhere.
463
(ii) Social citizenship
it [social citizenship] implies some limit to commodification and
commercialisation, in the sense that the basic welfare goods to which
individuals have rights are not ultimately to be subject to the market
mechanism, since the market cannot guarantee the provision of these
goods, as of right, on a fair basis to all citizens. Plant (1992) p.16
It is hardly likely to be coincidental that after well over a decade of New Right
ascendancy in Britain, academic commentators and politicians alike have begun to
search for different answers to contemporary social and economic problems. A fertile
source of material in this post-Thatcherism debate about the nature of the British polity
has been found in the theory of citizenship, involving inter alia a return to T.H.
Marshall's seminal account of citizenship written in 1949 (Marshall, 1992). The
resurrection of citizenship as an intellectual counterpoint to neo-liberal ideas is evident,
at the political level in the formulation of citizens charters by each of the three political
parties (see Taylor, 1991/92, for a useful comparative analysis of these three charters),
and at an academic level in the proliferation of published works on the subject (e.g.
Heater, 1990; Andrews, ed., 1991; Marshall & Bottomore, 1992; Mouffe, ed., 1992;
Roche, 1992; Coote, ed., 1992).
As well as possibly heralding the beginnings of a shift in the tide of political ideas, the
return to citizenship also underscores, interestingly, the hegemony of capitalism in late
twentieth-century society. For the template of citizenship - consisting of the triad of
political, civil and social rights - is superimposed on the extant structure of the market
economy (albeit often re-defined as the 'social market'); and indeed it was for these
reasons that Marshall's ideas were generally dismissed by neo-Marxist theorists in the
1960s and 1970s. The immediate relevance of this, for our purposes here, is that the
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framework of citizenship is likely to be more congruent with the privatised structure of
the public utilities, than would more radical, and possibly more desirable, political
formulations.
The present generation of writers on citizenship have sought to apply and adapt
Marshall's fairly simple thesis about citizenship to the contemporary era (with Plant,
1991, 1992, Bottomore, 1992, and Ignatieff, 1991 in particular doing an effective
updating job). Yet the basic construction of citizenship, with notably its elevation of
social rights to an equivalent status with civil and political rights, remains pretty much
the same as that originally articulated by Marshall:
By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a
modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the
full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being
according to the standards prevailing in the society. Marshall (1992) p.8
Marshall did not specifically allude to energy and water services in his account of the
evolution of citizenship rights (nor, for that matter, do most contemporary
commentators), but the character and importance of these services in present-day Britain
would place them firmly within the last part of his definition i.e. "to live the life of a
civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society".
Locating public utility services within a paradigm of social citizenship, as opposed to
the paradigm of consumerism, changes the theoretical and practical relationship of the
consumer to the privatised water and energy industries. It connotes a recognition of
substantive as well as procedural rights (Plant, 1991, p.58) and mandates public policy
and utility company action aimed at ensuring that access rights are guaranteed and
protected.
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The social security system, energy efficiency programmes and the regulatory bodies
would be the key instruments for the enactment of a social citizenship model of utility
service provision, at the level of public policy. Over recent years, relatively little effort
has been made to target assistance to households experiencing difficulties paying energy
and water bills (with the exception of the desultory cold weather payments scheme), and
this has been exacerbated by the post-1988 changes to the social security system
(Crowe, 1991). A form of fuel and water allowances for social security beneficiaries
with disproportionately high bills, or discounts made at source by the utility companies
(which would subsequently be reimbursed out of public revenue) would seem to be a
minimum requirement.
The causal link between housing quality, in terms of energy efficiency, and fuel poverty
is well established (e.g. Boardman, 1991a, 1991b; DoE, 1991b). Therefore, without
concentrated action to deal with the demand side of the energy equation in many low
income households, through a comprehensive domestic energy efficiency strategy, fuel
allowances would, in a sense, be simply throwing good money after bad. An energy
efficiency-led approach to fuel poverty would also, as Boardman (1990, 1991a) has
persuasively argued, intersect with the public policy objective of reducing energy-related
environmental externalities.
It is, of course, little more than wishful thinking to airily propose increases in public
expenditure in the current political and economic climate in Britain; a view underlined
by the knowledge that the Major Government apparently gave serious consideration to -
but ultimately rejected - taking action to rescind the statutory requirement to upgrade
benefits annually in line with inflation, in its search for public expenditure savings in
the 1992 Autumn Statement. This serves to reinforce the point, however, that unless
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there is paradigmatic change - not just in relation to the public utilities but in social
policy generally - then little progress towards greater equity and social justice will be
made. What is needed in relation to public policy programmes aimed at assisting low
income households in the field of utility service provision, is a replication of the
political will, which over the past three years has sanctioned the surcharging of
electricity consumers in order to underwrite the costs of the nuclear power industry by
something in excess of £3 billions.
A social citizenship approach to utility services would demand a far more active role for
the regulators than has been, with one partial exception, the case to date. This would
require, amongst other things, not only the setting of specific service standards to
provide a minimum floor of protection to low income consumers, but the delineation of
performance targets aimed at promoting competitive 'best practice' in relation to social
and environmental responsiveness. These would include targets designed to raise the
level of energy efficiency in low income households, to prevent the build-up of
consumer debt and to eliminate the extraordinarily archaic practice of disconnection for
debt. And like quality standards generally, these measures should be tied to the price
formula.
One of the most enduring and disingenuous myths perpetrated by the public utility
industries (which well and truly pre-dates privatisation) is that they are a set of basically
economic services, with no mandate, nor responsibility, for social welfare. But as Fitch
(1992, p.5) cogently asks:
..what is it that these providers of essential services supply ([not welfare.
Enjoyment of the services of the water, fuel and telecommunications
utilities is the foundation of well-being - of welfare - in modern societies.
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In a very real sense, public utilities are the bedrock of social welfare in contemporary
societies and in contrast to the consumerist paradigm, where this is hidden beneath a
morass of commercial and technical imperatives, the social citizenship model of the
public utilities would explicate and formalise the pivotal contribution of the industries
to economic and social well-being.
This does not necessarily mean though, that the utility companies would be required to
engage in extensive cross-subsidisation or 'tariff-tilting' in order to facilitate access to
services for particular sectors of the population. Measures aimed at giving financial
assistance to low income consumers are probably best handled through the
taxation/social security systems, for the reason that this is likely to be a more
distributionally progressive and transparent approach (although the latter attribute means
that they would be exposed to the vagaries of the government budgetary process).
External measures also would not have the negative impact on efficiency that has
generally been perceived to be the problem with internal price manipulation (see Dilnot
& Helm, 1987, for a useful discussion of these issues).
But under the social citizenship paradigm, tariffs would be tightly controlled and
constraints would be placed on the companies' ability to generate excessive profits;
much of which is derived from the capacity to extract 'monopoly rents'. At the moment
only shareholders benefit from efficiency and purchasing savings in excess of those
anticipated under the price formula. Provision could be made for the 'clawback' of a
proportion of the additional profits made by the utility companies (in the form of lower
tariffs), without negating the in-built incentives for efficiency. In this way consumers as
well as shareholders would gain a dividend from improved industry performance.
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There is much that the companies could do at a service delivery level to help low
income households maintain access to utility services, for example, in payment and debt
re-scheduling, on the supply side, and in energy efficiency initiatives, on the demand
side. This will inevitably involve an element of cross-financing, including the possibility
of slightly higher charges for consumers in general; but if the MORI survey
commissioned by the water regulator is anything to go by, this is a price that the
majority of consumers are willing to pay in order to assist low income households (see
MORI, 1992, Table 207).
Above all under the citizenship paradigm, "social responsiveness" (Frederick et al, 1988,
p.468) would form a primary criterion, along with commercial success, for adjudging
industry performance:
It will only be possible to create a more socially responsible economy
with more socially responsible companies, which recognise social
obligations as well as financial and economic ones.
Leadbeater (1991) p.24
In combination, the public policy and regulatory actions implicit in the adoption of a
social citizenship approach would effectively entail a re-negotiation of the terms of the
privatisation settlement between the Government, the industries and the people of
Britain.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to draw together a number of the primary themes in this thesis
through considering the salient defects in the British model of utility privatisation.
It has been suggested that more than marginal policy tinkering will be required in order
to correct these. The paradigm around which the privatisation programme has been
framed is inconsistent with the basic function and importance of public utility services
in the lives of individuals and families, and in the economy generally. If the rhetoric of
privatisation, notably in respect to the provision of new consumer rights and
opportunities for all households in the country, is to be matched with concrete outcomes
then major changes will be required. In this sense, the privatisation project remains
substantially incomplete.
Within the circumscribed frame of reference set for them, the regulatory bodies have
made, generally speaking, a positive contribution to the broad welfare of ordinary
consumers. The procedural rights that domestic consumers have gained in recent years
are certainly superior to those which existed during the decades of nationalisation in
Britain. But these have not been delivered by the operation of the market, as the thesis
of consumerism asserts, but through public intervention in the market via regulation.
However, the regulators have been relatively ineffectual in dealing with the important
issues of social equity and strategic policy in the provision and management of public
utility services.
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The privatisation programme has illustrated that, rather than leading to the withering
away of the state, that the mechanisms of public policy need to remain centrally engaged
within the milieu of public utility activity, if consumers are to be protected and if the
strategic resources of the utility industries are to be optimised to the benefit of society
as a whole.
Arguments that the levers of regulation should be released in order to let the markets
in energy and water operate without constraints, or that regulation should be
progressively displaced in line with the emergence of competition, are based on a set
of fallacious premises about the commodity nature, and unexceptional character, of water
and energy services. Public utility services are different from other commodities and a
failure to recognise this is likely to result in deep and long-lasting economic and social
damage.
The British privatisation programme has been rife with contradictions. This was in
evidence right at the beginning in the objectives of the programme and it has continued
to be a pervasive feature of the programme ever since. To suggest that a social
citizenship paradigm of public utility services could be built onto the quintessentially
individualistic model of privatisation might be seen to be a contradiction in terms, as
well as being wildly unrealistic. Yet, in theory at least, such an approach is possible.
It would be a major contradiction indeed if a project designed, in part, to entrench the
severely unequal distribution of property rights in this country could be transformed into
an instrument for the promotion of social justice and collective welfare in Britain in the
1990s.
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ANNEXE 1: NATIONALISATION OF THE UTILITIES. A HISTORICAL
SURVEY
The nationalised undertakings had been, as a whole, neither an inspiring
success nor a hopeless failure. Their uncertain achievement matched the
ambiguity of the task they had to attempt. Ashworth (1991) p.208
INTRODUCTION
The history of the public utilities as centrally-owned and managed public enterprises,
is a relatively recent one. The distinctive features of the public utilities; namely, their
natural monopoly character and their essential service nature had long been
recognised, but it was only in the immediate post-war period that comprehensive
national ownership was adopted as a public policy strategy for regulating and managing
the energy utilities. And the nationalised origins of the water industry dates back only
as far as 1974.
While the participation of the central state in utility ownership and management is
largely a mid-twentieth century phenomenon, the practice of public regulation and public
ownership of the electricity, gas and water services industries is substantially entwined
with the history of the utilities themselves.
Public regulation via Parliament, aimed at curbing the abuse of monopoly power,
accompanied the development of gas lighting and fuel technology in early nineteenth
century Britain and the introduction of electricity generation and supply later in the
century. The nascent regulatory regime for the utilities was extended, in the case of the
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water services industry in the late nineteenth century, to cover the public health
requirements of water supply and sewerage.
Public ownership in a municipal form, was a prominent feature of both the electricity
and water services industries in the latter part of the nineteenth century; and although
gas remained predominantly in private hands, there was considerable interest in locating
all three public utilities within the expanding domain of municipal control_
Yet for all this local authority and Parliamentary pedigree, the structure and character
of the publicly-owned utilities from the mid-twentieth century up till very recent times,
have been framed around a model that owes its origins not to the "Gas and Water
Socialism" of the Webbs and the Fabian Society, but to the centralised "public
corporation" concept of Herbert Morrison and others. Under this model neither local
government nor Parliament occupy positions of major significance; although the
ambiguous position of the latter has been the subject of on-going controversy throughout
the 'life' of the nationalised industries. In an important sense then, the history of the
contemporary public utilities is the history (or at least, a major sub-part of the history)
of the post-war nationalisation programme. Therefore, while historical antecedents will
be alluded to, this Annexe will substantially focus on the events subsequent to 1945, as
the relevant history of the organisation and management of the utility industries prior
to privatisation_
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This discussion of the nationalised utilities will be structured in three parts: the first
provides a thematic account of the approach of British governments to nationalisation
from 1945 onwards, the second contains a discussion of selected aspects of the history
of utility nationalisation, and the third explores, via a case study on codes of practice,
one dimension of consumer relations in the nationalised utilities over the last decade or
so of their existence. The emphasis in the first two sections is on the structural aspects
of the industries rather than their specific policy content; so, for example, while the
organisation of the energy utilities will be discussed, energy policy per se will not.
PART 1: A THEMATIC ACCOUNT OF POST-WAR NATIONALISATION
To attempt to provide a detailed history of post-war nationalisation in Britain would be
perilous; for it would extend the scope of this work beyond its already broad parameters,
as well as reiterate, in an inferior form, much of the material contained in existing
studies of the period, such as Robson (1960), Hanson (1961, 1963), Kelf-Cohen (1969),
Tivey (ed, 1973), Chester (1975) and more recently, Sloman (1978), Curwen (1986) and
Ashworth (1991). However, in order to understand the political and economic
environment in which the utility industries were located prior to privatisation, and to
appreciate some of the specific situational influences on their practice and performance,
a brief excursion into the historical terrain of the nationalised industiies generally is
necessary.
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The approach adopted here is selective and thematic, covering the following elements:
* The Public Corporation model of public ownership
* Financial regimes
* Non-commercial objectives
* Consumer representation.
(i) The Public Corporation model of public ownership
The public corporation is in my judgement by far the best organ so far
devised in this or any other country for administering nationalized
industries or undertakings. Allowing for some teething troubles which are
still not entirely cured, the public corporation which we have evolved is
an outstanding contribution to public administration in a new and vitally
important sphere.
Robson (1960) p.493
The policy and organisational framework for the ambitious and landmark programme
of nationalising key sectors of the industrial economy undertaken by the Attlee
Government in 1945-51, was substantially founded on the concept of the public
corporation. The adoption of a single structural form, for industries as diverse in their
history, structure and performance as the railways, coal mining, electricity generation
and supply and the manufacture of iron and steel, based on private sector practice rather
than conventional models of public administration, reflected the importance of
commercial efficiency as a primary objective in the Labour Government's
nationalisation programme.
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The attractiveness of the public corporation conception of public ownership and
management was enhanced by the practical consideration that it was seen to present the
only coherent alternative to conventional departmental and municipal forms of
administration (Chester, 1975, Morgan, 1985). The Guild Socialist form of worker
management (advocated by G.D.H. Cole and The Miners' Federation after the first
World War) and the tripartite structure of management-worker-consumer control
(expounded by the Webbs) were dismissed as inappropriate models for public ownership
by the Labour Party and the Trade Union movement during the inter-war period.
Despite some debate within Cabinet and within the Ministerial committee responsible
for the nationalisation programme, about the possibility of utilising traditional
departmental structures for the management of the publicly owned industries
(particularly, electricity and gas), the public corporation was ultimately favoured, as it
offered greater potential for a flexible and business-like approach to the running of the
newly-nationalised industries.
A distrust of the commercial competence of the civil service and the development of the
limited liability company in the private sector (with its separation of ownership and
management), were instrumental factors, according to Chester (1975), in the choice of
the public corporation as the preferred model. The strategic position of Herbert Morrison
as chairman of the Cabinet's Socialization of Industries Committee, was also apparently
significant in determining the form that nationalisation took in 1946-1950.
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The municipal alternative was barely countenanced, as the scale of operation required
to run the industries efficiently extended well beyond the geographical boundaries and
technical competence of most local authorities (exemplified in the case of electricity, for
instance, with the evolution of the "national grid" and the technical advances made in
power generation).
Herbert Morrison is rightly credited with the theoretical and practical development of
the public corporation model - through his creation of the London Passenger Transport
Board and his influential account of this in Socialisation and Transport, 1933 - although
similar ideas on the organisation of public enterprise had pre-dated, in a less developed
form, Morrison's formulation.
The Liberal Party, for example, in its 1928 Yellow Book, Britain's Industrial Future,
strongly supported the establishment of independent public boards for the management
of public enterprises. Also arguably, in 1920, the Webbs had anticipated a number of
the key elements of the public corporation in their seminal work, A Constitution for the
Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain (Kelf-Cohen 1969); although the detail of their
conception of public ownership was in many respects at variance with the approach
ultimately adopted after 1945 (see Radice, 1984, pp. 219-224). At a policy level, one of
the earliest prototypes of the public corporation was instituted by the Conservatives in
1926, with the creation of the Central Electricity Board.
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While the act of procreation might not have been Morrison's alone, he is, at the least,
entitled to the status of 'senior foster parent'; for his intellectual and practical
endeavours, as Minister for Transport in the 1929-31 Labour Government, as Chairman
of the manifesto committee prior to the 1945 General Election and as Lord President in
1945-51, did much to consolidate the dominance of the public corporation as the
primary means through which public ownership would be enacted. The merits of a small
appointed board to run the nationalised industries at "arm's length" from the government
of the day, were summarised by Morrison in his retrospective study of policy-making
during the period, Government and Parliament (1959):
[Public Corporations] ..seek to combine the principle of public ownershiA
of a broad but not too detailed public accountability, of a consciousness
on the part of the undertaking that it is working for the nation and not
for sectional interests, with a liveliness, initiative and a considerable
degree of freedom of a quick-moving and progressive business enterprise.
p.282-283
For Morrison, the requirement of commercial viability was as axiomatic for "socialised
industries" (a term he preferred to nationalisation) as it was for private sector enterprise.
But critically, because of the absence of the need to generate profits for private
shareholders, self-serving commercial behaviour would be displaced by 'public
service-oriented' policies and practices in the publicly-owned industries. Importantly,
under Morrison's formulation, this combination of commercial competence and public
service would be best achieved through releasing the industries from direct political
control and by ensuring that producer (i.e. trades union) and consumer interests were not
unduly influential in the day-to-day management of the nationalised industries.
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The question as to whether this arrestingly simple paradigm of public enterprise is itself
fundamentally flawed, or has been flawed through implementation, has been and
remains, a major axis around which the debate over public ownership has been
conducted.
The formal characteristics of the public corporation concept, are outlined by Hanson
(1963, p.13):
(a) it is wholly owned by the state, even though it may raise all or some of its
capital by the issue of bonds to the public
(b) it is created by special law, and is not subject - except to the extent as may
be prescribed - to the ordinary company law
(c) it is a body corporate i.e. a separate legal entity which can sue and be sued,
enter into contracts, and acquire property in its own name
(d) it is independently financed, obtaining its funds by borrowing, either from
Treasury or from the public, and deriving its revenues from the sale of its goods
or services
(e) it is exempt from the forms of parliamentary financial control applicable to
government departments
0 its employees are not civil servants, and they are recruited and remunerated
on terms and conditions that the corporation itself determines.
The members of the boards responsible for the management of the public corporations
were appointed by the Ministers of the sponsoring departments (with tenure of up to five
years) and were selected on the basis of their familiarity with and expertise in the
relevant industry, or business management generally. In keeping with Morrison's
concern about the influence of sectional interests, board members were not
representative of particular organisations or sectors of the industry; but provision was
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made for the appointment of members with experience in "organisations of workers" (i.e.
the trade union movement).
While their legislative status as quasi-independent organisations provided the boards with
considerable room for manoeuvre commercially (including originally, the ability to set
charges without the need for government approval), substantial powers were retained by
the Ministers of the sponsoring departments (and Treasury) including:
* control over borrowing and the use of reserve funds
* approval of major capital development programmes
* and the important reserve power "to give directions of a general character as
to the exercise and performance by a Board of its functions in relation to matters
appearing to the Minister to affect the national interest" Chester (1975) p.914
Beyond these legislated powers, relevant Ministers of State were in a position to
exercise considerable persuasive authority over the policies of the public corporations
during their regular informal contact with the board chairmen. In the view of
commentators like Chester (1975), Hanson (1963), Robson (1960) and Tivey (1973),
informal ministerial influence was to become a primary route for the application of
government constraints on the activities of the public corporations.
Because the public corporations existed as quasi-independent organisations outside the
traditional structure of government, the role of Parliament was seen - at least initially
- as limited essentially to the receipt of the public corporations' annual reports and to
the broad consideration of their financing as part of the Public Accounts monitoring
process. Likewise, the accountability of the responsible Minister to Parliament for the
performance of the nationalised industries was to be highly circumscribed; with the
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Minister answerable for departmental policy relevant to the operation of the public
corporation but not for the day-to-day policy and practice of the industries themselves.
In Morrison's view, this "hands off" approach was a necessary pre-condition to the
commercial freedom and flexibility of the public corporations. The continuing debate
on the floor of the House of Commons about the admissibility of questions on the
nationalised industries (see Morrison, 1959, pp.256-262 for a detailed review of the
issue), and the advent of the Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries (in 1952,
but not effectively functioning until 1956), illustrated the mounting restiveness of
members of Parliament about their hamstrung role vis-a-vis the nationalised industries.
The issue for many parliamentarians at the time, (and an issue that has continued to
provide difficulties for advocates of public enterprise) was encapsulated by Hanson
(1963) in the following terms:
The problem universally experienced is to combine such business flexibility with
an adequate measure of public control over general policy, without which there
would be little point in having the enterprise in the public sector. p.13
The power of Morrison's vision is attested by the fact that the public corporation
concept had a profound impact upon the form of public ownership adopted in Britain
and elsewhere (for example, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) for much of the post-
war period. Despite extensive internal re-structuring within the nationalised industries
themselves from 1951 to 1979, the public corporation retained its ascendent position as
the primary operational model of nationalisation.
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This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the Morrisonian concept of
nationalisation or "socialisation" has been an enormous success. On the contrary, the
public corporation model has, from the outset, been plagued by a number of seemingly
intractable problems; some of which appear to be intrinsic to the model itself, while
others arise from the way that it has been implemented. The policy conundra of the
public corporation model of public ownership include:
* marrying public accountability with commercial freedom and "arms length"
control;
* reconciling the public service ethos with commercial enterprise values;
* finding a mechanism for the expression of worker and consumer interests
and meeting the disparate - and, at times, conflicting expectations of these two
major constituencies;
* establishing appropriate proxy measures (in place of profit levels) for
adjudging performance;
* and reconciling industry-specific commercial decisions with macro-economic
policy priorities.
The inability of the public corporation model over its forty-odd year history to deal
effectively with these issues - some of which are explored in following sections -
explains to an extent, the policy retreat of the Labour Party vis-a-vis nationalisation from
the early 1950s onwards (see Hanson, 1963, Tivey, 1973, Sloman, 1978 and Fraser,
1988, for accounts of the shift in Labour Party thinking since 1951). It might also
contribute to an explanation for the marked degree of public and political quiescence in
the face of the Conservative Government's wholesale dismantling of the nationalised
industries in late twentieth century Britain.
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(ii) Financial Regime
The system of financial management and control of the nationalised industries changes
considerably over the course of their relatively short history.
The strictures of "financial targets" and "external financing limits" (EFLs) introduced
in the 1970s and 1980s appeared, on the face of it, to be a long way removed from the
simple injunction to "break even over a number of years" found in the Nationalisation
Acts of the late 1940s. At one level, the increasingly assertive financial stewardship of
the nationalised industries by successive governments from 1961 onwards, represented
a clear and irreversible breach of the Morrisonian principle of "arm's length" control.
While at another, it expressed a pragmatic refinement of the commercial and
efficiency-oriented criteria that, for Morrison and his Cabinet colleagues, explicitly drove
the machinery of the nationalised industries from the outset.
Whether Morrison would have seen - with the benefit of hindsight - the need for more
specific economic and financial guidance for the industries beyond "that the revenues
are not less than sufficient to meet their outgoings properly chargeable to revenue
account, taking one year with another" (Gas Act 1948, s.41(0), is a moot point.
However, it is probable that he may have found greater difficulty in concurring with the
manner in which successive governments actively interfered with the financial structure
of the nationalised industries in order to promote macro-economic and political
objectives. Instances of this "hands on" approach to the nationalised industries are
manifold; ranging from the anti-inflationary "price pegging" measures of the Heath and
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Wilson governments in 1970-75, through the IMF-inspired reductions in the industries'
capital development programmes in the mid-1970s, to the setting of inflated electricity,
gas and water charges by the Thatcher Government in order to increase revenue for the
Exchequer and to improve the commercial attractiveness of these industries prior to
privatisation.
The shifting economic and financial rules that have been applied by British governments
to the nationalised industries expressed, at the one time, a legitimate desire to introduce
greater precision and accountability into the financial policies and practices of the public
corporations, and an unwillingness to allow the industries to operate as commercial
entities in their own right, without politically-motivated intervention. Paradoxically, the
vulnerability of the nationalised industries to political interference, was used by the
Thatcher Government - which had interfered as much as any previous government - as
a leading argument for their return to the private sector (see Moore in Kay et al, 1986,
p.83).
Figure A.1 overleaf provides a summary of the major policy changes in the economic
and financial regulation of the nationalised industries from 1946 (when the first
Nationalisation Acts were passed) to the 1980s.
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Financial regulation of the Nationalised Industries 1946+
* Nationalisation Acts
* Finance Act 1956
* White Paper 1961
* White Paper 1967
* NEDO Report 1976
* White Paper 1978
Revenue sufficient to cover outgoings "taking one year with another".
All capital to be raised via Treasury and the issuing of industry-specific
guaranteed stocks terminated.
Five-year period introduced as time-frame over which revenue and
outgoings to be balanced. Replacement cost as basis for calculating
depreciation in place of historic cost. Specified rates of return on
capital set (e.g. electricity 12.5%, gas 10%). Yearly Ministerial reviews
of capital expenditure and capital development plans established.
Introduction of long-term marginal cost pricing and the "aim of pricing
policy should be that the consumer should pay the true cost of providing
the goods and services he consumes.." (White Paper, extract in Tivey,
1973, p.80). Test rate of discount on new investment - 8% (increased to
10% in 1969). Introduction of performance indicators.
Recommended tighter financial regulation and abandonment of the
"arm's length" relationship between government and the nationalised
industries.
Required rate of return of 5% on aggregate new investment.
Strengthening of industry-specific financial targets. Introduction of
non-financial performance targets. External financing limits imposed.
* Extensive use of EFLs
	
\
post-1979 "Under the Thatcher government, with its much publicised intentions to
reduce public spending, the external financing limits became the main
instrument of government
control of the nationalised industries_Overall by 1984-85, the
Conservatives had cut the total external finance of the nationalised
industries by 35% in real terms compared to 1979-80, though this was
much less than originally intended." Levacic (1987) p.262
* Oil & Gas (Enterprise)
Act 1982 and Energy Act
1983	 Introduction of "liberalisation" measures designed to raise the
performance of the electricity and gas industries through encouraging
rival sources of supply.
Figure A.1: Financial regulation of the nationalised industries
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Simply listing the financial control changes since 1946 does not, of course, portray the
full picture. In a number of instances, these financial regimes were never fully
implemented (as in the case of long-term marginal cost pricing), either because they
were measures inappropriate to the financial structure of the nationalised industries, or
because of resistance from within the industries themselves. Alternatively, some of the
measures designed to improve the long-term financial planning of the industries, were
quickly superseded by the shorter-term economic and political exigencies of central
government.
From the simple - if inadequate - test of financial performance that accompanied their
beginnings, the nationalised industries became increasingly embroiled in a confusing and
confused web of economistic aspiration, financial regulation and political intervention
(which, appeared to resemble, at times, a form of national "pork-barrelling"). It is
perhaps not remarkable then their overall performance either, in terms of efficiency or
public service (Pryke, 1981, Redwood, 1980, National Consumer Council, 1976b, 1989a)
has been less than Morrison and his colleagues might have hoped as the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Hugh Dalton introduced the Second Reading of the Cable and Wireless
Bill: "Yesterday it was coal; today it is cables. The Socialist advance, therefore,
continues" (quoted in Morgan, 1985, p.101).
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(iii) Non-commercial Objectives 
The test of commercial viability was no doubt offensive to those who
wanted the industries to be run as a public service. It was never made
apparent, however, what was involved in the public service concept.
Chester (1975) p.1054
The relationship between the commercial and non-commercial objectives of the
nationalised industries has been a matter of contention since the industries were first
taken into public ownership. The extent to which the industries have obligations beyond
efficient commercial production and practice - for example, in the redistribution of
income and wealth (through cross-subsidisation amongst categories of consumers and
through 'progressive' wage policies for their workforces), or in contributing towards
national economic planning objectives (such as directing capital development towards
regionally disadvantaged areas) - is a question that has, in practice, only been 'resolved'
negatively in recent years via the Conservative Government's denationalisation
programme.
Although commercial competence was of paramount importance to the post-war
architects of nationalisation, the goal of public ownership was generally viewed as
something more than this. With differing degrees of emphasis, public ownership was
seen as an essential lever for national economic planning and as a route to economic
freedom and equality. For Morrison, Shinwell, Dalton and Bevan, the view expressed
some thirty years later by Sloman (1978) would have struck a resonant chord:
Many of the most persuasive arguments for public ownership are based
on a recognition of the inadequacies of the price mechanism. The idea
that nationalised industries should be entirely commercial in character
is totally at odds with this justification for public industry. p.105
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Yet for all their apparent commitment to the attainment of non-commercial outcomes
- for workers, consumers and the nation alike - from the operation of industrially
efficient and service-oriented public corporations, Morrison et al. expended little mental
energy on the issue of how this might be achieved in tandem with the dictum of
commercial pre-eminence.
The assumption, apparently made by Morrison et al, that a devotion to 'public service'
and its corollary, 'the pursuit of the public interest', would be sufficient to guide the
public corporations through the dilemma of how to reconcile commercial and
non-commercial objectives, has proved to be flawed. This initial failure to define the
basis and expression of the social mandate of publicly-owned enterprises, has
substantially contributed to the uncertain place that non-commercial objectives have had
in the operational practice of the nationalised industries.
Succeeding governments acted ambiguously in relation to the putative non-commercial
obligations of the nationalised industries. On the one hand, they urged, with increased
vigour, the industries to adopt an explicitly commercial approach to the management of
their human and capital resources and to pricing policy. While on the other, they sought
to influence industry policy-making (and modify commercial prerogatives) in order to
achieve macro-economic and distributional aims.
A resolution to this ostensible contradiction in the management of public enterprise was
sought through the twin device of (i) separately identifying non-commercial activities
and (ii) shifting the financial burden for non-commercial obligations from the industries
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directly to the taxpayer generally. The following selected quotes from relevant sections
of the series of White Papers, alluded to earlier, illustrates how successive governments
attempted to deal with the problem of the non-commercial dimension of the nationalised
industries.
White Paper 1961:
They cannot..be regarded only as very large commercial concerns which
may be judged mainly on their commercial results: all have, although in
varying degrees, wider obligations than commercial concerns in the
private sector.. These [non-commercial] activities wig so far as
practicable, have been taken into account in fixing the financial standard
for each undertaking. To the extent that commercially unprofitable
activities are subsequently imposed from outside, a Board would be 
entitled to ask for an adjustment of its financial objectives. 
(extract in Tivey, 1973, p.73, author's emphasis)
White Paper 1967:
Where there are significant social or wider economic costs and benefits
which ought to be taken into account in their investment and pricing
these will be reflected in the government's policy for the industry: and
if this means that the industry has to act against its own commercial
interests, the government will accept responsibility. (Where necessary the 
government will make a special payment to the industry or make an 
appropriate adjustment to its financial objectives). 
(extract in Tivey, 1973 p.87, author's emphasis)
White Paper 1978:
The Government intends that the nationalised industries will not be
forced into deficit by restraints on their prices. When help has to be
given to poorer members of the communio, it will be given primarily 
throuzh the social security and taxation systems and not by subsidising 
nationalised industry prices. 
(quoted in Curwen, 1986, p.79, author's emphasis)
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The evolution of government policy on the non-commercial practices of the nationalised
industries therefore, consisted of a series of ad hoc, but cumulative, departures away
from the vague founding principle of generic 'public service'. The position by the late
1970s appeared to represent a marked dilution of the broader purpose of public
ownership as envisaged by its original proponents. For not only were the nationalised
industries substantially relieved of financial responsibility for non-commercial activities,
they were effectively released (in the conceptualisation of their mandate, if not in actual
practice) from social and other non-commercial obligations altogether.
The explicit commercialisation of the nationalised industries may have been valid and
indeed necessary, from a purely economic perspective; but manifestly from a wider
public policy lens, it brought into question the fundamental raison d'etre of public
ownership in the industrial sector in the first place. The process of eliminating all but
the commercial essence of public enterprises, also acted to eliminate the philosophical
and conceptual dividing line between public and private forms of industrial ownership
and management.
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(iv) Consumer Representation
The amount of consideration given by Ministers and civil servants and
even by Parliament to the consumer in the nationalisation legislation was
much less than that given say to the position of the workers and Trade
Unions and vet)) much less than that given to such general aspects as
compensation and the role of the Minister. Chester (1975) p.641
As this thesis has argued, the monopoly character of the utility industries - whether in
public or private ownership - requires that particular attention be given to the position
of the consumer. In contrast to the notional prerogatives of the consumer in arenas
characterised by multiple producers and suppliers and a competitive environment, the
consumer of utility services has few 'natural' safeguards with respect to service quality
and price. The ultimate sanction of withdrawal of custom is clearly not an option for
consumers of electricity, gas and water, where there is an absence of alternative supply.
The problem is further compounded by the fact that the products of the industries are,
by their nature, largely essential services. In the absence of the regulatory power of
demand therefore, forms of proxy market regulation are required in order both to
promote efficient commercial practices by monopoly providers and to protect the
interests of consumers. Conventionally, the establishment of consumer watchdog bodies
has been seen as one means of applying quasi-market controls and a form of external
regulation.
The one-sided commercial power of private utility monopolies was fully recognised by
the leading figures in the post-war nationalisation programme and this formed a potent
motivating force in the drive for public ownership. Yet characteristically perhaps, their
analysis of the dysfunctions of monopoly provision was translated only tangentially to
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the new order of public enterprise. While it was recognised that publicly-owned utilities
could theoretically - like their private sector predecessors - exploit their dominant market
position at the expense of the consumer, it was generally believed that the 'public
service' orientation of the public utilities would ultimately preclude this from happening.
The following extended quotation from Morrison (1959) illustrates the view, prevalent
at the time, about the intrinsic merits of the public corporation as a protector of the
consumer interest:
In the case of a public concern, whether monopoly or not, the consumer
does, I think start with certain advantages. The vet)/ fact that the Board
is a public authority appointed by a Minister responsible to Parliament
should, and I think does, give it a special sense of public responsibility
and therefore of the rights and interests of the consumer. It does not aim
to provide high profits for investors. Moreover the Board is, and knows
it is, more likely to be shot at in Parliament and in the Press than is a
private undertaking. There is much more public argument about increases
in charges and prices by a public than a private undertaking.. Generally
speaking, one would expect public concerns to be more
consumer-conscious than similar undertakings not publicly owned.
Certainly they should be. p.266
Under such an idealised model of public enterprise, the need for elaborate mechanisms
of consumer representation and advocacy was inevitably seen to be of secondary
importance. In addition, Morrison's reluctance to admit sectional interests into the
decision-making structure of the public corporation, served to relegate consumer
perspectives to the periphery. As a consequence of these factors, the Webbian view of
'consumer partnership' in the management of publicly-owned enterprises, drew little
support within the ranks of the Attlee Government.
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Nevertheless, despite what might arguably be seen as, a mixture of idealistic
complacency and consumerist antipathy, each of the major Nationalisation Acts included
provision for the establishment of some form of consumer consultative structure. But
even these limited measures, particularly in the case of the electricity and gas
nationalisations, may have had more to do with a desire to placate the local authorities,
following their loss of utility functions and revenue, than to an appreciable interest in
consumer representation. According to Chester (1975, p.656) "..the 'consumers'
committees' which emerged in the [nationalising] Electricity Bill were more the result
of the Ministry's worries about the opposition of the Local Authorities to nationalisation
than any greater concern about the need to protect the consumer .." (and the Gas Bill
was based very largely on the detail of the Electricity Bill).
The structure of the consultative councils parallelled the organisational structure of the
nationalised electricity and gas industries (i.e. area bodies); with the significant
exception that there were no national consumer equivalents of the Central Electricity
Authority and the Gas Council. The ministerially appointed membership was dominated
by local government representation and the chairman of each area council was given
ex-officio status on their respective area board. The functions of the councils
encompassed:
(a) the examination of complaints from individual consumers;
(b) the consideration of the factors likely to influence the supply of
electricity [and gas] in a general way;
(c) the discussion, criticism or approval of the policies and programmes
of the operating bodies concerned with the supply of electricity [and gas].
Robson (1960) p.255
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Significantly though, tight boundaries were drawn around the scope of the consultative
councils to take up broader energy policy issues, and to advocate outside the extant
structure of consultation, at a very early stage.
[See Chester, 1975 pp. 698-700, for an instructive account of the government's position on the prerogatives
of the councils following an early "test case" arising from the extra-organisational lobbying of a number of gas
consultative councils for the removal or reduction of the purchase tax on gas water heaters].
Although a number of important changes were introduced to the structure of consultative
councils after this (including, the establishment of national consumer bodies in the
electricity and gas industries and the belated introduction of regional consumer bodies
in the water industry in 1983), the broad framework for consumer representation in the
nationalised industries remained substantially the same up to the period when they were
abolished under privatisation legislation.
The limited effectiveness of the structures for consumer representation and advocacy in
the nationalised industries was repeatedly highlighted in a series of reports and
commentaries in the decades following their establishment, including two major critiques
prepared by the Consumer Council in 1968 and its successor, the National Consumer
Council (1976). Amongst the identified problems of the consultative bodies were:
* poor public awareness of their existence e.g. the National Consumer Council
(1976b) surveys found that only 4% and 5% of the public knew (without
prompting) of the existence of electricity and gas consultative councils
respectively. Interestingly, this was less than half the proportion of people who
could identify these bodies in a previous survey in 1966.
* limited public use of the consultative councils in the negotiation and
settlement of complaints and disputes e.g. only 1% of people with electricity
complaints took them to an electricity consultative council; athough the figure
was somewhat higher in the case of gas (NCC, 1976 p.34)
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* lack of information from the industries regarding their policies and plans and
lack of industry receptivity to consumer viewpoints
* deficient staffing and access to technical expertise
* and, a problem that the consumer bodies shared with the nationalised industries
themselves; namely, lack of access to decisions taken outside the industry (i.e.
by government) that have substantially affected consumer interests.
While the role of consumer organisation never appeared to occupy a particularly salient
place in the minds of the original protagonists of nationalisation, the outcomes achieved
through the structures for consumer representation, would probably have been viewed
as desultory even in their eyes. From one perspective, the problem could be seen to
reside, as Morrison (1959) presciently saw, in the nature of public participation:
But ([the Consumer Councils are to succeed there must be active public
participation. They will not have sufficient life and vigour if the
consumers fail to make proper use of them.. p.267
For other viewpoints though (for example, Sloman, 1978) the problematic nature of
consumer representation in the nationalised industries, was seen to relate to a different
dimension. Namely to way in which the interests of consumers were substantially
overlooked under the producer-driven and corporatist conception of public ownership
developed by Morrison et al. The structural nature of the problem is also perceived by
critics of a different ideological ilk; but for them, the disadvantaged position of the
consumer arises endogenously out of the structure of public ownership itself (see for
example, Redwood, 1980).
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PART 2: A SHORT HISTORY OF UTILITY NATIONALISATION
The public utility era, which began in the mid nineteenth century, saw the
town council (by whatever name it was called) invested with power to
own and operate water, gas, electriciV, and street transport
undertakings, and a great deal of municipal trading in these spheres still
exists in many countries. But in general the areas of administration
needed for the most efficient operation of these services have expanded,
whereas the areas of local government have remained static. In
consequence, municipal enterprise is declining and public utility services
are being projected on to a regional or national scale. Nationalization
of these services in France and Britain and their pro vincialization in
Canada, are only municipal trading writ large.
Robson (1960) pp.24-25
(i) Background
In a structural sense, the nationalisation of the electricity, gas and water industries
completed a process of public ownership that had been started in the middle of the
nineteenth century. In the period preceding nationalisation (in 1947 and 1948 in the case
of electricity and gas, and in 1974 in respect to water), the utility industries were already
characterised by a high level of public ownership, via municipal control and
management. The growth in municipal involvement in the utility sector, which
parallelled the full flowering of local government in Victorian Britain, was driven by a
trio of concerns: namely, (i) the elimination of competitive duplication and waste and
the minimisation of disruption caused by infrastructural development (i.e. laying of
pipes, constructing sewers etc.), (ii) the avoidance of private monopoly domination and
the concomitant effect that this might have on service quality and charges, and (iii) the
protection of public health.
496
In addition to the evolution of municipal ascendency in the utility industries, a formative
structure of controls was put in place to regulate the practice of private utility
undertakings e.g. limits on the level of profits generated by gas companies.
Effectively then, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the battle for public control
of the utility industries, through ownership and regulation, had been won. This 'victory'
was further consolidated - in the case of electricity at least - by the establishment of the
Electricity Commission in 1919 and the Central Electricity Board in 1926. In addition
to their importance for the organisation of the electricity supply industry, these two
initiatives put utility management firmly on the national policy agenda.
(ii) The Rationale for Nationalisation
The primary arguments used to support the economic and social case for nationalisation
of the utility industries mirrored those employed by the Thatcher Government to justify
privatisation some four decades later. These included (i) the need for greater levels of
efficiency (through rationalisation and re-structuring), (ii) the requirements of sustained
capital re-development, (iii) the raising of service standards, and (iv) the protection
of the consumer from manipulative monopoly practices. Among these the most
persuasive factor, for the Attlee Government and for the Heath Government (in the case
of water), was the substantial gains in efficiency that would accrue - in terms of
economies of scale, concentration of capital, and technology research and development
- from amalgamation, co-ordination and integrated management.
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In each of the three utilities, a convincing technical case for nationalisation (or at least,
for a radical restructuring of the industry) had been in place for some time prior to the
act of nationalisation itself. In electricity and gas, the critical groundwork had been laid
by the MacGowan and Heyworth reports published in 1936 and 1945 respectively. While
in the water services industry, a series of legislative and administrative measures from
1945 onwards (including, the Water Act, 1945; the River Boards Act, 1948; and the
Water Resources Act, 1963) stimulated a momentum that lead inevitably to the creation
of the regional water authorities.
In combination, the incontestable technical case for re-organisation and the already
strong presence of public ownership in the industries, served to dull both the ideological
dimension in nationalisation, and political opposition to the dramatic changes proposed.
To a large extent then, the nationalisation of the utilities represented a technical rather
than an ideological triumph. This may appear obvious in the action of the Conservative
Government under Ted Heath to nationalise the water industry; yet it is only marginally
less sustainable in the earlier instances of nationalisation under the Attlee Government.
In analysing the driving motivations in all three nationalisations, it would not be difficult
to conclude (albeit anachronistically) as Day and Klein (1987) have, in relation to water:
Water authorities are the product of the search for national efficiency
through institutional reform that marked the decade from 1965 to 1975.
They are a monument, as it were, to technocratic rationalio,. p.135
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(iii) The Mechanics of Nationalisation
In the eyes of critics of nationalisation, the vesting date for the three pieces of
nationalising legislation (1st April 1948, 1949 and 1974 respectively) may seem
amusingly apposite. Be that as it may, the legislative provisions for the nationalisation
of the electricity, gas and water industries share a number of similar features - beyond
their 'birthday'; despite the quarter century that separated the Electricity Act and the
Water Act.
The three nationalised industries were structurally and operationally based on the public
corporation model (although Morrison may have looked askance at the
quasi-representative structure of the original regional water authorities), with both central
and regional/area units of organisation. However, important differences existed in
relation to the role of the central body vis-a-vis its regional counterparts and in the
degree of autonomy accorded the sub-national units of each industry. Figure A.2 (on the
next page) summarises the major organisational features of the three industries
immediately following nationalisation.
In accord with their status as public corporations, the Minister of the sponsoring
department, was responsible for board appointments, although local authorities were
given the ability to nominate representatives in the case of the RWA's. In addition, the
Minister exercised the range of prerogatives outlined earlier in Part 1. All three
industries were subject to similar "break even" financial requirements. This is despite
the fact in the case of the water industry, that it was nationalised subsequent to the
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introduction of the financial reforms outlined in the 1961 and 1967 White Papers. The
establishment of consumer representative bodies in the electricity and gas industries was
not replicated in the nationalisation of the water utilities - the emerging "consumerism"
of the late 1960s and early 1970s notwithstanding. Another novel feature of the 1973
Water Act, was the continuation of a private sector role in water supply, through the
retention of the statutory private water companies, supplying approximately 25 per cent
of consumers nationally.
The structures set out in Figure A.2 above were changed in a number of significant
respects in the years following nationalisation, and these will be considered in the next
section.
In light of the unsuccessful claim by some local authorities in England and Wales for
central government compensation, when their pre-1974 water and sewerage assets are
sold through privatisation (see, for example, Municipal Review and AMA News, March
1989, p.257), a brief allusion to the compensation provisions contained in the
nationalisation Acts seems appropriate.
In the nationalisation of electricity and gas, the compensation terms for private utility
owners (which Morgan, 1984, describes as "remarkably generous") were similar. After
the difficulties encountered in applying Morrison's preferred formula of "net reasonable
maintainable revenue" in the transfer of the coal industry into public ownership, the
Attlee Government opted for the more straightforward method of basing compensation
on the market value of shares (as quoted on the Stock Exchange). Compensation was
not generally, however, paid in cash, but in the form of guaranteed government stock,
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at a fixed percent of return. The cost of compensation was £542 millions and £220
millions in the electricity and gas industries respectively. In relation to local authority
assets, the Government's initial inclination was to simply take over the net outstanding
debt of the public sector utilities. However, after intensive lobbying by the Association
of Municipal Corporations, payments of £5 millions (electricity) and £2.5 millions (gas)
were made to the local authorities to compensate them for revenue foregone and "for the
reduction of the field over which overhead expenses could be spread" (Chester, 1975
p.326). In terms of their actual value, local authority electricity and gas assets were
acquired at 'bargain basement' prices.
The acquisition of local authority water services assets in 1974 was achieved at even
less cost (in relative terms) to the Treasury. On the basis of the argument that the
nationalisation of water represented, in large part, a direct transfer of assets from one
part of the public sector to another, local authorities received no financial compensation
beyond the transfer of outstanding debt. It is against this backdrop then, that local
government peak organisations in the late 1980s sought to win support for the view, that
because of the changed status of water services assets under privatisation (Le. they will
no longer held in the public sector), local authorities were entitled to some form of
retrospective return on their historical investment in water services-related capital.
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(iv) Subsequent Structural Changes
The original structures of the nationalised utility industries were subjected to
considerable modification and revision in the years following their introduction. This
was always likely to be the case in the electricity and gas industries given that
"organisation received least attention of all the aspects of nationalisation" (Chester, 1975,
p.387). Aside from the changes required due to flawed design, the search for new
organisational solutions was stimulated by technological and/or political challenges to
the industries. Notable among the series of major and minor changes to the industries
were:
* the de-centralisation of the electricity supply industry following the report of
the Herbert Committee in 1956
* the centralisation of the gas industry in the early 1970s
* the "streamlining" of the regional water authorities in 1983
* and the "liberalisation" of the energy industries in 1982-83
Each of these structural changes will be outlined very briefly in turn.
In July 1954, the Herbert Committee was set up "to inquire into the organisation and
efficiency of the electricity supply industry" and it reported in early 1956. As well as
foreshadowing the revised approach to the financial management of the nationalised
industries that was introduced in the two White Papers in the 1960s, the Committee
recommended major changes in the structure of the electricity industry. The basic
formula for change proposed by Herbert was included in the 1957 Electricity Act,
namely: (i) the abolition of the Central Electricity Authority (the name had been changed
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from the British Electricity Authority in 1955) and its replacement by the Central
Electricity Generating Board and the Electricity Council, and (ii) the provision of greater
financial and operational autonomy to the Area Boards. The purpose of these legislative
changes was firstly, to separate electricity generation and bulk supply (CEGB) from
overall co-ordination and control (EC); and secondly, to expand the operational freedom
of the Area Boards responsible for electricity distribution. In effect, the restructuring of
the electricity supply industry moved it substantially towards the model adopted in the
nationalisation of the gas industry in 1948.
Paradoxically, the gas industry itself, had in the years subsequent to nationalisation been
moving in the opposite direction. The de-centralised structure of the industry had
initially been premised on the belief that - unlike electricity with its national grid - there
were no significant advantages to be gained from a centralised mode of operation. Yet,
in practice in the 1950s, the industry moved towards a more centralised approach:
As early as 1953 the Gas Council reported that the benefits of planning
and control of production and distribution over far larger areas than was
previously thought necessary were leading to more centralized forms of
organization. Vickers & Yarrow (1988) p. 246
The discovery of major natural gas reserves in the North Sea Basin in the mid-1960s
and the subsequent development of a 'national grid' for natural gas transmission, served
to accelerate the process of centralisation. The technology-led changes in the structure
of the gas industry were formally recognised in the 1972 Gas Act, with the
amalgamation of the Gas Council and the twelve Area Boards into a unified
organisational entity - the British Gas Corporation. In marked contrast with the 1957
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changes to the electricity industry, the autonomy of the Area Boards had been
exchanged for greater central co-ordination and control.
The changes introduced into the water industry in 1983 were less visible and dramatic,
but in their own way of equal significance to those effected in the electricity and gas
utilities. As indicated earlier, the boards of the regional water authorities established in
1974, were quasi-representational bodies with substantial provision for local government
representation. In the view of Khmersley (1988a) the provision of extensive
opportunities for local government participation on the RWAs was inspired by a desire
to placate local authorities, following their un-compensated loss of water assets, as well
as a need to establish "a degree of political validation" (p.99) for the new regulatory and
multi-purpose authorities.
Aside from the problem of establishing gargantuan boards to satisfy the representational
requirements of local authorities (one RWA, for example, had a membership of
fifty-eight), this mixture of public corporation and 'representative committee' in the
structure of the RWAs was seen to present formidable accountability difficulties:
The result was a political tension..between the constitutional position of
water authorities as bodies accountable to central government and the
traditions of local accountability by elected members.
Day & Klein (1987) p.137
Buttressed by a report from the influential Monopolies and Mergers Commission, the
Conservative Government introduced legislative change in 1983 (Water Act) aimed at
creating smaller, Ministerially-appointed, and 'business-like' boards. The provision for
local government representation was abandoned; although local authorities were to be
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represented on the newly-created divisional consumer consultative committees. In
addition, "..meetings were closed to the press and public, and a series of chairman
vacancies filled by people with experience of industry rather than of public or
environmental affairs" (Kinnersley, 1988a, p.112). In essence, the changes introduced
by the 1983 Water Act were designed to stimulate the development of a more rigorous
commercial ethos in the management of the water industry.
The final structural modification to the utility industries was more one of intent than
realisation. It relates to the passing of two pieces of legislation in 1982 and 1983,
explicitly oriented at breaking the monopoly hold of the [then] nationalised gas and
electricity industries. This legislation,
„reflected a shift in public policy toward an increased emphasis on the
use of competitive forces as a method of influencing the peiformance of
the nationalized industries. Vickers & Yarrow (1988) p.257
The 'liberalisation' measures, contained in the Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act and the
Energy Act, opened the way for private suppliers of gas or electricity to sell energy, and
to gain access to the public transmission and distribution network. In the event, the
partial 'deregulation' of energy supply, implicit in the legislation, was overtaken by the
Government's decision to privatise the British Gas Corporation and the electricity supply
industry. Interestingly, as an indicator of the prospects for competition in the energy
industries following privatisation, neither legislative measure stimulated much interest
or activity from potential alternative suppliers.
Symbolically, the 'liberalisation' initiatives in the energy industry, along with the
'commercialisation' of the water authorities, represented important historical milestones
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in the structure and orientation of the public utilities. For in substance, they completed
a process of gradual disengagement from the principles of public provision and public
service that underlay - however fragilely - the original nationalisation programme.
Politically, the policy actions of the Conservative Government in the early 1980s
vis-a-vis the utilities, set the scene for their ultimate privatisation.
PART 3: NATIONALISED PUBLIC UTILITY PRACTICE - A CASE STUDY OF
THE CODES OF PRACTICE
At present the [energy] industries can, and sometimes do, inflict injustices on
disadvantaged citizens with the full support of the law. Berthoud (1983) p.142
As voluntary and 'stand alone' measures (i.e. without supporting policy actions aimed
at addressing the causes of fuel and water poverty, and minus a system of enforceable
sanctions for code violations), codes of practice are likely to be ineffective in responding
to substantive access and equity issues. They may enhance the image, and some aspects
of the practice, of the industries' 'customer care' role, but codes of this sort will, at the
very most, only be ameliorative in their impact. The history of the voluntary code of
practice introduced (initially with reluctance) by the nationalised energy industries in
Britain in 1976 provides illustrative evidence of this.
The 1976 code of practice was formulated in the wake of that watershed event in recent
world history - the 1973 'oil crisis' - which at the one time revealed the fragility and
inter-dependency of Western economies, and the vulnerability of domestic energy prices
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to the vagaries of the international marketplace. The pervasive impact of the 'crisis'
invariably stimulated popular and political interest in domestic energy issues.
Contrary to public perceptions, at the time, there was no evidence of a dramatic increase
in the number of domestic disconnections over the first half of the 1970s, despite the
sharp rises in energy tariffs (Berthoud, 1983). Popular opinion was not entirely askew
though, as there had been a steady growth in the aggregate number of gas and electricity
disconnections in the period 1973/74 to 1975/76. The empirical situation on domestic
disconnections notwithstanding, a heightened consciousness of energy costs focused
public and political attention on the newly-defined phenomena of 'fuel poverty'. Much
of the direct stimulus for elevating fuel poverty as an item on the public policy agenda
in the mid-1970s came from organisations such as the National Consumer Council and
nascent activist groups such as the National Right to Fuel Campaign.
In contrast to the fuel boards, the social policy role of the water authorities attracted
remarkably little attention. The mid-1970s concern about the ability of low income
households to access (or more particularly, to maintain access to) essential services, in
a context of escalating prices and an apparently vigorous approach to debt management
and the use of disconnection powers, was not mirrored in the water industry. This might
be attributed, firstly, to the fact that water tariffs up to this period and beyond
represented a very small component of the expenditure of most households. To borrow
a phrase, used with notorious inaccuracy by the advocates of nuclear power in Britain
until 1989, water was seen literally as "too cheap to meter". Secondly, as reflected in
the following quotation from the National Consumer Council's report on fuel poverty,
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the water authorities were perceived as taking a rather different approach to
disconnection compared to their energy counterparts:
Strictly speaking, the water industry has the powers to cut off supply for
non-payment. But these powers are scarcely ever used; as the water
industry acknowledges, the consequences of depriving a household of its
water supply would be appalling. Instead, debts are pursued through the
courts.
National Consumer Council (1976a) p.81 footnote
The position of the water industry in respect to both tariff and disconnection policy, and
certainly public consciousness of these dimensions of water industry practice, was to
change quite dramatically during the mid-to-late 1980s.
In 1976, the then Secretary of State for Energy, Tony Benn, commissioned an 'informal
inquiry' to examine the "payment and collection methods for gas and electricity bills".
The report of the committee of inquiry (known as the Oakes Report after its chairman)
recommended inter alia that "the power to disconnect supply to domestic consumers
should no longer be exercised and the first opportunity should be taken to legislate
accordingly", and that "the industries should agree upon a common code of payment
methods" (Department of Energy, 1976, p.10). These recommendations were strongly
supported by community sector organisations like the National Consumer Council (in
its landmark report Paying for fuel, 1976a, pp.81-84) and the National Right to Fuel
Campaign.
Whilst the passage of legislation abolishing disconnection as a device for enforcing
payment was not realised, a voluntary code of practice on debt management and
disconnection was introduced during 1976. In the view of Bradshaw (1983) and
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Berthoud (1983) the code of practice was accepted by the fuel industries as a necessary
'trade off' in their successful political defence of the power to disconnect.
The clear intent of the 1976 code of practice was significantly to reduce, if not to
eliminate altogether, the incidence of disconnection for payment default as a result of
financial hardship. Among the most significant elements of the code were:
* a requirement to take the households circumstances and income into account
prior to disconnection
* the suspension of disconnection action if an acceptable arrangement for
clearing the debt was initiated by the consumer
* the introduction of stronger liaison and referral procedures between the utilities
and welfare organisations
* the extension of alternative payment schemes to suit the budgetary needs of
low income consumers, including the provision of pre-payment meters and
'budget accounts' (i.e. paying by monthly or weekly instalments, rather than
quarterly)
* the introduction of a moratorium on disconnections for pensioner households
between October and March.
Against the background of the industries' performance prior to 1976, the code of
practice (with it's two minor revisions in 1978 and 1980) represented a symbolically
important, if practically modest, advance in the social responsiveness of the nationalised
utilities. But in the light of its original objectives, the code was a significant failure. The
impact of the code in the core area of disconnection, was summarised by Richard
Berthoud (who led the Policy Studies Institute evaluation of the code of practice in
1980-82) in unequivocal terms:
..the existing Code of Practice has failed to minimise disconnections in
cases of real hardship. Almost all of the customers concerned are in
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hardship, one way or another. The electricity industry has a relatively
high rate of disconnection, and a poor record, compared to the gas
industry, over the implementation of the letter and spirit of the Code. But
the gas industry, with its better record and lower disconnection rate, has
not managed any better to winnow out the hardship from the non-
hardship cases. A radical reform of the Code of Practice is needed.
Berthoud (1983) p.84
Disquiet about the effectiveness of the code of practice as a mechanism for enabling low
income households to manage fuel debt and retain supply was crystallised in a major
review of the code by the Policy Studies Institute. The review, which was commissioned
by the fuel industries and the electricity and gas consumer bodies, reported in 1981 and
among its conclusions and proposals for overhauling the provisions of the code were the
following:
* the fuel boards should make more strenuous attempts to establish personal
contact with consumers in debt prior to disconnection
* an explicit offer concerning the repayment of debt should be made to
consumers with payment problems (under the old code, the onus was on the
debtor to propose a repayment arrangement)
* the automatic installation of a prepayment meter in lieu of disconnection. The
meter could be also calibrated to recover previous debt.
* the introduction of a standardised schedule for the repayment of debt in
hardship cases
* the partial writing-off of large accumulated debt amongst low income
consumers
* the development of an effective system of independent monitoring the code of
practice
The PSI review did not support a total abolition of the industries' power to disconnect,
primarily because this measure, in itself, was viewed as a deficient response to the
problem of fuel debt:
511
[the] problem is to ensure that electricity and gas are paid for with the minimum
of expense to the suppliers and the minimum of hardship to the consumers. It is
in the interest of both parties that payment is clearly unavoidable, and that the
procedures for ensuring debt payment should be sufficiently rapid to present [sic:
prevent?] the build-up of debt. The simple and unilateral abolition of
disconnection, without substitution of an alternative system, will not achieve
either of those essential aims. Berthoud (1983) p.139
An extension of the winter moratorium on disconnection for groups other than
pensioners was not supported for similar reasons. Interestingly, in light of the failure of
the water industry code of practice introduced at the time of privatisation (Condition H -
see Chapter 7), the review also identified flaws in the proposal made by a number of
consumer organisations, that the court system be used as the arbiter of debt management
agreements between the industries and consumers (as is the case in most other instances
of consumer debt). In Berthoud's (1983) view, the 'courts solution' was likely to be both
expensive and protracted (hence leading to the build-up of further fuel debt over the
period of court action), without any guarantee that they would be any more adept in
dealing with debtors in hardship than the industries had been.
The use of prepayment meters as an alternative to disconnection was seen as the most
satisfactory compromise to the problem of reconciling the industries' need to recover
debt with the desire to secure supply for low income consumers with debt problems.
Limited empirical evidence (such as that produced by the National Consumer Council
in its 1976 survey) indicated that prepayment meters were popular amongst low-income
households as a means of controlling fuel expenditure. But the proportion of households
in Britain paying for electricity and gas via prepayment meters had fallen sharply over
the 1970s.
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In 1966-67, two million electricity consumers in England and Wales, and over six
million gas consumers in Great Britain paid for their fuel through prepayment (mainly
coin-operated) meters. By 1975-76, this had fallen to one and a half million and three
million respectively (NCC, 1976a, Table 4.1). In 1975-76, 23.7 per cent of domestic gas
consumers used prepayment meters, whereas the proportion had dropped to 12.6 per cent
by September 1981.
Cost and security factors underlay the explicit desire of the energy industries to move
away from the use of prepayment meters as a major revenue collection method. In
addition, the industries were possibly responding to a preference by the bulk of domestic
consumers for credit, quarterly payment, arrangements. However, through withdrawing
prepayment meters, and in discouraging their future use, the industries were effectively
removing the payment option seemingly favoured by (and arguably, most suitable to)
many low-income households. In the view of the Policy Studies Institute, prepayment
meters represented a legitimate payment method for domestic consumers, and for low-
income consumers in particular. And despite the compulsion involved in the industries'
"insisting on the installation of a prepayment or other automatic meter" (Berthoud, 1983,
p.140), it - like the Oakes Committee previously - argued that this was immeasurably
superior to disconnection from supply.
The reaction of the electricity and gas industries to the PSI Review recommendations
was mixed. Although some of its' recommendations were ostensibly accepted in full, a
number of the more significant changes proposed in the Review were excluded, at the
behest of the industries, from the re-drafted code of practice published in July 1982. In
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particular, the industries rejected the suggestion of a partial write-off of large-scale
consumer debt, and the introduction of a standard formula for determining payment
agreements in hardship cases. In the latter, the industries argued that "rigid formulae
would be too inflexible" and that consumers should be treated "on a individual basis
[and] assessed according to his circumstances" (The Industries' Response to the Policy
Studies Institute's Reports' Recommendations, in National Gas Consumers' Council,
1985, Appendix 3).
Most significantly, in light of the subsequent implementation of the Code, the industries
did not agree to the automatic installation of prepayment meters in lieu of disconnection;
instead they agreed to install them "..on request where it is safe and practical" (ibid).
The energy utilities also saw the responsibility for monitoring the code of practice as
falling within the ambit of the existing regional electricity and gas consultative/consumer
councils, and held the view "[it] is unlikely that the establishment of additional bodies
to undertake the work..would give the customer any additional protection" (ibid).
As in the case of its predecessor code, the 'bottom line' in measuring the success of the
1982 Code of Practice is the extent to which it reduced - and ideally ultimately
eliminated - disconnections from supply amongst households experiencing fuel debt
problems due to financial hardship. But despite some initial modest success in
electricity, the overall level of domestic energy disconnections remained high up to end
of 1986, when British Gas was floated on the Stock Exchange.
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Little apparent attempt was made by the gas boards to match even the electricity
industry's very modest progress towards meeting the commitment in the Code to extend
the availability of prepayment meters for consumers in debt. The installation of
prepayment meters dropped sharply, from a peak of almost 70,000 per year in 1983, to
less than 40,000 in 1986. This could hardly be attributed to reduced demand or need for
this form of payment arrangement, for as indicated above, disconnections were rising
steadily over the same period.
The monitoring reports of both consumer bodies indicated that the industries adherence
to the provisions of the Code had much in common with its historical antecedents in
other respects as well. Compliance with the letter - let alone the spirit of the Code - was
extremely variable across the country, with a few region/area boards substantially out-
performing their peers in their endeavour to implement the Code. Conversely, boards in
other parts of the country displayed an almost blithe contempt for the objectives of the
code of practice. This was particularly evidenced in the practices initiated by individ
boards to establish contact with consumers prior to disconnection_ In general, however,
measures to establish contact were unsatisfactory:
No contact cases represent a significant proportion of disconnections, and the
considerable efforts made by the gas industry to contact consumers do not
appear to be sufficient to ensure that contact is made. NGCC (1985) p.7
_most boards only seek to communicate with their consumers by means of letters
and little else is done to establish personal contact. ECC (1985) p.16
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In conclusion, the voluntary code of practice approach to the stimulation of greater
social responsiveness amongst the nationalised utilities, as manifested in successive
British Codes over the 1970s and 1980s, could hardly be seen to have been anything
more than a marginal success. As policy initiatives essentially designed to eradicate the
use of disconnection amongst poor fuel consumers, the 1976 Code and its 1982
successor, were dramatic failures.
At a lesser order of ambition, as mechanisms for promoting greater sensitivity within
the utility industries for the circumstances of disadvantaged consumers, and for
stimulating greater accountability in the management of debt collection, the British codes
probably contributed to some modest advances being made. But in the context of the
increased commercialisation of the nationalised utilities and in the absence of an
effective regulatory infrastructure (and complementary central government income and
energy efficiency policy measures), the voluntary codes were always likely to be
incapable of addressing residual and deeply-entrenched equity and access problems in
the supply of utility services.
Perhaps most of all, the history of the codes of practice underlined the gulf between the
rhetoric and reality of "public service" as a ruling principle in the nationalised industries,
and illustrated that public ownership is not in itself a sufficient condition for the
enactment of a citizenship model of utility service provision.
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ANNEXE 2: A NOTE ON THE RESEARCH FOCUS, FIELDWORK AND DATA
SOURCES
(i) Research focus
This study began its 'career' as a comparative analysis of the social consequences of
public utility policy and management under different ownership conditions. Originally,
it was envisaged that the research would compare social policy-related aspects of the
performance of public utilities in Britain and Australia under privatisation and public
ownership respectively. However, after an initial period of data gathering in both
countries this approach was abandoned, for two reasons. First, the changes effected in
the public utility arena in Australia over recent years, involving `corporatisation' and a
move towards privatised models of operation (see Ernst, 1992), reduced the validity of
the Australian system of public utility organisation as a structural comparator with
Britain. Second, a detailed study of the three public utilities in Australia, in addition to
the utilities in Britain, would have extended the scope and complexity of the research
task considerably. Ultimately, it was decided that the research would be likely to achieve
greater coherence and depth by focusing exclusively on the British experience.
A decision was also taken, at an earlier stage, to exclude telecommunications from the
field of research enquiry. The energy and water industries display similar features along
the important dimensions of natural monopoly, essentialness, demand inelasticity and
externalities. A number of these features are not as strongly in evidence in the
telecommunications industry, and the network character of telecommunication services
is being transformed dramatically as a result of technological change. In addition, the
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energy and water utilities have a degree of interconnectedness which they do not share
with the telecommunications sector. This is evident at the point of production (e.g. the
use of water and gas in electricity generation) but also, increasingly, at an operational
and ownership level e.g. Welsh Water's substantial shareholdings in South Wales
Electricity and British Gas' involvement in electricity generation in Northern Ireland.
(ii) Fieldwork and sources of information
Much of the data contained in this thesis has been gathered during two periods of
fieldwork, where the researcher (a) conducted semi-structured interviews with key
informants and (b) directly accessed relevant documentary material. The primary focus
of data collection in phase 1, from July to October 1989, was on the privatisation
process i.e. the events leading up to and immediately following, the passage of the major
privatisation legislation; whereas in phase 2, during July and August 1992, the
interviews were specifically focused on the implementation and outcomes of the
privatisation programme and on the operation of the new framework of public utility
regulation. In addition, the researcher had been a participant observer in the Public
Utilities Access Forum (1989-1991, second half of 1992), the National Right to Fuel
Campaign (1989-1991), meetings with the regulatory bodies, the Yorkshire Customer
Service Committee, and over the period in Australia, a correspondent with members of
a number of the major community sector organisations and the regulatory agencies.
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Interviews were held with individuals from the following organisations and groups over
these two periods of field work:
* Age Concern
* Association for the Conservation of Energy
* Association of Metropolitan Authorities
* Birmingham Money Advice Centre
* British Gas
* Centre for Regulation Policy, University of Oxford
* Child Poverty Action Group
* Community Technical Services Agency, Liverpool
* Consumers' Association
* Electricity Supply Trade Union Council
* Environmental Change Unit, University of Oxford
* Gas Consumers Council
* House of Commons Select Committee on Energy
* MANWEB
* NALGO
* NACAB
* National Consumer Council
* NCVO
* Neighbourhood Energy Action
* Northern Electric
* Office of Electricity Regulation
* Office of Gas Supply
* Office of Water Services
* Sheffield City Council
* Winter Action Against Cold Homes
* Yorkshire Customer Service Committee
In most cases at least two separate interviews were held with members of these
organisations.
As the text of the thesis indicates, the researcher has made substantial use of a diverse
range of primary and secondary documentary sources. Major sources of primary
documentary material have included:
* Company Annual Reports, codes of practice and other customer-related
information
* Reports, letters and press releases published by the three regulatory
bodies
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* Reports, position papers and other written material produced by
consumer and community sector organisations
* Hansard, White Papers and government policy statements
* Press reports
Wide use has been made of secondary data, in the form of official statistics,
government-commissioned research reports, statistical data from the regulatory bodies,
research studies by organisations such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies and extant
survey data on consumer perceptions etc. The literature on privatisation and economic
regulation has been extensively accessed.
The Bibliography contains a full citation of the written material used in the course of
the research.
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So study evermore is overshot:
While it doth study to have what it would,
It doth forget to do the thing it should;
And when it hath the thing it hunteth most,
'Tis won as towns with fire, so won, so lost.
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